Demand for United Nations peacekeeping has been a consistent feature of the post–Cold War international peace and security agenda. Today, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations manages sixteen missions across the globe, using more than 80,000 troops, more than 13,000 police, and nearly 2,000 military observers, in addition to approximately 20,000 civilian personnel.

Given its expanded size and needs, the burden of supporting UN peacekeeping must necessarily be shared among UN member states in various ways. The US, Japan, and the European Union (EU) member states together fund around 80 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget, while “boots on the ground” are largely provided by African and Central and South Asian member states, which together provide 71 percent of the UN’s uniformed personnel. However, the notion that Western countries are absent from UN operations is partially misleading. The sixteen European countries represented at the Berlin roundtable were contributing 5,492 uniformed personnel—around 6 percent of total uniformed contributions to UN peace operations. European personnel are largely concentrated in UN operations in the Middle East; only 383 from this group are deployed to the six UN missions in sub-Saharan Africa (0.5 percent of the total uniformed peacekeeping personnel in that region). European countries contribute relatively low numbers of police, but those contributors are spread across all UN operations.

At present, the UN has little problem finding adequate numbers of troops, police, and observers to staff its operations. However, the capabilities of UN contingents are inconsistent due to a number of factors, including differences in training, leadership, and equipment. In many of its largest and most challenging operations, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, UN peacekeeping still lacks an array of critical enablers, which significantly limits its operational capabilities and negatively affects the implementation of mission mandates. At the same time, personnel may lack the specialized skills required to effectively implement complex mandates. For example, the role of UN Police has moved far beyond the monitoring of host-state police toward more specialized functions, such as restructuring police organizations or mentoring host-state police. The UN continues to rely on member states, including European countries, to identify, prepare, and deploy personnel with the appropriate skills and expertise to deliver on diverse mandates.

Thus, the need for specialized military and police contributions to UN peace operations and skilled personnel is a pressing concern. At the same time, the demands that contemporary peace operations place on contributing countries
have become increasingly challenging. Existing contributors and the UN Secretariat have assembled an impressive inventory of lessons learned, guidance, and best practices, yet the need for continued dialogue, reflection, and improvement remains.

In its most recent reports, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has continued to emphasize the need to broaden the base of troop- and police-contributing countries, recommending that “coordinated initiatives be taken to reach out to new contributors, that former and existing contributors be encouraged to contribute further and that support to emerging contributors be provided.”

The Being a Peacekeeper series—a joint initiative of the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Pearson Centre—is a response, in part, to that recommendation. It seeks to facilitate networking at a regional level among experienced contributors and countries considering becoming more actively engaged in peacekeeping. It also provides a forum for interaction among peacekeeping contributors and other key elements in the UN peacekeeping system, such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Field Support (DFS), interested member states, and the policy research community.

The Berlin roundtable was held under the Chatham House rule of nonattribution. The following is a summary of the key themes that emerged during the discussions.

**Strategic Security Context: New Realities and Emerging Threats**

The available supply of European peacekeeping capabilities might soon increase as NATO troop numbers decline in Afghanistan. At the same time, European governments continue to struggle with the implications of the global economic crisis. Reductions in defense spending have been accompanied in some countries by strategic defense reviews to define future threats, challenges, objectives, and capabilities. The goal of these reviews is to be more precise and consistent in defining the aims of intervention and cleverer in spending money.

Conflict prevention and diplomacy remain key aspects of European countries’ foreign and defense policies, while the promotion of the rule of law is commonly recognized as a core competence of European (civilian and police) crisis management. “Europe's interest,” in the words of one roundtable participant, “is in a just international order that emphasizes the responsibilities of nations to the rule of law; freedom of communications; access [for] all to sea, air, space, and cyberspace; and the resolution of disputes without the use of force.” Such a vision of the international order, however, is currently confronted by the reality of complex and violent conflict just beyond Europe’s borders. Vacuums of state authority have allowed for the resurgence of conflict and extremism, leading to an “arc of crises” from Kandahar to Dakar.

