

Analysis 08/09

Peace Operations and Peacebuilding in the Transatlantic Dialogue

– Key Political, Military, Police and Civilian Issues –

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Foreword and Conclusion

In September 2008 the Berlin Aspen Institute organized its first *European Strategy Forum*. It was held on the renowned Petersberg, overlooking the beautiful Rhine valley and the former capital of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn.

In view of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, “International State Building and Reconstruction Efforts – Experiences Gained and Lessons Learned” had been chosen as the topic of to be discussed by a group of respected international experts, politicians and military leaders, amongst them *Lakhdar Brahimi*, former Special Advisor to Kofi Annan, *Espen B. Eide*, Deputy Defence Minister of Norway, *Ashraf Ghani*, former Minister of Finance in Kabul, *Horst M. Teltschik*, former Head of the German Chancellery, *Guenther Nonnenmacher*, Editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*, General *Egon Ramms*, Commander Allied Forces Command, NATO, as well as Lt. General (ret.) *Ricardo Sanchez*, Former American Commander of the Coalition Ground Forces in Iraq and *Dimitry P. Titov*, Assistant Secretary General at the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and General *Heinrich Brauss*, NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Policy.

A major purpose of the Aspen meeting was to restart the transatlantic dialogue on key issues of Peace Operations and Peacebuilding which had almost completely broken down during the Bush administration because of its deep aversion against any kind of American involvement in peacekeeping as well as nation- or peacebuilding. The author was asked to write the lead paper for this topic. The paper which is published here in an updated version mostly dealt with issues of doctrine regarding the use of force, impartiality, consent etc. as well as with the overstretch of capabilities and the many unsolved problems of peacebuilding. (The paper will be published shortly in: Joachim Krause and Charles King Mallory IV (eds.): *International State Building and Reconstruction Efforts – Experience Gained and Lessons Learned*. Opladen & Farmington Hills, MI. Budrich Pubs., 2009)

Most of these issues have since then taken center stage in New York as part of the UN’s so-called “New Horizon” debate about the future direction of UN peacekeeping, initiated by members of the Security Council as well as DPKO and DFS (Department of Field Support).¹ In April 2009 the NYU Center for International Cooperation made an important input into this debate by issuing its report “Building on Brahimi – Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty”.² The CIC Report is an admirable research on the key problems of present UN peacekeeping. However, regarding its conclusions and recommendations, it suffers from being primarily directed at an UN audience, and thus addressing only on the margins the reality and remarkable developments “outside” New York, i.e. regarding NATO, the EU, AU and ECOWAS and other actors. In contrast, the Aspen Forum and this discussion paper had these actors very much in mind in their deliberations.

Due not at least to the presence of General Sanchez and other American military at the Aspen Forum, doctrinal issues of the use of force in the context of peace and stability operations on the one hand and of the “War on Terror” and “counterinsurgency” on the other, addressed in this paper at some length, received special attention in the discussion, with two clear results: *Firstly*, in terms of doctrine the American military wants to uphold the principle of “full spectrum operations”, in difference to the existing NATO doctrine and most others (see Chap. I of this paper).

¹ See *Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda – Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, New York, July 2009 (non-paper), pp. 46 and Security Council, Presidential Statement, 6178th Meeting, 5 August 2009

² www.cic.nyu.edu, pp. 56

Secondly, however, in terms of the de facto use of force American Generals have become very aware of the danger of conducting military operations in a way that they cause civilian casualties, and thereby undermining the chances for successful stabilisation. As this paper already argued for the Aspen Forum discussion, the bitter lessons of civilian killings as part of combat operations in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan have not failed to impress the American political and military leadership. In the post-Bush and –Rumsfeld era they are de facto returning to doctrinal principles of NATO and other actors who in their doctrine demand to draw a clear line between peace and stabilisation operations on the one hand and war fighting on the other. As the existing 2001 NATO *Peace Support Operations Doctrine* states PSO missions have to be distinguished "from any other enforcement action of war with a designated *enemy*, by specifying a desired political end state rather than the achievement of military victory".³

This (updated) paper deals extensively with these doctrinal issues as well as other key problems of present peace operations and peacebuilding.⁴ One of its key findings is that there are, indeed, a number of strategic issues which need a thorough transatlantic dialogue, such as the American doctrine of "full spectrum operations" and the distinction between war and peace and stabilisation operation, as well as several key issues concerning peacebuilding. However, apart from including the UN, this dialogue has to go beyond the transatlantic arena and systematically involve emerging global actors like China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Brazil etc. Otherwise, there is no realistic perspective to overcome the present overstretch of capabilities, the many unsolved issues of peacebuilding and the diminishing legitimacy of these operations.⁵

³ NATO Peace Support Operations Doctrine 2001, AJP – 3.4.1 (Allied Joint Publication) Chap. 3-1, p. 44.

⁴ This and all other papers written for the Aspen conference will soon be published by Prof. Dr. J. Krause on behalf of the Aspen Institute Berlin.

⁵ As there is no agreed terminology regarding these operations between the different multinational organizations, the terminology used in this article may vary accordingly; *peace operations* will be used as the overarching term. The Author also wants to express his gratitude to Melanie Vogelbach, Kathrin Nutt, Wanda Welker and Tobias von Gienanth for assisting to prepare this article.

Introduction

The last decade has seen an amazing surge of peace operations. A quantum leap in terms of the number of missions, the number of personnel and the diversification of tasks has taken place. Presently, about 60 operations which can be qualified either as peace and stabilization operations or peacebuilding missions are deployed world wide.⁶ Even though the UN is not any longer the exclusive institution to deploy peace operations, commanding more than one third, it still is the dominant one. Other multinational organizations like NATO and the EU, and the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Africa have joined the UN in deploying missions, mostly mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC). In a few cases, like the MNF (Multi-National Force) in Iraq or ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan in its early phase, so-called "Coalitions of the Willing" have fielded missions of their own.

More than half of the presently more than 200 000 international military, police, and civilians working in these missions are under UN command. With about 11 000 (the exact numbers are constantly shifting) the UN is also in charge of the highest number of police, either categorized as so-called "civilian police" or robust "formed units". The second largest police deployment is of the EU. As the new European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX, is almost fully staffed, the number is rising beyond 2 000. The overall 175 000 international military are roughly split up in half between UN-led and non-UN-led missions. Altogether the UN in 2009 has employed about 115 000 military, police and civilians in missions.

These numbers reflect several interesting structural developments in the field of peace operations since the end of the Cold War. NATO's increasing willingness to get involved in peace operations since the mid-90ies is probably the most significant one, the increasing involvement of the EU and the AU another one. In contrast to the late-90ies, NATO and the EU have gradually replaced the UN as the principal peacekeeping actor in Europe. The rise of AU and ECOWAS peace operations, however, has not led to a similar trend in Africa. The UN remains by far the dominant actor on this continent.

Outside Europe, the entry of China into UN peacekeeping missions with military and police elements (for instance in Sudan-Darfur), constitutes a significant innovation. It underlines the need for a global dialogue on the future of peace operations, involving not only the West but also major troop contributing countries from the South like India, Pakistan, Brazil and, of course, China. Extending the transatlantic dialogue on global peace and security to the so-called "emerging powers" is an issue seriously to be considered⁷.

⁶ This number does not include troops deployed as part of *Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)*

⁷ With the entry of China into UN peacekeeping a fundamental principal of the founding fathers of UN peacekeeping missions has been finally laid to rest. Dag Hammarskjöld, UN Secretary General in the late 50s and early 60s, and Lester G. Pearson, Foreign Minister of Canada during the Cold War and one of the founding fathers of peacekeeping, advocated at that time that – for the sake of impartiality – no Permanent Members of the Security Council (SC)

The surge in terms of number of missions and personnel as well as diversity of tasks and actors has not been paralleled by a corresponding increase of success. Some missions have failed dramatically (Somalia, Rwanda), others are in serious trouble (Afghanistan, Darfur), and most of them have to stay much longer than anticipated. Post-conflict peacebuilding has turned out to be much more time consuming in achieving sustainable results than originally assumed. *Doctrinal* confusion and difference with regard to basic conceptual issues persist and *overstretch* in terms of capabilities as well as sustained political will have to become topics of highest priority. This paper will focus on these and related issues of contemporary peacekeeping, peace support and stabilization operations including peacebuilding.

should participate with its own troops in UN peacekeeping missions. In the meantime, however, all Permanent Members of the SC have been engaged in UN missions in one way or the other.

I. Doctrinal Developments

AJP-3.4.1 – NATO's Peace Support Operations Doctrine (2001)

Surprisingly, it was not the long-time peacekeeper UN but NATO that issued the first detailed Doctrine on Peace Support Operations (PSO), the AJP -3.4.1. (Allied Joint Publication) published in July 2001. In June 2003, a Doctrine on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), the AJP-9, followed. The formation of NATO's *Peace Support Operations Doctrine* was, of course, very much influenced by the experiences from NATO's first missions in this field, i.e. the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid- and late-90ies. In 1997, members of NATO's *Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation and Peacekeeping* undertook a comprehensive lessons learned evaluation exercise on these missions. The British debate in the 90ies on concepts like "wider peacekeeping" and "defensive peacekeeping" as well as the Report of the Brahimi Panel on UN Peacekeeping, published in 2000, also had considerable influence on the formation of NATO's doctrine. The Brahimi Report for the first time explicitly recognized "robustness" as a decisive principle for UN peacekeeping in complex emergencies, particularly in failed states.

Based on these influences, NATO has adopted a wide definition of PSOs. Systematically, they fall under what in NATO terminology are called "non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO)" and are designed "to tackle the complex emergencies and robust challenges posed by collapsed or collapsing states..."⁸ These operations are multi-functional and "designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions."⁹ They include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian relief. However, the authors of the doctrine draw an explicit line between peace operations and war-fighting, stating that these missions have to be distinguished "from any other enforcement action of war with a designated enemy".¹⁰

The present US doctrine (see below) does not follow this classification and missions led by the US, like the MNF in Iraq as well as ISAF's and OEF's present activities in Southern Afghanistan, are difficult to reconcile with NATO's presently prevailing PSO definition.

Peacebuilding, impartiality, consent, flexibility, legitimacy etc. are key terms in NATO's doctrine, as is the demand for well coordinated civil-military cooperation. The term *comprehensiveness*, however, which in the meantime has become a key demand for NATO planning, does not yet occur in the 2001 document. Merely mentioned is the need for *unity of effort*. (This may indeed be a more realistic wording than *comprehensiveness*, as will be discussed later).

The absence of explicit reference to the *police* in NATO's doctrine as a later important actor in modern peace operations is striking. In Bosnia and Herzegovina a major police force, the so-called IPTF

⁸ AJP -3.4.1, p. XI.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid. 2-1.

(International Police Task Force) led by the UN, had been one of the main partners of NATO. Surprisingly, the lessons learned from this cooperation did not enter into NATO's doctrine.

However, NATO was quick to learn from the severe problems UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) had experienced in implementing its mandate due to weak capabilities. Its credibility was totally undermined due to this weakness, culminating in the Srebrenica tragedy. *Credibility* was therefore incorporated in NATO's doctrine as a key term and is defined as "a reflection of the parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission"¹¹ Yet, despite this emphasis on credibility formulated in December 2001, NATO member states, unfortunately, have been at the very same time most reluctant to provide ISAF in Afghanistan with a level of capabilities that would have assure such credibility (more below).

United Nations Peacekeeping – Principles and Guidelines (2008)

The first comprehensive UN peacekeeping doctrine has been developed much later. It took until March 2008 for the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to publish its "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - Principles and Guidelines." Although unofficially labelled the "Capstone Doctrine", it does not constitute an officially agreed doctrine. In his introduction former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, rather prefers to declare it a codification "of major lessons learned from the past six decades of United Nations peace-keeping". A number of UN departments, UN specialized organizations as well as relevant international and regional think tanks and peacekeeping actors were involved in a process of consultations to bring this document about.¹² Before its publication the document was presented to the C 34 (Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations)¹³ in New York for final deliberation.

