Toolbox

Crisis Management

From Civilian Crisis Prevention to Peacebuilding: Principles, Actors, Instruments

Claudia Major, Tobias Pietz, Elisabeth Schöndorf, Wanda Hummel
Imprint

The Crisis Management Toolbox

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Authors

Dr. Claudia Major, *Deputy head of the International Security Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin (SWP)*

Tobias Pietz, *Senior Researcher at the Center for International Peace Operations in Berlin (ZIF)*

Dr. Elisabeth Schöndorf, *Former researcher with the International Security Division at SWP*

Wanda Hummel, *Special Assistant to the Director at ZIF*

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Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
www.swp-berlin.org

Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze
www.zif-berlin.org

Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin
Germany
Toolbox

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From Civilian Crisis Prevention to Peacebuilding: Principles, Actors, Instruments
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Introduction

The Crisis Management Toolbox – From Civilian Crisis Prevention to Peacebuilding: Principles, Actors, Instruments

Crisis management as a comprehensive task for foreign and security policy

Crisis management has been a task for states and international organizations for some time. Here it is understood as the provision of civilian personnel, police and military, within a bi- or multilateral framework, to build peace and stability in crisis regions, by using various instruments. These instruments include measures for crisis prevention, for the resolution of acute and lasting armed conflicts, and for the consolidation of peace.

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of crisis management missions has increased and worldwide engagement has become more intense. The scenarios have become more diverse and the role of actors such as the European Union (EU) has changed. In the EU and particularly in Germany, the Balkan Wars of the 1990s have raised awareness of the necessity for effective crisis management. The experiences in Rwanda, Somalia, and later in Afghanistan, made clear that the stabilization of regional hot-spots contributes to international stability and collective security. However, they uncovered the limits of international commitments: Although states and organizations emphasize the necessity of prevention, reactive measures prevail in reality.

Most crises have multi-dimensional causes and symptoms. Thus, their management demands the application of different instruments and actors. Non-military instruments of crisis prevention and conflict transformation have gained in importance. Meanwhile, police, legal and administrative experts and experts from the business sector are recognized as essential actors. The heightened significance of civilian crisis management points to a new and greater understanding of conflict transformation. Even though it will almost always be partially supported by military means, civilian crisis prevention and post-conflict consolidation will ultimately decide whether crisis management is sustainable. This is also reflected in the understanding that it is necessary to coordinate all these various instruments into a comprehensive or cross-linked approach.

The structures, principles, actors and instruments in crisis management are subject to a continuous process of learning, adjustment and further development. Therefore, the parameters in crisis management have changed. The European External Action Service (EEAS) became active in December 2010. Its personnel and political development and thus the role of the EEAS in crisis management will only materialize in the years to come. The same is true for NATO: The potential development of civilian capacities can change the operational possibilities of the alliance in crisis management and with it the interaction with other actors. The consequences are not yet foreseeable.

Germany has become involved in various ways in international crisis management, both in bilateral and multilateral frameworks in international organizations such as the UN, NATO or the EU. In this process, Germany explicitly pursues a preventive and a comprehensive approach in which civilian means have the priority and civilian and military means are coordinated. The toolbox available to Germany for this is seldom portrayed. What principles form the basis of Germany’s engagement, in the framework of which international organizations does it act, and which instruments does it use?

The German Toolbox

This publication outlines the fundamental principles of German commitments and identifies the most important international frameworks in which Germany as a member is involved. Further, it provides a selection of the central instruments available to Germany for crisis prevention, civilian and for civil-military crisis management. From this results the division into three parts: principles, actors, instruments.

This booklet is conceived as a consolidated reference work which conveys a first overview: Each of the principles, actors and instruments is portrayed on one page. The pages are self-contained and can be read independently of each other. Content-wise, they are arranged according to a systematic scheme. They all provide the context of a principle, an international organization or an instrument, describe its implementation or function and identify the relevant actors. In addition, examples of German commitment in this particular field are given. References to further information offer the possibility of looking into a topic in more depth.

Moreover, the toolbox uses cross-references (➜) on every page to guide you to the respective principles, actors and instruments, thus providing a bigger picture of the available tools in crisis management, and how Germany uses them.
The Crisis Management Cycle as Guiding Principle

The principles, actors and instruments in crisis management are assigned to the different phases of the crisis management cycle. On the thematic pages it is pointed out in which phase of a crisis a principle emerges, an actor may become active or an instrument is applied. The cycle model portrays the different phases of a crisis in ideal types and assigns the corresponding phases of the crisis management to them.

Phases of Crisis and Crisis Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of a (potential) crisis</th>
<th>Phases in crisis management</th>
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<tr>
<td>Peace or no armed conflict</td>
<td>Crisis prevention</td>
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<td>Escalation</td>
<td>Conflict prevention</td>
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<td>Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>Fragile Post-Conflict-Phase</td>
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In reality, these phases merge into each other and in their sequence represent a cycle that is characteristic of most crises. Effective peacebuilding is in this context the best crisis prevention.

However, the subdivision into phases should not be understood in the sense that conflicts always evolve according to some linear course. The model is rather an analytical tool: It portrays an ideal type which should help to understand the course of a crisis, to illustrate commonalities, to develop appropriate goals and to recommend suitable instruments for crisis management. The model thus reduces the complexity and allows the observer to better understand the individual phases and to evaluate which elements can contribute to the escalation or de-escalation of a crisis. Thereby different instruments can be applied in each phase and some instruments can be deployed more than once in different phases.

Phases of the crisis management cycle, instruments of crisis management and actors involved

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<th>Phase</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
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If one translates this classification graphically into the crisis management cycle, the following results for the different phases.
The Crisis Management Cycle

**Peacebuilding**
- CIMIC
- Common financial structures
- Conflict mediation, Groups of friends
- CSDP operations
- Democracy promotion
- DDR, SSR
- Economic recovery, Election observation
- International tribunals, Small arms control
- Peacebuilding, Peacekeeping
- Police missions, Special representatives
- Political missions
- Reconciliation and transitional justice

**Crisis Prevention**
- Common financial structures
- Small arms control
- Disarmament and arms control
- Election observation
- Peace consolidation
- Political missions
- Sanctions
- Security Sector Reform
- Special representatives

**Conflict Management**
- CIMIC
- CSDP operations
- Groups of friends
- Humanitarian aid
- Military rapid response forces
- Peace enforcement
- Peacekeeping

**Mediation, Intervention**
- CSDP operations
- Groups of friends, conflict mediation
- Military rapid response forces
- Peace enforcement
- Peacekeeping
- Sanctions
- Special representatives
Do No Harm

Do No Harm is a principle for the planning, evaluation, and adaptation of international aid and crisis management. It is based on the understanding that external assistance comes with side effects. Therefore, crisis work should be shaped in a way sensitive to conflict and its negative effects should thus be minimized.

Background

The Do No Harm approach was developed at the beginning of the 1990s by NGOs. Originally developed for the field of emergency relief, it is since being applied in all areas and phases of crisis management. The basic assumption of Do No Harm is that in every conflict, forces and structures are present that foster or maintain violence (potential for violence). Yet, there are also »potentials for peace« that can be gained for peaceful solutions.

External crisis management should strengthen those structures (e.g. local dispute resolution procedures, civil society mergers) as well as actors (e.g. moderate leaders) who can work towards a peaceful transformation of conflict. In reality, however, the potential for violence may be promoted, even though this mostly occurs unintentionally. Depending on who is helped (first), who receives which benefits and which political and ethical signals the international actors send, external help can actually worsen conflicts and emergencies.

Implementation

External actors can cause damage by omission, but also in other ways. Their commitment can be too strong, they may articulate their interests and priorities only from their own perspective or they may be perceived as biased and could behave inappropriately on site.

For instance, after the end of the civil war in Guatemala at the end of the 1990s, returning refugees received international support in the form of land, houses, and educational programs. However, the population that had remained in the country during the conflict received no comparable benefits and felt neglected, resulting in local conflicts as well as disputes among relief organizations. In East Timor, international UN staff avoided integrating local actors and interests in the work of the UN-led interim administration (► Local Ownership) and the time-consuming capacity-building efforts, so as to keep to their tight time table. In this way, however, they put the sustainability of the ► peacebuilding process in East Timor at risk.

International crisis management is continuously confronted with such dilemmas; a generally positive result is nearly impossible. In line with the Do No Harm principle, it is necessary to recognize such negative developments, to stop and to find or develop suitable methods for examining one’s actions. Then the action can be adapted to the situation. Knowledge of the conflict and of local facts is prerequisites for this. On this basis, international organizations, states and NGOs must balance out different imperatives for action, and they must consider the unintentional, long-term consequences of their actions ahead of time.

Actors

• Nowadays, Do No Harm is a guiding principle in the crisis management of states, regional and international organizations, and NGOs. They are required to assess their crisis work on different levels: on the political and planning level, in regard to personnel which implements projects on site, and with the international, regional, and local partner organizations which help in the implementation.

• Addressees are local actors (government, main parties to a conflict, civilian population).

Selected examples of German commitment

• Do No Harm is a guiding principle of German emergency relief, development cooperation and crisis management.

• It is used in projects of the Foreign Office, the BMZ, the Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, World Peace Service or of the GIZ.


OECD (Publisher), Do No Harm: International Support for Statebuilding, 2010 (Conflict and Fragility Series), www.oecdbookshop.org.
Human Security

In the UNDP report of 1994, human security is defined as protection from (physical) force – freedom from fear – and as protection from hardship and deprivation – freedom from want. With this definition, the focus of security political action is directed at the individual instead of the state, and the concept of security is expanded by a development political component.

Background

In light of complex cross-border geopolitical challenges, states and international organizations have recognized the threat to human security – in contrast to threats to state security – as a new frame of reference for security policy. Human Security was first introduced in the Human Development Report of the UNDP in 1994. Taking into consideration failing states and uncertain monopolies of force, it was demanded that security policy concepts be oriented towards the survival, the security and the development opportunities of the individual human being. Accordingly, «freedom from fear» should apply not only to on-going interstate acts of war, but also to the pre- and post-conflict phase, as well as to further threats such as poverty and environmental disasters.

The UNDP and therefore many states as well, along with the EU, were hoping that development political issues would obtain a higher priority on the security policy agenda and that more resources would be directed towards development projects. Yet, even though basic ideas of Human Security have entered security policy debates, the concept is still disputed: Critics doubt its practicability and fear the «securityization» of international politics – with reference to Human Security everything could be declared a threat. Currently, two schools of thought exist: One works with a narrower, pragmatic definition (freedom from fear) while the other advocates a broad, holistic definition (freedom from fear and freedom from want).

Implementation

Human Security requires an integrated and multi-sector approach to action. It has to be aimed at the protection, the security and the empowerment of those affected. The UNDP names seven political fields of application: physical, political, local or communal, health, ecological, economic, and nutritional security. As a concept, Human Security is complementary to existing security terms. An extensive paradigm change has not taken place. The conceptual vagueness makes a political elaboration difficult. Different governments (above all Canada, Norway and Japan) have included the agenda of human security in their foreign, security and development policies.

In 2004, an advisory group of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, prepared the Barcelona Report (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe). In this report, he demands civilian as well as military commitment. In the subsequent Madrid Report (2007), the relevance of Human Security for European missions is further emphasized, and the following guidelines for the practice of this concept are formulated: the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, an integrated, regional focus as well as a transparent strategy. However, the implementation has turned out to be difficult.

In 2004, the UN OCHA established a Human Security Unit, which administers the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, through which more than $350 million since 1999 have been invested in projects. The concept has been introduced into many projects and reports of the UN. A group of friends is continuing the concept discussion.

Actors

- National states, UN, EU.
- Human Security Unit (HSU) of UN OCHA.
- Human Security Network (informal union of 13 governments with annual meetings at the level of ministers).
- UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS).
- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).

Selected examples of German commitment

- Participation in the Group of Friends «Friends of Human Security».
- Mentioning of the concept in official documents (e.g. 3rd report on the implementation of the action plan «Civil Crisis Prevention» – however, without naming concrete measures.

Local Ownership

Local Ownership designates the process as well as the objective of the gradual takeover of responsibility by local actors. As a prerequisite for the sustainability of peace consolidation, it is a key ingredient in the exit strategy of a peacekeeping mission. Local Ownership is a results-oriented principle and a normative concept, which demands the involvement of local actors early on.

Background

For decades, Local Ownership, under terms such as »help for self-help« or »participatory development«, has been an ingredient of development cooperation. In the realm of peacebuilding, Local Ownership has become even more important, with the increasing number of peace consolidation tasks since the 1990s. The term Local Ownership appears in more and more reports, position papers and guidelines for international actors in peacekeeping missions. However, there is neither a coherent theory of Local Ownership nor a common understanding of what the implementation of the principle means in practice. How can local populations completely or proportionally »possess« sovereignty over peacebuilding processes, if they are still, above all, dominated by external actors? Often, Local Ownership does not mean local autonomy, the selection of programs and specification of priorities through local actors. Rather, it is the attempt to adjust already defined international politics to local realities. In contrast, many international actors on the working level often pursue communitarian or bottom-up approaches that create a scope for development for local partners and support this freedom. Here, Local Ownership is made possible through the inclusion of local traditions.

Implementation

Since the personnel in peacekeeping missions largely works together with national government structures, either the civil society or the wider public of a country are typically involved in such missions. Beyond this, the interaction between internal (local) and external (international) actors is, as a rule, asymmetric: International actors dominate and therefore impede Local Ownership. Meanwhile, however, in practice, methods and instruments of cooperation between national and international actors are applied that support local participation, acceptance and ownership. In this regard, co-location (spatial merging of international and national personnel) is a key factor for good cooperation and joint learning. Programs for the recruitment and further education of national employees (National Professional Officers) are also received well, even though, they always entail the danger that qualified national experts will migrate to international organizations (Brain Drain). Moreover, a stronger regress to regional advisors, moderators, and institutions seems promising. Also, regional solution proposals and the consideration of regional traditions (jurisdiction and administration) could be helpful. In February 2011, the United Nations published the key report on »Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict« which highlights four main principles to improve the performance of the UN in post-conflict peacebuilding: ownership, partnership, expertise and nimbleness. The report states that a primary task of the international response is to identify, protect, nurture and support national capacities.