UN peacekeeping continues to be only one element of European countries’ crisis-management tools, albeit an important one. For Europeans, the UN remains the primary framework for maintaining international order based on international human rights and the rule of law—despite the ongoing polarization among the permanent members of the Security Council over questions such as Syria. Given the complexity of the conflicts on its periphery and the finite set of available resources, increased collaboration with regional organizations will be a critical element in Europe’s attempts to address such challenges. On Syria, in particular, both the UN and the EU should work together now, it was said, to be ready to do their part when the civil war eventually ends. The situation in Mali is another current threat to Europe that must be addressed, but not without the cooperation of the other key regional actors, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

In addition to partnering with regional and other entities, European countries also realize the need to maintain their own capabilities for high-intensity operations, especially as the United States begins to focus on other parts of the world, such as Asia-Pacific. In this light, it was noted that during peace time, UN peace operations provide real-world

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opportunities for the training and skill development of European militaries and police, particularly with regard to offering young officers command experience. However, European governments must be honest about the fact that lengthy deployments to Afghanistan have created a considerable degree of fatigue, leaving less public appetite for other prolonged international engagements.

Integrated regional security policy in Europe, although more advanced than anywhere else, is still a work in progress. More than ten years after its founding, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is still struggling with its procedures and structures, and with a lack of consensus on what the CSDP should—and should not—aim to deliver. As the EU intensifies its efforts to implement the Lisbon Treaty, it will also work to strengthen its high representative for foreign affairs as vice president and voice of the union. The European External Action Service (EEAS) is only two-years old and thus still evolving, but the strategic review of the EEAS in 2013 and 2014 brings with it the opportunity to develop a stronger vision of EU-UN partnership. Participants acknowledged that more frequent EU operations in the field would help the EU learn to better strategically align its missions with the UN and other partners, as well as make operations more effective and cost-efficient.

Contemporary UN Peacekeeping: Evolution and Reform

“Europe should stop living under the shadow of Srebrenica. Just about everything in the UN has changed in twenty years. There is no limit to what the UN can do if the member states agree to it and invest in it.” – Berlin roundtable participant

Following their experiences with the UN in the Western Balkans, some European countries have exhibited a reluctance to participate directly with their troops or police in UN peace operations. As a result, such countries may be less aware of the major changes since that period toward the professionalization of UN peacekeeping, particularly in the areas of doctrine development, logistics, and command-and-control arrangements. Progress in these fields is by no means complete, however. The composition of peace operations has also undergone a transformation, as civilian and policing components of multidimensional operations have steadily increased in size and, at the same time, their scope of work has broadened.

COMMAND-AND-CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS

Since the failures of the mid-1990s, the UN has worked to strengthen and clarify its command-and-control arrangements, one of the major issues of concern cited by the UN’s European critics. Indeed, few seem to have a good understanding of the system. In a recent survey of member states conducted by DPKO, two-thirds of member states responded that the UN’s command-and-control arrangements are only “somewhat clear” to them.

Last year, the UN undertook an evaluation of its command-and-control (C2) arrangements. The objectives of the evaluation were twofold: to assess the effectiveness of C2 arrangements and processes and to suggest measures to strengthen command and control at all levels. The study noted several key characteristics of UN C2: it is based on an essentially political endeavor combining civilian and uniformed components; it is a decentralized, “flat” command structure supported by a policy framework; and it features delegated authority from the UN Security Council to the Secretary-General to his special representative (SRSG), with light backstopping at UN headquarters. The main findings of the evaluation included the following: (1) the SRSG–force commander relationship was clear and effective; (2) the current UN C2 arrangements provide a good basis for conducting UN peace operations; (3) UN C2 is suited to the UN civilian political leadership design; (4) the flexible, decentralized command structure is a comparative advantage; and (5) current arrangements allow for an integrated military-police-civilian structure.

It was unclear among the participants of the roundtable what the specific European concerns related to C2 were, or if the issue was a lack of clarity or an antiquated understanding of the UN C2. It was pointed out that, in certain respects, the UN’s command-and-control chain is more agile than NATO’s. A UN force commander, for instance, can assign tasks to contingents—a decision that a NATO commander is unable to perform on his own. Some questioned whether the oft-stated
concern over C2 was in fact a cover for other concerns with UN peacekeeping, such as a lack of confidence in UN personnel.

In terms of the police, the strategic and operational division between military and police components, each with a very different organizational culture, may contribute to the lack of clarity among member states regarding UN peacekeeping. Capitals have no operational control over the police they deploy to UN peacekeeping, as this control rests with the police commissioner. It was recommended that Formed Police Units (FPUs) could be provided with more flexible command-and-control arrangements, possibly with a military commander when there is likely to be a sustained use of military weapons.