It is not surprising that the UN is much more cautious than NATO with regard to the military aspects of peacekeeping. This starts with the fact that *peacekeeping* - and not peace support operation or peace operations - remains the official term of the UN. Consultations in particular with member states from the South convinced the authors of the guidelines to drop the term *peace operations* – although used more frequently in earlier drafts of the document and in the Brahimi Report. It smelled too Western and interventionist.

Also robustness is defined in the UN document more narrowly than in NATO's doctrine. Robustness is clearly distinguished from peace enforcement. The robust use of force is restricted to the tactical level

¹¹ See AJP -3.4.1, 3-8.

¹² The author as well as other staff members of the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin participated in this consultation process from the very beginning.

¹³ The Special Committee was established by General Assembly in 1965 to conduct a comprehensive review of all issues relating to peacekeeping and is comprised of 124 Member States, mostly past or current contributors of peacekeeping operations. 17 other Member States, as well as the European Union (European Commission), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), participate as observers.

and needs the consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict.¹⁴ Everything beyond has the character of "peace enforcement" and is therefore not part of UN peacekeeping. This is – looking at the operational realities of the UN's missions in the Eastern Congo or in Darfur – a tightrope to walk for leaders and commanders of UN missions. But it is, indeed, in line with this cautious approach that the UN puts much more emphasis on the need for *consent* and *impartiality* than NATO. Yet, the UN follows NATO in incorporating *credibility* as an important imperative for planning and conducting a mission.¹⁵ (The AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is obviously lacking such credibility).¹⁶

Being drafted more than half a decade later than NATO's doctrine, the UN document spells out the key elements of peacebuilding more concretely and refined than the former:¹⁷

- Restoring the State's ability to provide security and maintain public order;
- Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights;
- Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes;
- Promoting social and economic recovery and development;
- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of combatants;
- Security Sector Reform (SSR);
- Electoral assistance, mine action etc.

However, the UN document – like NATO – fails to sufficiently acknowledge the *police* as a key actor in peacekeeping operations. It only incorporates the recent change in terminology from CIVPOL (Civilian Police) to UNPOL, thereby indicating that the police now are to be considered an actor on its own merit, and not simply another civilian actor. Yet, the so-called *Formed Police Units* (FPU's) and their strategic importance in closing the "public security gap" between the military and the civilian side are not dealt with in the documents, although their introduction into peacekeeping is one of the most innovative developments of UN peacekeeping, as well as non-UN-led missions. (*Update*: DPKO's Police Unit is busy to close this gap by developing strategic guidelines for FPU's.)

The UN, however, endeavours to be innovative with regard to another important issue, i.e. improving *coordination* and *integration* of missions. Both are more or less unsolved issues in most missions; although hundreds of lessons learned seminars have been organized worldwide dealing with them extensively. An entire chapter is dedicated to this complex issue. The UN defines an integrated mission in a very demanding way as "one in which there is a shared vision among all United Nations actors as to the strategic objectives of the United Nations presence at the country-level. This strategy should reflect a

¹⁴ UN Principles and Guidelines, Chap. 3, pp. 31.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ A recent Joint NGO Report, supported by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Lakdhar Brahimi, President Jimmy Carter and Gracia Machel, came to the conclusion that the lack of 18 transport and 6 attack helicopters is the starkest point in terms of capabilities UNAMID has not been provided with. According to a detailed research, the Report comes to the conclusion that these helicopters could be provided by NATO member states or other states. See A Joint NGO Report, Grounded - The International Community's Betrayal of UNAMID (July 2008) 32 pp, http://darfur.3cdn.net/b5b2056f1398299ffe_x9m6bt7cu.pdf.

¹⁷ UN Principles and Guidelines, p. 26.

shared understanding (ital. added) of the operating environment and agreement (ital. added) on how to maximize the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of the United Nations overall response."¹⁸

This integrated approach is put into practice by the UN in two ways: *Firstly*, DPKO has adopted the so-called *IMPP (Integrated Mission Planning Process)* to facilitate multi-dimensional planning amongst all relevant departments and actors (DPKO, Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) etc.) in the UN system. For the IMPP to be implemented, an *Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF)* will have to be established, as well as so-called *IMPTs (Integrated Mission Planning Teams)*. *Secondly*, in the field, integration is meant to be "a strategic partnership between the peacekeeping operation and the UNCT (UN Country Team), in which the humanitarian and development actors of the UN, like OCHA, UNDP, the World Food Programme (WFP), and others, are represented. DPKO wants to bring these actors under the authority of the *leader of the mission, i.e. the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)*. In practice, this difficult undertaking is supposed to be achieved by giving the post of the Deputy SRSG to the *Resident Coordinator* of the UNTC or the humanitarian coordinator. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) have been organized as "integrated" missions in this sense – with varying success.

European Security Strategy (2003) – Not Yet a Doctrine

The European Union (EU) has not yet published an official peacekeeping or peace support operations doctrine despite its rising number of missions. However, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) "A Secure Europe in a Better World" indicates the nature and direction of its involvement. It agrees with all other documents about the need for international action to curtail regional conflict and state failure as well as to combat the proliferation of organized crime and international terrorism, both closely related to the former. For this to be achieved, the document comes forward with a very strong call to member states "... to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, when necessary, rapid intervention".¹⁹ With this demand the EU not only has its own missions in mind but also sees itself very much as a partner and supporter of the UN and NATO. There is nothing in the ESS which in principle would contradict the doctrines of these two organizations.

¹⁸ UN Principles and Guidelines, Chap. 5, pp 53.

¹⁹ European Security Strategy, pp. 4 and pp.11 see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDPoperations.jpg>.

The African Union Peace Support Operations Doctrine (2006) – Building a Comprehensive Peace and Security Architecture in Africa

The EU is not the only regional organization which has started to launch peace operations. The African Union (AU) - with 54 states double the number of EU member states – is another important newcomer. To many it might be surprising that the AU stands in the forefront in working out a very detailed *Peace Support Operations Doctrine* with a first draft in March 2006, complemented by a *Policy Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)*, drafted in December 2006. Both documents have been extensively discussed in the relevant AU institutions and with members of civil society.²⁰ The PCRD delineates a number of post-conflict reconstruction activities, like the restoration of the rule of law, establishment and development of democratic institutions, organization and supervision of elections etc. (It is quite impressive to see how unambiguously this set of "Western" values has been incorporated into African doctrine and accepted by AU member states. Western countries, in particular the EU and several European countries played a key role in supporting this process).

Both, the doctrine as well as the PCRD Framework are part of a wider African effort to build up a comprehensive *Peace and Security Architecture*. These efforts, triggered in the mid- and late 90ies by the events in Somalia, Rwanda and later on, Liberia, gained considerable momentum with the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the AU in 2002. In July 2003, during its summit in Maputo, the AU made an important step forward by adopting the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union*.²¹

Apart from the creation of the PSC, this document has laid the foundation for building up the African Peace and Security Architecture by designing its main elements, i.e. the *Panel of the Wise*, the *Continental Early Warning System (CEWARN)*, the *Military Staff Committee*, the African Peace Fund and, most importantly, the African Standby Force (ASF), consisting of five regional brigades: NASBRIG (North Africa Brigade), ECOBRIG (ECOWAS Standby Brigade; West Africa), SADCBRIG (Southern African Development Community Brigade) EASBRIG (Eastern African Standby Brigade) and ECCASBRIG (Economic Community of Central African States Brigade).

These Standby Forces are designed by the AU with the understanding that they are likely to be deployed in close cooperation with the UN.²² And, following the AU's overall integrated approach, they will "be composed of multi-disciplinary civilian and military components held on standby basis".²³ On the police

²⁰ The Policy Framework was first adopted by the Third Session of the African Chiefs of Staff in May 2003 and noted by the AU Maputo Summit in July 2003. A refined version of the framework was noted by the Fifth Meeting of the Chief of Staffs and the Ordinary Meeting of the Ministers of Defence and Security of March 2008.

²¹ Document of the Website of the AU: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf.

²² Since its inception in 2000 the AU has deployed three multi-dimensional operations, namely the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) (2003-4), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur 2004-7 and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (2007).

²³ Art. 13 of the Protocol of the African Union Peace and Security Council.

side, that will include one FPU (Formed Police Unit) to be generated in each of the five regions. The aim is to have the ASF deployable in 2010. Not all regions may be able to comply with this ambitious schedule. When one looks at its title, the *African Peace Support Operations Doctrine* seems to follow NATO doctrine. However, the parallels are limited to the terminology. Indeed, the doctrine is a mix of NATO, UN and African doctrinal thinking. Like the UN and NATO, it defines PSOs as a response to complex emergencies. PSOs are therefore by nature "multifunctional", consisting of diplomatic, military and civilian elements. In Chap. 3 of the doctrine much emphasis is put on "impartiality" and "consent" as defining elements of PSOs and as the decisive distinction to war and full fledged enforcement under Chap. VII of the UN Charter. Even more than in the UN document the importance of consent generating and supporting techniques is therefore stressed (Chap. 6), as well as the strict limitation of the use of force to self-defence.

If the AU would not explicitly state in Chap. 2 para. 21 that the overall purpose of African PSOs is - similar to UN as well as NATO missions - to "promote, create and maintain a secure environment" one might come to the conclusion that the AU doctrine limits African Peace Support Operations to traditional, consent-based peacekeeping. Most probably, African governments as well as their generals will have different views on how far African units should go in using force when they are challenged to do so by realities on the ground, like for instance in Somalia.

Summing up, the African effort to build a comprehensive Peace and Security Architecture with the support of the West is impressive and not matched by any other region in terms of how systematically it is undertaken on the level of documents. However, in view of the *de facto* weakness of African capabilities in terms of military hardware, transport and logistics, sustained funding and the like, only time will tell how effective this system will turn out to be in reality. Lack of political unity in the AU when it comes to deciding upon concrete actions including military elements, may be as limiting as lack of capabilities.

Great Britain, France, Canada, Germany, the Nordics, the Netherlands and India

Coming back to Europe and transatlantic relations, there are three major contributors to peace and stabilization operations, *Great Britain, France* and the *United States of America*, that stand out as having been busy to develop national doctrines. *Canada* did so as well in 2002.

As indicated earlier, *Britain* has been on the forefront in this debate since the mid-90ies, due to its substantial involvement first with UNPROFOR and then with IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its painful experience in Northern Ireland. The first *Peace Support Operation Doctrine* ensued from this experience was endorsed by the British Chiefs of Staff in 1998, a 2nd and still valid edition was published in June 2004.²⁴ It has to be read in close connection with the *British Defence Doctrine* published in October 2001, only a few months after the publication of NATO's doctrine and containing basic elements of British PSO philosophy. Both documents explicitly refer to NATO's doctrine and follows its

²⁴ See http://www.coe-dmha.org/PKO/USA04/images/references/jwp3_50.pdf

understanding of what constitutes a PSO very closely: (1) the military element is but one component of the total effort; (2) its principal task is to ensure a stable security environment; (3) impartiality, consent and the restraint in the use of force are key considerations; and (4) every effort has to be made to encourage civilian agencies to take over the various tasks as soon as possible. Like the UN doctrine, it takes quite a differentiated view on the reality of consent in a failed state scenario and states "that there may be variances of the degree of consent at lower levels "although" strategic level consent (in the form of a UN mandate for example)" exists.²⁵ In the preface to the British doctrine the Chiefs of Staff, explicitly encourage the reader also to read the IJWP 3-90 on *Civil-Military Co-operation*, published in November 2003.²⁶

Canada's Joint Doctrine Manual Peace Support Operations, B-GF-005-307/FP-030, published in November 2002, stands out as one of the most sophisticated documents.²⁷ It was written in response to the hard lessons learned in Somalia which made the Canadians to rethink their entire prior approach. It breaks away from the focus on traditional peacekeeping and distinguishes three different types of Peace Support Operations: traditional peacekeeping, complex peacekeeping operations and enforcement. The term "complex peacekeeping" is close to what in other documents is labelled robust, multidimensional peacekeeping. However, the Canadians are very clear in stating that this is not one clear-cut type of operations but rather groups together different kinds of responses to complex emergencies: "Each such operation will be uniquely organized for the situation on the ground".²⁸ In a similar vein the Canadians take a very differentiated view on the importance of legitimacy, impartiality, consent, minimum but at the same time sufficient use of force, credibility and other principles already dealt here with regard to NATO, UN, AU, and the British doctrine. It should also be noted that the Canadian doctrine is the only one making a direct reference to the "Responsibility to Protect" as a trigger for international intervention.