Selected examples of German commitment

- In the 3rd report on the implementation of the »Civilian Crisis Prevention« action plan, ownership (in the sense of autonomy) is referred to as a key principle of German foreign, security and development policy.
- Local Ownership is a fundamental principle for directing projects of the BMZ, e.g. in the development of police structures in Africa or joint border management in Sub-Saharan Africa with the AU.


Protection of Civilians

The protection of civilians in armed conflicts is a cross-cutting task in the mandates of peace missions. Civilian, police and military mission components should guarantee this protection, which is to be supported by political measures and coordinated through the activities of humanitarian actors and development cooperation.

Background

In conflict-ridden territories, civilians are often victims of targeted violence: of killing, sexual abuse, displacement, or as child soldiers. The governments of the affected states do not meet their responsibilities towards the population – because they are either weakened or themselves involved in serious human rights violations. The obligation to protect human rights and the responsibility to protect, demand that the international community becomes active in such cases. Yet, even the international community has failed in the past, such as in the massacres of Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s. Nowadays, the protection of the civilian population is one of the priorities of UN-mandated peace missions. Not least, the security of the civilian population is a prerequisite for the socio-political reconstruction in crisis-ridden countries.

Implementation

Thus far, the UN has developed neither an exact definition nor operative guidelines for the protection of the civilian population. This makes the implementation on site difficult. It also allows for confusion with the related concepts of human security and responsibility to protect. In contrast to these two concepts, the protection of civilians is no abstract principle of international law. Rather, it is a cross-sectional task for civilian and military personnel of such mandated peace missions (e.g. ISAF in Afghanistan or UNMIS in the Sudan). The UN Security Council first deliberated on the protection of the civilian population in 1999. The Secretary-General was charged with developing recommendations for the implementation. On this basis, the Security Council passed two resolutions (1265, 1296) in 1999 and in 2000. Moreover, in 1999, he explicitly allowed the use of force for the protection of threatened civilians in two missions (UNAMSIL / Sierra Leone, INTERFET / East Timor). Nowadays, the protection of the civilian population is part of nearly all UN mission mandates. In March 2011, the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya invoked the protection of civilians as a key reason for an intervention.

However, there is a big gap between mandates and their implementation, as the high numbers of civilian casualties in conflicts, such as in the Congo or Darfur, demonstrate. A prerequisite for the implementation are adequate prevention, reaction, defense, and deterrence capacities, as well as sufficient civil, military and police personnel with corresponding qualifications. The prevention portfolio also needs to include political and diplomatic measures of the UN and member states, such as in conflict resolution and early warning as well as analysis capacities. At the same time, the UN and its member states must warn against excessive and unrealistic expectations: The protection of each and every individual is impossible. One frequent problem is also the coordination between peace missions and humanitarian actors (e.g. UNICEF; humanitarian aid), which also commit to the protection of civilians. A report initiated by the DPKO and the UN OCHA and co-financed by Germany, demands complementary strategies when taking protection measures.

Actors

• UN Security Council as the mandating authority.
• Peace missions and humanitarian subsidiary organizations of UN, EU, NATO as executing body; ICRC as an important supporter; guest states as partners in the implementation.

Selected examples of German commitment

• In the third report on the implementation of the action plan »Civilian Crisis Prevention,« the Federal Government emphasizes its advocacy for the protection of civilians.
• It places the preventive aspects of the protection mission in the foreground and names Good Governance and the rule of law as prerequisites for the ability of states to guarantee security to their citizens.

Resolution 1325

Resolution 1325 was passed unanimously by the UN Security Council on October 31, 2000. In it, the Security Council requests from the UN member states to promote a stronger, all levels encompassing participation of women in institutional prevention and in the resolution and settlement of conflicts.

Background

With the adoption of Resolution 1325 «Women, Peace and Security» by the UN Security Council, the UN and its members did not just refer to the protection of women in conflicts and their involvement in peace negotiations for the first time. They further demanded concrete measures, such as the appointment of more women as special representatives or the expansion of the role and contribution of women to civilian, police and military missions.

Implementation

Thus far, the slow and insufficient implementation of 1325 has mainly been criticized. Frequently, this criticism refers to the inadequate representation of women in leadership positions in the peacebuilding structure of the UN and in delegations in peace processes. Indeed, the record after ten years is still sobering: Although the total number of peace missions and the strength of its personnel have increased by almost 400 % in the past 20 years, there are only twelve women directing missions at the UN (currently five SRSG). Women are also underrepresented in the police service and in military missions with eight and two percent respectively.

The effects of 1325 can better be discerned apart from the statistics: Since 2000, almost all processes in the different peacebuilding institutions are being reviewed with regard to the integration of women. 1325 has been taken into account in almost every strategic paper of the UN, the EU or the OSCE. The setup of Gender Focal Points in all departments of the UN Secretariat and the appointment of Gender Advisors in the different missions on site has steadily increased. The fact that women are no longer just seen as victims of wars, but are increasingly regarded as facilitators and promoters of peace processes, is largely attributable to the debate that 1325 initiated.

At the UN level, the ten year anniversary of the resolution in 2010 led to two substantial initiatives. On the one hand, in March of 2010, a group of experts was named, who examine the effects of resolution 1325 in the last decade. On the other hand, in July 2010, a new Institution for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women was established by a resolution of the General Assembly: UN Women merges all previous institutions into a new strong actor, which speaks now with a greater voice in the UN system.

Actors

- UN Women includes: the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), as well as the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INRAW).

- Main actors in the implementation are nation states: Fourteen European countries have already passed action plans for 1325 – among them are France, Great Britain and the Netherlands.

- Additionally, many NGOs worldwide are engaged in the implementation of 1325.

Selected examples of German commitment

- As several other countries, Germany had preferred the form of an implementation report. In 2004, Germany was one of only 25 states, which followed the request of the UN Secretary General to report on the implementation of 1325. A second report followed in 2007, and the third implementation report was published in 2010. The German Government just finalized its first National Action Plan for the years 2013–2016.

- Numerous projects: among them the development of a «Training Program for Police for Combating and Preventing Sexual and Gender-specific Violence» with the UN DPKO Police Division, as well as the implementation of the «Gender Training Strategy in Peace Keeping Operations» with the UN DPKO.


Gunda-Werner-Institut für Feminismus und Geschlechterdemokratie in der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (Publisher), Hoffnungsträger 1325. Eine Resolution für eine geschlechtergerechte Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik in Europa, 2008.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P) aims to prevent the most serious violations of human rights. According to R2P, every state is responsible for the protection of its population. If it is incapable or unwilling to do so, the international community should, where necessary, take measures to protect the civilian population. R2P is anchored in the concluding document of the UN world summit held in 2005.

Background

The idea of responsibility to protect evolved from the discussion on humanitarian intervention (e.g., in Kosovo) at the end of the 1990s. It attempts to provide an answer to the question of how a civilian population can be protected from the most serious violations of human rights without disregarding the sovereignty of a state. It solves this conflict by means of a two-step procedure. According to R2P, every sovereign state has the responsibility to protect its population. Only if it is not in the position to do so or is unwilling, is the responsibility to protect transferred to the international community. The conceptual development of R2P took place in several commissions and reports in preparation of the UN world summit in 2005 in New York.

Implementation

After protracted negotiations, R2P was formally recognized by UN member states at the world summit in 2005: Thus, states must protect their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. With this, the realm of application for R2P was explicitly limited to these four cases. This limitation underlines the alarming effect of the concept, as well as its potential for mobilization; it limits legal uncertainties and political discrepancies in the implementation. In the final resolution, the states affirmed their responsibility to employ, through the → UN, the → appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter to help protect populations. In case national authorities should fail to do so and peaceful means prove not to be sufficient, they declare they are → prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate.

Yet, the interpretation of the concept is difficult. First, it is unclear what R2P is in the legal sense. Earlier reports characterized it as a → developing norm. However, the UN member states avoided this classification thus far: States are very sensitive towards changes of norms in customary law, which affect the principle of sovereignty. One of the greatest challenges is to make the concept operational in a way that the states can actually implement the agreed upon standards. Corresponding measures range from diplomatic pressure to → sanctions up to the use of military force (→ peace enforcement) — although the latter remains a highly sensitive topic.

In the sense of R2P, preventive measures are always to be favored. Yet, in this context, there is a need for further development, particularly in early warning of a crisis. An example of successful prevention was the reaction to the crisis of state in Kenya in 2008. With the support of the international community, the UN Secretary-General at the time, successfully mediated in the conflict and avoided an escalation by using civilian means.

For many, the UN and NATO action in Libya in 2011 has been a validation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. In response to a strong global consensus on the imminence of a major attack on civilian populations, the international community came together with unprecedented speed to support a United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 authorizing the use of force to protect civilians from harm in Libya. Others have come to the conclusion that the implementation of 1973 → regime change by force → has hampered the principle for years to come. As a result, Brazil and other countries (the so-called BRIC states) have introduced and discussed a new principle called → Responsibility While Protecting (RWP).

Actors

- UN member states, particularly permanent members of the Security Council.
- UN and regional organizations such as the → EU, AU, ECOWAS.

Selected examples of German commitment

- The Federal Government and Bundestag support principles, goals, and above all, the preventive elements of R2P.
ACTORS
EU / European Union

The EU is composed of 27 states. Thanks to the instruments of the European Commission and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it can handle a wide spectrum of tasks in the area of civilian and military crisis management including humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and peace enforcement measures, election observation and developmental cooperation.

Background

Since its inception in the 1950s, the EU and its predecessor, the European Community, have been engaged in managing conflicts, developmental cooperation and humanitarian aid. Within the enlargement process, the EU employs stabilizing instruments and promotes measures for conflict settlement, reconciliation and demoratization. Since the creation of CFSP in 1992 and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 1999, the EU can also apply military means. It has furthermore acquired a civilian portfolio and provides legal or technical experts in the framework of the CSDP. Hence it has at its disposition a unique blend of civilian and military means: It has access to civilian (political, diplomatic, economic, police) and military means, such as the military rapid response forces for reactions to crises, the EU Battlegroups. It strives to employ these instruments in the most preventive and most comprehensive way possible.

Functions

The civil and military instruments of the EU are not organized in a single structure with decision-making authority. Rather, they are assigned to the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the leadership of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and to the EU Commission. Located in the EEAS are organizational structures for the civilian (police, law, civilian administration) and the military (e.g. EU Battlegroups) instruments of the CSDP. The EU states decide on their use. Since 2003, 26 CSDP operations were carried out in Europe (e.g. Bosnia), Africa (e.g. Congo), and Central Asia (e.g. Georgia). The tasks range from SSR (e.g. operation EUSEC RD Congo, since 2005) to election observation (e.g. operation EUFOR RD Congo, 2006).

The European Commission has civilian instruments at its disposal, particularly in its enlargement and neighborhood policy, for humanitarian aid, crisis reaction, development cooperation, and democratization. In the last five years, about €1 billion were annually available to Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO). In 2010, the earthquake victims and the reconstruction in Haiti were supported with these means. A key element is the Instrument for Stability (IfS) for the socio-economic development and the promotion of human rights, democracy and basic freedoms in non-EU states. The IfS offers financing for short-term (disaster relief aid, reconstruction) and long-term projects (fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, weapon smuggling, capacity building). For the period of 2007–2013, the IfS had over €2 billion available, of which, over two thirds are allotted to short-term and about one third to long-term projects.

In the implementation of this comprehensive approach, the EU has to coordinate the employment of different instruments between the EEAS and the Commission, but also within both units. Non-uniform decision-making and financial structures as well as divergent time horizons (e.g. short-term crisis reaction in the framework of the CSDP and long-term development cooperation of the Commission) make this process more difficult.

Actors

- 27 member states.
- High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
- EEAS, European Commission.

Selected examples of German commitment

- Provision of civilian and military capabilities for EU operations, e.g. EUFOR RD Congo 2006; seconded personnel in civilian missions (EULEX Kosovo since 2008).
- Participation in CSDP operations, in the case of military operations, it implies taking on the largest part of the costs (»costs lie where they fall«).
- Germany makes the greatest contribution to the EU budget. Costs for the CSDP operations have to be provided by the states separately.


North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO is a collective defense alliance of 28 states in Europe and North America. According to its Strategic Concept (2010), it has three main tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. To this, it relies on the military resources of its member states.

Background

During the Cold War, NATO (founded in 1949) was to guarantee freedom and security to the allied states through the maintenance of the strategic balance in Europe. The means available to achieve this were deterrence, defense capability, and, since 1967, a policy of détente.

After the Cold War, NATO adapted the alliance to the altered security environment. The guarantee of security and stability in Europe came to the fore, deterrence and defense remained in the background. Since the Balkan Wars in the 1990s, NATO also took over crisis management and peacekeeping tasks. Along with collective defense, these were anchored in its 1999 strategic concept. NATO recognizes the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining world peace and international security. However, in crisis management, it does not explicitly tie itself politically or legally to a UN mandate.

Functions

The highest decision-making bodies are the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Defense Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group. It advises these groups on questions of military policy and strategy and is responsible for the overall military leadership. NATO employs military instruments for solving crises. Among these is the NATO Response Force (NRF) for rapid military responses to crises. With few exceptions – such as the AWACS planes – NATO has no capabilities of its own, but relies on the contributions of its members. Their limited willingness to make troops and equipment available renders operations more difficult. Also, different political guidelines and interoperability problems impede missions. Currently, NATO is involved in five military missions, among them ISAF in Afghanistan (since 2001) and KFOR in Kosovo (since 1999). The mutual defense clause was invoked only once after the attacks of September 11, 2001. In its current strategic concept (2010), NATO announced the set up of a small civilian planning and conduct capability as well as the potential recruitment and training of civilian experts. This could change NATO’s role in crisis management and its relationships with other actors (EU, UN, NGOs).