ENSURING CONSISTENT STANDARDS AND PERFORMANCE

Another criticism of UN peacekeeping from Europe regards the lack of consistent standards for the performance of the UN’s peacekeepers in the field. DPKO officials underlined their ongoing efforts to strengthen both performance and accountability in peace operations—including through measures such as training; the development of guidance, standards, and evaluation methodology; and taking a close look at the system of accountability from the field to headquarters. Another key issue affecting performance (largely out of the hands of the UN Secretariat) is the incentives provided to troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs). The recent deliberations of the senior advisory group on troop reimbursement rates included discussions on providing higher compensation for key assets, for operating in higher-risk theaters, and for improved performance.

DPKO has exerted much energy developing its first manual of infantry battalion standards (UNIBAM), and is also developing training modules for staff officers and standards for medical support. It is hoped that the development and use of common capability will be a unifying factor among the various TCC contingents in the field, leading to improved interoperability.

Given the current model for training peacekeepers employed by the UN, in which each TCC or PCC is responsible for the training of its own contingents, it has been a challenge to standardize the training content and methodology, as well as to ensure that all UN personnel have undergone peacekeeping-specific training prior to deployment. Participants made clear that, given the UN’s resource limitations for training, more cooperative partnerships are needed to develop training materials that can help create uniform standards.

Efforts to improve compliance with standards, guidance, and training materials may be aided by the creation of the Directorate for Evaluation of Field Uniformed Personnel. Reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, this directorate would review, assess, and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of uniformed personnel. The function would also support member states by providing timely and accurate feedback to PCC/TCCs on a broad range of issues, including missions’ utilization of contributions against endorsed requirements, UN policies and standards, training, best practices, and safety and security issues. Such a role—common in national militaries—was employed in an ad hoc, informal way at the UN from 2003–2008.

UN POLICING

With the realization that many stabilization tasks in a postconflict context are related to community law and order rather than the use (or threat) of military force, the growing numbers of police personnel has been a major feature of UN peace operations over the last decade. There is, however, a lack of key specialized policing capabilities and a shortage of qualified police officers.

Broadening the base of police-contributing countries and deepening the pool of contributions from existing contributors would help DPKO recruit and select more qualified officers, as well as find policing and rule-of-law specialists with important capabilities. This includes very basic requirements, such as female police officers, French- and Arabic-speaking officers, or policing mentors. The minimum age requirements for individual police officers often presents a barrier to young women who want to deploy earlier in their career. Financial considerations also pose an obstacle: Europeans have shifted away from deploying as UN police, opting instead for EU missions, in part because EU compensation rates
for individual police officers are much higher. The perception that European rule-of-law and policing experts are not properly utilized when deployed to a UN mission may also have contributed to this dynamic.

Finally, the need for police in UN peace operations is still growing, in part because of the increasing threat of organized crime in postconflict environments. Increased staffing inside the UN Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) reflects the importance of such threats. In such situations, experienced law-enforcement personnel with expertise in combating organized crime will be crucial to preventing both the commercial trade of illicit materials and the corrupting influence on state institutions that accompanies such business. Given the UN’s important role in supporting the development of responsible state institutions, such policing and rule-of-law issues must be given greater attention by member states. It was noted that DPKO, for its part, needs to do more to convince capitals of the added value of sending their police to UN missions.

Obstacles to Increasing the Number of European Blue Helmets

Despite a potential increase in the available supply of European troops and police post-2014, a number of obstacles to increased European participation in UN peace operations remain. Participants cited challenges at the operational level and the strategic level, at the levels of domestic politics and international security, as well as on basic questions of finances. At the strategic level, there are stated hesitations among European militaries about a lack of doctrine guiding UN peace operations in the field. Among some European contributors there is also low confidence in the UN’s selection, recruitment, and training of its leadership, in both headquarters and the field. Command-and-control arrangements, as noted above, are still cited by Europe as an impediment to its involvement, specifically with regard to the need to increase strategic control of and support to operations from headquarters. At the operational level, interoperability—which is now functioning at a high level among European militaries through planning, training, and shared experience in Afghanistan—cannot quickly or cheaply be achieved between Europeans and the traditional UN TCCs.