In difference to *Germany* which until now does not see a need to work out a particular national PSO doctrine,²⁹ *France* has done so recently in its *Manual FT-01 "Winning the Battle - Building Peace - Land Forces in Present and Future Conflicts"*.³⁰ In terminology, less in content, this document differs quite a bit from the others. The term "Peace Support Operations" is not used at all. The manual rather underlines the change from "symmetrical warfare" to "asymmetrical conflict" as a basic reality of today's international security challenges and stresses that "military engagement alone no longer wins wars; it simply leads to the establishment of minimal conditions for strategic success".³¹ *Intervention, stabilization, and*

²⁵ See Joint Warfare Publication 0-01 British Defence Doctrine (2nd Edition), October 2001, pp. 6-3. In addition to this basic document, the British Chief of Staffs have published a number of additional Doctrines more or less related in its Joint Doctrine and Warfare Publications Series, like in particular "Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC)", Interim Joint Warfare Publication 3-90, November 2003 and "The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations", Joint Warfare Publication pp. 3-50, June 2004.

²⁶ See http://www.coe-dmha.org/PKO/USA04/images/references/ijwp3_90.pdf

²⁷ See <http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page=3490>.

²⁸ Preface, Joint Doctrine Manual, p. i.

²⁹ The German armed forces, as a rule, follow the doctrine of the multinational organisation they are deployed with, i.e. mostly NATO doctrine. However, its ability to follow this doctrine may be severely limited by caveats decided upon by the German Parliament or the MoD.

³⁰ Published by the Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces, Paris, January 2007.

³¹ Ibid, p. 7.

normalization are therefore pointed out as the decisive contribution of the French forces in a changed world.

Despite the different wording this is in substance very close in particular to NATO doctrine. The French reluctance to follow the heavily Anglo-American dominated peace operations and peacekeeping terminology does not surprise and should not be overestimated with regard to its practical relevance when it comes to joint peace operations.³² But the more straightforward language of the French military in comparison with NATO, British and UN doctrine with regard to the use of force is notable. The need to assure *credibility* by using, if necessary, "the dissuasive nature of a destructive force" is stressed. And the willingness to do so in "clearly defined limits" has to be understood "by all protagonists" from the very beginning.³³ Obviously, this unambiguous language is very much based on the experience of French troops in African scenarios. (Such wording, however, would cause an outcry amongst a number of German parliamentarians as well as civil society actors. It is not by chance that the 2006 "Weissbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik" of the German Government explicitly warns that military means are risky and should therefore not dominate diplomatic, economic, developmental and other non-military means).³⁴

The *Nordic* countries have one of the longest traditions to be thoroughly involved in peacekeeping operations, starting with their participation in UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organisation) in Palestine in 1948. In 2001 NORDCAPS (Nordic Co-operated Arrangement for Military Peaces Support) published the first 2. volumes of NORDCAPS Tactical Manual containing the basic doctrinal as well as operational thinking of the Nordic countries. The lessons learned in the manifold participation of Nordic countries in peacekeeping and peace operations have regularly been updated in new editions of the manuals, the last one dating from 2007.³⁵ Not surprisingly, in this course of time Nordic doctrinal thinking had to pay tribute to the changed dynamics of conflict, not at least regarding the issue the level of violence and complexity encountered in scenarios of state failure and humanitarian disaster. The main focus has shifted from peacekeeping to peace support and today the Nordics use PSO as the all encompassing term for the different kinds of intervention needed in modern conflict management: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building, humanitarian etc.³⁶ In sum, Nordic doctrine and operational instructions are well designed to be compatible with UN and NATO doctrine. The *Netherlands* has a long tradition of being involved in peacekeeping very similar to that of the Nordics. Their present doctrine which was updated in June 1999 is, of course, very much influenced by the dire experience of Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica in 1995. Still, it has a more traditional approach towards

³² Language in *The French White Paper on Defence and Security*, presented to the public by President Sarkozy in June 2008 demonstrates a 'rapprochement' with the Anglo-Saxon NATO and UN terminology by picking up the formulation that its the armed forces task "to provide for a safe and secure environment" for reconstruction (p.11).

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³⁴ *Weissbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik und Lage der Bundeswehr*, (Berlin: Federal Government, 2007).

³⁵ Vol.1 of the Manual see http://www.nordcaps.org/tactical_manual/volume1.pdf

Vol: II see http://www.nordcaps.org/tactical_manual/volume2.pdf

³⁶ *Ibid.* Vol. 1 pp. 17

peacekeeping than its Canadian, British, US, and French counterparts.³⁷ The same holds true for the *Indian Army Doctrine*, making a clear distinction between Chap. VI peacekeeping and Chap. VII peace enforcement operations.³⁸

US Doctrine: FM 100-23 (1994) in the Clinton Era and the New FM 3-0 (2008)

The story of the evolution of US doctrine on peace operations and peacebuilding is, not surprisingly, very much one of its own. There are very few, even in the US, who remember the fact that the US Army was the first to put in writing a very refined peace operations doctrine, the *FM (Field Manual) 100-23 Peace Operations* in December 1994.³⁹ It incorporated the lessons from previous UN missions, like the one in Cambodia, UNITAF (United Task Force) in Somalia in 1992/93 as well as the first experiences on the Balkans. In this first manual, the definition of peace operations was very broad and covered the entire continuum of operations from traditional, consent based peacekeeping to peace enforcement "to compel compliance (...) with the purpose (...) to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts", i.e. the robust use of force.⁴⁰ Combined with the principles and guidelines as laid down in the PDD 25 by President Clinton in May 1994, it is remarkable how much US thinking at that time, in the Army as well as in the State Department, was in accordance with the basic principles and guidelines of NATO, UN and British peace operations and peacekeeping doctrines.⁴¹

This, however, changed with the arrival of the Bush Administration and Donald Rumsfeld becoming the head of the Pentagon. In their election campaign against the Clinton Administration both had ridiculed nation-building and peacekeeping as being unworthy for the world's leading military power and only appropriate for the "do-gooders" and "old Europe". Consequently, peacekeeping and peace operations turned into unpopular and forgotten challenges in US doctrinal thinking. Combat, war fighting and achieving victory got on top of the agenda, culminating in the Iraq war. There was no more meaningful dialogue about peace operations doctrine with official US participation, neither in the transatlantic relationship nor in the UN. Without the US, however, such dialogues lack ultimate relevance.

It took the tragic course of events in Iraq to bring the US back into the debate. Step by step, the American military realized, in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan that having a sound, long-term strategy for peace operations and peacebuilding is imperative.⁴² The *Department of Defence Directive 3000.05* as of November 28, 2005 is one of the first documents to signal this reversal despite the fact that it carefully

³⁷ Victoria K. Holt & Tobias Berkmann, *The Impossible Mandates? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations*, The Stimson Center, Washington, http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Chap_6-The_Impossible_Mandate-Holt_Berkman.pdf, pp. 123

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 125; The *Indian Army Doctrine* is not available on the Internet.

³⁹ See > http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm100_23.pdf.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴¹ Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25), Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, U.S. Department of State, February 22, 1996.

⁴² The author will not take up the debate which of the many terms is most appropriate with regard to the work which has to be done to achieve long term stabilization: nation-building, peacebuilding, reconstruction, transformation, state building etc.. In a way, all these terms describe one part or another part of the extremely complex task of long term stabilization.

tries not to use peace operations terminology. Instead of PSOs, it speaks rather of military support to so-called *Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)*. As this support is meant "to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society", it is basically serving the same purpose as NATO, PSOs or UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.

Yet, a key divide between US on the one and NATO, UN etc. doctrine on the other hand remains.

"Impartiality" and "consent" are terms which do not have much relevance for US documents of the Bush era. More importantly, US doctrinal thinking does not draw a clear line between peace and stabilization operations on the one side and war fighting in the form of either "counterinsurgency" or "War on Terror" on the other. A December 2006 document of the Pentagon, based on the 2005 Directive, in the context of SSTR operations states that "if this situation includes the presence of armed insurgent forces actively opposing the efforts of the existing or new host government, then this operation is a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation".⁴³ In the new US Army Field Manual FM 3-0 as of February 2008, the distinction between peace support operations and other operations is even less visible, given that its key concern is the ability to execute "full spectrum operations (...) to defeat the enemy."⁴⁴

Still, because of the integration of civil support operations and other non-military elements into the doctrine, the authors of the 2008 FM 3-0 see the new Manual as a "revolutionary departure from past doctrine".⁴⁵ This view is also shared by a commentator of the New York Times who, however, correctly points out that it is questionable to what extent this new approach already is common practice in the US Army.⁴⁶

A very recent document, the *FM 3-07 on Stability Operations*, issued by the Headquarters Department of the U.S. Army in October 2008, reflects the above tendency of the Pentagon to move away from the emphasis on war fighting during the Bush/Rumsfeld era. Although based on the FM 3-0 it explicitly "elevates stability operations to a status equal to that of the offense and defense".⁴⁷ Consequently, the need for civil-military integration receives greater attention than before which is elaborated with considerable detail in Chap. 3 of the new document. The tasks and goals of civil-military co-operation are basically the same as those put forward in the other doctrines: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian, and social well-being, governance and participation as well as economic stabilization and infrastructure. Following UN terminology, the need to "establish a safe and secure environment" is stated in Chap. 2 as the main tasks of the military forces to make the execution of these civilian tasks possible, as is the need to an "integrated approach to achieve true unity of effort in a comprehensive effort." Yet, three important differences with the other doctrines remain:

⁴³ Department of Defence, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations*, Joint Operating Concept, version 2.0, December 2006, p. iv.

⁴⁴ Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations*, February 2008, Chapter 3.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, Foreword.

⁴⁶ Michael R. Gordon, *After Hard-Won Lessons, Army Doctrine Revised*, *New York Times*, 8. Feb. 2008.

⁴⁷ Headquarters of the Army, *FM 3-07 Stability Operations*, Washington October 2008, p. vi.

- Impartiality, consent und credibility which are key terms in NATO as well as UN Doctrine have found no place in the in the new document;
- So-called "Civilian Affairs Forces" and "Civilian Affairs Operations" set up by the military and under the command of the military are a key component for executing stability operations. They are "nested within the overall mission and commander's intent" and are primarily meant to "improve the relationship between military forces and host-nation authorities in areas in which the military forces operate."⁴⁸
- Finally and most important: stability operations remain firmly embedded in the concept of *full spectrum operations*. The fact that the "simultaneous nature of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks" is explicitly stressed in the Preface of the FM 3-07 implies that the basic divide between US and NATO (as well as UN and AU) doctrine on the link between *peace operations* and *warfare* remains an unresolved issue.