NATO cooperates with the UN and the EU. Since 2003, the EU has access to NATO assets for its CSDP operations (Berlin Plus Agreement). Despite extensive overlap in membership, cooperation with the EU is difficult.

Actors

- 28 member states.
- Numerous partnerships in the framework of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and with »Partners across the globe«.

Selected examples of German commitment

- Germany is the second largest contributor of funds after the USA.
- Germany makes military capacities for the NRF and current missions (e.g. Afghanistan) available.

Hofmann, Stephanie/Reynolds, Christopher, EU-NATO Relations: Time to Thaw the »Frozen Conflict«? 2007 (SWP-Comments 12 / 2007).

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The OSCE is a regional security organization with 56 participating states from Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and North America. Areas of duty are early warning, prevention, management and aftercare of conflicts. The decisions, which are taken by consensus, are political, but not binding according to international law.

Background
The OSCE was founded in 1973 during the Cold War as a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), to provide a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiations between East and West. In 1975, the heads of state from the then 35 participating countries (European countries, Canada and the US) signed the final accord of Helsinki. This was a politically binding agreement, which specified the basic principles for interstate behavior of the participants and the conduct of the governments towards their citizens. Until 1990, the CSCE met regularly (three follow-up conferences were complemented by meetings of experts) and determined measures for trust building among the participants. The end of the power bloc confrontation implied that the CSCE encountered new challenges in regional security and stability.

In 1990, the Charter of Paris for a new Europe introduced the transformation to an operative organizational structure, in the course of which the CSCE built up its own institutions and set new thematic priorities. In 1992, the CSCE reacted to the conflicts in the West Balkans and in the Soviet successor states as an actor in crisis management with the first dispatch of fact finding and reporter missions. Following these developments and the stronger structuring of the conference’s work, the name was changed in 1995 to OSCE.

In 1999, on the basis of the European Security Charter of Istanbul, the OSCE established an operations centre within the centre for conflict prevention (Conflict Prevention Centre, CPC). The focus on democratization and human rights (above all → election observation) is increasingly regarded as interference by some rather authoritarian states. Thus far, the OSCE has not had a breakthrough or been successful in the reconciliation of frozen conflicts (Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh) and its role in the European security structure remains unclear at the beginning of the 21st century. As a consequence, since 2009, the participants have tried to develop new approaches and partnerships in the →Corfu-process, so as to preserve political efficacy.

Functions
The chairmanship of the OSCE rotates annually among the 56 participating states. The political resolutions are adopted at summit meetings and through the Council of foreign ministers. The administrative and operational implementation is on the one hand the responsibility of the Permanent Council of Ambassadors, and on the other hand, of the Secretariat in Vienna, led by the Secretary General. Additional bodies are the High Commissioner for national minorities, the OSCE representative for freedom of the media, and, since 1991, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). ODIHR’s election observation missions are among the most important activities of the OSCE.

The CPC in Vienna is responsible for the current 17 long term missions and other field activities. At present, the OSCE is represented in Southern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, and in Central Asia with missions (above all in the West Balkans, since 1995 in Bosnia Herzegovina, since 1999 in Kosovo), with offices (among others in Zagreb, Yerevan, Baku) and with centers or project coordinators (above all in Central Asia).

Actors
- 56 participating states.
- Cooperating partners from the Mediterranean area (Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia), from Asia (among others Afghanistan) and Australia.
- Significant contribution of finances and personnel (2011: 12 % of the OSCE’s budget for field missions).
- Project financing (contribution to the set-up of a Border Management Staff College in Tadzhikistan).
- Accompaniment of personnel on field missions, election observation missions, and OSCE institutions.
- Agenda setting on certain themes (e.g. the Berlin OSCE conference on anti-Semitism in 2004).

United Nations

The UN is an international organization committed to the maintenance or restoration of peace. It has 193 member states, which provides it with a unique legitimacy. The decision-making practice in the UN rests on the principles of consensus and compromise.

Background

In 1945, the victorious powers of World War II founded the UN as the successor organization of the failed League of Nations. Its member states are to help preserve peace and security in the world. The UN is not a world government and it does not pass laws. Rather, it makes means available for international conflict resolution and contributes to the setting of norms, which guide the behavior of member states. Since its founding, the number of members has increased (from 51 to currently 193) and fields of activity have expanded (among others, crisis management, development, environment). The regular total budget for the period 2010–2011 amounts to $5367 billion. The UN headquarters are located in New York.

Functions

The UN has six principal organs: the General Assembly as the plenary assembly of all member states; the Economic and Social Council, which is responsible for economic, social and development related questions; the International Court of Justice as the judicial organ of the UN; the Trusteeship Council, which originally accompanied decolonization processes, but is currently inactive; the Secretariat, the UN’s most important administrative body under the leadership of the Secretary-General; and the Security Council, the UN’s most powerful council. According to the UN Charter, the 15 member panel has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. To this, the UN can impose sanctions which are binding under international law, and it can mandate peacekeeping operations and the application of military force. At the end of bloc confrontation of the Cold War, the Security Council has become considerably more active; peacekeeping missions have developed into an important instrument. The Secretariat is responsible for the planning of these missions. These six principal organs of the UN together with auxiliary organizations, subsidiary organs and programs, as well as numerous specialized agencies, make up the UN system. The UN is financed through the assessed contributions of the member states to the regular UN budget, through assessed contributions to peace operations and to international criminal courts, as well as through voluntary contributions to UN funds, programs and individual measures. Resolutions are adopted on the basis of consensus and compromise; the often divergent interests of member states impair decision-making processes. In order to enhance the capacity of the UN to act, the member states not only have to support the UN politically and meet their financial obligations, but they also have to promote reforms (Security Council, institutional setup, financial and management reform).

Actors

- Security Council as the most powerful organ, authorized to issue binding resolutions and mandate peace operations.
- General Assembly, particularly the Budget Council and its Advisory Committee for administrative and budget questions as the budgeting institutions, as well as the Special Committee for peacekeeping as a recommendation making organ – in this committee, the EU Commission has an observer status.
- Commission for peace consolidation as an advisory auxiliary organ of the Security Council and the General Assembly.
- Secretary-General and Secretariat: above all, DPKO, DFS and DPA, as planning and administrative offices for peace or political missions.
- Field missions themselves, under the direction of a SRSG; they cooperate with the corresponding UN country teams, consisting of UN programs and sub-organizations.

Selected examples of German commitment

- Germany is the third largest contributor to the regular UN budget, the fourth largest donor to the peacekeeping budget, and is engaged in the promotion of projects through numerous voluntary contributions.
- Special engagement in the areas of human rights, climate protection and in areas of international security, among others as a member of groups of friends.
- 2011–2012, Germany was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

CIMIC stands for the interaction of the military with governmental or non-governmental civilian actors in international military operations. It is a military doctrine for the operational and tactical level: it supports the cooperation of foreign troops with civilian forces and local actors to fulfill the military mission and to contribute to the protection of the troops.

Background

Civil-Military Cooperation has become a keyword since the 1990s. Due to growing challenges in international crisis management, e.g. in dealing with failed states, the overall number of actors in the field increased and military forces encountered more and more civilian actors, e.g. those of humanitarian aid.

However, the understanding and use of the term have changed. In a first phase at the beginning of the 1990s, many actors used CIMIC as a collective term for all types of interaction between civil and military actors. Yet, there was no clear or consistent definition. In a second phase, civilian and military actors developed their own differentiated concepts.

The current understanding is based on the NATO definition of CIMIC as a military doctrine. Basic documents are the NATO Military Policy on CIMIC (MC 411/1, 2002), the NATO CIMIC Doctrine (NATO AJP 9, 2003, currently under revision) and for the German military forces the sub-concept ZMZ Bundeswehr (March 2009) and the special instructions ZMZ/A 1 (April 2009).

CIMIC has three core functions:

1) Support of armed forces, e.g. through an overview of the situation developed by civilian actors to advise the military leadership;

2) Support of civil authorities and actors, to increase the acceptance of the armed forces and thereby to offer them greater protection, e.g. through Quick Impact Projects such as the construction of wells; and

3) Organization of civil-military relations, hence building and fostering contacts in the field of operation.

The focus of CIMIC varies according to whether it is a prevention-, conflict management- or post-conflict mission.

In general, CIMIC is a military doctrine and not a crisis management strategy with a developmental policy component. CIMIC projects should not impede development cooperation, but are not necessarily aimed at sustainability.

Implementation

CIMIC has become an integral part of operations, but it contains the potential for tensions: aid incurred under the auspices of CIMIC is occasionally portrayed as a genuine contribution of the troops. This raises questions about principles, scope and rules of civil-military interaction.

Some aid organizations criticize that the principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality that apply to them could be jeopardized through CIMIC. The boundaries between neutral civilian and military actors engaged in the conflict could be blurred. Thereby, it would be difficult to distinguish between civilian and military actors, and therefore they could be taken for enemies. This would increase the risk for civilian actors to be the target of attacks and could impede their access to those in need.

Actors

- Nation-states or their ministries of defense and military forces.
- International organizations (UN, EU, NATO).

Selected examples of German commitment

- CIMIC units are part of all missions of the German armed forces.


Comprehensive Approaches

Comprehensive approaches are to ensure the coordination and cooperation of different national or international, civilian and military actors in crisis management. They should help to define common objectives and to coordinate the different activities and instruments.

Background

Crisis with military, social and economic causes and symptoms require the coordinated use of political, diplomatic, military, humanitarian and development-related instruments. Examples such as Afghanistan show that the success of crisis management is endangered, if one dimension is neglected or overvalued and an overarching strategy is missing. Such a comprehensive crisis management is a complex undertaking: the tasks are manifold, the number of actors involved is great, and the commitment takes time. Additionally, diverse interests of the various actors (such as states, international organizations) often give rise to conflicting opinions on the objectives and the means of an operation.

Coordinated cooperation and coherent measures are, however, essential preconditions for effective crisis management. Therefore, an early definition of common objectives, the coordination of all actors (national ministries, international bureaucracies, NGOs, donors) and instruments (military and civilian instruments), both in the field as well as in political centers, is needed at different stages of the conflict. Also important are appropriate and timely action. A broad participation of actors ensures lasting results and contributes to shared burdens and increased legitimacy.

Implementation

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Actors

- Thematically: military, police, forces for development cooperation, civilian experts.
- Actor-related: all actors involved in crisis management, in particular states, international organizations (UN, EU, NATO), civil society actors, NGOs and local forces.

Selected examples of German commitment

- Institutions: e.g. Steering Group and the Advisory Board »Civilian Crisis Prevention,« the subcommittee of the Parliament, »Civilian crisis prevention and networked security,« the integrated platform for the training of partners, topic-specific forums.
Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is a collective term for processes of diplomatic conflict settlement by third parties. It can take place preemptively, to avert the escalation of a crisis, but may also accompany the use of civilian and military means that can bring about the termination of a crisis and establish stable political conditions.

**Background**

If direct negotiations between conflicting parties to end the dispute do not come about or do not lead to a substantial result, then a third party can intervene and mediate. There are several approaches and different levels of participation. Good offices and mediation are frequently used. Good offices are provided by an international actor who encourages contact between conflicting parties, by for instance organizing joint meetings. In mediation, the third party also provides content-wise inputs to the search for a solution, for example submitting its own proposals. Procedures of conflict resolution are generally non-binding and dependent on the voluntary participation of conflicting parties. Since the end of the Cold War, international conflict resolution has gained in importance.

**Implementation**

The UN are the most active institution in both mediation and good offices. Both are traditionally tasks for the UN Secretary-General or his envoys and Special Representatives, who carry these out in UN country offices, in peacekeeping missions or in political missions.

During the last decade, the UN shifted its focus away from its own mediation work – also because of a lack of capacities – to consulting and supporting other mediators. This task is particularly addressed by the Mediation Support Unit of the DPA. The unit disposes of, among other things, a standby team of mediation experts. In 2006–2008 alone, it participated in 18 peace processes. It worked closely together with regional organizations such as the EU or the AU. The latter has taken on an increasingly significant role in processes of conflict resolution. The advantages of regionalization are closer cultural proximity and thus the avoidance of misunderstandings, better access and a stronger commitment due to own dismay. The disadvantages can be a lack of neutrality and acceptance.

The aim of every conflict resolution is the peaceful and long-term settlement of a conflict through the creation of a win-win situation for all parties concerned, accomplished for instance through peace agreements and their implementation plans. Preconditions are that the international mediator be accepted by all sides, has a comprehensive understanding of the conflict and of local actors, has developed a clear strategy for its own commitment, engages in a credible and conflict-sensitive way, sets the process on a broad local and international basis, and accompanies the implementation of the results of the mediation. Peace negotiations are generally led by a mediator with extensive experience.

**Actors**

- The UN, regional organizations such as the EU, OSCE, AU, major powers like the USA, but also smaller states such as Switzerland or South Africa, as well as NGOs.
- Security Council members are generally less active as mediators, but regularly engage in groups of friends that support mediation processes. The number of such groups has been increasing for some years.
- Increasingly highly professional NGOs such as the Crisis Management Initiative of Martti Ahtisaari or the CSS Project for Integrative Mediation of Christian Schwarz-Schilling.

**Selected examples of German commitment**

- Commitment in various groups of friends, e.g. for Georgia, but rarely active as a mediator.
- Active in the »group of friends mediation«.
- Commitment through the EU to various conflicts, e.g. the Middle East Quartet.