Communication is also seen as a weak link, with several participants expressing the need to improve the interactions between European governments and the UN. Mutual trust and confidence could be developed through more frequent exchange, perhaps at the capital level, and a more specific articulation of the UN’s expectations of Europeans. There is likewise a common impression that European governments lack suitable partners in the UN Secretariat with which to interact. Specifically, the elements of the Office of Military Affairs responsible for communication with potential TCCs were not perceived as having the mandate or resources to develop this relationship meaningfully. The UN needs a longer-term and more strategic force-generation engagement to interact with Europe. European militaries have a much longer planning horizon, and political approval for deployments can take longer than it does for the UN’s more experienced TCCs.

Domestic politics and financial considerations can also be cited as limiting factors for the Europeans. After a decade of engagement in Afghanistan, a segment of the European public is weary of continued military deployments abroad, even if undertaken through the UN rather than NATO. The current fiscal climate also makes significant commitments to the UN a challenge. Finding the money for this in shrinking budgets and legitimating the use of that money for far-removed conflicts, rather than for immediate domestic or regional needs, can be a difficult political decision in any country. European governments would need more assistance from the UN in “selling” UN peacekeeping to their publics as a justifiable fiscal priority.

Partnership Opportunities and Regional Arrangements

Given the challenges to increasing the level of European contributions, there is an obvious need for more dialogue among European governments, the European Union, and the UN to find new
modalities for contributing to UN peacekeeping. Enhancing or developing new peacekeeping partnerships is not only a way to share common burdens, but can also help build peace and security capacities and reform defense sectors in the developing world. The ongoing financial crisis, while limiting the overall size of European contributions, could push European governments to focus on quality over quantity and to ensure they bring added value to peace operations, likely through the contribution of specialized or niche capabilities.

The most obvious partnership option currently available is a regional contribution via the European Union or NATO. Such a partnership would likely be aimed at performing a specialized function (such as rapid response or surge capacity) for a limited time horizon (six or twelve months in duration). Recent developments in the EU-UN relationship aim for closer collaboration between the two entities and include the establishment of a UN liaison office for peace and security in Brussels and the re-launch of the UN-EU Steering Committee on Crisis Management, which will be discussing issues like Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Syria. The EU has also adopted a new plan of action to enhance its support to UN peacekeeping and is planning to develop a detailed list of civilian and military capabilities that the EU could provide to the UN. However, progress in implementing the plan of action has been slow so far.

Given the current state of discord among EU member states on a variety of big issues, few roundtable participants were optimistic about the possibility of a significant EU military contribution to UN peacekeeping in the near future. In general, it was stressed that dialogue on troop and police contributions has to happen with national capitals and not Brussels. With ongoing instability on the EU’s immediate periphery in North Africa and the Middle East, however, it would not be impossible to see the establishment of an initial EU peace operation that would eventually transition to a UN mission. On this issue, participants noted the need to learn the right lessons from the troubled experience of transitioning between the two organizations in Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008. The preparations for a mission in Mali were cited as a good example of cooperation between the EU, UN, and African Union. Likewise, the UN and the EU continue to work together creatively and effectively to support the African Union Mission in Somalia. It was suggested that a more structured trilateral strategic dialogue between the UN, EU, and African Union (AU) would be beneficial, as would a structured dialogue with the Arab League.

Bilateral and other joint arrangements are likely options for European participation in UN peacekeeping. Rather than operate through an EU mechanism, some European governments are looking at arrangements to deploy jointly in small groups. For instance, the possibility was raised of contributing a joint unit composed of personnel from among the Nordic countries. North-South bilateral arrangements have the added advantage of helping to build the capacity of developing countries to contribute more effectively to peacekeeping. Broader bilateral defense agreements, such as the one between Belgium and Benin, can include peacekeeping support in their frameworks, allowing developing countries to gain valuable experience with the UN. Numerous other examples of training provided by Europeans to other countries exist. Some notable examples include the French Program for African Militaries; Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAM); and, on policing, the Italian-hosted Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU). Participants suggested that the UN play a greater role in facilitating the matching of capacity builders and training providers with those countries that might desire such assistance through, for example, mechanisms such as the G8++ Africa Clearinghouse.