This basic divide, i.e. how "robust" should/can these operations be, how much can they be linked up with "counterinsurgency" and "war on terror" without becoming counterproductive or even self-defeating with regard to the overriding goal of these operations, i.e. stabilization, therefore remains an unresolved issue. It will be dealt with in a separate chapter on Afghanistan, after debating the present overstretch with regard to peace operations.

II. Overstretch, the Humanitarian Dilemma and R2P

In June 2008, the *Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)* in Berlin and the *New York Centre on International Cooperation (CIC)* conducted an international Expert Workshop on the development of peace operations and peacekeeping partnerships. There was one conclusion on which all participants agreed: "By early 2008, it was clear that the reflex to resort to peacekeeping as a conflict solution was reaching its limits. Peacekeeping operations from Darfur, Afghanistan and Kosovo, to Lebanon, the DR Congo and Somalia were each faced with respective logistical and political challenges that threatened their performance". Increasingly, the UN Security Council is seen "as ignoring the operational reality where the pool of available personnel, logistical and political resources is already stretched thin."⁴⁹ Jean Marie Guéhenno, until recently the head of the UN's peacekeeping department, was no less outspoken when he left his post in July 2008, warning that the world body had passed the "outer limits" of its peacekeeping capacity.⁵⁰

In short, overstretch has become a basic reality of peace operations. This is particularly true for Western countries. Most of them feel that their military as well as their police capabilities are dangerously strained, not only with regard to personnel but also to high value equipment like mine-protected

⁴⁸ Ibid, 3-20.

⁴⁹ See the Report *Towards an Understanding of Peacekeeping Partnerships*, June 2008, p.1 and 2, on the Website of ZIF.

⁵⁰ See the article by Steve Bloomfield, „UN Peacekeepers at breaking point“, *The Independent*, 28 July 2008.

armoured cars, or helicopters. Strategic airlift is even more of a scarce commodity. Less known but also very real: It is increasingly difficult to attract qualified and experienced civilian Senior Management and Leadership personnel into difficult missions.

The roots for the overstretch lie in the mid- to late-90ies when the number of conflicts which required external intervention increased rapidly. Regarding these engagements, be it on the Balkans or in other regions, it was assumed by Western governments and public opinion that the involvement would be short – one year, maybe two or three years at worst! "Our boys will be home for Christmas" was an often heard phrase at that time. This expectation has turned out to be a deep illusion. Interventions have become lengthy and very complex in terms of demand and risks. The drain on capabilities and resources is enormous.

The overstretch manifests in a variety of ways. The most obvious one is the reluctance to take up new and risky missions, like the one in *Somalia*, although the humanitarian situation in the country is desperate. It has even become worse than the one in Darfur. The AU mission present in the country and trapped in Mogadishu has been pleading the UN to take over for quite some time.⁵¹ The Security Council in principle has agreed but no action has been taken so far.⁵² Going into Somalia again would require lots of capabilities and would be much more risky than in the early 90ies. UNAMID in *Darfur* stands out as another dramatic case of lack of capabilities.

From the perspective of transatlantic relations, ISAF, and the European police presence in Afghanistan are the most alarming cases in terms of insufficient capabilities and resources. How to change this for the better has been an ongoing controversy across the Atlantic and amongst European partners for quite some time. Afghanistan will absorb additional high value military, police, and civilian resources in the years to come. How many remains to be seen.

Overstretch is creating a serious dilemma for Western governments. On the one hand, they have good reasons to resist participation in future missions in view of the strained capabilities and declining public acceptance at home; on the other hand, the call by media, NGOs and parts of the public for "humanitarian" intervention, when massive killing and suffering animates Western TV screens, persists. Indeed, all interventions in humanitarian crises since the 90ies teach one sobering lesson: the worse a humanitarian crisis, the more difficult it is to fix. The demand for capabilities, personnel and other resources is enormous. It is not simply about chasing down a few "bad" guys. And there is no quick way out! Somalia in the early 90ies was an exemplary case of this dynamic, and not the only one. The public and media are quick to call for international action to end humanitarian crises; they are no less quick to cry foul and to demand withdrawal when the risks and cost of intervention become apparent. Politicians are caught between the two.

⁵¹ In spring 2007, the AU decided to deploy a mission in Somalia. The mandated strength of AMISOM (AU Mission in Somalia) is about 8 000. De facto less than 3 500 troops have arrived in Somalia and are trapped in Mogadishu in their barracks (as of Feb. 2009).

⁵² See for instance Res. Security Council 1814 (2008), 15 May 2008, para. 8.

By and large, however, realism about the duration of international interventions is growing. The number of politicians who dare to confront the public with the unpleasant reality is on the rise. To envisage five years or longer is not considered exceptional anymore, although one or two generations would be a more realistic timeframe in a number of cases.

The war in Iraq has obviously been the main culprit for the overstretch of military resources, particularly with regard to Great Britain and the US, and the decreasing availability of high value components like helicopters, other means of air transport, strategic airlift and the like (more below). Should the new administration in Washington be able to negotiate a constructive withdrawal from Iraq within the next years this would, however, diminish the overstretch.

Overstretch on the one hand and the call for "doing something" on the other will continue to haunt Western governments. The latter has resulted in a new, much more systematic debate on the need for "humanitarian intervention" under the label R2P (Responsibility to Protect). The basic concept of R2P was first outlined in December 2001 in a report sponsored by the Canadian government and issued by the *International Commission on State Intervention and Sovereignty*⁵³.

Though well intentioned, R2P is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it initiates something very worthy by more precisely defining criteria for the "humanitarian intervention" and by insisting on a multinational procedure of legitimization to prevent its abuse. On the other hand, R2P is very much in danger of creating false and dangerous expectations about whether protection really will be forthcoming! In view of the described overstretch of capabilities, the chances that these expectations will be fulfilled are, in the view of the author, extremely low. Rwanda and Srebrenica should serve as warning examples to make false promises!

III. Peace Operations – How Robust?

When in the early 90ies less than a handful of authors responded to the new challenges facing UN peacekeeping by introducing the concept of "robustness" into the peacekeeping debate, their initiative was not very well received.⁵⁴ Traditional peacekeepers as well as academics angrily accused these authors of daring to challenge two hitherto sacrosanct principles: consent and the non-use of force.⁵⁵ No doubt, the critics had a strong point: The concept of allowing the use of force beyond personal self-defense is

⁵³ For more details on R2P see the website <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/>.

⁵⁴ See John MacKinley and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15 No. 2 (Summer 1992, pp. 113-131, Winrich Kuehne (ed.) *Blauhelme in einer turbulenten Welt*, (Blue Helmets in a turbulent world) (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993) pp. 17-100. Already in December 1992 Sir Brian Urquhart, a peacekeeper of the first hour, wrote: "...a third category of operations is needed something between peacekeeping and large-scale enforcement." IHT 31.12.1992.

⁵⁵ The two principles were first elaborated in a Report which Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester G. Pearson wrote in the mid-50ies for the General Assembly as a basis for the first true Blue Helmet mission, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) on the Sinai from 1956-65.

blurring the line between peacekeeping and war fighting and might thereby be contradicting the very essence of peacekeeping, i.e. preventing violence and providing peace.

Indeed, the question of how robust peace operations should be allowed to become without undermining their very own purpose of stabilization is a very important one, and difficult to solve. In Afghanistan, the issue is even more fundamental: To what extent is the War on Terror, conducted by OEF, compatible with ISAF's robust stabilization mandate? It is advisable to start this debate on the basis of the PSO and Peacekeeping doctrines dealt with before, and their different position on the use of force:

- The AU is, as mentioned, very cautious with regard to the use of force; it closely links it to consent, almost like traditional peacekeeping does.
- The UN and its *Principles and Guidelines* is less strict; on the tactical level, the use of force is considered permissible and might even be necessary, depending on the circumstances; beyond that, any use of force strictly needs the consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict; otherwise, it would be "peace enforcement" and therefore not part of UN-peacekeeping (as mentioned in Chap. I, this description might be too narrow with regard to the practice of one or another UN mission).
- The British doctrine has a less rigid view on the need for consent and concedes "that there may be variances of the degree of consent at lower levels" although "strategic level consent (in the form of a UN mandate for example)" has to be kept.
- NATO takes an even broader view by stating that "the conduct of PSO requires an understanding of the complex concept of consent and impartiality and how they *constrain and guide* (ital. add) the conduct of military activities, in particular the use of force".⁵⁶ And unlike the UN, peace enforcement is one possible way to proceed in the context of a PSO to achieve the overriding goal of stabilization. Nevertheless, NATO draws a very clear line with regard to war-fighting by stating that PSO missions have to be distinguished "from any other enforcement action of war with a designated *enemy*, by specifying a desired political end state rather than the achievement of military victory".
- The present US doctrine does not follow NATO in drawing this clear line. It is the only doctrine in force which avoids any clear distinction between stabilization efforts on the one hand, and war fighting on the other.⁵⁷ As indicated before, the principle of *full spectrum operations* continues to be a key element in American military thinking until today. This spectrum includes stabilisation operations as well as countersinsurgency and all out war. The difference between stabilisation and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is very fluid and in practice sometime difficult to draw. The new *U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual* (FM 3-24), elaborated in 2006 under the command of General David H. Petraeus, is very clear in that regard and states "COIN is a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations".⁵⁸ NATO's and other actor's clear and uncompromising distinction between PSO and "war against an enemy" is not followed. On the contrary, the use of force for reasons of stabilization and for creating a secure environment is just one possibility amongst others

⁵⁶ NATO Doctrine, Chap. 3-1, p. 44.

⁵⁷ This is even true for the French doctrine although it puts very much emphasis on the need to assure the credibility of a mission by using, if necessary, "the dissuasive nature of a destructive force".

⁵⁸ See FM3-24/FMFM 3-24, June 2006 (Final Draft), para. 1-3

to proceed in the broad spectrum of military operations, including counterinsurgency and War on Terror.

It needs to be stressed that all existing peacekeeping and peace support operation doctrines, except the one of the US, put strong emphasis on consent and impartiality as the guiding principles for the use of force and draw a clear line to war fighting. Both principles do not emanate from theory or ideological thinking but thorough lessons learned from field missions which preceded the elaboration of these doctrines. Consent and impartiality, jointly with legitimacy and credibility, have proven to be *the* decisive variables in maintaining the support of the majority of the population and its leaders. In the long run, no mission can survive and succeed without this support. It is of strategic importance! This implies that the robust use of force should never be directed against the population at large or the major parties to the conflict, who enjoy considerable support amongst the population, but only against the so-called "spoilers" or "negative forces" who are considered as such by the majority of the population.

Yet, doctrines may, and actually do, vary in the strictness of the link between consent, impartiality and the use of force. For understandable reasons, the AU and the UN more strictly than NATO and Britain insist on consent and impartiality. And it is the above mentioned 1994 US Peace Support Doctrine which most aptly formulates the relative character of this relationship: "The critical variables of peace operations are the *level of consent*, the *level of force* and the *degree of impartiality*". The French doctrine also basically follows this line although it puts very much emphasis on the need to assure the *credibility* of a mission from the very beginning by using, if necessary, "the dissuasive nature of a destructive force".⁵⁹ In principle, no experienced Force Commander will disagree with this imperative.

The need to discipline, neutralize, or even eliminate so-called spoilers may, indeed, compel commanders to walk a tightrope between the robust use of force and going into types of counterinsurgency warfare. Determining who these spoilers are and whether and what kind of force should be applied, therefore, is one of the key challenges for the military, police and civilian leadership of missions. Such a determination requires working together harmoniously in terms of political analysis, intelligence assessment as well as strategic and operational planning. Communicating and explaining the purpose and limits of any use of force to the local population is no less important. Unfortunately, leadership which fulfills all these kinds of demands is not available in abundance. (The author refrains from citing examples of problematic leadership.)