Background

During the Balkan wars in the 1990s, the EU illustrated that it was not able to defend its own security, to forge a consensus on the type of crisis management needed and not able to handle the situation independently. As a consequence, the EU states founded the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

This was followed by the development of civil and military institutions to observe and analyze the situation and, if necessary, to prepare and conduct operations, such as the EU military staff and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. The attempt to consistently connect civil and military aspects is reflected in the founding of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate that covers both realms. Moreover, the EU states agreed upon Headline Goals, to provide long-term military and civil capabilities like police, judiciary and administration, including efforts for rapid military crisis response (e.g. EU Battlegroups, civilian crisis response teams).

The so-called Petersburg tasks, agreed upon in 1992 by the Western European Union (WEU), and later transferred to the EU, describe the operational range of the CSDP. They include humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, post conflict stabilization tasks.

Implementation

Since 2003, 28 operations in Europe (e.g. Bosnia), Africa (e.g. DR Congo) and Asia (e.g. Indonesia) have been established. The majority of them were civilian missions. The tasks range from police training (EUPOL, Afghanistan, since 2007) to SSR (EUSEC RD Congo, since 2005), from training and education in the judiciary realm (EUJUST LEX Iraq, since 2005) to the safeguarding of elections (EUFOR RD Congo, 2006). The deployment of missions, which may last from a few months to several years, is unanimously decided by the EU Council. The HR is responsible for the overall coordination.

While civil operations are mainly paid for through the EU budget, the EU member states provide the financial and material means, as well as the personnel, in the case of military operations. However, for financial reasons or domestic political considerations, member states are reluctant to provide military capabilities. In the civilian realm, recruitment is difficult, particularly as there are no EU standards. Such standards do exist for training now.

Selected examples of German commitment

• Provision of civilian and military capabilities (e.g. contribution to EU Battlegroups and provision of air exports) for EU missions.

• Participation in operations (e.g. EUNAVFOR Atalanta since 2008; EUPOL Afghanistan since 2007).

Actors

• The EU states have a great influence on the CSDP, because it is intergovernmental and organized according to the principle of unanimity.

• The European Council of heads of states and governments formulates guidelines on which basis the Council for Foreign Affairs makes its decisions.

• The HR of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy acts as the central coordinator.

• European External Action Service, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD).

• European Commission and the European Parliament, although they only have a limited say.
Democracy Promotion

In German linguistic usage, the promotion of democracy encompasses all non-military measures of external actors, who aim to establish, strengthen or restore a democratic political order. For that, states and international organizations, as well as NGOs, are engaged.

Background
Beginning with the upheavals and transformation processes in Middle and Eastern Europe, democracy promotion, in the 1990s, has evolved into a central issue in Western development- and foreign policy. It is not only regarded as an effective means of conflict prevention and post-conflict consolidation, but also as an instrument of international development cooperation. Approximately one-tenth of the worldwide budget for development cooperation flows into democracy promotion.

Implementation
In democracy promotion, a broad spectrum of economic, diplomatic and civil society tools is used. The promotion of the economy and of economic reconstruction, which is occasionally complimented by conditions for the allocation of credits, offer positive incentives for democratization efforts. Political incentives have also proven to be efficient. Thus, the prospect of EU accession has stimulated the establishment of democratic structures. The majority of measures of international or national organizations support the building of state structures, democratic processes and facilities (voting commissions, election observation, constituent process).

Additional focal points are the sustainable strengthening of democratic institutions, for instance through the cooperation between parliament and civil society (e.g. Global Program for Parliamentary Strengthening of the UNDP), the strengthening of multiparty systems and the support with institutional setup (e.g. modernization through the E-Governance-Program of the UNDP). Additionally, there are the promotion of plurality, transparency, freedom of the press, human and minority rights, as well as the rule of law. In the framework of development cooperation, basic democratic values are anchored in common strategy papers or serve as evaluation criteria for partnerships. An essential element for democracy promotion is the strengthening, emancipation and involvement of civil society actors, such as associations, unions and the free media. This is achieved through capacity building, programs for infrastructure, political education measures, or the empowerment of women.

The objective of democracy promotion is the transformation of the political order and the power relations. To this, the connection to local traditions and structures is a prerequisite for permanent success (Local Ownership). Participatory, strongly contextual and flexible strategies are required that are construed for a comprehensive and long-term process. Often, tensions exist between other political goals of security and economic policy, which are often oriented towards short-term priorities.

Actors
- UN: UNDP, DPA (Electoral Assistance Division) and UN Democracy Fund.
- EU: European Commission (European Neighborhood Policy). Since 2006, the majority of programs for democracy promotion are brought together under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). For the period of 2011 to 2013, the EU has provided the EIDHR with € 472 million.
- Governments, state actors, political foundations, and NGOs such as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) or the National Democratic Institute (NDI).

Selected examples of German commitment
- Financial support for the completion of democratic elections (among others for election observation).
- Democracy promotion as a cross-cutting theme and in individual projects of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the BMZ.
- Strengthening of political institutions and processes through programs of political foundations (above all parliamentary and party work, strengthening of civil society structures and political participation).

Leininger, Julia et al. (eds.), »Do all good things go together? Conflicting objectives in democracy promotion«, Democratization 19 (3), Special Issue, 2012.
Disarmament and Arms Control

Both concepts describe a series of measures, agreements, and initiatives, which are targeted at limiting or reducing of military instruments and capacities. In broader terms, instruments of non-proliferation or export control are included.

Background

Disarmament aims at the reduction or abolishment of military forces or means of violence. Proponents of the disarmament approach consider war instruments (e.g. weapons), as the main reason for wars. Hence, their elimination reduces the probability of war. Arms control designates the control of existing or yet to be created military capacities, agreed upon among actors, mostly states. The goals are prevention of war, damage limitation in the case of war and reducing costs. In this case, the weapons are not regarded as the main problem, but rather their integration into a greater security political context, which includes at least two parties.

Instruments of disarmament and arms control are treaties and conventions, traditionally on the international stage. They can be agreed upon regionally (groups of states), bi- or multilaterally, and can apply globally or in a limited geographic space. Central to the functioning of disarmament and arms control is to check whether the treaties are being observed (verification). This creates transparency for the participants and should prevent a breach of the agreement. Mostly existing organizations (e.g. OSCE for the Dayton Agreement) are entrusted with the implementation.

Implementation

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the idea of disarmament dominated (e.g. Geneva Disarmament Conference 1932–35). After World War II, arms control gained in importance, which was supposed to limit the military competition between the USA and the Soviet Union. Today more than twenty bi- and multilateral arms control agreements are in place that include all groups of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC weapons). Additionally, nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) have been established and limits for conventional weapons were agreed upon. Since the end of the Cold War, the transformation of the security environment, technological innovations, new types of warfare and globalization – the increased access to dual-use technologies – represent new challenges to arms control. Small weapons and light weapons are the main means of combat in conflicts. The military development of the past years has fostered a system, which is difficult to understand in terms of arms control policy, as only the inter-connectedness of different technologies yields effects. Further, international terrorism and non-state actors present challenges to arms control and limitation.

Since the 1990s, cooperative arms control guaranteed by treaties has been renounced. The trend is towards a) making agreements more informal and b) focusing on a non-cooperative non-proliferation policy. The latter strengthens the since the 1970s established division of the world into states which possess military technologies and weapons, and those who do not. Yet, there is a lack of incentives for those who do not possess these capabilities to abstain from acquiring the technologies. A ray of hope in the nuclear realm is President Obama’s Global Zero Initiative (2009). Although the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons seems visionary for now, the initiative has revived disarmament and arms control.

Actors

• States, OSCE, EU, UN
• Implementation organization for each agreement

Selected examples of German commitment

• Germany has signed all important treaties.
• Germany is engaged in implementation organizations, in governance structures like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the G8 initiative Global Partnership, which seeks to reduce nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological proliferation risks.
• Support in the form of experts / personnel in international organizations (e.g. IAEA) and in the form of financial resources, e.g. the support of the G8 Initiative, where Germany is the second largest contributor with a commitment of up to $1.5 billion.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants are central tasks in post-conflict situations. Accomplishing these is a key prerequisite for stabilization and reconstruction.

Background

DDR is a part of an extensive cluster of measures for the stabilization of a country. Since the 1990s, DDR programs are implemented together with UN (multidimensional) peacekeeping missions, above all in the Western Balkans and in Africa. Since then, more than 60 programs were carried out above all by the UN, but also by other international actors. In 2012 alone, more than 20 DDR processes in post-conflict countries were going on worldwide. While disarmament and demobilization can be realized relatively quickly, reintegration measures may require a commitment over several years.

Implementation

While the military component of a peacekeeping operation is in charge of disarmament and demobilization, the civilian personnel is responsible for reintegration in cooperation with local actors of development assistance. The first two phases usually only last a few days: For a short period of time, the combatants are accommodated in camps for registration purposes. In cooperation with civilian actors and local groups, they are informed about the peace process and background information is gathered (status of education, skills).

Given the narrow scope for planning, international organizations such as the UN often have problems to sustain a long-term commitment to reintegration. Usually therefore, after the first two phases, financial bottlenecks arise, leading to the interruption of the program.

DDR is one of the few fields of actions of UN peacekeeping missions, in which the reworking of practical experiences has led to a large-scale coordinated learning process with the involvement of all international actors. At the end of this process stood the adoption of the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) in 2007 by the UN’s Interagency Working Group on DDR (IAWG). Since then, the IDDRS are guiding for DDR programs worldwide. However, the DDR processes until today have great difficulties of meeting the high expectations of local and international actors. Even within the IAWG let alone in field missions, UNDP and DPKO have not been able to fully implement an integrated approach towards DDR. In Haiti, UNDP decided to establish a distant yet complimentary program to MINUSTAH’s DDR activities, dealing with local gangs and criminals. This project has opened a new stream of activities in post-conflict situations which are now often coined Community Violence Reduction (CRV).

Actors

- DDR is conducted by international organizations in the framework of peacekeeping missions. In the predominantly military phases, the DPKO is above all in charge, together with civilian actors, including the World Bank, UN agencies, and bilateral donors (DFID, GIZ).
- In addition, there are subcontractors for the realization of sub-projects in the reintegration phase (GIZ, but also private local businesses).

Selected examples of German commitment

- Participation in the financing of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program of the World Bank, in DDR programs in Afghanistan and in the UNDP Fund for crisis prevention and reconstruction. Out of this fund, projects and programs for prevention and reconstruction are financed, with the special focus being on DDR programs.
- Participation in DDR programs of the KfW and the World Bank e.g. in the Sudan and in Rwanda.

References

Economic Recovery

Measures of economic reconstruction aim at the creation of a constitutionally regulated and welfare state-oriented »Peace Economy« and fighting against economies of violence and shadow markets. International donors finance, coordinate, and implement these measures in cooperation with local actors.

Background

The unequal distribution of resources and wealth is one of the most common causes of conflict. Thus, the establishment of a peace economy based on the rule of law and fair distribution of wealth is an important objective of crisis management and development work, especially in the post-conflict phase. Corresponding measures promote local economic structures, should attract foreign investors and stabilize the crisis-ridden state economically so as to provide employment and income, particularly for former combatants (DDR). A major challenge is the fight against the so-called economies of violence and shadow economies. In economies of violence, spoilers or conflict parties acquire their income through the violent seizure of resources and trade routes, particularly in resource-rich regions. In shadow economies, they gain their income through illegal activities, such as drug trafficking. Meanwhile, organized crime has become a main obstacle to successful peacebuilding.

Implementation

Security and the rule of law are prerequisites for the establishment of a peace economy. On its basis, international organizations, states and NGOs can take measures to reconstruct the infrastructure (e.g. roads), to reactivate agriculture and the economy, to construct health and education systems, and to attract foreign investments. Work and income can for instance be created through the provision of seeds or micro-loans. Yet, only within the framework of long-term stable macro-economic structures will those measures be effective. To this, international financial institutions such as the World Bank have developed special programs (e.g. market liberalization). In the course of this, a difficult balancing act has to be carried out between long-term stabilization and short-term negative effects on the economic situation of the population, which again could trigger unrest. Conversely, economic development can contribute to peace and reconciliation, by stimulating cooperation between estranged groups. The same ambivalence affects private-sector activities in conflict zones, especially in extractive industries (crude oil etc.). Large investments of companies to the benefit of corrupt regimes exacerbate tensions; charging license fees for instance for the rights of use of these resources can counteract this. However, companies can also have conflict reducing effects, by involving different groups in the population in the awarding of contracts and work and thus promoting communication and cooperation. The Global Compact-Initiative of the UN developed guidelines for this. Economic aid programs should build on what already exists in the country, and not perpetuate old inequalities or create new ones. Thereby, the promotion of economies of peace and the prevention of conflict-promoting economies go hand in hand. The international community can take action against economies of violence by labeling or banning products (e.g. so-called blood diamonds in the framework of the Kimberly process), by global regulatory measures (e.g. deregulation of drug markets) or through structural support of legal economic activities.

Actors

- States, international organizations (UN, in particular UNDP, World Bank, IMF).
- Companies, international and local NGOs.

Selected examples of German commitment

- Particularly financial contribution through international institutions such as the UN and World Bank.
- Political support and implementation of actions through the BMZ and Foreign Ministry or their executive organization the GIZ.
- Individual projects of NGOs, such as support of the production of rose oil in Afghanistan through the Deutsche Welthungerhilfe as an alternative to poppy cultivation.

GIZ, Conflicts and Economies (Online-Topic Page), www.giz.de.
Spelten, Angelika, Economies of Violence: A Challenge for Development Policy, 2004 (FriEnt-Guideline).
Election Observation

In the context of an election observation, a group of independent international and/or local observers monitor and assess the election process in a country. Thereby, international standards and national legislation have to be taken into account. The aim is to guarantee free and fair elections and to improve the conditions for confidence in the democratic process.