According to the UN’s Office of Military Affairs, many of the gaps in UN peacekeeping capabilities are in the areas of interoperability, intelligence-driven operations, policing specialties, and air assets. European contributors may be in a position to provide unmanned aerial vehicles, the use of which is being considered for some UN peace operations. Niche and enabling capabilities such as these, along with medical and logistics support and engineering, happen to be in greater supply among the Europeans than most other regions and would have positive knock-on effects, greatly increasing the overall operational capacity of current UN peacekeeping missions. Assisting other UN TCC/PCCs in quick deployment to UN missions
Conclusion

As NATO draws down its forces in Afghanistan, the security situation outside Europe’s borders and the financial situation inside them present continuing challenges. The pace of change along Europe’s periphery is much faster than once seemed possible, and preparing for “strategic surprise” is a necessity. Institutional capacities to respond to crises (i.e., at the UN, EU, AU, etc.) have not yet evolved to match either the complexity of contemporary crises or the dramatic speed of change. The Berlin roundtable featured a strong rhetorical commitment from both the UN and the European countries to work together to strengthen the global crisis-management tool that is UN peacekeeping. However, it remains to be seen if Europe will decide to make the required investments—in money, time, or effort—to play its part.

Despite the perception of UN peacekeeping as a global common good and a comparatively cheap conflict-management mechanism, European countries still lack political will to increase their direct engagement for a number of reasons. On the technical side, there are European concerns over UN management, command and control, interoperability, transparency, standards, and performance assessments. The political issues are both national, within each European capital, and international, related to evolving geopolitical realities and perceived security threats. Indeed, the decision to engage in UN peacekeeping is a political one, made by the political leaders of a country. When political will exists, countries and organizations often find it much easier to work out the technical issues. As such, a key takeaway from the Berlin roundtable was the need for the UN and European governments to work together to convince the European publics that (1) peacekeeping “done well” serves the national interest and (2) UN peacekeeping will do better with greater European involvement.

In this light, recommendations emerged during the two-day roundtable that centered on continuing

Recommendations

STRATEGIC OUTREACH

1. DPKO must develop an outreach policy targeting European contributors as part of a longer-term force generation strategy. This should focus on the military and the relevant ministries, as well on the public. “The UN needs to get out of New York,” was a common refrain.

2. A stronger argument for why Europeans should engage must be made. The reasons cannot only be value-based: they need to be interest-based as well.

3. The UN must make clear what it needs and what, specifically, Europeans can contribute.

4. DPKO should appoint strategic-level interlocutors to engage with European capitals, in addition to the operational-level team in the UN Office of Military Affairs.

5. EU member states should bring the discussion about potential systems, structures, and partnerships for UN peacekeeping back to Brussels. They should use the opportunity of the 2013–2014 strategic review of the European External Action Service to make it a stronger partner for UN peacekeeping in the future through its CSDP structures.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING

6. DPKO must build stronger political and personal connections with European capitals to increase confidence in the UN Secretariat—its people and its systems.

7. A “group of friends” of some sort should be established among European TCC/PCCs to enhance the dialogue and the collaboration between UN leadership and European capitals on peacekeeping.

8. European governments must also begin to engage in a dialogue with traditional, non-
European TCCs to alleviate any fears of a European takeover of UN peacekeeping, but also to develop more bilateral partnerships, including joint deployments.

9. Staffing some key positions at UN headquarters with European officers may increase their militaries’ confidence in the UN. In particular, DPKO could use more European military planners.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

10. DPKO should continue efforts to “right-size” missions by assessing mandates at least every two years. It should also continue to develop adequate transition strategies. Improved alignment of peacekeeping operations with peacebuilding strategies and priorities could be one way of clarifying transition and exit strategies.

11. The creation of the position of “Directorate for Evaluation of Field Uniformed Personnel” for DPKO should be supported politically and financially by European governments.

12. There may be a need for a strategic command cell at UN headquarters to increase European buy-in to the UN’s C2 system.

13. European governments should look for ways to build on the senior advisory group’s work on troop reimbursement to find innovative ways to incentivize high performance and the provision of key assets and specialized capabilities.
Agenda

Enhancing European Military and Police Contributions to UN Peacekeeping: A Being a Peacekeeper Regional Roundtable

Berlin, Germany

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

09:00  Welcoming Remarks

Michael Freiherr von Ungern-Sternberg, Director-General for the UN and Global Issues, Federal Foreign Office, Germany
Michel Mirailet, Director, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department, Ministry of Defense, France
Almut Wieland-Karimi, Director, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)

09:15  Opening Remarks
“The State of UN Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe”

Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

10:30  Panel 1: Strategic Security Context Post-2014—Europe, the UN, and the World

Chair
Louise Fréchette, former United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, former Deputy Minister of Defense of Canada

Speakers
Ulrich Stefan Schlie, Director, Policy Directorate, Federal Ministry of Defense, Germany
Michel Mirailet, Director, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department, Ministry of Defense, France
Svein Efjestad, Director General, Department of Security Policy, Ministry of Defense, Norway
Massimo Marotti, Deputy Director General, Directorate General for Political Affairs and Security; Principal Director for the UN and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy

13:45  Panel 2: Evolving Capability Needs in UN Peacekeeping—What can Europe Offer?

Chair
Jean Baillaud, Chief of Staff, Office of Military Affairs, UN DPKO

Speakers
Salvatore Farina, Chief and National Policy Director, Department for Military Planning and Policy, General Staff, Ministry of Defense, Italy
Michael Rendi, Director, Department for International Organizations, Federal Ministry of European and International Affairs, Austria
15:30 Panel 3: Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping

Chair
Robert Gordon, former UN Force Commander and Senior Adviser to the Challenges Forum

Speakers
David Haeri, Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPET, UN DPKO
Paolo Serra, Head of Mission and Force Commander, UNIFIL
Ellen Margrethe Løj, former SRSG and Head of Mission, UNMIL

18:30 Evening Event
“Keeping the Peace in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for Peace Operations”

Opening Remarks
Ina Lepel, Deputy Director-General for Global Issues, German Federal Foreign Office

Discussants
Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General, UN DPKO
Louise Fréchette, former United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, former Deputy Minister of Defense of Canada

Moderators
Andrea Böhm, Journalist, Die ZEIT
Bernd Mützelburg, former Special Envoy to Afghanistan/Pakistan, Federal Foreign Office; Managing Director, Ambassadors Associates

Thursday, October 25, 2012

08:30 Panel 4: Ensuring Consistent Standards and Performance of Blue Helmets

Chair
Francesco Mancini, Senior Director of Research, International Peace Institute (IPI)

Speakers
Jean Baillaud, Chief of Staff, Office of Military Affairs, UN DPKO
Patrick Nash, former Operation Commander, EUFOR Chad/CAR
Reinhard Trischak, Director, Military Policy Division, Ministry of Defense, Austria

10:15 Panel 5: Specialized Policing Needs and Opportunities

Chair
Birgitta Ekelund, Deputy Director, Police Division, Ministry of Justice, Sweden

Speakers
Mehmet Erdem, Deputy Head, International Relations Department, Turkish National Police, Turkey
Stefan Feller, Commissioner, International Police Missions, Federal Ministry of the Interior; former Head of Mission, EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)
Ata Yenigun, Chief, Police Selection Recruitment Section, UN DPKO

11:30

Panel 6: Bilateral Capacity-Building Partnerships and Joint Deployments

Chair
Winrich Kühne, Steven Muller Professor, Bologna Centre, School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS)

Speakers
Vincenzo Coppola, Commander, Mobile Units Division, Carabinieri Corps, Treviso, Italy
Matthew Rowland, Head, Peacekeeping Team, Conflict Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom
Alfons Vanheusden, Adviser, Ministry of Defense, Belgium

13:30

Panel 7: UN-Europe Partnership Arrangements: Past and Future

Chair
Marco Bianchini, Senior Liaison Officer, UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security, Brussels

Speakers
Timothy Clarke, Head, CSDP Policy, Partnerships and Agreements Division, Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), European External Action Service
Richard Gowan, Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations
Allan Jacobsen, Head, International Department, Ministry of Defense, Denmark

15:30

Panel 8: Enhancing European Contributions to UN Peacekeeping – What Steps Are Needed?

Chair
Almut Wieland-Karimi, Director, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)

Speakers
Michael Freiherr von Ungern-Sternberg, Director-General for the UN and Global Issues, Federal Foreign Office, Germany
Ciarán Murphy, Assistant Secretary General, Department of Defense, Ireland
Joakim Vaverka, Head, Global Division, Security Policy Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

17:00

Concluding Remarks

Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Francesco Mancini, Senior Director of Research, International Peace Institute (IPI)
Kevin McGarr, President and CEO, Pearson Centre
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