IV. Peace Operations and the War on Terror

In June 2009 the debate on Afghanistan is dramatically different from that of the years before. Public statements by American as well as Allied Generals about the worsening security situation in Afghanistan abound and acknowledge that the Taleban have recovered remarkably from their defeat in 2001, and that

⁵⁹ Le Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces, *Winning the Battle, Building Peace-Land Forces in Present and Future Conflicts*, Paris, January 2007, p. 43.

large sections of the population have lost faith in the effectiveness of the international presence. Even German Generals and politicians who in the past tended to be overly optimistic about the impact of their presence in the North, have finally become realistic and voice their concerns about the deteriorating security situation. In August 2009 General Stanley A. McChrystal, the new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, caused international shock waves when he was reported with a remark that "the Taliban are gaining the upper hand in Afghanistan".⁶⁰ Later on, he claimed to be misquoted.

It is amazing that it took the military (and many security politicians and experts) so long to come to a realistic assessment of the fortunes of the intervention launched in 2001. Indeed, its fate was in serious doubt from the very beginning. Fundamental lessons learned in the 90s regarding the risks of peace and stabilisation operations deployed into such a volatile environment of state failure and ethno-religious conflicts were grossly neglected.⁶¹ In particular the parallel conduct of a peace and stabilization operation (ISAF) and an offensive War on Terror (OEF) was absurd and predictably counterproductive. The peace operations doctrine of NATO's as well as the U.S. and other Allies at that time clearly advised against such parallelism. Their prescriptions were not based on academic studies but on solid lessons learned during peace operations in the 90ies as has been pointed out in Chap. I.

The mix of both types of operations inevitably had disastrous consequences regarding the support of the population. A systematic look at the relationship between a peace and stabilization operation on the one hand, and the War on Terror on the other explains why. In contrast to robust and multidimensional PSOs, the *War on Terror*, like any other war, is defined and conducted in very different terms. Destruction and defeat of the enemy is the overarching goal. Of course, hitting civilians and civilian targets should be avoided as much as possible.⁶² Yet, often such restraint is not possible, at least not in the eyes of military commanders who have as their first priority to defeat and destroy the enemy at minimal costs to their own troops. The military-technical term "collateral damage", frequently used in this context, hides rather than reveals the disastrous psychological effect civilian casualties will have on the local population, like the repeated killings of dozens of Afghans attending weddings or other events as a result of erroneous bombing by Allied planes. The population expects the international troops to bring peace and stability, not war and destruction.

A 2008 Report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) correctly points out that "civilian deaths resonate enormously in communities, particularly given the terrible memories of Soviet bombing campaigns".⁶³ Whether the deaths occur in the context of OEF or ISAF campaigns is of no relevance to them. Efforts of Western commanders to downplay the negative effect of civilian killings by pointing out either the number of Taliban they eliminated with these raids or that the Taliban kill even more civilians completely miss the point of what is at the heart of this struggle: Not military but political-psychological victory. The Taliban, like most other guerrilla movement, certainly know that they do not stand a chance

⁶⁰ See <http://www.newsrunner.com/entity/world/stanley-mcchrysal/3039050889/0/0>

⁶¹ See Winrich Kuehne, *Eine schwache Truppe (A weak force) – in den Verhandlungen um das UN-Mandat bahnen sich verhängnisvolle Fehler an (serious flaws in the negotiations of the UN mandate)*, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 20 December 2001, p. 11

⁶² The US Army Field Manual 3-0 (Feb. 2008) does not fail to stress this point.

⁶³ International Crisis Group, "Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?" *Asia Report* No. 158 24 July 2008.

to defeat the West on the military battlefield. Their fight is about by wearing down the political will of the Western public and that of those in Afghanistan who have sided with the West to continue the war. Unfortunately, the Taleban seem to do well in this regard!

Another core failure at the start of the Western intervention in 2001, closely related to the War on Terror, needs to be mentioned: the *de facto* alliance of Western troops, in particular Americans, with the warlords in many parts of the country, many of them drug barons and/or notorious human right violators, to defeat the Taleban. This alliance has a certain logic in terms of the War on Terror. If military victory, and not stabilization and peacebuilding, are the highest priority the principle applies "the enemy of my enemy is my friend". Inevitably, all those who have a record of opposing the Taleban were welcomed as allies regardless of their past misdeeds.

In terms of a quick military victory over the Taleban at the beginning without much cost for the Allies this strategy was effective. Overtime, however, it had amongst the Afghan population a disastrous effect on the credibility of the Western democratization, human rights and rule of law agenda as a way to stabilize Afghanistan.

It was in particular Britain which in 2001 had offered an alternative approach. The British military proposed the deployment not of some minimal 3 000, but at least 30 000 troops to secure Kabul and other strategic places without the help of warlords. This was exactly what the Afghan population hoped for after the defeat of the Taleban. They did not want the warlords to return!

However, the British proposal did not fit the mood in most Western capitals that were ready to enter Afghanistan with much fanfare and grand international agreements, like the "Petersberg Accord", but only with few troops. And it was also still the time when then Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld's dislike for peacekeeping was very much *en vogue*. Unfortunately, Lakhdar Brahimi, renowned for chairing one of the best panels in the history of peacekeeping lessons learned and well informed about Afghanistan, provided a comforting rationale for this reluctance to get substantially involved by advocating a "light foot print" approach.

Fortunately, as indicated before there seems to be an increasing understanding amongst the military, not least US commanders, that the kind of War on Terror they have fought until recently is counterproductive and plays into the hands of its declared main enemy, the Taleban. ISAF as well as OEF have in the meantime turned to strategies of avoiding civilian casualties and making the protection of civilians, and not the killing of Talebans, the highest priority of their operations. The new 123 page handbook, "Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan", produced by the U.S. Centre for Army Lessons Learned, strikes a very different tone in that regard, and even has a tone of respect for the combat abilities of the Taleban.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Washington Post, August 13, 2009.

Whether this change of strategy is not coming too late to reverse the present negative trend in Afghanistan is difficult to predict.⁶⁵ The experiences in other missions teach the lesson that it is very difficult to regain the confidence of the local people once it has been lost. And the new strategy will have, of course, a downside which is not going to please several governments in Europe: Higher troop levels will be needed to achieve its goals. In February 2009, President Obama, ordered to increase American troops by 17 000 or more. To what extent the Allies will follow suit in building up their contributions remains to be seen.

In sum, one might well argue that treating the Taleban as a "negative force" to be fought with the limited but well targeted use of force along the lines of existing NATO, British, Canadian, and the past 1994 US Peace Operation Doctrines might have been more effective in containing them than the War on Terror. Most certainly, the population in Afghanistan would not be as alienated from the international presence as it is today.

Such a strategy would have of course demanded a considerably stronger ISAF from the very beginning. Ironically, the aggregated strength of all troops presently deployed in Afghanistan in either ISAF or OEF of about 80. 000 (ISAF about 63.000 plus OEF slightly over 30.000, mostly U.S.) has significantly surpassed the numbers originally proposed by Britain in 2001.⁶⁶

V. Peacebuilding – Too Slow and Ineffective?

All of the peacekeeping and peace support operations doctrines quoted in this article address the strategic need for *civilian* efforts of reconstruction, stabilization and post-conflict peacebuilding in parallel to the military tasks. The UN doctrine and the AU document are the most explicit in this regard. And there are numerous other documents that deal with peacebuilding related issues, most noteworthy the *Guidelines on Conflict Prevention, Peace and Development Co-operation* (Paris 1997) of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

Yet, the diversity of terms used in the doctrines is stunning: Stabilization, reconstruction, transformation, nation-building, state building, post-conflict peacebuilding, development and other terms are in use. This diversity derives from a variety of reasons. Above all, it reflects the difficulty to agree on the best way to stabilize violence-torn states and societies. Nevertheless, in abstract, a general understanding of "peacebuilding" (or how so ever it is labeled; henceforth, the author will use the term peacebuilding) has evolved. It comprises, as the UN doctrine correctly states, a "range of measures to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capabilities for conflict management". Furthermore, peacebuilding is a complex and long-term process in which those areas that are decisive for

⁶⁵ For a differentiated overview of recent developments in Afghanistan see *Winfried Nachtwei, Member of the German Parliament, Better news statt bad news aus Afghanistan, Mach 2009, www.nachtwei.de*

⁶⁶ Allegedly in August 2009 more than a 100 000 Western troops are deployed in Afghanistan, 62 000 of them American. Daily News; 7 August 2009. <http://www.newsdaily.com/stories/isl115559-us-afghanistan/#>

the "functioning of society and the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions"⁶⁷, need to be addressed.

This sentence from the UN Principles and Guidelines contains an important clarification: The term state-building, most frequently used in Western literature on peacebuilding and development, is misleading. Peacebuilding is not only about the state but as much about society and its transformation because it is not only state institutions which have eroded in countries like Afghanistan, DR Congo, Liberia, Haiti, but societal structures and textures as well. The term "state failure" does not catch this reality and the heavy reliance on institution-building in Western driven efforts more often than not ends up in erecting "Potemkin villages", i.e. a façade of democratization, rule of law and good governance, which crumble once the internationals have left. The term *re*-construction is equally misleading. Reconstruction, taken literally, would mean to resurrect those structures which caused the conflict. This cannot be the purpose of meaningful peacebuilding.

Despite the terminological tangle, since the 90ies a rather consolidated understanding of peacebuilding has evolved which encompasses the *substantive* areas such as human rights and the rule of law, democratization and elections, security sector reform and DDR, transitional justice and reconciliation, economic stabilization and development. In fact, each of these areas constitutes a demanding field of its own in terms of expertise, support, capacity building, phasing etc. These components require to be thoroughly tailored to the local cultural, economic, political, and social conditions in each and every individual case which is much more complex than tailoring military activities.

At the same time, prioritization, synchronization, and phasing of stages in and between the different substantive areas are continuously needed on a strategic level. (Unfortunately, both requirements can hardly be met in a sufficient manner, even though the writing up of an Implementation Plan in UN missions has brought some improvement).

There are good reasons to argue that - taken all its substantive areas into consideration - peacebuilding has become so complex that it is beyond what international institutions, with all their internal bureaucratic difficulties *and* the poorly tamed anarchy of nation-states, are able to render in a coherent manner. The "messiness" of peacebuilding efforts in the field, quite often deplored, is only surprising for those who have neither a proper understanding of its complexity nor of the workings of the present international system. (The majority of the academic literature on peace, development, and conflict prevention continues to systematically negate this unpleasant reality by directing its demands and complaints to a non-existent political actor, the "international community" who like a *deus ex machina* should respond to these demands in a coherent manner. Unfortunately, there is no such *deus ex machina*, an international community being able to act as an unified, well organized actor. Indeed, the unfortunate reality is that this community remains a rather chaotic system of regions and states with merely one or

⁶⁷ UN Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines, p. 18.

the other islands of more or less coherently organized multinational or multilateral actors like the UN, EU, OAS, AU, ECOWAS, OSCE etc..

It is beyond the scope of this article to address the demands and implementation problems of each and every area of peacebuilding. The next chapters will limit them to focus on five basic structural issues of peacebuilding: (1) *Civilian-Police-Military Cooperation*; (2) *the Liberal Peace Agenda –Too Ambitious?* (3) *Time Horizon and Exit*; (4) *Local Ownership Unsolved*; (5) *the Myth of Coherence and Comprehensiveness*.