**Background**

Election observation is one of the key instruments to support democracy, human rights and the rule of law. After some isolated predecessors, systematic monitoring of electoral processes became a major element of crisis prevention after the Cold War and the related democratic aspirations of the international community. It demonstrates international interest, may strengthen public confidence in the electoral process, exposes any irregularities, provides transparency and acceptance for all parties involved, and contributes to the political stabilization, above all in transition- and post-conflict countries.

In particular, regional organizations conduct electoral observation missions (EU, OSCE, AU, OAS). The OSCE founded the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in 1991. In 2000, the EU systematized and consolidated its activities, developed since 1993 with the guiding principle Communication on EU Election Assistance and Observation, and sent missions outside of the OSCE region.

The focus of the UN is on the preparation and conduct of elections (Electoral Assistance).

In 2005, within the UN framework, the Declaration of Principles for International Election was adopted and signed by the most important actors. Since then, an internationally recognized methodology of election observation exists.

**Implementation**

International election observation missions require an official invitation from the country of destination. In a Memorandum of Understanding, between the government and the deploying organization, the framework conditions are agreed upon (including unrestricted access by the observers to all actors involved in every stage of the electoral process). In return, the observers commit to neutrality and objectivity. Already weeks before the election, a group of experts (Core Team) and Long-Term Observers (LTOs) arrive in the country. Nationwide, the LTOs get in contact with electoral authorities, parties, candidates, local media and civil society; the Core Team assesses the information gathered at country level. A greater number of Short-Term Observers (STOs) is present on the Election Day, to observe the casting and counting of votes, as well as possible complaint procedures and bodies until the official announcement of the results. All findings and assessments, as well as suggestions for improvement, are published in a final report.

Its recommendations are not binding for the observed countries. Occasionally, the final reports play an important role in the evaluation of reform processes and for further cooperation. However, reports can be ignored by the observed country and the observation itself can be criticized or rejected. Overall, the record of success of electoral observation is mixed.

The EU has sent out more than 70 missions since 2000, OSCE-ODIHR more than 200 since 1996.

**Actors**

- EU, OSCE-ODIHR, OAS, AU, ECOWAS.
- International and national NGOs such as the Carter Center.

**Selected examples of German commitment**

- Backing, nomination and preparation of the German election observers through the ZIF since 2002 (thus far, more than 3,400 deployed election observers to OSCE, EU and Council of Europe).
- Participation of German members of parliament in election observation missions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE.
- Training of West African election observers in the West Africa project of ZIF at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana (10 training courses since 2004).
- Training of election observers from Belarus and Ukraine by the ZIF.

**German Election Observers**

**As of 12/2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OSCE</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>CoE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STOs</td>
<td>2,473</td>
<td>282</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTOs</td>
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<td>243</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,861</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

German Observers in total since 2002: 3,404
LTO: Long-Term-Observer, STO: Short-Term-Observer
Source: Center for International Peace Operations

**ZIF, Interactive Presentation on EU and OSCE Election Observation, www.zif-berlin.org (analysis/publications).**
Groups of Friends of the UN Secretary-General

Groups of friends are diplomatic instruments for negotiations. They are small, informal unions of UN member states, which support the Secretary-General or his representatives on site and the Security Council in finding a solution to a conflict or a content-related question of UN crisis management. Composition and size may vary.

Background

Since the early 1990s, groups of friends have been increasingly employed as instruments of conflict resolution. The growing complexity of the conflicts required additional political instruments. Groups of friends are such an instrument that is less visible, but can still have a great effect: They can contribute to the exchange of information between the UN and conflicting parties, as well as among conflicting parties. They signal to them that the international community is determined to solve the crisis and committed to apply pressure. In addition, there are groups of friends who commit themselves to a specific topic of UN crisis management, such as, for example, the «Supporters of Resolution 1325».

The success of the groups depends on a range of different factors: the credibility and sustainability of the engagement, the impartiality and political will of the participating countries, the composition of the group itself as well as the reliability of the negotiation partners in the conflict-ridden country. In Somalia, for instance, the group of friends could not achieve anything, because no local partners were available for the peace process.

Implementation

Groups of friends meet ad hoc and mostly act in regard to a specific country or a thematic issue. As a rule, they consist of representatives of three to six states. As in the case of El Salvador, Cambodia or Georgia, groups of friends support the UN Secretary-General on the diplomatic level and provide him with the necessary political backing for negotiations with conflicting parties.

Groups of friends can be employed in conflict prevention. Still, most of the time, they work along peace operations, supporting them politically. They are often involved in negotiating peace agreements or accompanying its implementation. After the Civil War in El Salvador in the mid-1990s, for example, neighboring states like Mexico had a crucial role in facilitating talks between the parties to the conflict, while the US made available extensive financial resources for implementing the peace process. In addition, there are groups of friends who commit themselves to a specific topic of UN crisis management, such as, for example, the «Supporters of Resolution 1325».

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Actors

• A group of friends consists of representatives of UN member states.

• As a rule of thumb, a group of friends should represent a balanced combination of Security Council members, financially strong donor countries, neighboring states to the conflict-ridden country, and representatives of the most important stakeholders. Last but not least, it needs to be impartial.

Selected examples of German commitment

• Member of and since 2003 coordinator of the group of friends for Georgia, along with France, Great Britain, Russia, and the U.S. (since 1993 trying to find a solution to the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia).

• Membership in further country-specific groups (e.g. Yemen) and thematic unions, such as the groups for the reform of the UN, for the implementation of Resolution 1325, and for mediation. human security and conflict prevention.


Humanitarian Aid

Humanitarian aid is the immediate relief for people in acute humanitarian emergencies. It is provided by state and non-state actors and is bound by principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality. Humanitarian actions should alleviate the suffering of affected people. Yet, their aim is not to eliminate the causes of the emergency.

Background

Humanitarian aid includes the material and logistical provision and distribution of aid for people that are in acute humanitarian emergency situations due to natural disasters (e.g. floods in Pakistan, 2010), epidemics (e.g. cholera in Haiti, 2010 or conflicts (e.g. Afghanistan). The focus is on supplying clean drinking water, adequate nutrition and basic medical services, as well as providing protection against weather factors and violence. The adherence to impartiality, independence and neutrality is intended to ensure that all parties to the conflict permit the aid – thereto, they are compelled by international humanitarian law.

Implementation

The majority of international humanitarian aid is undertaken in war and civil war zones. The key actors are organizations of the → UN such as UNHCR, UNICEF and the World Food Program (WFP), the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs. In their work, they are often supported by local partners.

The → EU has a commissioner who is in charge of an office for humanitarian aid: ECHO, which annually had up to 1 billion € at its disposal for the past four years. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission is currently establishing the EU Aid Volunteers, a global initiative that will create opportunities for some 10,000 people (of EU and non-EU member states) from 2014 to 2020 to volunteer in worldwide humanitarian operations.

Both, the need for humanitarian aid and the number of actors increase.

According to the British Overseas Development Institute (ODI) over 300,000 people worldwide were actively involved in NGOs in 2008, with the financial resources of $18 billion.

The effectiveness of humanitarian aid can be impaired by external and internal factors. For instance, in civil wars, in which the displacement and the homicide of civilians is a means of waging war or the war objective, humanitarian aid is often impeded. In times of reconstruction, the demarcation to development cooperation can be difficult, which puts a strain on the cooperation of different organizations. Also a lack of knowledge of the situation on the ground and un-coordinated actions (particularly given the increasing number of humanitarian actors) often reduce the effectiveness of aid.

Moreover, humanitarian aid has come to be considered a viable economic resource for belligerent parties, who often try to misuse relief supplies. This creates an incentive to continue conflicts, thus exacerbating existing emergencies or creating new ones. Humanitarian principles are also often subordinated to political goals which run contrary to the basic principles of humanitarian aid.

Selected examples of German commitment

• Provision of approximately € 925.5 million worldwide from 2007 to 2011 and around € 550 million annually.
• As the fourth largest economy in the world, Germany remains approximately at the tenth place in donor statistics. In the past years an upward trend has been observed.

Actors

• States.
• European Union: EU commissioner for international development cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response, to which the European Commission Humanitarian Office, ECHO is subordinate to.
• UN organizations (UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP).
• Red Cross, Red Crescent.
• NGOs.
• Local partners that support the aforementioned actors.

Ramalingam, Ben/Barnett, Michael, The Humanitarian’s Dilemma: Collective Action or Inaction in International Relief?, 2010 (ODI Background Note).
**International Tribunals**

The International Criminal Court (ICC), a tool in the fight against severe human rights violations, should strengthen the rule of law in local and international relations. Before the ICC, individuals have to take responsibility for crimes of international concern (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression).

**Background**

Historical predecessors of the ICC are, among others, the military tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo after 1945: Acts that violate the International law of war or rather the Geneva Convention should not go unpunished. Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. The definition of the criminal offence of aggression is currently being discussed; the foundations were created at the ICC conference in Kampala in 2010.

The ICC is based on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998. After the required quota of sixty countries was surprisingly quick to ratify the statute, the ICC began its work as an independent international institution with its head-quarters in The Hague. Since then, 121 states have ratified the statute (yet not the USA, China, India, Israel, Russia, Sudan). They send representatives to the legislative and supervisory assembly of the ICC.

According to the complementarity principle, the ICC only gets involved when nation states are not willing or not able to assume the prosecution themselves. As a superordinated supervisory body, the ICC should provide incentives for establishing local rule of law structures. It can only judge on individuals and has no universal jurisdiction. Perpetrators can only be held accountable if they are a citizen of the contractual state or if the crime was committed on its territory. The ICC is funded through payments from the contracting states as well as through voluntary contributions.

In addition, there are also territorial and temporary tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. It was established by the UN Security Council in 1993, in order to persecute war crimes in the Balkans. In 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was set up in Arusha (Tanzania). In Sierra Leone (2002), Cambodia (2005, Khmer Rouge Tribunal) and for Lebanon (2007, Hariri tribunal in The Hague) Special Courts were set up based on a bilateral agreement with the UN.

**Implementation**

The first hearing at the ICC was held in 2009; the defendant was the Congolese militia leader Thomas Lubanga, accused of the forced recruitment of child soldiers. He was found guilty and sentenced to 14 years of prison – the trial is now in the appeals phase. Today, the court has opened investigations to seven situations in Africa, i.e. against Joseph Kony and the command personnel of the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army and. A fifth and sixth trial are scheduled for 2013 for the Kenya situation. The ICC has publicly indicted 30 people and issued 21 warrants. In 2009, the ICC issued its first arrest warrant against an acting head of state, Sudan’s president Omar Al-Bashir, among others, for crimes against humanity in Darfur. Particularly African states criticize these arrest warrants, arguing that they impede the stabilization of post-conflict societies. Since 2010, investigations are underway regarding the incidents in Kenya. The effective power of the ICC continues to be disputed, many of the accused are still at large, and sentences were not enforced. Important states reject the court. For instance, the US fear the indictment of their soldiers and have therefore even threatened ICC supporters with the withdrawal of development aid.

**Actors**

- 121 states which ratified the Rome Statute (among others 33 from Africa, 27 from Latin America, 18 from Eastern and 25 in Western Europe).
- In the ICC: President and deputy, attorney, 18 judges in three chambers and their staff.
- Supporters: The civil society network Coalition for the ICC (2,500 members in 150 countries).

**Selected examples of German commitment**

- Strong political, financial and organizational support for the ICC, Special Courts, ICTR, ICTY.
- Germany is regularly under the largest contributors, funding about 10% of the ICC’s budget.
- German national Hans-Peter Kaul is one of 18 ICC judges; legal experts are sent to the ICTY.


**Military Rapid Response Forces**

Military rapid response forces are a distinct capability which enables a quick reaction in crisis scenarios. The underlying assumption is that a timely, rapid and decisive intervention of a few troops might allow to prevent the escalation of a crisis or suspend it until larger units are available, or until political solutions to resolve the conflict are found.

**Background**

The experiences of the 1990s in the Balkans and Rwanda illustrated to the international community their lack of capabilities to undertake effective preventive measures or to respond quickly to a crisis. Hence, the result were initiatives in the EU, NATO, UN and the AU to establish military rapid response forces.

The quick and decisive deployment of such troops, supposed to arrive with first units in the theatre of operations within 10 to 15 days (UN: 30 to 90), has the aim of preventing the escalation of crises. Such a mission raises hopes that future and often bloodier, more expensive and long-term interventions can be avoided, as the scope of action of the intervening actors in such interventions is restricted. Conflicts might spread and escalate, and might create results which can then only be revised by applying the full range of military instruments. In humanitarian terms, a delayed intervention often risks extending the suffering of the population and increasing the number of victims.

However, a rapid military response can only succeed as part of an overall grand strategy. Ideally, the military crisis response is to be embedded in the context of further measures that serve to cope with the social, economic or political problems causing or fostering conflicts. These include civilian instruments, which should be available both during and after military operations.

**Implementation**

The UN could rely on the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) from 2000 to 2009. Yet, the troops of this brigade (up to 5,000 soldiers) were never deployed. Only the SHIRBRIG planning element has participated in UN missions (e.g. UNMIS 2005). The capacity of the SHIRBRIG diminished continuously for various reasons, including a lack of commitment of states, until it was finally dissolved in 2010.

The African Standby Force (ASF) of the AU agreed on in 2004 is to consist of five regional brigades with approximately 5,000 soldiers each, so that the ASF troops can reach up to 25,000 to 30,000 men. The envisioned operational target for 2010 has not yet been reached.

Since 2004, the NATO Response Force (NRF) has reached full operational capability. First parts of this multinational unit can be deployed within five days. A NRF can be brought up to approximately 25,000 soldiers and can manage a wide range of tasks. So far the NRF has only been used for disaster relief aid (e.g. hurricane Katrina, U.S. 2005) and security tasks (e.g. Olympic Games in Athens 2004).