Civil-Police-Military Cooperation

In contrast to the early 90ies, there is nowadays a broad consensus on one important issue: development needs security and security is not sustainable without development. Likewise, all the doctrines agree upon the close nexus of military involvement and civilian-lead peacebuilding activities. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) has become the widely accepted term for the cooperation of both (although the military and the civilians may not always have exactly the same in mind when using this term).⁶⁸ Despite this acceptance, a number of civilian governmental and non-governmental actors remain suspicious about the manner and purpose of military involvement in areas which they consider as the civilians traditional turf. Civilian fears of losing funds to the military also do exist. And there is in particular strong resentment towards the US practice of deploying "military-civilian teams", led by the Department of Defense. These military-civilian teams are accused of blurring the divide between civilian and military actors. Therefore, some organizations, such as the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) or MSF (Médecines Sans Frontières) reject any co-operation with the military because they fear that it may affect their neutrality and the security of their personnel. (It is to be welcomed that in Afghanistan military and civilian actors recently agreed on the "Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines" to overcome this divide. These guidelines address the concerns of the civilians about the increasing involvement of international military forces in humanitarian aid and development efforts.)⁶⁹

However, the *police* as one key actor of peacebuilding has been neglected in the whole debate on Civil-Military Cooperation, even though the police has become a strategic pillar of its own in peace operations since the 90ies. Moreover, the police has very much an operational culture of its own, which is distinct from that of the military and non-uniformed civilian actors. Therefore it is more appropriate to speak of *Civil-Police-Military Cooperation (Civ-Pol-Mil)* instead of merely *Civil-Military Cooperation*. Within this cooperation triangle, the division of labor and cooperation between the police and military needs to be better defined and more strategic guidance in all existing doctrines, in particular with regard to the following three areas:

- *The "policing" role of the military in the start-up phase of a mission:* The demand for a policing role of the military may be surprising, given the fact that the deployment of police, civilian rule of law

⁶⁸ For more details concerning the military side see for instance NATO's AJP-9 NATO CIMIC Doctrine (June 2003) or the British Interim Joint Warfare Publication 3-90 CIMIC, November 2003.

⁶⁹ IRIN, humanitarian news and analysis, 8 August 2008.

experts and prison personnel simultaneously with the military has today become an accepted standard and should be part of any mission planning from the very beginning in order to avoid a vacuum with regard to the police and the rule of law in the first few months of a mission. The need to safeguard public order and the rule of law starts on day one of a mission! Due to the difficulty of recruiting police units with sufficient speed and quantity, this is, however, a schedule the police are rarely able to meet. The military therefore cannot limit itself to its core task of creating a "secure environment", but also has to be prepared to do some policing in the start-up phase.

- *Support for the police in cases of mass unrest* with potential for escalation and violence, for instance the detention of "war criminals" or popular leaders who are involved in organized crime, as it has repeatedly occurred on the Balkans (likewise in Liberia). Military commanders often hesitate to follow appeals for such support as they do not feel that this is a "military task". They fail to understand what has been pointed out in this paper: Peace operations in failed state scenarios are "militarized police operations". The line between military and police tasks is fluent and the grey area in between needs subtle and coordinated management of both, the police and the military. There are a number of experienced Police Commissioners and Force Commanders who have developed artful techniques of deploying their respective units in inner (UNPOL and FPU) and outer circles (military) of protection in critical cases of public unrest.
- *Support and cooperation with the police in combating organized crime (OK)*. OK has become a main obstacle for successful peacebuilding.⁷⁰ Its containment and abolition (as far as this is possible) is therefore key for the final success of a mission. The military can provide valuable intelligence (although military intelligence is not legal evidence) as well as logistical and organizational support. It is, of course, the police which has the ultimate responsibility to combat organized crime and therefore has to remain upfront.

The Liberal Peace Agenda – Too Ambitious?

When multidimensional peacebuilding became a strategic element of peacekeeping in the early 90ies, politicians as well as most experts expected this, as was mentioned in the beginning, to lead to quick results enabling missions to withdraw as planned. The success of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia as well as of missions like the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) and the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) in the early 90ies seemed to confirm this expectation. These missions basically managed to fulfill their mandate within the envisaged timeframe and eventually withdrew.

⁷⁰ For more see the Report by the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), "Organized Crime as an Obstacle to Successful Peacebuilding. Lessons learned from the Balkans, Afghanistan and West Africa," Report on the 7th International Berlin Workshop, December 11-13, 2003 (www.zif-berlin.org).

The hope for quick withdrawals has thoroughly been shattered in the meantime. In the Balkans as well as in Africa, Afghanistan and Haiti, exit dates needed to be stretched again and again, up to a decade and longer. Even the mission in Timor-Leste, where a rather quick withdrawal of troops was accomplished, suddenly turned into a heavy disappointment by sliding back into violent turmoil. The international withdrawal of troops had been premature because the solidity of previous peacebuilding efforts had widely been overestimated.

One can basically identify two key reasons for the fact that pre-determined exit dates of missions have become so difficult to meet: an overambitious "liberal peace agenda", and much too short time horizons to implement this agenda.

The "liberal peace agenda" basically aims at ensuring the development of a modern state through the establishment of the rule of law, market economies, and liberal democracy. Over time, SSR, DDR, transitional justice and other tasks have been added as further important elements. Increasingly, however, this agenda has become the object of very sobering and widespread critique.⁷¹ The list is long. Only the most basic points of critique will be summarized here:

- The agenda erroneously assumes that international interveners can control the formation of states and processes of social change. Furthermore, the agenda ignores an important conclusion found in most literature on state building, democratization, and social change, namely that transitional processes are inherently unstable, are likely to lead to more rather than less conflict, and do not follow a linear, technocratically organized trajectory.
- The latter is particularly true if very demanding elements of the agenda such as institution building, capacity building and profound transformation of values and socio-cultural structures are imposed on weak states and societies which are still deeply segmented and caught in paternalistic-authoritarian styles of rule. (Such rule can be identified to a stronger or lesser degree in all those countries where missions have been deployed since the early 90ies). These countries and their societies are asked to accomplish within a few years what took Western countries centuries to develop. Again: Unduly speeding up complex processes of social change and liberalization in these societies may lead to more rather than less conflict.
- The political and financial resources that are needed to implement this agenda are rarely available. Even in cases where resources are plentiful, as in Kosovo and Bosnia, the achievements of the liberal

⁷¹ Selection of the extensive literature on peacebuilding and related issues: Barnett, H., H Kim, M. O'Donnell, L. Sitea, "Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?" In: *Global Governance*, vol. 13, 2007, pp. 35-58; Church, C. and Rogers, M.M., *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs*. Washington, D.C. Search for Common Ground (2006); Paris, R., *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Smith, P.M., *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*. (Brattvaag, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004); Anderson, M.B. and Olson, L., *Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners* (Cambridge: The Collaborative Development Actions, 2003); Lund, M., *What Kind of Peace is Being Built?* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2003); Doyle, M.W. and Sambanis, N., "International Peacebuilding. A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." In: *American Political Science Review* (December 2000) vol. 4, pp. 779-801. Kuehne, W., „Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Tasks, Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Practical Solutions", in: Krumwiede, H. (ed.), *Civil Wars: Consequences and Possibilities for Regulation*. (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2000).

agenda are not impressive. In fact, the infusion of more or less huge amounts of financial aid in a rather short period may be counterproductive in at least three respects: firstly, it triggers more rather than less corruption, despite the international call for good governance; secondly, it is hastily spent without adequate planning, in particular with regard to strengthening local ownership; thirdly, as a consequence of the latter, it often ends up in the portfolios of the international governmental and non-governmental organizations (more on that in the chapter on Local Ownership).

- Consequently, an enormous peacebuilding "industry" has rapidly grown over the last two decades. Unfortunately, this expansion has not been accompanied by an increased ability of peacebuilding organizations to coordinate and demonstrate their impact.⁷² As most evaluations are limited to input-output evaluations, they provide little insight into the impact these inputs really had. Realistic impact evaluations are extremely difficult to conduct due to the complexity of peacebuilding processes and dynamics.
- With regard to the ability of the international community to implement this agenda, there exists an enormous myth concerning the ability to pursue a comprehensive (or fully integrated) approach, although the latter is considered in most literature as well as in doctrines and related documents as a *sine qua non* for successful peacebuilding. The fact that the organizational cultures of the development, humanitarian and peacekeeping communities are basically irreconcilable within a single unified or even centralized structure of coherence is well-known to those who work in these communities but hidden behind a never-ending rhetoric about the need for coherence, integration and coordination. The UN does its most to tackle this long-standing problem by trying to implement its "integrated mission concept" – with very limited success so far.

One can hardly deny that these and other points of critique are very substantial and justified.

Afghanistan, although often center stage in the media, is only one telling example of all the negatives enumerated here.⁷³ Yet, the critique of the liberal peace agenda faces one big problem: It has not been able to come up with a convincing alternative. The alternative most frequently mentioned (although never worked out in detail) is the call for going back to traditional structures instead of pursuing Western driven models. This sounds better than it is. In fact, it is quite fallacious for two reasons:

- To a large extent, these traditional structures do not exist or function anymore as assumed because they have been eroded or deformed in centuries of slave trade (Africa), colonialism and/or decades of civil wars and violence (see Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Liberia, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan etc.).
- Secondly, these deformed, traditional structures, particularly in Africa, constitute one of the main root causes of the development of dictatorial and corrupt authoritarian regimes in the 70ies and 80ies which then became one of the main causes of state failure and disintegration in the 90ies. Nobody wants to return to this state of affairs.

⁷² An excellent study on this topic is undertaken by Campbell, Susanna P., *Peacebuilding Organizations: Explaining the Gap Between Intention and Outcome*. March 2008 (unpublished).

⁷³ See the excellent Report of the US House of Representatives, Committee of Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility – Lessons We need To Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, April 2008).

Today's demand, therefore, is not to jettison the liberal peace agenda, but rather to work on its structural deficiencies which have been pointed out in the critique above. In the view of the author, the following are the most essential and urgent aspects which need to be addressed: the issue of time pressure, overambitious concepts, and exit; local ownership; and the myth of coherence and comprehensiveness.

Time Horizon and Exit

The normal duration of UN mandates in the 60ies, 70ies and 80ies has been up to one year. This has never been realistic. In fact, most of the traditional Blue Helmet missions deployed since the late 40s are still in theatre, like the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO, deployed in the Middle East in 1948), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF; Golan Heights in 1974), and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFYCIP, in 1974). Only exceptionally there have been first generation missions such as UNEF I on the Sinai and the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) which did not stay long, the latter very recently withdrew in summer 2008. They did so not because they had successfully completed their tasks, but because consent had been revoked.

Budgetary rules and the demand for financial control constituted the main reason for introducing these short time frames. Understandably, those countries which overwhelmingly fund UN peacekeeping missions via the so-called assessed budget are most reluctant to agree to lengthy and costly adventures. The US as the main contributor has particularly been hesitant to agree to expensive missions, unless they served America's immediate national interests. Countries such as Japan, Germany, Britain, France, which are next in line as main contributors, principally share these US concerns, but have been less outspoken in revealing them as the official reason for not agreeing to new missions. Thus there are good reasons for short time frames. Yet this does not change the fact that they are counterproductive for a number of reasons. Unrealistic or overtly wrong planning of implementation, projects and activities, as planning cannot be based on time frames which are realistic in terms of achieving sustainable results. Ironically, this drives cost up although short time frames are meant to save costs. However, some improvements have taken place in recent years as mission implementation plans are allowed to go beyond these time horizons to some extent.

Unrealistic time frames also force mission personnel to find "creative" ways and means to cope with them; otherwise their career may be at risk. Two ways have become popular in missions: Firstly, speeding up slowly moving projects by calling in additional international consultants. This is not only costly, but also damaging in terms of strengthening local ownership. Secondly "embellishing" regular mission reports by either inflating progress and/or minimizing failures and non-performance.

The quick rotation of mission personnel aggravates the negative effects of unrealistic time frames. With regard to the military, the semi-annual rotation of most troop contributors (African and other troops from the South mostly rotate on an annual basis) has since long been identified as a major impediment to subtle and sustained performance in complex socio-cultural and socio-economical environments.