Since 2005, the EU disposes of the EU Battlegroups (EUBG), multinational units of approximately 1,500 to 3,000 soldiers. They can be deployed ten days after operational decisions have been taken.

The EUBG and the NRF have never been deployed in crisis management despite several requests (e.g. to the EU for DR Congo 2008). This is above all a result of political and financial considerations. If an EU and NATO member state votes against a deployment, the mission does not come about (abstentions are possible). Moreover, troop-contributing countries have to give their consent. Military operations are mainly financed by the troop-contributing states and are therefore a substantial burden for them (costs lie where they fall principle). Furthermore, there are doubts about the military quality and the operational capability of EUBG and NRF.

**Actors**

- Contribution to EUBG.
- Contribution to NRF.
- NATO with NRF.
- AU with ASF.

**Selected examples of German commitment**

- Participation in EUBG and NRF.

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Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement implies the application of sanctions up to the point of military force on the basis of a UN Security Council mandate. It can be carried out in case of a threat to peace and international security or in case of a breach of peace. It aims to re-establish peace and security.

Background
According to the UN Charter, the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. If the Council identifies a risk to international peace and security, it has a range of instruments at its disposal in order to restore peace, including, among others, the application of military force. Its use, however, is politically controversial and remains a means of last resort. The enforcement of peace is regulated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. For its authorization, the UN Security Council must first determine a threat to international security according to article 39 of the UN Charter. Subsequently, the Security Council can pass a resolution that is legally binding for all 193 member states. A Security Council resolution requires the affirmative votes of nine out of fifteen members including the affirmative votes of the five permanent members, i.e. they must not veto the resolution. Abstentions or absences are not considered a veto. In practice, the implementation of peace enforcement mandates lies with other international or regional organizations or coalitions of UN member states. The consent for the intervention given by all major parties to the conflict is desirable, but it is not required according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. During the Cold War, the bloc confrontation in the Security Council inhibited the use of peace enforcing measures. An exception was the intervention in Korea from 1950 to 1953. Since the early 1990s, peace enforcement measures have been implemented more frequently.

Implementation
The application of military force is the ultima ratio of crisis management. The UN Security Council authorizes military coercive measures only in case of an acute threat to regional and international security. An assertive and credible military presence is supposed to end disputes between conflicting parties and offer protection to the civilian population. Through its deterrence effect, it can contribute to de-escalation. Mainly regional or sub-regional organizations are entrusted with enforcing peace, such as NATO (e.g. in the Balkan conflicts at the beginning of the 1990s and in Afghanistan since 2001), the EU (e.g. in the CFSP mission in the Congo 2006), ECOWAS (e.g. in Liberia 1990) and SADC (e.g. in Lesotho 1998). Occasionally, the Security Council also mandates coalitions of the willing, such as the multinational transitional troops in Haiti (2004), or individual states, such as Great Britain in Sierra Leone in 2000. As a rule, UN-led peace missions do not take over this task, as they lack the appropriate capabilities e.g. for fast deployment of troops as well as technical equipment. Peace-enforcing measures without a Security Council mandate lack political as well as legal legitimacy, as the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 exemplified. For a sustainable restoration of peace and security, military measures should be supplemented by political and civilian measures. Successful examples include the multinational INTERFET, which prevented an escalation of violence in East Timor in 1999, or the British Operation Paliser in Sierra Leone (2000). In both cases, the military operations were planned from the beginning as part of a comprehensive crisis management strategy.

Actors
• UN Security Council as mandating body.
• The military components of international, regional and sub-regional organizations (NATO, EU, AU etc.) and the troops of multinational coalitions or individual member states as actors, accompanied by humanitarian aid and diplomatic measures.

Selected examples of German commitment
• Participation in peace-enforcing measures under a UN Security Council mandate, such as in Afghanistan in the framework of the NATO-led ISAF mission.
• In principle, however, Germany conducts a policy of military restraint.

United Nations (Publisher), UN Peace Operations, Principles and Guidelines, 2008.
**Background**

The concept was coined by UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (Agenda for Peace, 1992). Nowadays, peacebuilding is an integral part of international crisis management. The importance of peacebuilding derives from the fact that about half of all post-conflict states relapse back into conflict within five years. Comprehensive peacebuilding measures are supposed to stabilize conflict-ridden countries. Therefore, successful peacebuilding means also successfully preventing the next violent crisis.

**Implementation**

Peacebuilding is a task that cross-cuts through various interdependent fields of activities. In the security realm, it includes DDR and SSR. In the political sector, it involves political and administrative institution-building, as well as the implementation of the rule of law, human rights and minority rights. Economic reconstruction requires, among others, combating war economies and the development of local economic structures. Reconciliation and transitional justice, along with the reintegration of traumatized refugees or child soldiers, are measures for overcoming psychological and social consequences of war. In addition, neighboring regions must be involved, for instance, where the regulation of border issues is a concern. Meanwhile, peacebuilding tasks have continuously increased over the last 15 years. Increasingly, the UN also deploys exclusively civilian peacebuilding and political missions (e.g. Sierra Leone). Peacebuilding activities mostly occur in cooperation with other international organizations, NGOs or individual states. The number of actors involved has continuously risen. As a result, coordination and coherence problems ensue, as the Afghanistan experience shows. In order to better coordinate and support the actors institutionally, UN member states have created new structures in 2005: The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The PBC is to create integrated strategies and implementation plans for states weakened by conflict. It also mobilizes resources and coordinates donors. The PBF, a voluntary fund under the authority of the Secretary-General, is supposed to provide flexible financial means, particularly in the early stages of a consolidation process. So far, 46 member states have assured $350 million. The PBSO, located in the UN Secretariat, supports the commission and funds analytically and administratively. Currently, the PBC has six focus countries under the auspices of the so-called Country Specific Configurations (CSC). Yet, the new structure remains short of its potential: the Commission needs more political clout and therefore a stronger link to the Security Council, as well as more support from member states. Further, it should expand its analytical, strategic and communicative capabilities. For the implementation on site, it needs above all appropriate personnel and reliable resources.

**Actors**

- States, international and regional organizations (e.g. EU), which provide politically strategic and financial contributions, and support the implementation. In addition, groups of friends, financial institutions, and NGOs.

- Local governments, conflict parties and the civilian population as recipients and »agents« of peacebuilding.

**Selected examples of German commitment**

- Peacebuilding is a focal point of German crisis management and was one of the main topics of the German UN Security Council membership in 2011/2012.
- In the year 2010, chairmanship of the Peacebuilding Commission.

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Peacebuilding refers to a range of different civilian measures, which are to establish lasting peace in a post-conflict country. They are aimed at removing structural causes of violent conflicts, overcoming the consequences of conflict, and the creation of mechanisms for conflict transformation. Peacebuilding unites security and development policy approaches.
Peacekeeping

UN-led peacekeeping missions help states, which are involved in armed conflicts, to create the requirements for a sustainable peace, for instance by accompanying the implementation of peace accords. Mandated by a Security Council resolution, the missions typically consist of international troops, police, and civilian personnel.

Background

UN-led peace missions are one of the most important instruments of international crisis management. Presently, the UN maintains 15 missions with overall approximately 116,000 employees (approximately 81,000 soldiers and military experts, 13,600 policemen, 5,400 international and 14,000 local civilian employees, and around 2,200 voluntary UN volunteers, retrieved: October 2012). On the one hand, they are financed by the UN budget for peace missions, into which the member states make annual payments. On the other hand, they are sustained through voluntary contributions. In contrast to peace enforcement, the approval of the conflict-ridden country is a prerequisite for a UN mission.

Implementation

Over the 60 years of their existence, UN missions have evolved. Four categories or generations of peace missions can be distinguished: traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional missions, missions with a robust mandate, and those with an executive mandate. During the Cold War, traditional peacekeeping missions prevailed: light armed UN peacekeeping troops monitored the compliance with peace agreements and cease fires. Nowadays, such missions are unusual. With the end of the Cold War, conflicts and threats changed and, accordingly, peace missions also changed. The so-called second generation of multidimensional peacekeeping also encompasses non-military tasks, such as DDR. These peacebuilding tasks are above all carried out by civilian personnel. Since the 1990s, the Security Council has provided many missions with a so-called robust mandate, which empowers them to use force not only for self-defense, but also for the enforcement of the mandate. Most of the latter missions, fall into this category, e.g. in the Congo. Missions with an executive mandate, the fourth generation, temporarily take over government functions, for instance in the Kosovo.

The number of actors involved has risen with the increasing need for operations and the mounting complexity of missions. Mostly, UN missions stand in a relationship based on a division of labor to other UN organizations, such as the UNDP, and to regional and international actors such as the EU, the AU, the OSCE, NATO, the World Bank, and NGOs. A comprehensive approach should contribute to better coordination. This would be in the form of »integrated mission planning processes« (early inclusion of all actors involved on the UN planning level) and »integrated missions« (merging of UN missions and of the on-site working UN country teams into one organizational structure). Yet, the coordination remains difficult, both within and outside UN structures. Not least, missions often lack the capacity for fast deployment, political support, and (leadership) personnel with the necessary qualifications.

Actors

• The Security Council issues the political mandate and its executive leadership resides with the Secretary-General. He in turn is supported by the DPKO and the DFS.
• The mission leadership in the country of operation, implements the mandate under the operative direction of a special representative.
• Multinational troops and police forces, which the member states make available on a voluntary basis; mission-specific recruited international and local civilian personnel.

Selected examples of German commitment

• Fourth largest donor for UN-led peace missions.
• In 2012, Germany provided 51 civilian employees and 12 police officer, in addition to 220 soldiers and military advisors (October 2012: 48th place on the list of UN troop providers).

Sources:

Police Missions

Police missions should support security forces in their efforts in crisis-ridden countries, stop state failure or achieve internal stability through the construction of statehood.

Background
The first international police mission was organized in 1989 by the UN to support the election preparations in Namibia. The missions in Cambodia (1992/93) and West Sahara (1993–1996) had similar tasks. In former Yugoslavia, the international police force was not only involved in assisting the election preparations, but also in the operational monitoring of the economic embargo. Additional tasks included: training and consultation of local police forces, establishing a functioning police administration, the support and consultation on infrastructural issues, as well as prosecution, border control and the supra-regional protection against threats. Many of the new tasks are summarized under the generic term SSR.

Police missions, above all under a UN mandate, successively increased in number and size of personnel. In 2012, the UN (UNPOL) dispatched nearly 16,000 police officers worldwide. Also since 2000, the EU increased its policing capacity in its CSDP operations. In 2004, the EU set the target of 5,761 police officers for relevant operations, of those, 1,400 policemen should be ready for action within 30 days. The first greater EU police missions occurred in the Balkans at the end of the 1990s (EUPM Bosnia/PROxima Macedonia etc.).

Implementation
Currently, major tasks of an international police mission are: consulting and training measures, assistance with technical equipment, including the necessary briefing, and increasingly also the establishment of complete administrative structures along with responsible ministries and mentoring of the personnel. In past years, members of police missions are recruited mainly from the police force and from criminal investigation departments, increasingly also from the Gendarmerie forces. The so called Formed Police Units (FPUs) have gained in importance, above all in the UN. Generally, FPUs are composed of about 120 officers of a personnel-dispatching state, who are qualified through joint training sessions and special equipment, to react to violence prone demonstrations and unrests. They are meant to close the gaps in the spectrum of competencies, which are neither covered by military components nor by civilian police (CIVPOL). Particularly suited for this task are paramilitary police forces of some European states, such as the Gendarmerie (France), the Carabinieri (Italy) or the Guardia Civil (Spain). The UN FPUs were first deployed in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. Their main tasks are the protection of personnel and of the facilities of a mission, the support of local police forces in their attempts to maintain public security, as well as local FPU capacity building (training, consultation). In 2010, 70 FPUs of the UN were in action, encompassing more than half of the police forces sent by the UN. Since 2003, the EU provides FPUs within the European Gendarmerie (EGF); Germany, however, does not participate.

Actors
• The manpower for police missions mandated by UN, EU or OSCE is provided by the national states.
• Moreover, police forces operate within the framework of bilateral agreements and projects, such as the German Police Project Team (GPPT) in Afghanistan.

Selected examples of German commitment
• Currently, 309 German police officers are involved in international police missions or in bilateral projects (September 2012).
• Strongest commitment of manpower in the bilateral GPPT (181 officers) and in the European police mission EUPOL AFG (25 officers) in Afghanistan.
• »UNPOL High Level Conference on International Police Peacekeeping in the 21st Century« hosted by the German Government in Berlin in October 2012, which included more than 200 police delegates from more than 100 member states.
• Support of international police missions through the provision of equipment, consultation and training, e.g. provision of the equipment of the Senegalese FPU for UNAMID, police training sessions at the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix de Bamako in Mali, construction of a police force in Palestine.

Political Missions

Political Missions is a loose collective term for predominantly civilian operations, in which various multilateral actors work towards conflict resolution and peacekeeping. They vary greatly in number and composition of their personnel, their duration and mandate. What they have in common is that they seek to achieve their aims through political interaction with local partners.

Background

Already, in the early 1990s the CSCE (now OSCE) deployed political missions to different successor states of the former Soviet Union. Since a few years, the international interest in political missions has risen significantly. Accordingly, the deployments and involvement of international organizations has increased as well. UN member states in particular regard political missions as an increasingly effective and inexpensive alternative to labor-intensive large-scale operations: the 2012/2013 budget for the 14 UN peacekeeping missions amounts to $7.23 billion. In contrast, the 12 political missions cost only $324 million. Thus far, there is no clear definition for this type of operation. The increasingly recognized concept, used here, is derived from the corresponding budget line for the activities of the DPA in the UN budget (Special Political Missions).

The mandates of political missions range from traditional diplomacy and peacebuilding to humanitarian help and development cooperation. They can also enter into play at different stages of the conflict cycle. The political missions of the UN often join larger, more robust operations, while others have a preventative and early-warning function. The majority of missions are only active in one country; however, some are also involved in regional fields of operation; this, for instance, applies to the mission of the EU Special Representative for the peace process in the Middle East or that of the UN office for West Africa (UNOWA). The strength of the personnel in political missions ranges from approximately 2,000 employees (the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA) to just nine civilian experts in UNRCCA in central Asia.

Political missions are legitimized through multilateral political bodies, such as the UN Security Council, the EU Council or the Permanent Council of the OSCE. They just use political means in dialogue with local actors and in the mediation between them. The objective of the mission is also political: to seek, together with local actors on site, policy approaches for conflict transformation in order to ensure lasting peace.

Implementation

Currently there are more than 30 political missions, which are first and foremost carried out by the UN, the OSCE and the EU. In the UN, the DPA is responsible for a total of 12 missions (apart from UNAMA, which as the largest mission, falls under the authority of the DPKO). They are concentrated in Africa (8), Central Asia (1) and the Middle East (3).

In contrast to the UN, the OSCE exclusively conducts political missions in its member states, as in the Balkans (6), in Eastern Europe (2), in the Caucasus (2) and in central Asia (5). The OAS, with its four missions, and the AU, with its single mission, are also only active in member states.

Political missions are confronted with three challenges in particular. Firstly, flawed recruitment mechanisms in member states as well as in international organizations exist, so that some missions are understaffed by up to 30%. Secondly, the small political missions in the UN and the EU in particular, find it difficult to gain the necessary attention and backing for their agenda from their headquarters. Thirdly, in addition to political missions, there are usually many other international actors on the ground, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq or in the DR of Congo. A lack of coordination implies that there are frequently high losses incurred through conflicting and duplicated activities.

Actors

- DPA (UN), OSCE, EU, AU, OAS.

Selected examples of German commitment

- Political support of the operations of the UN, EU and OSCE as part of Germany’s membership, seconding of personnel to EU, UN and OSCE missions.
- UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative Martin Kobler resides currently over the political mission UNAMI in Iraq.


Pooled Funds

Pooled funds are multilateral mechanisms to mobilize country- or issue-specific resources, and coordinate donors. The aim is greater coherence, flexibility and effectiveness in the application of contributions.

Background
The means that states and organizations provide for crisis management are often not used efficiently: Every donor has its own agenda, priorities, procedural requirements and distribution channels. This leads to duplications, gaps and aid programs that lack coherence. Pooled funds should counteract the disruptive factors as well as guarantee a coordinated, fast and flexible use of the means.

Implementation
The most important pooled funds are international funds, into which international organizations, states and sometimes private individuals pay (Multi-Donor Trust Funds, MDTFs). Even if the institutional design of MDTFs varies, they all combine the deposits of multiple donors into one pool, which is administered by a mandated actor (e.g. UN).

There are country- and issue-specific funds. Most country-specific funds are applied in a multi-sectoral way and as such finance measures in different areas (security, health, education etc). An example is the Afghanistan Re-construction Trust Fund. Sometimes however, they also have narrowly defined tasks (e.g. DDR in Sierra Leone).

Global funds promote the awareness of a cross-cutting security political issue in crisis-ridden countries (e.g. UN Democracy Fund) or in a specific region (e.g. African Peace Facility as the main financial source for the AU). There are also hybrids of country-specific and global MDTFs (e.g. Peacebuilding Fund).

The effectiveness of MDTFs is impaired by a number of factors. The fragmentation of donors can only be overcome to a certain extent: Divergent interests impede quick decisions. Furthermore, MDTFs are often confronted with conflicting objectives. A strong involvement of local partners (→ Local Ownership) in the implementation of programs, for example, can be a protracted undertaking: Suitable people and groups have to be identified, whereby different population groups have to be involved equally (→ Do No Harm). These time-consuming verification processes can be at the expense of quick aid.

Moreover, aid recipients are often unable to administer the aid well: personal and structural capacities for planning and organization are often missing. Frequently the financial and personal efforts for the management of funds are underestimated by donor countries. Finally, a systematic evaluation of the results of projects financed by funds is absent.

Selected examples of German commitment
• Contributions to numerous funds; emphasis on states in Africa, particularly Sudan, and in Afghanistan.

Ball, Nicole/van Beijnum, Mariska, Pooled Funding at the Country Level, Prepared for the UNDG/ECHA Task Team on Financing Transition, available at www.ciponline.org.
Reconciliation and Transitional Justice

Reconciliation and transitional justice are defined as processes in a post-conflict country, designated to lead from a state of hostility to a situation of cooperation. In this context, coming to terms with the past and the attempt to achieve justice are essential.

Background

Many societies of post-conflict countries are traumatized and deeply fragmented by war, displacement and human rights violations. Reconciliation processes are meant to help to come to terms with the consequences of violence and destruction at the individual, social and political level, and to create confidence between different population groups, conflict parties and between state and population. The fact that, in many conflicts, people equally suffered from violence and exercised violence themselves, acts as an obstacle to reconciliation. Yet, if there is no reconciliation, a country may rapidly relapse into armed conflict. Also, when peace efforts come to a halt, a hostile stalemate may arise, as has been the case in Cyprus for about thirty years. Reconciliation is ultimately also prevention of violence. There is a wide variety of approaches and mechanisms of working for reconciliation, which have to be adapted to the specific situation.

Implementation

Reconciliation is a lengthy process. Non-violent co-existence needs to replace fear and hatred and lead to mutual trust and cooperation. For that, various mechanisms exist: searching for truth (through documentation, truth commissions), establishing justice (through compensation, recognition of suffering, tribunals, prosecution) and measures to support healing, understanding and confidence building (trauma care, educational programs). Reconciliation cannot be imported from outside, but must be undertaken by the people affected (Local Ownership). However, international actors can make important contributions in the judicial sector: through counseling, financial support and support of personnel of truth and reconciliation commissions and their monitoring, as was the case in East Timor (2001–2005). Also important is advice in issues concerning criminal law and legislation, when dealing with past injustices; financial contributions to reparation funds; through promoting dialogue initiatives in civil society and, last but not least, through the setting up of international tribunals (e.g. The Hague, Arusha) or through calling in the ICC. Generally, it is applied to create a general framework that fosters a climate of reconciliation, for instance through anchoring appropriate programs in peace agreements.

Reconciliation is an instrument which is always linked to other measures of peacebuilding. Often however, the supporting projects of external actors are not coordinated. It is also problematic that reconciliation measures are often initiated when it is already too late, so that the problem of refugees or repatriates is repressed or alibi measures are taken up that often conceal more than they inform. Finally, the objectives of the reconciliation work are often not clearly formulated. Thus, they are difficult to control and to verify.

Actors

- Involved in the reconciliation process are individuals, societal (e.g. churches) and political actors (notably the governments) in the crisis-ridden country – as victims and perpetrators.
- International supporters are states (particularly ministries of development and institutions of technical cooperation), NGOs (e.g. International Center for Transitional Justice) and international organizations.
- The UN become active through the UNDP and their instrument of jurisdiction (ICC); also the mandates of the UN peacekeeping missions contain corresponding orders.

Selected examples of German commitment

- Reconciliation is a guiding principle of German crisis prevention and development cooperation. The German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) has the most practical experience in this field.
- The German Federal Government is currently involved in numerous projects of reconciliation, e.g. in Colombia and Cambodia (including e.g. project to develop alternative approaches of conflict management).

Bloomfield, David et al., Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 2003.
Sanctions

Sanctions are political or economic compulsory and/or punitive measures aimed at inhibiting states, groupings or individuals from taking a specific policy or action. In the context of an overall strategy, international sanctions can weaken their addressees economically and militarily or put them under pressure politically.

Background

Sanctions can block the access to specific resources for a country, groupings or individuals. They are meant to influence the cost-benefit calculations of the addressees or cause direct costs in case of continued conflict-laden behavior. The mere credible threat of sanctions can produce this effect. Sanctions can be imposed by the UN Security Council, but also by other international organizations and individual states. The power of the Security Council to adopt so-called non-military sanctions is derived from articles 39 et seq. of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Decisions on sanctions require the approval of nine of the 15 members, whereby none of the five permanent representatives are to veto or vote against the resolution. Abstention or absence are not regarded as a veto.

The EU supports the UN Security Council in the implementation of its sanctions, which are binding under international law. The Council of the EU may also decide restrictive measures on its own, to support the EU’s foreign and security policy objectives. Such decisions are binding to the member states. The relevant programmatic concept of the EU is laid down in the Basic Principles in the Use of Restrictive Measures (2004). Each decision on sanctions must orientate itself on international law.

Implementation

In the past, sanctions very often had uncontrollable consequences for the civilian population of affected states, such as in Iraq. Therefore, the Security Council nowadays, instead of imposing extensive economic blockades, imposes above all targeted, »smart« sanctions, which are addressed to specific groups or people. Among these are embargoes on armaments trade, travel restrictions for certain persons, fiscal measures, such as targeted freezing of foreign bank accounts. Since September 11, 2001, those smart sanctions have been used more frequently in the fight against terrorism. The Security Council has established special committees that implement and monitor the sanctions (e.g. Al-Qaida / Taliban sanctions committee). The committees inform the states about violations by actors who are under their jurisdiction. In that case, the member states are expected to ensure compliance with the sanctions by taking appropriate measures.

Often, sanctions unfold their effects in an undesired way or only with delay. Ultimately, the member states are responsible for the enforcement of sanctions. Yet, they often do not act united enough, which opens up loopholes for the sanctioned actors. Sanctioned regimes also suffer from a lack of transparency and occasionally their legitimacy is questionable:

The appointment of think tanks, the creation of monitoring mechanisms, as well as the inclusion of non-state actors in the administrative and monitoring tasks could counteract this.

Most commonly, sanctions are taken as reactive punitive measures. Yet, they can also be seen as a means for crisis prevention – as they act as a deterrent and strengthen international norms.

Actors

- UN, EU and other regional organizations, such as ASEAN or AU, but also individual states, e.g. the USA.

Selected examples of German commitment

- As a member state of the UN and the EU, participation in many sanctions regimes, e.g. actions against Iran.
- 2011–12 chairmanship of the Al-Qaida / Taliban sanctions committee of the UN Security Council. There, German representatives want to commit themselves, among other things, to introducing improved standards for the handling of the sanction list, in which affected groups and persons are recorded.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) refers to a long-term transformation process. The aim is to transform institutions and organizations involved in internal security to make them more efficient, more transparent and more democratic. For this purpose, the government of a country willing to reform applies appropriate strategies and programs in collaboration with local, regional and international partners.

**Background**

Since the late 1990s, SSR, based on the concept of human security, belongs to the toolbox of international crisis management. It is a normative concept and has an operational approach, based on the insight that states and their security apparatuses may become a security threat to the population, particularly when the military is marauding and raping, or when people are detained without trial. The aim of SSR is to create an effective, efficient and democratically controlled security sector.

This sector includes military, police and intelligence agencies, ministries and parliament, civil society organizations, judicial and criminal prosecution bodies, as well as non-governmental security companies and paramilitary groups. SSR encompasses, among others, the establishment of civilian authorities for the supervision of the security forces, the reform of institutional structures, as well as improving operational capabilities. All measures are interdependent, but only if they are coordinated, can a sustainable and effective SSR be accomplished.

Many states and international organizations have adopted SSR as an integrated concept and field of action (e.g. European Security Strategy 2003; UN report on SSR 2008).

**Implementation**

In 2004, the OECD / DAC has approved guidelines for the implementation of SSR and has published, in 2007, a respective manual. Main instruments of SSR are judicial and police reforms, DDR, small arms control, mine actions, human rights and the promotion of gender justice. SSR is carried out in weak and post-conflict countries, both through bilateral programs (above all UK, The Netherlands) and through SSR components of international missions, such as in the context of EUJUST LEX Iraq, EULEX Kosovo, UNIPSIL Sierra Leone or UNMIT East Timor.

However, implementation is a financial, personnel, and time-wise challenge: Thus far only a few Best Practices exist, expertise and integrated approaches are lacking, and often only single measures are implemented.

According to the principle Local Ownership, the programs should be adapted by the actors according to the current situation. Yet, this is often not the case, because of the donor-dominated perspective. The implementation at the local level (such as Iraq, Congo) is threatened by a lack of local leadership competencies, diverging agendas and by vested individual interests of the conflicting parties, as well as by the interests of neighboring countries. Public confidence in the security bodies is difficult to regain, if security forces were involved in the conflict; security reviews are not very reliable due to the lack of archive data.

**Actors**

- On site: government, national states, non-governmental or trans-national actors, intergovernmental and regional organizations, bilateral donors and private security companies.
- International: OECD, UN Inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, EU, national states (above all UK, NL), NGOs, World Bank.

**Selected examples of German commitment**

- Help with the equipment of foreign forces; Police building and counseling in 8 international missions (e.g. Iraq, Congo and as Lead Donor in Afghanistan).
- Numerous SSR programs of the German Federal Government.

Development Assistance Committee (Publisher), OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, 2008.
Small Arms Control

Included in small arms control are various measures on the national and international level: from UN moderated state conferences and national action plans to local small arms control programs in post-conflict situations. All measures aim to prevent illegal access to small arms and to control the legal arms trade more strongly.

Background

After the end of the East-West conflict, the number of civil wars soared. In these wars, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) were used in particular, whose price had fallen sharply due to the oversupply from arsenals of the former Warsaw Pact countries. They were exported in large quantities to crisis-ridden areas. In many parts of the world SALW can be acquired by civilians relatively easily, cheaply, sometimes legally, but more often illegally. In many crisis areas, they are widespread outside the regular security forces. It is estimated that more than 600 million SALW are in circulation worldwide. The Geneva organization Small Arms Survey (SAS) assumes that half a million people are killed each year through these weapons.

As part of the increase in the number of peacekeeping missions, the international community was directly confronted with the challenges that small arms pose. Projects of small arms control have become key activities for peacebuilding and crisis transformation (e.g. DDR). Parallel to this, various states and NGOs have brought the issue of small arms control to the international agenda. Their efforts culminated in the Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2001, which adopted the small arms action program of the UN.

The overall objective of small arms control is to change supply and demand dynamics to be able to permanently restrict the misuse of SALW, particularly in crisis areas.

Implementation

The small arms action program arranges that states meet at the UN every two years and calls for national implementation reports. Thus far, 51 states have complied with this request. The previous review conferences dealt, among other issues, with the marking and tracing of SALW, warehouse management and, since 2008, with the preparation of a global Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). All countries of the world of the United Nations gathered in New York in July 2012 for the ATT to negotiate an arms trade treaty that would establish high common standards for international trade in conventional arms. Despite the efforts put forth by delegations during the intense four weeks of negotiations, the Conference could not reach agreement on a treaty text. Governments are now considering the next steps to conclude the negotiations in the not-so-distant future.

Small arms control is also advanced by large civil society associations internationally and regionally, such as, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).

On site, numerous measures for small arms control have been developed by forces of peacekeeping missions and/or development cooperation together with representatives of local civil societies: Small arms studies explore the complexity of the situation on the ground and form the basis for collective programs (Weapons in Exchange for Development, WID), awareness activities, for the ritual destruction of weapons and the change of behavior (Gun Culture).

Selected examples of German commitment

• In 1998, under German leadership, the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures (GIS) was established, which is involved in the implementation of the UN small arms action program. The group is open to NGOs such as IANSA.

• Worldwide projects in the area of small arms control by the German Federal Government.

Actors

• Besides the UN, the EU adopted a code for the transfer of conventional weapons in 1998. In November 2000, the OSCE adopted the document on small arms and light weapons. The latter is the farthest-reaching politically binding document on small arms at a regional level and is the pilot for the implementation of the UN small arms action program.

• IANSA is the most significant civil society actor; the network has 800 organizations as members from over 120 countries.

• Almost all development organizations are involved in SALW programs, often with local partners like the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA).

Parker, Sarah/Green, Katherine. A Decade of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of National Reports, by Sarah Parker and Katherine Green, Small Arms Survey & UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2012.


**Special Representatives**

Special Representatives are appointed by states or international organizations to take over responsibility for certain issues or regions. They can be located in the region itself or in the headquarters of an organization.

**Background**

Special Representatives are often renowned experts or former high-ranking politicians. The first Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for the UN intervened in 1947 for conflict resolution in India and Korea. Since then, they have increased in number and their range of tasks has expanded. SRSG are appointed by the UN Secretary-General to serve in his name: as an advocate in cross-cutting issues (e.g. human rights) and regions (e.g. Sudan) or to represent him and assert the moral authority of the community of states in conflicts. The SRSG conducts state visits, investigations and negotiations on behalf of the UN.

The Special Representatives of the EU (EUSR) are appointed on proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy by the Council of the EU to carry out certain tasks related to the common foreign and security policy. Additionally, other actors, such as states, appoint special representatives to focus their policies and to underline the importance of a topic. Their powers depend on the respective mandate.

**Implementation**

SRSG have developed into an important diplomatic tool of peacekeeping and conflict mediation of the UN. As leaders of complex peacekeeping operations, they are confronted with diverse and often contradictory demands. SRSG conduct peace negotiations and possess extensive governmental powers as head of the UN interim administration, such as in Kosovo/UNMIK. Further, they are the central authority that coordinates civilian, police and military components of the mission and regulate links to non-UN actors. With these various roles, the SRSG are often confronted with conflicting priorities of politics and administration. Since multiple tasks and far reaching competencies are focused in the SRSG, his management skills as well as his personality have significant influence on the success or failure of UN peacekeeping missions.

The EUSR have established themselves as a successful instrument of EU foreign policy, since 1996 when the first mandates for the Great Lakes in Africa and the Middle East peace process were issued. Currently, eight EUSR represent the interests and policies of the EU in crisis-prone countries and regions and play an active role in the efforts in peacebuilding, stability and the rule of law. They coordinate the various EU activities in crisis regions, support the Brussels’ decision-making level with reports and policy proposals, and provide an important link between the field level, the political-administrative level in Brussels, EU agencies and the member states. Moreover, they are contact persons for third countries and partner organizations. EUSR work in the EU institutions in Brussels or in the country/region of assignment.

States and groups of actors appoint special representatives as well. Hence, the German Federal Government appointed the diplomat Michael Stein as a Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan or the Middle-East Quartet (EU, UN, U.S., Russia) appointed the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as a Special Representative for the region to re-vive the stalled peace efforts.

**Actors**

- Currently ten EUSR, including for Afghanistan and Sudan.
- Currently 90 UN Special Representatives with different mandates; two-thirds with a geographical commitment (e.g. Sudan) and one third with a thematic reference (e.g. prevention of genocide).

**Selected examples of German commitment**

- On several occasions Germany provided EUSR and SRSG, such as Christian Schwarz-Schilling as EU Special Representative for Bosnia, Tom Koenigs as SRSG in Afghanistan or Michael von der Schulenburg as ERSG in Sierra-Leone.
- Currently in the UN: SRSG of the UN mission in Iraq (UNAMI), Martin Kobler.

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**References**


Outlook

Quo Vadis Crisis Management?

Germany acts according to clear principles in crisis management: it wants to prevent crises, primarily use civilian instruments, take effective action and enter commitments on the basis of broad legitimacy. The latter is generally guaranteed through the multilateral framework of German involvement and through UN mandates. As this overview as well as many analyses of security policy and studies of SWP and ZIF illustrate, Germany contributes to international crisis management with financial and human resources, and ideationally. At the same time, there is still the problem of implementing these principles consistently, providing the necessary support to international actors in crisis management and applying the described instruments effectively and efficiently. This applies in financial, human and political terms.

The German federal government and parliament should assess German engagements in crisis management and evaluate to what extent it is able to translate its goals into an efficient crisis management work with lasting results. On this basis, international and national challenges in crisis management should be defined, priorities set to establish initiatives to improve its structures and further develop its instruments.

Germany in Crisis Management – An Ambivalent Assessment

Germany’s commitment has changed and intensified over the past twenty years: conceptual foundations were created, structures were established and the participation in missions and other commitments increased.

Concepts

Germany has many conceptual foundations at its disposal: the action plan »Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding«, the »White Paper 2006 on Germany’s Security Policy and the future of the armed forces«, »Interministerial guidelines for coherent Federal Government policy towards fragile states« as well as strategy papers of several ministries. In addition, Germany seeks orienta-

Structures

The federal government has gradually set up national structures, such as the interministerial steering group on »Civilian Crisis Prevention and Comprehensive Security«, to organize crisis management as a preventive and cross-departmental measure, and under civilian auspices. The Center for International Peace Operations recruits, trains and deploys since 2002 civilian personnel for international missions. In 2010, the subcommittee »Civilian Crisis Prevention and Comprehensive Approach« of the German parliament started its work. In addition, several cross-departmental forums on specific issues exist. In some cases, recently in the Sudan, the interaction of these structures had yielded tangible results. Otherwise however, the implementation of the concept of comprehensive security in existing structures remains difficult. These difficulties are often explained by the fact that the federal government struggles to declare political priorities, but also by the problem of coalitions and the fragmentation of competences among various departments, and the departmental principle according to which ministers enjoy relative independence in their areas.

Commitment

Germany is committed in many ways; it contributes to election observation missions of OSCE and the EU, DDR programs, UN-groups of friends. With all due respect to this commitment, it is not always clear what is the decisive overall rationale that guides when, where and with what partners Germany acts. Moreover, with increasing duration, engagements suffer from fading material, personnel, and notably political support.
Challenges and Opportunities in Global Crisis Management

The experiences of past years show that the paradigm of crisis management has its limitations. An indication of this is the ambiguous assessment of international operations. Failures or ambivalent results such as in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and DR Congo outnumber the successes in countries such as Sierra Leone. Also, the events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2012 have revealed the limitations of the international ability to act. Although the international community reacted, it was not able to assess the developments and to generate tailor-made scenarios and strategies.

As part of the international community, Germany can contribute to create better conditions for successful crisis management. To do this, it should address a number of challenges.

The Future of Crisis Management: The Necessary Outlook for »Crisis Management 2030«

Improve strategic planning and raise awareness of future developments: Current trends, such as the rising influence of Asia, the strategic pivot of the U.S., urbanization, climate change, demographic transformations and cultural conflict will have an impact on international crisis management. In addition, the financial crisis and the subsequently adopted national and international austerity programs will have an effect. The consequences are difficult to predict. However, it seems certain that resources are getting scarce – simply because of the steady or even increasing need for crisis management along with declining budgets. Recent developments suggest that preventive measures and civilian capabilities are needed on a greater scale. Further, many issues remain uncertain: What will future crises look like? What form will the commitment of external actors take in 20 years from today? What does »Crisis Management 2030« require in terms of material and human expertise and capabilities? What partners is Germany able and willing to cooperate with?

Operations, Commitments, and Resources: Development through Lessons-Learned Evaluation Processes

Carry out systematic evaluations: Germany can only improve its crisis management instruments if it systematically develops a better understanding of its past achievements and of the failures of its commitments. If at all, the evaluation of operations often takes place behind closed doors and is only rarely done systematically, comprehensively and with the inclusion of all actors involved. In many cases, only single instruments are evaluated instead of investigating to which degree the strategic objectives of the commitment have been reached. Yet, only through systematic, institutionalized and transparent analysis can lessons be learned that change this practice.

In this regard, all completed operations of the past should be analyzed in the context of lessons identified / lessons learned processes. Also, the »landscape of crisis management« should be revised eight years after the adoption of the action plan »civilian crisis prevention« and should undergo a critical assessment. The results will determine the further development of structures, concepts, cooperation agreements and financing arrangements. The goal is an effective and cost-efficient crisis management that yields sustainable results.

Austerity Programs and Crisis Management: Joining Forces

Understand and control the impact of austerity programs: As a consequence of the international financial crises, Germany and most of its partners have launched national austerity programs. Yet, Germany does not know whether and to what extent the current austerity programs led its partners in the EU, NATO, OSCE and UN to cut their funding for crisis management. The possibility exists that with declining public budgets, instruments of international crisis management will gradually be reduced and will no longer be available in their current scope. Policy responses are necessary if the need for international crisis management remains constant or even increases, while resources decrease at the same time.
Hence, these effects should be recorded first. Independently of that, states and organization could achieve synergy by the common use of instruments such as transport. Thereby they can increase efficiency in crisis management and release additional means.

**Conceptual Challenges:**
**Ensure a Clear Understanding and Realistic Claims**

*Consolidation of the terms comprehensive security and civilian crisis prevention:* Both terms are key benchmarks in the security political actions. Their overlaps, differences and characteristics have remained largely unresolved. The consequences are confusion of international partners and arbitrary use in the national language. The process of clarifying these concepts and their relations could be a substantial contribution to a comprehensive and consistent German security concept.

*Acknowledge limits of comprehensive approaches at the national and international levels:* In practice, evident problems and limits of the implementation of these concepts have been pointed out. Coordination is a prerequisite for success in crisis management, but should not develop into a constraint or be an end in itself. There is a difference between close agreement, and if necessary integration, and coordination of a division of labor among actors. This difference has to be considered in theory and in practice. Comprehensive approaches are not a universal remedy.

**Structural Challenges:**
**Strengthening National Structures and International Embedding**

*Strengthening national institutions:* Governmental actors and external observers from academia and civil society occasionally assess existing national structures as little effective and efficient. The cross-departmental cooperation in Germany is based on voluntary participation. If it is achieved, it generally enjoys a high degree of acceptance and legitimacy. The challenge in reforming existing structures or creating new ones is to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of comprehensive crisis management, without weakening the legitimacy of the structures.
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<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>BIC</td>
<td>Bonn International Center for Conversion</td>
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<td>BMZ</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
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<td>LEX</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<td>FriEnt</td>
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<td>GIGA</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures (for the implementation of the UN Small Arms Action Program)</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Organization</td>
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<td>Istituto Affari Internazionali/Institute for International Affairs (Rome)</td>
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<td>International Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INEF</td>
<td>Institute for Development and Peace at the University of Duisburg-Essen</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>INSTRAW</td>
<td>International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, UN</td>
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<td>International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force, NATO</td>
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<td>KfW</td>
<td>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau / German Credit Institute for Reconstruction</td>
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<td>LTOs</td>
<td>Long-Term Observers MDTF</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
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<td>NUPI</td>
<td>Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institut / Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (Oslo)</td>
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<td>NWFZ</td>
<td>Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone</td>
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<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
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<td>PRIF</td>
<td>Peace Research Institut Frankfurt</td>
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<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
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The German Institute for International and Security Affairs of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) is an independent academic research center. On the basis of independent research and expertise, it advises the Bundestag (German parliament) and the German Federal Government on foreign and security policy issues. Since its founding in 1962 in Ebenhausen near Munich, the SWP has enhanced its reputation in Germany as well as abroad, through its publications, analyses and international symposia. In January 2001, the SWP set up its new home in Berlin. With approximately 120 employees it is the largest institute in its research domain in Western Europe. The SWP is funded from the budget of the Federal Chancellery, as well as through third-party funds.

The Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) was founded in 2002 by the German Federal Government and the Bundestag (German parliament). The core mandate of the ZIF is the training and the provision of civilian experts on international peace operations, as well as the drafting of analyses and concepts on peacebuilding and peacekeeping. ZIF cooperates closely with the German Foreign Ministry and is particularly responsible for missions of the UN, the EU and the OSCE. The integrated approach of ZIF, which combines training, human resources and analyses, is recognized worldwide as a leading model.