Rotation cycles of four months, a common practice of the Bundeswehr for instance, practically render such performance impossible. Spoilers and other negative forces have a walk-over to manipulate the rotating internationals and to play them off against each other. They know the "internationals" and their problems often much better than vice versa.

Finally, short time frames of mandates boost a problem all missions are struggling with: unrealistic expectations of the local population (and considerable parts of the international community) about what missions are able to achieve quickly. Sooner or later, disappointment and animosity will therefore grow and turn against the internationals. Unfulfilled expectations are one of the most severe psychological problems missions have to struggle with. UNMIK in Kosovo has very much suffered from this fate after its enthusiastic start.

However, there is also good news. Missions are increasingly moving beyond these unrealistic time frames by substituting rigid exit dates with more refined draw-down processes and benchmarks. One important lesson learned already in the 90ies was that it is wrong to dogmatize elections as the end state and exit date of missions. Elections are just one step in the long process of stabilization and democratization but, as a rule, not suitable for defining exit dates. The UN paid tribute to this insight by deploying a variety of post-conflict peacebuilding missions after elections have been held. Typically, these missions do not have any (or only a very weak) military element, but a limited civilian and possibly police element that continue to monitor the situation and provide support and advice. UNIOSIL (UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone) and BINUB (UN Integrated Office in Burundi) are typical for this type of mission.⁷⁴ UNMIL in Liberia under the leadership of its former SRSG, Allan Doss, has been most creative in substituting rigid exit dates by a more flexible approval. Starting in 2006, the mission together with DPKO in New York has developed a phased and carefully monitored process of drawing the mission down and by defining benchmarks in the main substance areas of Peacebuilding. They are continually assessed and reformulated before the next draw-down steps are undertaken.⁷⁵

In the missions on the Balkans, a similar constructive way to manage the divide between mandates' time frames and reality evolved, albeit not as consciously designed as in the case of UNMIL in Liberia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the military presence of IFOR/SFOR has been drawn down cautiously but steadily from about 57 000 in December 1995 to less than 7 000 (EU Operation Althea) in summer 2008. The same applies to the police and civilian presence. A slide back into gross violence, like in East Timor, has thereby been prevented. Kosovo shows a very similar pattern: The Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered with a strength of more than 50 000 in June 1999. In 2008, its strength was down to less than 16 000. And the progressive substitution of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) by EULEX, the European Rule of Law and Police Mission is an interesting and innovative approach to manage the need for long-term international

⁷⁴ A comprehensive outline of the current political and peacebuilding missions of the UN is to be found on the UN Webpage: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ppbm.pdf>.

⁷⁵ For details see the Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/2007/479 (8 August 2007) and S/2008/183 (19 March 2008).

monitoring and support, despite its immense start-up problems due to the still controversial status of Kosovo as an independent state.

In sum, the search for better ways and means to bridge the gap between time frames set by mandates and the long-term reality of peacebuilding efforts has successfully been started and needs to be continued. By doing so, the tendency towards unrealistic expectations of what missions are able to accomplish will be eased, less costly planning ought to become possible, and the counterproductive effects of these short time frames on Local Ownership will be reduced.

Local Ownership – Unresolved

There is one imperative in peacebuilding that is totally undisputed: International actors cannot be successful without the support of the local population and its final take over of responsibility. Otherwise, there will be no successful exit, neither by the troops nor by the police and civilians. All existing doctrines agree upon this imperative of "Local Ownership".

The rationale behind the concept of Local Ownership is not new. Ownership, as well as related terms such as "local participation" and "local empowerment", was already in use in the development community throughout the 80ies and 90ies, and was later adopted in a number of peacebuilding documents. Still the challenges in the field to implement this concept are enormous, despite its unanimous acceptance and ritual repetition in international documents as well as in most peace research literature. Confusion about its operational content and the problems of implementation abound. Cynicism is widespread amongst those working in missions. The expression "the locals", current in most missions, is not as innocent as it may sound to outsiders.

And what does ownership realistically mean in societies who have been devastated for decades by state failure and violence? Should peacekeepers and peacebuilders select Western-style organized NGOs as partners, although they often only have token roots in the local population and little influence, or might even have been created for the sake of accessing international funds? Are so-called traditional leaders the better choice, although most of them are only a shadow of what they used to be and are often corrupted and spoiled by colonialism and decades of state failure and civil war? In contrast, warlords and militias do exercise real power in no uncertain terms based on their weapons and not at all without significant roots in the local population. Yet, their agenda and the concept of peacebuilding hardly match.

In other words, it is difficult for the "internationals" to find partners in these war-torn societies who are – according to the UN jargon – "able, willing and relevant" at the same time. This difficulty is, given some reflection, not surprising at all. It is an expression of the fact that these societies are not only war-torn, but also engulfed in very profound and conflict-ridden processes of societal transformation. Fighting for physical and material survival is not the only issues in this process. It is as much about power,

enrichment, and identity. Local actors are not outside of this process, but very much part of it, to a greater or lesser degree. They primarily define their identity and behavior in accordance with this process, and not in accordance with the wishes of the internationals and their peacebuilding agenda. Warlordism and different brands of organized crime inevitably thrive in this kind of context, quite similar to the 30 Years' War in Europe. Both are not only experts in profiting financially from the international presence, but are also masters in linking informal clan and family structures with the fluidity of the global market for their own benefit. By doing so, they have developed and brought to perfection the art of using modern technology, like the internet, satellite phones and air transport, in order to run these amorphous networks.

Experts like Ellis, therefore, argue against an early transfer of control to local actors. According to him, this might play into the hands of the original perpetrators: "Many officials in the new government, however, have murky pasts – including ties to a militia that committed atrocities during the war. They and their colleagues have very little interest in making more than a rhetorical commitment to good governance".⁷⁶ Simon Chesterman has similar concerns: "At worst, premature restoration of local control might lead to a return to the governing policies (or lack thereof) that led to intervention in the first place".⁷⁷ In a similar vein Kuehne asks: "What is the substance of the concept of local ownership in failed states where there is, by definition, no political class available to exercise this ownership in a responsible way? A key feature of state failure is that the political class has been destroyed or has destroyed itself."⁷⁸ The issue of how to deal with "spoilers" has to be seen in this context. As Scheye and Peake have stated, local actors are not necessarily benevolent stakeholders, "but rather ought to be conceived to be a collection of actors, many of whom regard reform as a direct challenge to their power, livelihoods, and practices".⁷⁹ Steve Stedman, therefore, distinguishes in his well-known article on "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes" between "limited", "greedy" and "total" spoilers. Each of these groups has to be managed in a specific way, either by bringing them into the peacebuilding process or by isolating or even neutralizing them.⁸⁰ Practitioners are still struggling to put this differentiation into practice, be it in Afghanistan, the DR Congo, Kosovo or elsewhere.⁸¹

⁷⁶ Ellis, S., How to Rebuild Africa, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 5 (2005), p. 142.

⁷⁷ Chesterman, S., *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 6.

⁷⁸ Kuehne, W., *Post-Conflict Reconstructing and War-Shattered Societies – What Actually is the Problem? What can be Done?* Unpublished Draft Paper Prepared for the UN Foundation, New York, in Preparation for the Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Chance 2004, 2003, p. 5.

⁷⁹ Scheye, E. and Peake, G., *Unknotting Local Ownership, After Intervention: Public Security in Post-Conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership* (Geneva and Vienna: DCAF/ PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, 2005) p. 236.

⁸⁰ See Stedman, S., "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes", *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997), pp. 5-53.

⁸¹ ZIF is presently conducting a major, field oriented research project on "Peacebuilding Processes in Failed States – How to Improve Local Ownership? Paper prepared for the 49th Annual International Studies Association Convention, San Francisco, 29 March 2008, Panel on "Multidimensional Peace-Keeping and – Building and the United States". Winrich Kuehne in Co-Authorship with Tobias Pietz, Leo von Carlowitz and Tobias Gienanth, Berlin, Germany, 2008. The project is supported by the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF).

It would go beyond the scope of this article to address the manifold difficulties of defining and implementing the concept of Local Ownership in a realistic, field-oriented manner.⁸² The author will therefore merely point out its three most basic structural problems and dilemmas for further discussion: *Process and outcome*: Local Ownership is not only a process, but also an outcome-oriented normative principle of transferring international responsibilities into local hands. This dual nature of Local Ownership inevitably raises the question about *phases and timing* as well as *degrees and types* of involvement at the different levels and areas of peacebuilding. Preliminary research reveals that not very much systematic and strategic planning in this regard is to be found in most missions, although *capacity building* in its different forms is an important activity to promote Local Ownership.

Asymmetric relationship: Researchers like Reich have correctly pointed out that the use of the term Local Ownership distracts from the fact that international interventions tend to be characterized by a profound asymmetric relationship between external and internal actors.⁸³ In most cases, donors and international organizations have already shaped the agenda, assessed the situation, and designed the programs before any local involvement takes place. Providing funds together with the bureaucratic procedure *per se* establishes an inescapable asymmetry, regardless the claims of the project description in terms of Local Ownership. Instead of appealing to fictitious Local Ownership, the asymmetric interaction between *external* and *internal actors* should, therefore, be acknowledged as a fundamental feature on the way to effective Local Ownership.

Dilemmas of local ownership: Other authors explored the dilemmas which internationals face when trying to engage with the local population in order to transfer responsibility.⁸⁴ Three dilemmas are key:

- *Intrusiveness dilemma*. Overly intrusive policy- and decision-makings by external actors tend to alienate local stakeholders. Less intrusive measures may not be sufficient to stabilize a post-conflict situation.
- *Dependency dilemma*. Establishing sustainable local structures and capacities requires long-term external commitment. Yet, long-term international involvement and assistance tends to create local dependencies on external support.
- *Transition dilemma*. International peacebuilding activities should cooperate with local actors and should be based on existing structures and traditions from the very beginning. However, traditional power structures and mentalities often cause or contribute to the outbreak of conflict.

⁸² There are good reasons to argue that because of its vagueness and the many diverging interpretations, the term Local Ownership rather obfuscates than promotes local participation and responsibility and should, therefore, be dropped altogether. However, there are normative as well as practical reasons for retaining this term: (1) Local Ownership is a reflection of core principles of international law, i.e. the right to self-determination and the principle of national sovereignty as stipulated in the UN Charter; it is consistently used in official mandates and documents of the UN as well as by other international actors like the EU, World Bank, AU, which guides the field work of these organizations.

⁸³ Reich, H., *Local Ownership in Conflict Transformation Projects. Partnership, Participation or Patronage?* (Berlin: Berghof Foundation, Occasional Paper 27, 2006) pp. 6-8.

⁸⁴ Narten, J., *Post-conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: A Case Study on External-local Dynamics in Kosovo under UN Interim Administration*. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference in Chicago, 3 March 2007, pp.16 et seq. Accessible at: <http://64.112.226.70/one/isa/isa07/>; see also Hansen, A. / Wiharta, S., *The Transition to a Just Order after Conflict*, Policy Report, Draft 2006.

Myth and Reality of Integration and Comprehensiveness

Those who have never seen a mission from the inside will hardly be able to appreciate the enormous difficulties international actors face to properly manage the profound structural problems and dilemmas of Local Ownership. The reality on the ground is complex and messy.

Unfortunately, this is no less true for the internationals themselves. As has already been indicated, modern peace operations and conflict resolution efforts, in particular in big missions, are a messy market place for hundreds if not thousands of smaller and larger international actors trying to do their best, but also to secure their turf. Despite a multitude of lessons learned seminars, overall cooperation and coordination of tasks and activities in missions have not significantly improved.

The reason for this sobering state of affairs is not due to an unwillingness to learn lessons. It can rather be traced back to the enormous explosion of actors in terms of numbers and a heavy bureaucratization of many international actors involved in peace missions. Peace operations, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding have become mainstream activities for which a lot of money is spent. Systems of evaluation, oversight and other control mechanism have proliferated since the 90ies. The need for such a system cannot be denied. But there is also no denying that they exacerbate bureaucratic inertia and inflexibility of decisions and planning in most organizations, in particular the larger ones.

Apart from the mission itself, the large specialized agencies of the UN system, like UNDP, WFP, UNHCR, or UNICEF, dominate the field. More than 16 of such agencies, 14 funds and programs, and 17 departments and offices of the UN, all with different mandates and many with different governance structures and funding sources, may be present. Although part of the UN family, these agencies are not under the direct command of the mission's leadership. This is even truer with regard to the hundreds of international NGOs in the field which all have their special way of operating. Most of them do not like to be subjugated to tight coordination and insist on their own turf, like the UN specialized agencies do.

The UN is trying to counter this enormous potential for disorder and chaos by trying to implement the "integrated mission concept". It has briefly been described in its main elements in Chapter I. Some limited progress has been made to implement this concept. Whether significantly more is achievable remains to be seen. Most UN staff members in the field as well as in the New York headquarters probably have serious doubts, but will certainly not voice them in public. The fragmentation in the UN system in terms of governance structures, funding systems, bureaucratic vanity etc. is simply beyond what any integration effort could overcome. Other international organizations, like the EU and the AU, are not doing better! The EU struggles with internal divisions along several lines:⁸⁵ First and foremost, there are deep institutional divisions between the Commission and the Council, which not only entail lack of cooperation but often also open competition and turf war, in Brussels as well as in the field.

⁸⁵ For more details see *Niels Nagelhus Schia & Stale Ulriksen*, *Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations – A Discussion Paper for MNE5*, (728) NUP Working Paper, 2007, pp. 11.

This kind of fragmentation within the EU system will not be overcome until the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) has come into force and Brussels will start to build up an integrated External Service of the EU. That may take a long time and the outcome is uncertain. Nevertheless, the critical look at the EU's ability to act in an integrated manner does not deny the fact that there have been cases in which coordination was satisfactory, in particular regarding small missions like the Monitoring mission in Aceh. It should also be noted that the Council Secretariat is disposing of a *Civilian-Military Cell* under the Military Staff to provide strategic options and integrated/comprehensive planning.

The Security Council has been very much amongst those calling for better coordination and integration in missions. Despite this call, the SC and its members are the main culprits for making effective integration and coordination difficult. They increasingly agree on mandates which do not single out one international organization for planning and conducting a mission, but tasks several organizations in parallel. Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid 90ies was one of the first of such cases. NATO, the UN, the OHR (Office of the High Representative) as well as the EU were in charge to perform different tasks. The mandate for the Kosovo turned out to be not much better, although the UN were officially in charge of the four pillars which constituted their mission UNMIK. De facto, however, the EU and OSCE as well as UNHCR (a pillar of UNMIK in the first phase of the mission) only grudgingly accepted the lead of the UN and often pursued very much their own agendas. The lack of coordination was a constant complaint in UNMIK. UNAMID in the Sudan (Darfur) is another and recent case in which two very unequal organizations and their bureaucracies have been mandated to work together and to plan and conduct one mission, namely UNAMID. The deficiency of this co-called hybrid model, so enthusiastically welcomed by some in the beginning, is meanwhile widely accepted. The European Force (EUFOR) and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) are further cases of a politically convenient, but in terms of architecture and efficiency problematic model.

Despite the obvious problems created thereby, there is a catchy new name for this trend to authorize diverse international organizations: peacekeeping partnerships. About 40 of the more than 50 peace operations presently conducted worldwide operate in one form or the other in such a partnership. Peacekeeping "partnerships" are becoming a major feature of the present global peace operations' architecture. While each case is individual unto itself, these partnerships can be characterized by three broad variants:

- *Sequential Operations*: Where different peace operations platforms succeed each other, like it was planned with regard to UNMIK and EULEX in Kosovo;
- *Parallel Operations*: Two or more platforms operating in the same theatre under separate command, but to the same broad purpose such as the missions in Bosnia in the 90ies and now ISAF and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA);
- *Hybrid Operations*: Characterized by unified or joint command like UNAMID in Darfur.

There is no doubt: the use of partnerships has given the Security Council and its members an impressive amount of flexibility in addressing conflict situations in different parts of the world. Partnerships have also been useful in joining up global legitimacy to regional actors (or vice versa).

Yet, the implementation of peacekeeping partnerships has largely been ad hoc and, despite their positive aspects, they must be recognized for what they are: operational formulations, primarily driven by political compromises and dictated by the situation at hand, by actors in theatre and at the international and headquarters level. More often than not, partnerships have added unnecessary levels of complexity to peace operations, negatively spread accountability across actors involved and opened space for spoilers to employ "divide and rule" strategies. While peacekeeping partnerships have grown in frequency, a parallel process in developing institutional architectures that recognizes the operational imperative of inter-institutional coordination has been slow in coming. There is little in the form of predictability of how a given partnership will function, how it will be financed, or how they will cooperate and coordinate in theatre.⁸⁶

Summing up, the outlook for improving cooperation and integration of international peace operations and peacebuilding is dim. This is, in the first place, not due to the unwillingness of staff to learn, but rather due to the enormous explosion of actors in the field and the heavy bureaucratization which has taken place since the 90ies. This makes quick and flexible planning, decision-making and implementation very difficult. A radical reform of the existing intuitional architecture for peace operations and peacebuilding would be needed. The strong leadership by key international actors to achieve this Herculean task is not in sight.

Therefore, the author argues that continuing the almost ritual calls for better integration and coordination should be abandoned and replaced by a culture which faces the reality of diversity with honesty and develops mechanisms to manage it. The ability to provide creative "management of diversity" has to be promoted. There have been and there are mission leaders and senior staff who – paying tribute to the often chaotic reality in missions – are already practicing this in an admirable way. If such "management of diversity" is complemented by a realistic demand for "unity of purpose", missions will be better off.

The SC can greatly contribute to this aim by providing missions in their mandates with an institutional architecture in which such a management can be conducted with a perspective of success. For this to happen, SC members must not only have the need for political compromises in mind in order to agree on a mandate, but also to develop a strong sense for the need to empower missions to do their job. The SC has not been up to this task in recent years.

⁸⁶ See the CIC/ZIF Report *Towards an Understanding of Peacekeeping Partnerships*, June 2008, p.1 and 2, on the Website of ZIF: http://www.zif-berlin.org/Downloads/Veroeffentlichungen/CIC-ZIF_Conference_Report_06_08.pdf.

VI. Conclusions

When US presidential candidate Barack Obama visited Berlin in July 2008 he had one strong message: Europe and the US have to make a special effort to overcome irritations and rifts which have developed in the transatlantic relationship over past years. The German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has confirmed on different occasions that he feels very much the same way. In February 2009, Vice-President Biden reiterated the particularly strong interest of the new administration to get into a thorough dialogue with its allies about strategies to jointly deal better with Afghanistan. Such a dialogue, however, would have to be based on a willingness to contribute more capabilities, if needed.

There are a number of topics resulting from this article which should be considered for an ongoing transatlantic dialogue on peace operations and peacebuilding:

- How can the rift between US doctrine on the one hand and NATO, British, UN and other doctrines with regard to the use of force in peace and stabilization operations be overcome? A joint understanding of robustness, i.e. the relationship between the use of force and consent, impartiality and credibility needs to be developed. Even more important, the divide between the present European and US doctrines on the parallel conduct of peace and stabilization operation and warfare, in particular War on Terror, has to be discussed. That is imperative for increasing the effectiveness of joint operations in the context of NATO, Coalitions of the Willing or any other kind of operations. The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan is urgently calling for such a dialogue, not only on the military but on the political level as well.
- The structural problems of peacebuilding which have been addressed in the article equally need to be discussed at the transatlantic level (and in the UN and EU as well). Successful peacebuilding is a precondition for the exit not only of civilians but also the military. Issues to be addressed are: (1) civil-military cooperation with particular emphasis on unsolved problems of cooperation and division of labor between the military and the police; (2) overambitious concepts of the liberal peace agenda; (3) improving time horizons for peacebuilding planning and implementation; (4) substituting rigid exit dates with realistic draw-down processes and mechanism based on agreed benchmarks; (5) a better understanding of the basic problems and dilemmas of local ownerships and finding ways and means to deal with them more effectively as in the past.
- Assessing the lessons learned with regard to the varying peacekeeping and peacebuilding partnerships used in the past decade and developing common ground on how to influence the Security Council to design them in a way that they enable, and do not hinder, missions to do their job effectively. These lessons learned concern in particular best and bad practices of past division of labor and cooperation between the UN, NATO, and the EU and, with respect to Africa, the AU. Again, Afghanistan would be the most urgent and appropriate case study in this regard as improvement of the international presence there is of vital importance for the US as well as Europe. And Africa is important as these partnerships are becoming a dominant pattern of Western involvement there. On the whole, the SC has to stop ignoring the operational reality of missions and issuing mandates which have no realistic chance to be successfully implemented, like the one in Darfur. Authorizing "we pretend to do something" mission is one of the unforgivable sins of the SC and should be discontinued.

- Finally, overstretch of capabilities which are particularly perceived to exist in most European countries has to be addressed on the transatlantic level in a more constructive way. Angry and polemic posturing of demands and repliquas across the Atlantic via the media is of little help and deepens rather than overcomes the present divisions on this issue. As the means for improving these capabilities in quantitative terms will remain very limited for the foreseeable future, qualitative remedies should be explored, like abolishing the different kinds of caveats which Germany and other European countries attach to the deployment of their troops, stretching and reorganizing rotation circles of units in a way that they are better tailored to the needs of working in a failed-states environment (four months rotation cycles are insufficient and costly), finding ways to improve the availability of strategic airlift as well as helicopters and other means of air support for missions operating in difficult environments.

Governments on both sides of the Atlantic should be clear that when they take up this dialogue it will only engender progress if it is linked with a clear willingness to accept tough lessons learned from the past, as they have been partly identified in this article, and to adapt policies and behaviour accordingly. They may also come to the conclusion that a dialogue on the transatlantic level is not sufficient for finding remedies to the manifold problems of peace operations, in particular with regard to the issue of overstretch and providing missions with solid legitimacy regarding their interventionist activities. It may well be advisable, and possible, to bring China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and other emerging powers and main troop contributors into this dialogue to successfully tackle conflict, violence and state failure in the next decade!

VII. List of Abbreviations

AJP	Allied Joint Publication
ASF	African Standby Force
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
BINUB	UN Integrated Office in Burundi
C 34	Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CEWARN	Continental Early Warning System
CIC	Centre on International Cooperation
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CIV-POL-MIL	Civil-Police-Military Cooperation
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CRO	Crisis Response Operations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
EASBRIG	East Africa Standby Brigade
ECOBRIg	ECOWAS Standby Brigade
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Force
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FM	Field Manual
FPU	Formed Police Units
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IHT	International Harald Tribune
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IMPT	Integrated Mission Planning Team
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IPTF	International Police Task Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force

MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad / Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo / Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo
MNF	Multi-National Force
MSF	Médecines Sans Frontières
NASBRIG	North African Regional Standby Brigade
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHR	Office of the High Representative
ONUSCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONURSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
OSCE	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCRD	Policy Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PDD	Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCBRIG	Southern Africa Standby Brigade
SC	Security Council
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMID	AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNIOSIL	UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNITAF	United Task Force

UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTC	United Nations Country Team
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
US	United States
WFP	World Food Programme
ZIF	Center for International Peace Operations / Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze