Challenges of Peace Implementation in Côte d’Ivoire

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Expert Workshop by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)

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Executive Summary

This report is based on the proceedings of an international experts’ workshop with the theme “Challenges of Peace Implementation in Côte d’Ivoire”, held at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre from 31 May to 2 June 2004.

Côte d’Ivoire, once a stable and prosperous country in a generally unstable West African region, has been in a state of civil war since a failed coup attempt in September 2002. The period of actual combat was relatively short, and the levels of destruction and casualties suffered during the crisis have been low - indeed way below that suffered in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, with which the Ivorian crisis has been linked. However, the war has effectively split the country into two, and has threatened a major humanitarian catastrophe, including, some fear, ethnocide on the scale of Rwanda.

Partly as a result of that fear, and also because of Côte d’Ivoire’s importance in the region, international reaction to events in the country has been unusually swift. Shortly after the failed coup attempt, West African leaders, acting under the auspices of ECOWAS, visited the country and pledged support to its democratically elected President, Laurent Gbagbo. France, the country’s former colonial master and its chief foreign backer, reinforced its permanent military presence in the country, and deployed to separate the warring factions. ECOWAS, the West African regional organization, also sent in troops.

Known as ECOMICI, the force was deployed in addition to and in co-operation with the French Licorne operation. Negotiations spearheaded by France and fully supported by ECOWAS led to the signing, by the warring parties, of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, which outlined a peace process that would lead to the disarmament of the belligerents, the reunification of the country, and fresh elections in October 2005. In quick order, the United Nations agreed to deploy a peacekeeping mission, which has now effectively subsumed the ECOWAS forces and which is operating in close collaboration with the French forces.

Discussions around the Ivorian crisis have focused almost exclusively on the supposed internal contradictions of the Ivorian state, contradictions that became glaring after former President Bedie, who replaced the country’s long-term leader, the patrician President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, enunciated the policy of Ivorite. It has been argued that the long-simmering grievances among the relatively impoverished, and largely politically marginalized inhabitants of Côte d’Ivoire’s northern regions against the more favoured inhabitants of the south, are among the most important causes of the present crisis. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement itself was anchored on this interpretation. But while these grievances are real, the external factors that helped launched the rebellion and have sustained it since then are equally important. To overlook them will do little to advance the peace process in the country.

Three main principles govern the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement: (1) The need to maintain the territorial integrity of Côte d’Ivoire; (2) The creation of a Government of National Reconciliation, with a new Prime Minister; and (3) The need to conduct transparent and free elections in which people would not be excluded by means of churlish legislation. Implementation of the Agreement, however, has been slow because of a lack of political will on the part of the signatories, including the government of President Gbagbo. But the Agreement itself may be too ambitious, for implicit in it is a call for a radical change of the character of the Ivorian state. It also appears to give legitimacy to rebel factions which had striven for unconstitutional change.
The misgivings about Linas-Marcoussis notwithstanding, some gains have been made in the peace process. The Gbagbo regime has expanded the government to include some members of the anti-government groups; the security of these people has been assured; amnesty laws have been passed; laws protecting migrant workers are being legislated; and military personnel, including French, ECOWAS and UN troops, have been deployed around the country to protect civilians, and to oversee a disarmament process. The humanitarian catastrophe that was feared - the fear of an ethnic cleansing campaign has not happened, although parts of the country have suffered from shortages of basic necessities. A comprehensive programme of disarmament and demobilization of combatants has been worked out, and awaits full implementation.

Yet the peace process has stalled. The anti-government Forces nouvelles, accusing the Gbagbo government of bad faith, have refused to be disarmed ahead of the elections in 2005. The government on its part claims that logistical arrangements with respect to the electoral process are hampered by the fact that the rebels are holding on to half of the country, preventing officials from gaining unimpeded access to those areas. Similarly, humanitarian assistance to some parts of the country controlled by the rebel forces has been impossible because of logistical and security reasons. There is a marked reluctance on the part of both parties to adhere fully to the provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, but there is no alternative to the full implementation of the agreement if the peace process is to go ahead. The situation of 'No-War-No-Peace' that has resulted is a volatile one, threatening to unravel the hard-won gains of the peace process. This cannot be allowed to happen.

There is a need on the part of the international community - including the UN, the AU, ECOWAS and France - to vigorously re-engage all the parties involved in the conflict to make sure that the peace process is back on track. The basic principles governing the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement need to be reiterated and urged upon all the parties. Among the most important of these principles are the inviolability of the sovereign territory of Côte d'Ivoire. Any talk of secession by the rebel-held north of the country should be condemned and discouraged; the idea is non-negotiable. Similarly, the government of President Gbagbo should reiterate and act upon the commitment to an inclusive and functioning Government of National Reconciliation.
Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the government of Ghana for their support to the KAIPTC, and to the workshop. In particular, we appreciate the participation by the Hon. Akwasi-Osei, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ghana, who delivered the keynote address. We sincerely appreciate the efforts of Dr. Winrich Kühne of ZIF, the German Federal Government, and GTZ, who provided respectively the conceptual and financial support that made this event possible.

We would like to express our deep gratitude to the United Nations. In particular, Colonel Nicholas Seymour, Chief, Military Planning Service, UNDPKO and the Head of United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, Prof. Albert Tevoedjre for delegating his senior political advisor, Ambassador James Aggrey-Orleans, to the workshop and for authorizing the participation of Deputy Force Commander Brigadier General Abdul Hafiz, and DDR Advisor, Captain Christian Lupuleasa. Their contributions to our understanding were invaluable.

The KAIPTC aims, above all, to serve the training, education and research needs of the West African Community. In this respect, we wish to thank H.E. Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, for authorizing the participation of key staff members for the duration of the workshop. And to express our sincere appreciation for the contributions made by Mr. Frank Afanyakonson, Colonel Dixon Dikio, and Major Julius Nwadioha.

The co-operation of the government of Côte d’Ivoire contributed greatly to the information shared during the workshop, especially through the active participation of Mr. Alain-Richard Donwahi, President, Côte d’Ivoire NCDDR and his delegation. Similarly, we acknowledge the support of the French government; particularly the participation of H.E. Jean-Michel Berrit, Ambassador of France to Ghana, and Lt Col Nicolas Casanova who spoke on behalf of the Licorne force whilst also representing the ECOWAS Secretariat.

While each and every participant contributed to the richness of the very candid discussions, we would like to say a special thanks to the panelists not already mentioned above: Prof. Francis Akindes of the University of Bouake; Mr. Takwa Suifon of WANEP; Dr. Kwesi Anning of ASDR; Mr. Mike McGovern of ICG; Major Babakar Gueye of Senegal; and Lt Col Leopold Kohou of Côte d’Ivoire.

Lansana Gberie and Prosper Addo
KAIPTC
12 July 2004
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<td>AU</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>ECOMICI</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Movement of the Forces of the Future</td>
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<td>United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>Rally of the Republicans</td>
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I. Introduction

The Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, once a bastion of stability and increasing prosperity in the generally unstable West African region, has been embroiled in conflict since a failed coup attempt by renegade soldiers in September 2002. The violence that followed the attempted putsch quickly morphed into a highly complicated civil war, and the country itself has now been effectively split into two, with the legitimate government of President Laurent Gbagbo controlling the southern half, and anti-government forces controlling the northern half. It is a conflict that has been characterized by relatively little in the way of active hostilities between combatants, but which has spawned widespread and egregious abuses against civilians. And while apparently internal, it is a conflict that has profound regional dimensions.

When it became evident that a major humanitarian catastrophe loomed, France, the country’s former colonial master and chief foreign backer, quickly reinforced its 600-strong permanent military presence in the country (the result of a Defence Pact signed in the 1970s) to a 4000-strong force, which deployed to separate the warring parties. This deployment effectively underscored the division of the country into two parts. The French intervention was followed by the deployment of army contingents from West African states acting under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), known as the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI).

Negotiations spearheaded by ECOWAS and supported by France led first to a ceasefire agreement, in Lome, Togo, on 13 January 2003, and then to the signing by the various warring parties, in January 2003, of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement in Paris, France. The Agreement emphasized “strict compliance” with the ceasefire agreement, which was “made possible and guaranteed by the deployment of ECOWAS forces supported by French forces.” It reiterated the need to “maintain the territorial integrity of Côte d’Ivoire and respect for its institutions and to restore the authority of the State,” and it provided for the immediate setting up of a transitional government of National Reconciliation. The Agreement called on ECOWAS, France and the UN to “arrange for their forces to guarantee” the regrouping and subsequent disarmament of all forces, including “mercenaries,” involved in the conflict.\(^1\)

On 4 February 2003, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1464, which legitimized the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, and backed the continued operations of the French military operation - known as Licorne - as well as ECOMICI. ECOMICI was subsequently enlarged with an additional 1,100 troops in March 2003, and was brought under the command of Major General Khalil Fall (of Senegal). On 13 May 2003, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1479, establishing a United Nations mission for Cote d’Ivoire known as MINUCI, and detailing the role of the UN in facilitating the return to peace and the observance of Linas-Marcoussis. On 27 February 2004,

\(^1\) See Appendix A for the full text of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.
the UN Security Council authorized a full peacekeeping operation for Côte d’Ivoire and mandated nearly 7,000 UN personnel to monitor and help implement the comprehensive peace agreement. The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was authorized for an initial period of 12 months, starting on 4 April 2004, on which date the mandate of MINUCI ended. The ECOMICI forces were subsumed under the UN flag as part of the UNOCI force, with the formal handover of ECOMICI to UNOCI taking place on 5 April 2004.

The interventions in Côte d’Ivoire provide the most recent example of a trend towards ‘hybrid operations’ in Africa – operations, such as those in Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC and now Burundi, in which the UN takes over and re-hats regional peacekeeping forces already on the ground in a conflict zone. In Sierra Leone, the UN took over and re-hatted West African troops who were already engaged in peace-enforcement, and British forces bolstered the UN mission when it was in crisis. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC, the French-led EU Operation Artemis deployed rapidly to avert further bloodshed in Bunia and the Ituri district. In Côte d’Ivoire, the French Licorne force has provided and continues to provide a credible backstop for regional and UN forces on the ground. Whatever we call these new kinds of engagement, the importance to the entire West African sub-region – and indeed to Africa - of achieving success with the Ivorian peace process, cannot be overstated.

As a result, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) decided to convene a workshop on peace implementation in Côte d’Ivoire, in part to help meet the need for better understanding of ECOWAS contributions to peace support operations in West Africa. The workshop, held at the KAIPTC in Accra from 31 May to 2 June 2004, was a joint initiative of the KAIPTC and the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF). When KAIPTC and ZIF began planning for a “lessons learned” workshop, in late 2003, the exact nature of the developments in the Ivorian peace process could not be foreseen. It was clear, however, that the international and regional involvement would still be ongoing by June 2004, and it was therefore decided that the theme of the workshop should be “challenges of peace implementation”, rather than lessons learned.

The timing of the workshop remained delicate, coming so soon after the deployment of UNOCI and amidst ongoing setbacks, primarily at the political level, in the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement. It was therefore necessary to amend the programme several times, to accommodate the withdrawal of participants who had urgent operational priorities to attend. It must be accepted that there is seldom an opportune time to reflect on progress with an ongoing peace implementation process. Nevertheless, it was possible to bring together a committed group of over 60 participants - diplomats, senior military officers, and policy analysts who are or were closely involved in the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Côte d’Ivoire.

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2 See Appendix B for the final draft of the programme.
3 See Appendix C for a list of participants at the workshop.
Participants were informed that the presentations of the panelists, as well as the essence of the ensuing discussions, would be captured, edited and published for the purpose of providing a wider audience with a better understanding of the challenges of implementing peace in Côte d’Ivoire. The intention is not to produce long lists of recommendations to the UN or to ECOWAS, as both organizations have suffered an overdose of such exercises in recent years. (The few recommendations that are indeed noted, were proposed mainly by UN and ECOWAS staff themselves.) The purpose of this report is rather to gather as much of the information shared during the workshop as possible, to document it as accurately as possible, and to disseminate it to all who are interested in the promotion of peace in Côte d’Ivoire.

The structure of the report is semi-chronological, inasmuch as it begins with an overview of the origins and nature of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, and provides a brief perspective on French involvement in the country and in Africa. The focus on the role of the French is carried through to a synopsis of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the intervention of the Licorne force in Côte d’Ivoire. The report then covers efforts by the ECOWAS to resolve the crisis, from intense peace-making diplomacy through to the deployment and operations of ECOMICI, the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire.

Although all agreed that it was too early for a thorough analysis of UNOCI, the report provides some detail of the planning, deployment and concept of operations of the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire – including a few lessons from the start-up phase. This is followed by an overview of the planning that is in place for the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, an aspect that is critical for effective UNOCI mandate implementation at the operational level.

The report continues with an overview of progress with peace implementation at the political level and the role of the Monitoring Committee. It concludes with a summary of the Ivorian peace process to date, and an assessment of what is needed to take this forward to a successful conclusion. Here, we relied heavily on information provided by Ambassador James Aggrey-Orleans who, as a veteran diplomat and principal political advisor to UNOCI, helped participants to grasp the “big picture”. The authors took some liberty in adding some secondary sources to enhance the depth and scope of the two sections that follow. For the rest, we have rather unashamedly plagiarised our participants under cover of the Chatham House rule, though some general references to individual presenters are provided in footnotes.
II. Origins and Nature of the Ivorian Conflict

The Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, otherwise known as FANCI, were created in May 1960 by the government of the late President Houphouët-Boigny with a focus on creating a small army for various political and developmental activities. These included administration of the civil service and serving in other capacities as Ministers, Ambassadors and Directors in hospitals. FANCI was to also engage in road construction and infrastructural development, agriculture/fisheries and other marine activities, and the running of the national airlines (Air Ivoire). In terms of actual combat role before the current crisis, FANCI has not been involved in any military aggression or serious peacekeeping missions. During the Congo crisis in the early 1960s, FANCI was attached to the medical services unit of the UN force in the country.

FANCI’s capacity as a fighting force was, therefore, severely limited. Before the ongoing crisis, 80% of the FANCI budget was devoted to paying salaries of soldiers. This obviously had broad implications with respect to the capacity of the state to equip and defend itself, as has been glaringly manifested during the current crisis.

The role of FANCI changed, however, under the leadership of ex-President Bedie. Bedie’s efforts to use FANCI in a political role - to suppress popular protests - resulted in serious tensions within the army’s officer corps and rank and file, and led to the sacking of the then armed forces commander General Guei. This prompted an attempted coup d’état in 1996, and a successful one in 1999. The current crisis has its genesis in these events.

Past insurgencies in West Africa have typically started as incursions from neighbouring countries by armed groups, beginning with attacks from the border areas and gradually progressing towards the capital city, which has often been far removed from the initial scenes of fighting. This was the trajectory of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. In the Ivorian case, however, the violence flared up, suddenly and unexpectedly, in the large commercial capital, Abidjan, and very quickly, with little apparent movement of forces, spread to the northern cities of Korhogo and Bouaké, the country’s second largest city and a major industrial base. The attacks, involving about 800 soldiers who were about to be retrenched from FANCI, appeared to have been well-coordinated. They were also bloody. In the first few days of fighting, 400 people were killed, many of them in Abidjan, including the country’s Interior Minister, Emile Doudou, and a

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4 The authors acknowledge, in particular, information gleaned from the presentations of Takwa Z. Suifon of WANEP, Kwesi Anning of ASDR, Mike McGovern of ICG, and Lt Col Leopold Kohou, speaking on behalf of Col. Miezou Kadjo, Côte d’Ivoire.

5 The Ministry of Defence is in charge of FANCI. The Minister of Defence, as the political head of the ministry, officially directs the policy of FANCI. Next to the Minister of Defence is the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the armed forces, who serves as the supreme chief of the gendarmerie. There are also Directors in charge of the different arms of service (Terrestrial, Air and Marine). The Commander of the Gendarmerie is in charge of military training. The total troop strength of FANCI is 20,000. The Gendarmerie constitutes 8,500 of the total personnel of FANCI, the Army 7,000, the Air force 1,350 and the Navy 1,250. About 3,500 personnel were recently recruited into FANCI.
former President, General Robert Guei (the country’s first successful coup-maker) and his entire family.

An ill-equipped and ill-prepared Ivorian army was able to mobilize quickly, however, and in a few days of fighting repelled the rebels from Abidjan. The rebels, though, had already taken over the northern cities of Bouaké and Korhogo. A less than spirited attempt by FANCI to retake the cities was repulsed. A crack force of French troops staged a dramatic rescue of foreign nationals, including hundreds of American students, from Bouaké in the first weeks of fighting, and a reinforced French contingent established camps just outside Bouaké and along a zone roughly dividing the country into two parts - a formal acknowledgement, if this were needed, that the rebels now controlled the northern half of the country. The government of President Laurent Gbagbo, elected just over a year before in a popular but controversial vote, reinforced its control of the southern half.

An uneasy stalemate ensued in the country, to be quickly disrupted, in November 2003, by the emergence of two new ‘rebel’ groups in western Cote d’Ivoire. The two groups, the Mouvement Populaire du Grand Quest (MPIOGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP), said they were fighting to avenge the death of General Guei, and determined to do so by removing Gbagbo, whom they accused of the killing, from power. It emerged, however, that the rebels were really former Revolutionary United Front (RUF) soldiers and units from Liberia’s army loyal to then President Charles Taylor6, and that pillage, far more than politics, was driving their ‘insurgency’. Unlike the group holding the north of the country (the Mouvement Patriotique de la Cote d’Ivoire (MPCI), which established itself as a rather well-behaved force in key cities, the new groups in the west of the country soon became notorious for vandalism and terror, and they soon after clashed with French troops, leading to serious casualties. Tens of thousands of Ivorians fled the country.

If it was easy to establish the character and provenance of the western rebel groups, understanding the motivation and nature of the much more important northern group proved far more difficult. Were they simply mutinous soldiers hungry for power? Or were they champions of a marginalized sector of the country, the mainly Muslim - and Dyula-speaking - half of the country (the north), as they claimed? Or were they, as Gbagbo’s government claimed, an assorted bunch of disgruntled rogue soldiers and foreign mercenaries carrying out a plot by Côte d’Ivoire’s neighbours, particularly Burkina Faso, to destabilize the country? These questions persisted months after the failed coup and the beginning of the insurgency. Western reporters who ventured into the rebels’ stronghold generally found them genial and charming, behaving well to the civilian population but otherwise not engaged in any form of governance. A reporter from a major American newspaper found the rebels “lazing about,” and possessing “more satellite pho-_
nes than battle scars.” She noted that five months after the rebels’ occupation of Bouaké, the banks there were not functioning, businesses were boarded up, schools closed and half the town’s population had fled. As the months progressed, the World Food Programme announced that 50 per cent of residents in Bouaké had no savings, and that the rest had lost 80 per cent of their purchasing power. Starvation loomed, precipitating a further mass exodus from the city.

All that was clear about the rebel leadership was that it comprised of mainly ex-soldiers and that a prominent figure in the group was a former radical student leader named Guillane Soro. Soro soon emerged as spokesman for the group, and in one interview he reacted impatiently to questions about his group’s real identity. “Who are we? We are young Ivorians, and we are ready to fight and die.” He then described his group as a mix of exiled soldiers and former students who were furious at the Ivorian government’s mistreatment of northern Ivorians. “If you are from the north,” he said, “you are subhuman, according to the government. We want a united Ivory Coast. We want a country that lives in harmony and includes everyone. We want a Pan African nation where the Ivory Coast is a melting pot.”

Though evidently self-serving, this rhetoric undoubtedly taps into long-simmering grievances among the relatively impoverished, and largely politically marginalized, inhabitants of Côte d’Ivoire’s northern regions. Since independence in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire has been ruled by people from the southern part of the country, who as a result constitute an elite class dominating the country’s government, civil service, academia and the business sector. This charmed circle, from mainly the Baoule and Bete ethnic groups (the first two Presidents of the country, Houpouët-Boigny and Conan Bedie, were Baoule, and Gbagbo is Bete) has in the past even contorted the country’s constitution to maintain the lopsided status quo. The most striking case was the adoption of a new electoral code by the National Assembly, at the instance of Bedie, which stipulated that Presidential candidates must be born in Côte d’Ivoire to parents who were themselves born in the country. Gbagbo, then an outspoken opposition figure, angrily described the electoral code as “liberticide, racist, xenophobic and dangerous.”

The intention, however, was purely churlish: to exclude from participation in the polls Bedie’s chief rival, Alasane Quattara, of Dyula ethnicity from the north, and a former Prime Minister of the country. Quattara’s mother is said to have come from Burkina Faso, and he was subsequently barred from contesting the 1995 Presidential polls, which Bedie won. But the code, which sedulously created a distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ Ivorians, had far-reaching implications.

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7 Emily Wax, “For now, Ivory Coast’s Northern Rebels enjoy Goodwill; Group’s Leaders noted for Civility, if not Governance,” Washington Post, 10 March, 2003; page A 12.
10 “The War is not Over Yet” (ICG report). p.53.
When Côte d’Ivoire gained independence in 1960, it had a population of 3 million; in 2002 the population stood at 17 million. The remarkable increase resulted as much from natural growth as from labour immigration. Under the patrician President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who led the country to independence and ruled it until his death in 1993, the Ivorian government made it a policy to encourage huge immigration into the country of other Africans from the more depressed - and sometimes chaotic - states adjacent to Côte d’Ivoire. The new immigrants were smoothly integrated into Ivorian society, with some of them holding important governmental positions, and the majority were employed in the country’s booming agricultural sector.

By the 1980s, world market prices for cocoa and coffee (the country’s key export commodities) slumped drastically, and the huge presence of nationals from other African states began to be seen as a burden. In 1990, Houphouët-Boigny named Quattara, a senior official of the IMF, Prime Minister partly to handle the economic crisis. Quattara introduced residency permits for foreign nationals in the country. They cost $50 per annum for nationals from ECOWAS states and $500 for non-ECOWAS nationals. Houphouët-Boigny died in 1993, and Bedie, then head of the National Assembly won a power struggle with Quattara to become President. It was then that the toxicity of ethnic politics was smuggled into the debate about non-native Ivorians. In 2002, there were an estimated 3 million Burkinabes, 2 million Malians, 500,000 to 1 million Ghanaians and over 250,000 Guineans, plus tens of thousands of Liberian refugees in Cote d’Ivoire. In his power-struggle with Quattara, Bedie’s rhetoric persistently hammered on the concept of ‘Ivorite’ or ‘pure Ivorian-ness’. It was his way of ensuring that he remained at the helm, one of the most invidious uses of ethnicity. It irked the millions of non-native residents of Cote d’Ivoire, and, more significantly, Ivorians in the north who generally supported Quattara.

Differences within the political class and the rolling back of the armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire from its previous engagement in the administration and developmental activities of the country eventually led to the 1999 coup détat and subsequent crisis after the elections in 2000. The reason for the actual crisis, however, came from the elimination of ex-President Bedie and Alassane Ouatara from the elections based on constitutional issues and issues of identity, citizenship and nationality.

In December 1999, a group of non-commissioned officers, led by Staff-Sergeant Ibrahim (“IB”) Coulibaly, ousted the unpopular Bedie in a bloodless coup, and invited former army chief Robert Guei - who had been sacked by Bedie for refusing to use the army to crush civilians protesting the flawed electoral process of 1995 - to become the new Head of State. Guei was himself forced to organize elections in October 2000 in which he contested for the Presidency. Making use of the Bedie electoral code, he banned Quattara from contesting. Longtime oppositionist Gbagbo stood, however, and he appeared to have emerged victorious by a wide margin. Guei’s attempts to rig the results were scuttled by massive demonstrations in Abidjan, and he fled the country in a helicopter. Gbagbo became President. Less than two years later, the foiled coup and insur-
gency occurred, with the rebel leaders citing the controversial elections which excluded Quattara as one of the reasons for their rebellion.

The question of national identity in Cote d’Ivoire, in other words, although instrumentally used by all parties, has become a key issue in the conflict, one that has threatened to unravel all the best efforts at bringing peace to the country. It may yet unravel the Ivorian state itself. For a country with more than 40 per cent of its population immigrant, the threat can hardly be over estimated. Cote d’Ivoire’s famous musician, Alpha Blondy, called ‘Ivorite’ “black Nazism,” and opined, insightfully, that the “only people benefiting from the madness are the people in politics”11. Unfortunately, everyone else, including the state, has lost as a result of the “madness”.

Still, because ethnicity is used in an opportunist manner, with hardly any of the warring groups having an ideological determination to carry out ethnic cleansing, the threat of genocide on the scale of Rwanda, which has been persistently evoked recently, is virtually nonexistent. A more likely model would be Liberia, whose civil war, also involving the exploitation of ethnicity by warring groups, had a much lower casualty figure per proportion of the population, and never became an ethnocide as was earlier feared.

Another overarching factor that was frequently evoked during the workshop was the problem of youth and, linked to this, the emerging problem of mercenarism in the region. Some participants argued that the ‘rebellious but patriotic syndrome’ in Côte d’Ivoire may be the beginning of the explosion of an unresolved and potentially devastating youth factor in Africa. Demographically, Africa is the world’s youngest continent, and a large proportion of the continent’s youth are unemployed and marginalized by corrupt and oppressive gerontocracies. But the problem goes beyond Cote d’Ivoire, and is potentially explosive for much of the continent. In situations of collapsing state institutions and the emergence of predatory warlordism, the youth has become restive, and is ready-made cannon fodder for opportunistic ‘rebels’ leaders and the long-entrenched corrupt political elites alike. Mercenarism and youth, therefore, become congruent; and they have become, not special actors, but key actors and increasingly “institutionalized” ones. They are a strategic group of sub-state actors that have become an ‘aphrodisiac’ for the political elite.

A cognate factor in this trajectory, as evoked in the workshop, is the issue of whether Cote d’Ivoire is a failed state or not - is it functioning or non-functioning? One of the truly disturbing questions thrown up by the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, as in Sierra Leone and Liberia, is this: How is that a small group of largely self-interested characters can recruit support and hold the country virtually hostage while the state, even with significant outside support, appears so ineffective in meeting the challenge?

It was generally agreed that Côte d'Ivoire is not in the category of Liberia and Sierra Leone, both virtually bankrupt by the time their insurgencies started. Côte d'Ivoire was a reasonably functioning state, with established institutions and a growing middle class. But a number of unresolved and potentially explosive factors - its internal contradictions, as have been highlighted - had rendered it highly vulnerable. The situation of vulnerability was strikingly demonstrated by the weaknesses that were exposed in its security networks - the police, the army, the gendarmerie - since the crisis started.

Another important issue that was raised in discussion concerned the rather overlooked regional dimension of the crisis, and how this impacts the peace process. Some speakers observed that the role of Burkina Faso, in particular, in supporting the rebel Forces nouvelles needs to be formally condemned by the international community, and that lasting peace could depend on addressing the sources of outside support for the rebel groups.

In summary therefore, the instability in Côte d'Ivoire is anchored on the controversial nationality question that disenfranchises 26% of the Ivorian population and the presence of fugitive opposition leaders in Côte d'Ivoire especially those from Liberia who maintained a highly visible presence in Abidjan did not help the case of Côte d'Ivoire. The immediate cause can however be attributed to the plans to demobilize about 800 soldiers allegedly loyal to General Guei. In view of some of these obvious signposts, it is a surprise that the mutiny by soldiers in Niger did not send a warning signal to Côte d'Ivoire authorities to be more circumspect with the welfare of those it has entrusted with weapons.

III. The French Connection

1. Historical Involvement

France, Côte d'Ivoire's former colonial master, remains the West African nation's most intimate and traditional backer. Before the September 2002 crisis, there were 20,000 French nationals - some of them simultaneously holding Ivorian citizenship - in Côte d'Ivoire, and a further 20,000 Ivorians who held French citizenship. A 600-strong contingent of French troops was based in Abidjan. These troops, however, did not participate in crushing the coup attempt of September 2002, and France became involved in the crisis only after it spread to engulf much of the country, threatening a serious humanitarian catastrophe. There may be good reasons for the initial reluctance.

12 While a section of FANCI was complicit in the rebel uprising during and after the mutiny, many of the rebel fighters were foreigners. Some of those involved in the initial attacks in Abidjan did not even know their way about town. The insurgency, therefore, was perceived as a matter of a fight for survival by the majority of the FANCI forces who remained loyal to the government.
France’s investment in Africa is five per cent of its external trade, and Paris has, since the 1960s, intervened militarily in at least nine African countries. France intervened in Mauritania, Senegal, the Congo, Gabon, Cameroon and Chad in the 1960s; in Chad again, as well as in Djibouti, Western Sahara, the Central African Republic and Zaire in the 1970s; and in Chad twice more in the 1980s; in Togo in 1986; and finally—and most controversially—in Rwanda in the 1990s. These interventions earned France the title “the gendarme of Africa”.

In fact, in early 2001, French President Jacques Chirac was a prominent proponent of intervention in Guinea, during a time when Liberian-supported guerrillas were ravaging the southeastern parts of the country; and France still maintains significant military bases in Senegal and Djibouti. Unlike other former colonial powers, especially Britain, France continued to regard most of its ex-colonies in West Africa, with the exception of Guinea, as its traditional sphere of influence and maintained a policy of rayonnement towards them. France’s military aid to Africa was 800 million French francs in 1984, and in 1990, France had 6,600 troops stationed in Africa. This military presence by a major European power was a source of great disquiet among other, non-French-speaking African states, especially the West African regional power Nigeria, which viewed the recipient African nations as neo-colonial client states, and the intrusive French presence in West Africa as a kind of ‘Trojan Horse’ strategy.

France could perhaps afford to ignore African nationalistic rhetoric of neo-colonial intervention. But it could not brush aside the deeply embarrassing episode of its Rwandan adventure, which amounted, in the eyes of many around the world, to collusion in the genocidal campaigns of the Hutu leadership of the country in 1994. After that episode, France decided to be more cautious about militarily intervening in an African crisis.

When the Côte d’Ivoire crisis broke out in September 2002, France’s initial impulse was to use its forces to protect its interests and foreign nationals in the country. French troops staged a dramatic rescue of Western nationals from Bouaké during the first two weeks of the crisis. After that, the French called on the warring parties to observe a ceasefire and to resolve the crisis through peaceful negotiations. Meanwhile, 200,000 Ivorians fled rebel-controlled Bouaké on foot and by bus in the first four weeks of the crisis.

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14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
19 Utley, “Not to do less but to do better.”
20 Emily Wax, “Key to Conflict in Ivory Coast.”
2. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement\textsuperscript{21}

In January 2003, the French government, concerned about the escalating crisis, proposed to host peace talks in France between the government of President Gbagbo and the rebels. Earlier, in November 2002, less than two months after the crisis started, French Foreign Minister Dominique Villepin visited Côte d’Ivoire and held talks with the Ivorian government. His visit coincided with a government offensive, said to have included foreign mercenaries, on Vavoua, which alarmed the French. Villepin visited the country again, in January 2003, and obtained a promise from President Gbagbo to expel mercenaries from the country and halt air attacks against supposed rebel strongholds. Villepin was quick to disavow support for either side in the conflict. “France,” he said, “has no other camp except the one for peace”\textsuperscript{22}. Through ECOWAS and French mediation efforts, a ceasefire agreement between the government and the western rebel groups was signed on 13 January, and the participation of the rebel groups in proposed talks in France was assured.

Talks began on 15 January in Linas-Marcoussis, just outside Paris, and ended on 24 January 2003 with an Agreement that was signed by all the parties. The Agreement called for the establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation with wide executive powers, and was to be composed of ministers from the main political parties and the rebel groups on a roughly equal basis, but the current government of President Gbagbo was to be given primacy in the arrangement. Gbagbo was to remain President, but a Prime Minister with wide-ranging powers was to be appointed in agreement with the other groups.

The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement was anchored on three main principles, namely:

1. The need to maintain the territorial integrity of Côte d’Ivoire;

2. The creation of a Government of National Reconciliation, with a new Prime Minister; and

3. The need to conduct transparent and free elections in which people would not be excluded by means of churlish legislation.

Other concerns included the need to re-organise the army, the granting of amnesty - only slightly qualified - to the army mutineers and other militia forces which constituted the insurgent forces; and, most far-reaching, the need to address the issue of identity or nationality with new legislation that integrates and protects the millions of immigrants residing in the country. The Agreement states that “foreign nationals…have made a major contribution to national wealth and have helped confer on Côte d’Ivoire its special position and responsibility within the sub-

\textsuperscript{21} This section draws heavily on the presentation by H. E. Amb. Jean-Michel Berrit, Ambassador of France to Ghana.
region,” noting that “the petty annoyances perpetrated by the administration and the police and security forces, which often disregard the law and human rights and which often affect foreigners, can be caused by using willful misapplication of identification laws.” The new government, therefore, “will immediately eliminate the residence permit requirement...for nationals of ECOWAS countries and will carry out the immigration inspection needed by using means of identification not subject fraudulent misuse.” The Agreement also called for changes to land ownership laws, in order to grant immigrants access to land.

Appropriate measures were also to be taken to ensure the freedom of the media, but the Agreement condemned “the incitement to hatred and xenophobia propagated by certain media.” Measures were also to be put in place to facilitate the liberation of prisoners of war.

Implementation of the Agreement has been slow because of a lack of political will on the part of the signatories, including the government of President of President Gbagbo. Observers have accused Gbagbo, in particular, of bad faith. He is said to have “a long practice of publicly endorsing agreements while privately ensuring that they are undermined”\textsuperscript{23}. With respect to the Agreement, Gbagbo is said to have found “a way to resist the peace pact and stay in power without actually saying no, artfully flicking a switch on when he wants a protest and off when it is time to appear cooperative”\textsuperscript{24}. A counter-factual argument, advanced during the workshop, is that the Agreement is so profoundly radical, entailing major alterations of the constitution as well as the national character of the country, that any elected President would find it extremely difficult to carry it through and still remain in power\textsuperscript{25}.

On the other hand, there have been a number of significant achievements that should not be negated. The President has expanded the government to include some members of the anti-government groups; the security of these people has been assured; amnesty laws have been passed; laws protecting migrant workers are being legislated; and military personnel, including French, ECOWAS and UN troops, have been deployed around the country to protect civilians and to oversee a disarmament process.

In key areas, however, there appears to be a gap between signatory promises and intentions. No progress has been made with respect to preparation for the elections in 2005; the anti-government forces insist on elections before disarming; the security situation is still precarious; and the country is still divided into two, with the government holding on to the south, and the rebels the north.

\textsuperscript{23} Emily Wax, “Pledge peace, creating chaos; Ivory Coast leader said to be behind anti-French protests,” Washington Post, 16 February 2003; page A17.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} FANCI was not invited to the talks that led to the Agreement, and thus felt slighted by the outcome of Linas-Marcoussis. However, FANCI broadly accepts the principles of the Agreement.
3. The Licorne Force

The French government dispatched Licorne force to Côte d’Ivoire on 6 February 2003 partly to facilitate the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and to protect French interests across the country. The mission of the Licorne Force was backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1464. The French Force was mandated, among other things, to participate in the establishment of security within the border zone with Liberia, and to provide security for foreigners and evacuate them when necessary.

In quick order, Licorne force deployed across the country and was able to check the spread of the violence. But there were limitations. Côte d’Ivoire is a large country, and the borders between the country and its neighbours, for example Liberia, are extremely porous. The French troops were spread rather thin over a large geographical area that is well forested, posing something of a logistical nightmare, particularly in the rainy season.

With respect to the use of force, simple but detailed rules of engagement (ROE) were developed in close collaboration with the Legal and Political Council of the French government. However, the rebels in the west of the country were located in a largely inaccessible area and merged themselves with the civilian population. Since they did not wear uniforms, use of direct force against them posed a serious dilemma for Licorne force.

There were also refugee problems around the Liberian border regions, as well as around San Pedro and Tabou, involving Burkinabés. The United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) set up camps in San Pedro, protected by Licorne force, to handle the refugees. Licorne force prevented the rebels from coming downward toward the south. It also intervened in some events in the San Pedro region and St. Paul encampment zone where some Liberians were looting and burning properties. Rebels attacked parts of southern Côte d’Ivoire where it was difficult for Licorne to gain access, however.

In terms of co-ordination with FANCI, Licorne force collaborated with FANCI in this operation using a great deal of tact and diplomacy. There remains a high level of logistical and other co-operation between the two forces. Regarding co-ordination with Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Licorne force escorted UNHCR officials to facilitate movement of refugees. However, the force was not multi-dimensional in nature and hence had to re-organise itself to assist in humanitarian matters. While various NGOs complemented the efforts of Licorne force, competitive objectives did emerge, and this called for intense co-ordination.

On the positive side, the mandate of Licorne force was clear and direct, and the Force operated as a legitimate entity with UN backing. The rules of engagement were clear and unambiguous.

26 Our thanks to Lt Col Nicolas Casanova for sharing his perspectives as former Licorne Battle Group commander.
protect the civilian population and prevent an escalation of the conflict. Hence, there was a need to be strong and firm.

On the negative side, there were logistical constraints in a rather large theatre of operations. Protection of the people on the ground, therefore, was not adequate. There were also few military vehicles, including armoured personnel carriers on the ground, and soldiers were therefore exposed to risks. Also, co-ordination at the operational and tactical levels was limited, with the battalions having limited autonomy and having to work on the ground with a variety of different actors.

At a more fundamental level, there seems to have been a change with respect to the character of French intervention and how it is conducted, and the perception of Africans regarding French interventions has changed accordingly. While the colonial past may still detract from the legitimacy of such intervention, this is unlikely to happen during the current phase of the peace process. Since the deployment of the UN force, the Licorne force has been aligned to the UN operation in a more or less supportive role, and will remain on the ground throughout the peace process. Prior to this, Licorne had operated also in co-operation with ECOWAS, in a remarkable convergence of mutual interest.

IV. ECOWAS Efforts to Resolve the Crisis

“ECOWAS has grown in stature and is gaining dignified salience as a regional organization or (to use the UN Charter terminologies in Chapter VIII) a regional arrangement acting for the Security Council with regard to measures under Chapter VI or VII of the Charter. Côte d’Ivoire could be cited as part of the emerging success record of ECOWAS including also the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict has been determined by the Security Council as constituting ‘a threat to international peace and security in the region.’ The role of the United Nations has been axed on the initial intervention of ECOWAS. Although these conflicts are still ongoing, ECOWAS deserves credit for ‘cutting its teeth’ as it were, on these hot experiences and assuming its responsibilities in close cooperation with the UN.”

27 This section is based on the presentations by Hon. Akwasi-Osei, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ghana, Col. Dixon Dikio of the ECOWAS Secretariat and Maj. B.A. Gueye, former Abidjan Logistics Rear Support Group Commander.
28 Ambassador James Aggrey-Orleans, Senior Political Adviser to UNOCI, Accra, 31 May 2004.
1. Peacemaking Initiatives

Côte d’Ivoire is an integral member of the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS. The organisation was founded as a forum to integrate the economies of West African states, but it has, since it first set up a peace-enforcement force (ECOMOG) that intervened in Liberia in 1990, taken on the role of a regional security organization. The reaction of ECOWAS to the events in Côte d’Ivoire was informed by the fact that the violent overthrow of the legitimate Government of President Laurent Gbagbo would have been in gross violation of the basic principles of the African Union, including the Algiers Declaration of July 1999, which established a framework for reaction to unconstitutional change of government. The attempted coup d’etat also contravened the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which prohibits the recognition of any government that came to power by the overthrow of a democratically-elected government or by unconstitutional means.

There was also the fear of a possible spill-over of the violence across the borders. Soon after the crisis broke out, Ghana, together with Nigeria and Togo, sent a delegation to Côte d’Ivoire to express solidarity and support for President Gbagbo and to assure him that ECOWAS would do whatever it could to ensure that democratic and constitutional order prevailed in Côte d’Ivoire. President Gbagbo was also urged to do everything possible to ensure peace, stability and reconciliation in the country.

Consequently, at very short notice, Ghana readily hosted an Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in Accra on Sunday, 29 September 2002. The Summit decided to create a High Level Contact Group (HLCG) of Seven Heads of State and Government. They were the Presidents of Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo. The group was to establish contact with the insurgents, prevail upon them to immediately cease all hostilities, restore normalcy to the occupied towns and negotiate a general framework for the resolution of the crisis.

The Contact Group began its formal work at Ministerial level in Abidjan on Wednesday, 2 October 2002. The Group held discussions with President Laurent Gbagbo and obtained his commitment to allow the Contact Group to meet with the insurgents in order to engage them in a dialogue with the objective of resolving the crisis. The Contact Group also met with the Ambassador of France to Côte d’Ivoire and obtained French commitment to provide logistical support and security escort for the Group so as to enable the group visit the insurgents in Bouaké. The Contact Group traveled to Bouaké under French escort on Thursday, 3 October 2002, where it held discussions with representatives of the insurgent forces and succeeded in obtaining a commitment, in principle, to a ceasefire.

Following the Ivorian government’s subsequent indication that it was willing to sign a Ceasefire Agreement, the Contact Group traveled to Yamoussoukro en-route to Tiebiso for the signing ceremony. At Yamoussoukro, however, it was learnt that the officer who had been designated to
sign the Ceasefire Agreement on behalf of the Ivorian government had not received the necessary written authorization. The written mandate was never given and the Contact Group was compelled to abandon its mission and return to Abidjan. Subsequent consultations between the Contact Group, the then Chairman of ECOWAS, President Abdoulaye Wade, and President Gbagbo, and the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal to Côte d’Ivoire, resulted in a proposal for an agreement for cessation of hostilities; the agreement was signed by the insurgents on 17 October 2002.

The Agreement provided that the insurgents and the government would remain in the areas they were controlling, and for the return of normal administrative life and supplies to the occupied towns. President Gbagbo made a nationwide broadcast accepting the cessation of hostilities and declaring the readiness of the government to dialogue with the insurgents. ECOWAS designated President Gnassingbe Eyadema as its principal coordinator to facilitate the day to day management of the mediation effort.

2. Peacekeeping Efforts

The Defence and Security Commission, the Mediation and Security Council, and Authority of Heads of State and Government, had played their roles, as required by the Mechanism, in a remarkable show of solidarity. The ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission submitted a proposal to deploy ECOMICI, on 26 Oct 2002, to the Mediation and Security Council. The following mandate for the force was approved: to monitor the cessation of hostilities; facilitate the return of normal public administrative services and the free movement of goods and services; contribute to the implementation of the peace agreement; and guarantee the safety of the insurgents, observers and humanitarian staff. The authorized strength of ECOMICI was 2,386, with the provisional breakdown of contributions to the force as follows: Benin - 300; The Gambia - 135; Ghana - 265; Guinea Bissau - 386; Mali - 250; Niger - 250; Nigeria - 250; Senegal - 250; and Togo - 300.

Ambassador Raph Uwechue of Nigeria was appointed Special Representative of the Executive Secretary to direct peacekeeping operations of the force, and Brigadier General Papa Khalil Fall of Senegal was appointed Force Commander. Unfortunately, there was a faulty appreciation of the gravity of the military situation from the onset. It turned out that the number of troops pledged was far too small to execute the mission, and the deployment of these troops was subject to the approval of the Government of Côte d’Ivoire.

29 It is interesting to note that, by August 2002, the troop strength pledged to constitute ECOWAS Standby Units stood at a combined total of some 13 battalions. When the chips were down, however, it was a tough task to extract the 2,386 that was pledged at the Extraordinary Meeting of the Defence and Security Commission held on 25 October 2002.
The limited troop strength was further whittled down because though Mali was one of the most prepared to deploy, its troops did not deploy. This was probably because it was considered that national sentiments towards the large number of Malian immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire would compromise their neutrality. Nigeria, which in the past led other West African intervention efforts, was not able to do so at this point because of its own security considerations. Guinea Bissau’s case was different. The country had pledged 386 soldiers, which was the highest number of troops pledged, but it was not allowed to deploy them.30

On the issue of Command and Control, it may be recalled that based on ECOMOG experience, certain problems were identified. The lack of an integrated chain of command structure was a key concern because it sometimes complicated the job of the Force Commander who was the political and military head of the Mission all rolled into one. Experience showed that some Commanders did not have the appropriate diplomatic skill to deal with sensitive issues and so sometimes complicated accomplishment of the overall peace process.

To address this problem, Articles 32 and 33 of ECOWAS Mechanism stipulated the procedure for appointing the Special Representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary and the Force Commander. It also outlined their functions, especially the chain of command with ECOWAS Secretariat. A dogmatic application of Article 33, paragraph 2(d), which stipulates that “the Force Commander is accountable to the Executive Secretary through the Special Representative” was found to impede the lateral and horizontal flow of information. This made coordination ineffective between the Executive Secretariat and the Force Headquarters.

Unfortunately, the Executive Secretariat was also not organizationally prepared to handle the Ivorian crisis. The Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security charged with the responsibility for assisting the Executive Secretary to implement the Mechanism, assumed duty in April 2001. By September 2002, when the crisis erupted, his professional staff consisted of only two: a Principal Programme Officer, Peacekeeping and a Principal Officer, Political Affairs. This small team worked almost around the clock with the Deputy Executive Secretary (PADS) to implement the mechanism in response to the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.

The team had to devise ingenuous methods of convening meetings, and of planning and coordinating the deployment of ECOMICI. In fact, apart from officers from Member States who were invited to assist, the UNDPKO and United States European Command also sent assistance. Somehow the deficiency of manpower in the ECOWAS Secretariat was converted into a very good way of carrying all stakeholders along. Thus when a meeting of Troop Contributing Countries was

30 There was no doubt at all that Guinea Bissau was heading for trouble and needed help, because its soldiers had not been paid for a long time. Deploying their soldiers abroad would not only have provided the much needed soldiers, but it would probably have kept them busy and prevented the coup of 14 September 2003 in Guinea-Bissau.
organized on 6 November 2002, to discuss the deficiencies of equipment, logistics support and funding, major donor partners also attended.

Regrettably, at this late stage, the Force Commander had not been nominated as envisaged in Article 33 of the Protocol on the Mechanism. An advance team was however dispatched to Côte d’Ivoire on 17 November 2002 to undertake preliminary work on operational and logistics issues, pending the appointment of the Force Commander - who was eventually nominated and confirmed on 18 December 2002. Meanwhile, the Chairman of the Defence and Security Commission had pro-actively mobilized resources under his command to assist with logistic support efforts.

At the operational level, the French presence was therefore essential to the implementation of the mandate. By February 2003, there were approximately 3,000 French soldiers and only 500 ECOWAS troops on the ground. While ECOWAS struggled to complete its deployment, the French continued deploying their troops with their high mobility and superior reinforcement capability. The French had deployed five combat teams, when ECOMICI first sent an advance party, to be followed by four combat teams that were deployed from west to east. The Ghana company was first to arrive, travelling by road across the border. It was agreed with Licorne that ECOMICI would not deploy west of the Sassandra river, because this area was extremely volatile. This area was therefore left to the French, who had the strength and the fire power to deal with the situation.

The ECOMICI Force Commander’s concept of operations envisaged four phases, as follows:

- Phase 1 involved monitoring of the ceasefire line and the provision of VIP protection. The objective was to create a zone of confidence, stretching from west to east, to the north and south of the ceasefire line;
- Phase 2 would see the disappearance of the ceasefire line and the extension of operations into the wider territory of Côte d’Ivoire, for the purpose of opening up economic and humanitarian corridors;
- Phase 3 encompassed support to the process of DDR; and
- Phase 4 would be the drawdown and withdrawal of ECOMICI forces.

This concept of operations was never completed; it stalled at phase one for two basic reasons: the lack of human, financial and other resources for ECOMICI; and secondly, because of reliance on the French, who were ECOMICI’s main backers, while their forces apparently had different plans. However, it was eventually possible to deploy troops north of the ceasefire line - in Bouake, Man, Seguela and Bouna.

31 As a consequence of these shortcomings, the ECOWAS Secretariat requested and received authorization by the Mediation and Security Council, in December 2003, to establish a Mission Planning and Management Cell.
The rules of engagement were well understood, and ECOMICI personnel were well trained and well prepared to apply them. However, the most important factor for ECOMICI’s success is the permanent liaison the impartial forces had with the belligerents. The quadripartite meetings and the quadripartite operations centre were very efficient means for preventing situations that could lead to an escalation of tensions that may have necessitated the use of force by ECOMICI.

3. Strengths and Weaknesses of ECOMICI

ECOMICI gained a lot of strength from the fact that troops shared a common cultural background and had knowledge of the region in general and the host country in particular. All contributing countries were from the West African region, and many members of the force had previously visited Côte d’Ivoire.

Moreover, ECOMICI personnel had an aptitude for dialogue, something which is often overlooked or underplayed. Despite all the ongoing conflicts in Africa, Africans tend to have a gift for dialogue which is not exploited to its fullness. There was also a considerable level of acquaintance between the neutral forces and the protagonists. Members of ECOMICI, Forces nouvelles (who were for the most part former members of the Côte d’Ivoire regular forces) and Licorne often knew each other, which made things much easier. Many officers from all parties had attended the same military schools, and some had met before. This applies equally to the French who have strong ties with many ECOWAS countries, where some of their personnel have even worked and lived.

On the negative side, it is apparent that there was a lack of strategic support to deployment of the forces. The problems started with the advance party, which deployed at very short notice, and had to rely on the French for mobility and support. There was also a very long period of waiting before the first troops hit the ground. The Force Commander had to use his own initiative, his own knowledge of the country, and his own acquaintances to get things moving. Even so, it took more than 100 days to set up a basic force headquarters. When the main body of Detachment South deployed to Abidjan in March 2003, it had no vehicles and no place to work. It is mainly through the assistance of the French, the government of Côte d’Ivoire, and through personal contacts of the Force Commander and the efforts of the Chair of the DSC (Lt Gen Obeng of Ghana) that this force was able to build up slowly, to survive, and then succeed.

32 With the Government of National Reconciliation not fully in place, it was still possible for the military protagonists to conclude the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement in Togo, which was signed in Bouaké, Côte d’Ivoire, on 31 May 2003. Under this Agreement - which reinforced the earlier one of 17 October 2002 - a Quadripartite Commission was instituted as a mechanism of close consultation and cooperation mainly among the two major military protagonists: FANCI and the FAFN as well as with ECOMICI and the Licorne force (and MINUCI’s Military Liaison Officers).
There was a great deal of financial uncertainty, and there was no integrated logistics plan. The Force Commander did not have any control over the future of his finances; indeed he sometimes had to operate for up to two months without any funds. The lack of integrated logistic support resulted in a laborious build up of the force, which had to be stopped on several occasions to get the communications equipment operational and to wait the arrival of more radios from France. There were also incoherencies in force generation and donor support. For example, ECOMICI had to wait for the contingent from Benin, who were in turn waiting for the Belgians to provide the logistics support they had promised.

One can imagine the incoherence of a logistic “system” in which the French RECAMP provided support to certain countries, Britain provided support to Ghana, and Belgium to Benin. Individual troop contributing countries also provided their own contingent owned equipment, and US equipment was supplied to the force via a private company – Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE). Though troops were provided overall with adequate logistics support, there was no integration whatsoever - and that is one of the main principles of logistic support.

4. Summary of Lessons

On the negative side, it is clear that:

- Lack of proper and well integrated logistics was a major hurdle to successful operations;
- ECOWAS could not generate its own resources;
- There were deficiencies in the chain of command;
- More efforts are necessary to reduce the language barrier in ECOWAS military operations (though ECOMICI did well in this respect);
- A force of this strength cannot be deployed and sustained without adequate visibility for its financing and proper integration of the logistics support; and
- Abuja did not have then a proper strategic command structure to give the necessary directives and guidance, and to carry out its responsibilities for mission management.

On the positive side:

- There was total consensus by all ECOWAS heads of state to deploy an intervention force in RCI;
- Donor support was forthcoming, but slow (ECOWAS must build the capacity to resource its force on the onset);
ECOWAS has the human resources to plan and execute in a professional manner a large scale peacekeeping operation;

ECOMICI was a credible force which achieved major successes in the peace process;

There had been prior training of personnel in peace support training centres and other military schools, as well as joint exercises, which were most valuable; and

ECOWAS has troops that are capable of operating alongside modern, well equipped, and well trained armed forces (indeed, ECOMICI and Licorne complemented one another to achieved success in a “hybrid operation”.

5. Recommendations

• ECOWAS should generate its own minimum mission planning and management capabilities.
• The Executive Secretariat should continue the build up of an efficient operations centre.
• ECOWAS should have stand by logistics assets (trucks, communications, medical).
• ECOWAS should encourage TCCs to deploy with their own equipment by signing an MOU with scales of equipment and reimbursement rates as per the UN.
• ECOWAS should encourage the further development of joint training at operational and tactical levels.
• Last, but not least, greater transparency is needed – future missions should have one finance cell, including finance officers from ECOWAS and donor countries.
V. The United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) \(^\text{33}\)

The United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, MINUCI, was established on 13 May 2003 by UN Security Council Resolution 1479. It was deployed in the field alongside ECOWAS forces (ECOMICI) and Licorne force. All three forces operated with different mandates, with none assuming the leading role in the peace operation in the country. This situation posed some challenges. The Licorne force was hampered by questions about its accountability while ECOMICI was hampered by shortages in manpower, equipment and logistical support.

Having determined that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its \textit{resolution 1528} of 27 February 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) as from 4 April 2004. UNOCI replaced MINUCI, which had essentially been a political mission.

1. Planning

The Military Planning Service (MPS) of UN DPKO had commenced planning for the military component of the mission months in advance of the adoption of Resolution 1528. As with all forward-planning, the MPS planning process was guided by a number of basic assumptions. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, these were as follows:

- The Government and Forces nouvelles would continue to participate in the Government of National Reconciliation;
- Security guarantees for UN personnel and equipment would be provided by the Government and Forces nouvelles;
- There would be respect by other countries and Ivorians for Côte d’Ivoire’s territorial integrity;
- The Security Council would authorize a UN force operating under a Chapter VII mandate;
- The French military presence would remain in Côte d’Ivoire alongside UN peacekeepers;
- The new mission would involve a continuation and expansion of the functions that MINUCI had been carrying out;
- ECOWAS contingents would remain in theatre, to be re-hatted as UN peacekeepers; and
- The deployment of UN forces would be throughout the territory of Côte d’Ivoire.

\(^{33}\) This section draws on presentations by Brigadier General Abdul Hafiz, Deputy Force Commander, UNOCI, and Colonel Nicholas Seymour, Chief, Military Planning Service, UNDPKO.
The structuring of the force was based on a number of envisaged tasks, which had become evident from the dynamics of operations conducted hitherto by ECOWAS, LICORNE and MINUCI. Importantly, the lessons of previous missions, particularly in Sierra Leone, were taken into account during planning. Prime among these were the need for a properly structured force capable of achieving success, and avoidance of an incremental build up of the UN force.

One of the issues that had not been germane to similar mission planning processes was the issue of the relationship between the UN operation and the French Licorne forces – particularly Command and Control arrangements. Three key points were made in this regard:

- Licorne would provide a guaranteed quick reaction force (QRF) in support of the UN Force Commander;
- On deployment, QRFs would resort under Tactical Command (TACOM) of the UN (sector) commander in whose area they operated; and
- A permanent liaison structure would be established as early as possible.

**2. Mandate and Mission**

The Security Council indeed authorized UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, and provided the mission with a broad, multifunctional mandate as stipulated in paragraph 4 of resolution 1528 (see Appendix D to this report).

In paragraph 11 of resolution 1528, the Security Council authorized, for a period of 12 months from 4 April 2004, the French forces to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI in accordance with the agreement to be reached between UNOCI and the French authorities, and in particular to:

- Contribute to the general security of the area of activity of the international forces;
- Intervene at the request of UNOCI in support of its elements whose security may be threatened;
- Intervene against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so require, outside the areas directly controlled by UNOCI; and
- Help to protect civilians, in the deployment areas of their units.

UNOCI is thus a complex operation. It is part of an emerging trend in UN peacekeeping in which the UN force is actually a hybrid of two or three different peace operations that are subsumed under - or operate in tandem with - the UN. Three key words underline the UNOCI mission. These
are transformation (of the ECOWAS forces) absorption (of MINUCI) and cohabitation (with the French forces.) The success of the UNOCI mission will depend on how well these three factors play out.

The new UN force has rehatted ECOMICI as part of the expanded UN operation, and has streamlined its relationship with Licorne force, which should now play a more or less supportive role to the UN force in pursuit of its mission. UNOCI will assume responsibility for monitoring the parties’ compliance with the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, building confidence between the parties and providing support to the Government of National Reconciliation in the implementation of the DDR programme and maintaining security in order to establish the conditions to enable the full implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.

UNOCI’s Force Commander intends to conduct a phased peacekeeping operation in Côte d’Ivoire, with the initial focus on monitoring security along the Zone of Confidence (ZOC) and provide support to the activities at the DDR sites in close co-operation with the French forces. Once the DDR phases are completed, the ZOC will be abolished and the forces will be re-deployed throughout the country in order to widen the UN presence and to assist all UN Agencies and other organizations’ peace support and humanitarian operations. In the interim, UNOCI will monitor closely the ceasefire agreement in the ZOC.

UNOCI will maintain close liaison with French forces, and also establish and maintain a close liaison with all other military actors in the country. The force will act positively to build trust with the Ivorian population. On the other hand, it will adopt a firm posture, show determination and react robustly within the ROE to meet any incidents or provocations.

3. Force Preparation, Transition, and Build-Up

UNOCI forces have been well prepared for their mission. Pre-deployment training for staff officers was conducted at the KAIPTC in Accra, Ghana from mid March to early April 2004; this really contributed to a smooth take-over from MINUCI headquarters in Abijan. Pre-deployment training for military observers and team leaders was also presented in Bamako, Mali, while pre-deployment training for the formed units or contingents was presented in the TCCs by the UN DPKO.

An added advantage is the fact that MINUCI military liaison officers transformed into military observers for UNOCI. This served, as it were, as a very effective ‘launching pad’ for UNOCI operations. Similarly, the re-hatting of ECOWAS forces was characterized by a smooth transfer of authority and lent a good deal of continuity. On 4 April 2004, Maj Gen Abdoulaye Fall of Senegal, former commander of the ECOMICI force, was appointed Force Commander of UNOCI.
By the end of May 2004, troop strength stood at 3,004 out of a total authorized strength of 6,240 military personnel. About half the troops in place were former ECOMICI contingents from Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The remainder of the force comprised 63 officers at mission headquarters, 123 military observers, 171 members of the French engineering company, 305 members of the advance party of the Bangladesh contingent, and the 726-strong Moroccan contingent. One infantry battalion and one engineering company from Bangladesh, and a Pakistani transportation company are expected to be deployed by the end of June. All troop deployments, with the exception of helicopter unit, are expected to be completed by the end of July 2004.

Despite good planning, pre-deployment training, and a smooth transfer of authority, ONUCI has encountered significant limitations at the operational level. For example, the logistical support system could not keep pace with the growth of UNOCI, despite the delays in the arrival and deployment of the full complement of forces. There is a long chain of command, and there are multiple tasks to be executed by an under-strength force. These tasks have, inevitably, been delayed. However, it is expected that UNOCI will reach its full complement by July or August 2004.

Compounding the challenge of force generation has been the unacceptability to Ivorian parties of certain troop contributing countries. The Forces nouvelles, for example, have objected to the participation of Ukrainian (helicopter unit) and Angolan troops, on grounds that troops or mercenaries from both countries force have fought alongside the Côte d’Ivoire government against them.

The UNOCI budget was also received late; the Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority (PMCA) was received only on 24 March 2004\(^3\). These limiting factors have combined to make extant time-frames unrealistic, which may become a serious issue in view of unrealistic expectations of UNOCI from the populace.

### 4. Challenges Ahead

The establishment of UNOCI was based on a number of assumptions, in addition to the initial panning assumptions already mentioned. First, that the New Forces would renew its commitment to the peace process. Second, that the opposition parties would shelve their planned demonstration for March 2004. And third, that there is an agreement among all the parties on the need for peace in Côte d’Ivoire. The reason for these assumptions is that UNOCI cannot perform its mandated task (that is peacekeeping) in a situation of “neither peace nor war”. In the ab-

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\(^3\) The PMCA is a result of Brahimi Report recommendations for more rapid mission start-up. The mechanism provides the Secretary-General with the authority to draw on up to $50 million in funding once it is likely that an operation is to be established – before the adoption of a security Council resolution and approval of a budget.
sence of these assumptions being met, it is unsurprising that UNOCI has already encountered problems in the pursuit of its mandate, most of which are related to a political impasse in the country with respect to the implementation of Linas-Marcoussis.

Sensitising the population and members of Civil Society Organisations on the peace process and the role of UNOCI has been equally challenging. For example, on 31 May 2004, out of impatience with the apparently slow pace of the peace process, a large rally was held in Abidjan by civil society and political leaders with the apparent aim of pressuring the UN and French forces to disarm the anti-government rebels. In Bouaké, a counter demonstration organized by rebels called instead for elections to be held, and for President Gbagbo to resign from office. It is clear that the population is insufficiently informed about UNOCI, in particular with regard to the limits of the mandate. Better public information is therefore crucial to prevent further disappointment in the population and abuse by parties to the conflict.

Another critical area of challenge is the need for all the forces (especially the New Forces) to restart dialogue. Liaison activities of UNOCI with FANCI, Forces nouvelles and the Licorne force are being strengthened. Special emphasis is being placed on operational co-ordination, in particular with the Licorne force.

UNOCI and the Licorne force will operate together with separate but permanently liaised command and control structures. UNOCI Forces will not be placed under French command. However, French forces may be placed under UN tactical command in specific circumstances. Coordination will be achieved through an effective liaison structure, with an exchange of Liaison Officers down to battalion level. Movements of French Forces will be co-ordinated with UNOCI at all times, and a QRF will be provided by French Forces to UNOCI for the whole duration of the mission and throughout Côte d’Ivoire.

5. Conclusions

With the Ivorian peace process stalled at the political level, and the force not yet really put to the test, it is obviously too early to generate a comprehensive list of lessons from the operation. However, it is possible to relate a few factors, both positive and negative, that have impacted on the early life of the operation.

On the positive side, it must be said that the rapid deployment of UNOCI forces when it became appropriate to do so is commendable. More than a third of military personnel and observers were in place in the first few weeks after the Security Council passed the resolution setting up the mission.
Morover good economy of effort between the various neutral forces and organizations was achieved, thanks to an interactive and complex planning process. There is good co-operation between UNOCI and French Forces; and the mission has been on the forefront of innovation - in the creation of integrated support systems (ISS), and in the command structure of UNOCI (in terms of a single chain of command).

On the negative side, it is clear that logistical support was inadequate, and that this needs to be in place before deployment or it should be deployed with the forces. This problem was compounded by a shortage of funds for the mission in the critical start-up phase, a situation which could have been improved by effective utilization of the PMCA mechanism. Moreover, while the ISS was a good idea, there was a poor understanding of this system by both civilian and military mission components.

Though UNOCI is still in its early stages and is confronted with many challenges, these challenges are not unique to UNOCI. The UN DPKO has been working hard, across a number of new missions, to overcome the limitations and negative aspects noted above. Despite the challenges, UNOCI has already made a positive impact on the Ivorian peace process by making its presence felt, and will continue to facilitate the implementation of peace in Côte d’Ivoire. There must, however, be peace to keep in the country. The UNOCI force will come into its own, and really begin with meaningful operations once the political impasse has been unblocked and the DDR process commences in earnest.

VI. The DDR Process

In the ritual calendar of events for peace processes, as reflected in numerous Security Council resolutions and mission mandates, the key to stabilization and security has always been seen as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. The unstated purpose of such stabilization measures has been to wrest power and the means of violence from local militias and warlords and to recentralize it at a much higher level. In other words, the success of the whole peace process has hinged on the degree to which warring factions can be effectively disarmed.

However, disarmament has been one of the most difficult tasks to implement. It has been extremely hard to collect all weapons, even at the end of an armed struggle, when the remaining conditions of insecurity create high incentives for the maintenance and acquisition of small

35 Details provided in a presentation by Alain-Richard Donwahi, President, Côte d’Ivoire NCDDR and Capt. Christian Lupuleasa, UNOCI DDR Advisor.
arms. And the challenges of reintegration – mental and psychological disarmament – have been even greater. In Côte d’Ivoire, DDR is seen, and is being implemented as a national process, but one which involves strong international and regional partnerships.

1. The National Programme for DDR

The National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation Reinsertion/Reintegration, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (NPDDR/RRR) defines the implementation mechanism, political and legal framework, as well as the financial and management guidelines for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. The National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) is in charge of the NPDDR and oversees the whole process. DDR is one of the most important aspects of the peace process, and it consequently is the most contentious.

The NCDDR is made up of 25 members from the ministries of Economic Planning, Defence and Security, Lands and Employment and Social works. Other members of the Commission also come from FANCI, the Gendarmerie, the police, the Forces nouvelles and three special advisors to the Prime Minister.

The framework governing the DDR programme is the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, which stipulates that the Government of National Reconciliation, created as a result of the Agreement, shall, “immediately after assuming office… undertake the process of concomitant regrouping of the forces on the ground, under the supervision of ECOWAS and French forces;” and that, following this, “measures [are] to be taken with respect to disarming and demobilizing these forces, also under ECOWAS and French forces.”

All fighters recruited after the failed coup of 9 September 2002 are to be disarmed and demobilized. Exactly 30,000 fighters are slated to be disarmed and demobilized (about 4,000 fighters from the South, 25 to 30,000 from the North). Each disarmed individual will receive $900 subsistence payment, or “safety allowance”, to sustain them for an estimated six months period of reinsertion.

The DDR programme is an almost exclusively national-controlled programme, with its basic principles constructed by the warring parties, and flowing from the Ivorian experience of war and peace. The Transitional Government provides 50 per cent of the funding required for the programme. 40 per cent is to be covered by a World Bank loan, and 10 per cent is to be provided by EU and other bilateral donors.
A database for the process will be harmonized with those of Sierra Leone and Liberia to prevent combatants from these other countries crossing over borders to disarm in Ivory Coast, which has a more generous “safety allowance” package. It is not a weapons “buy-back” scheme - the distinction is important, for obvious reasons.

Disarmament and Demobilization are preceded by several months of sensitization, made easier by the limited psychological damage due the relatively short duration of the Ivorian conflict. The setting up of a UN radio station, which will be on the air soon, will greatly aid this process, as it could be used extensively to inform and sensitize both the public and the combatants to be disarmed on the positive aims and development of the process. Fortunately, the psychological impact on both combatants and civilians is more limited than, for example, in Sierra Leone or Liberia - due to the short duration of the conflict and actual combat operations.

The disarmament and demobilization phase of the programme is meant to be completed within five to six weeks. Military developments have so far outpaced the political ones in the development and implementation of the peace process. The DDR programme will culminate in national Presidential elections, slated to be held in October 2005. There will then be a phased withdrawal of all foreign forces - now under UN command - from the country.

In the Ivorian context, the DDR programme has institutional, political and defence/security dimensions. The institutional dimension entails the respect for the constitutional legality and government of National Reconciliation, while the political dimension focuses on the peace process, including fidelity to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, the Accra II agreement and the guidelines provided by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement follow-up committee. The Defence and Security dimensions concerns the restructuring of the national defence and security forces into a single force. FANCI does not have a specific role in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process but is supposed to collaborate with UNOCI and support the NPDDR in the DDR process36.

There has been solid progress thus far, thanks to widespread international support for the peace process. The DDR programme was clinched with the successful conclusion on 9 January 2004 of the Yamoussoukro Agreement on the Joint Operational Plan and Guidelines for the DDR programme, which had been drawn up by FANCI, Force nouvelles, and the neutral forces. The Plan defines all military actions that should take place in the DDR process. In addition, a contact group, made up of 8 officers of FANCI and 8 officers of the New Forces, has been established, and monitoring and evaluation processes are in place for the DDR process.

36 According to Lt Col Leopold Kohou, speaking on behalf of Col. Miezou Kadjo (Chief, Joint Operations Centre, Côte d’Ivoire).

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FANCI and the armed wing of the Forces nouvelles have shown commitment to implementing the DDR plan. A simulation exercise on disarmament was undertaken on 20 February 2004. The exercise was witnessed by the Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, who at the end, announced 8 March 2004 as the indicative date for the commencement of the programme.

The visit of the UN Electoral Assessment Mission from 26 January to 6 February 2004 raised expectations over the possibility of a steady pace towards organizing the preparations for the 2005 elections under the vigilant supervision of the United Nations. This general feeling was reinforced by the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1528 (2004) authorizing UNOCI, which generated optimistic hopes of peace keepers supporting the implementation of DDR, the reunification of the country and assisting in the conduct and organization of the 2005 elections.

However, several negative developments were looming on the horizon, casting a deep shadow on the peace process and the implementation of DDR. The President’s plan to visit Bouaké in February or March 2004 was aborted for reasons of insecurity, and in the face of the vehement protests by the Forces nouvelles. The date of 8 March 2004, announced by the Prime Minister as the start-up of the DDR programme, had to be postponed indefinitely due to political objections by the Forces nouvelles.

2. Constraints and Opportunities

Despite the elaborate planning, incorporating lessons from similar processes in Africa, and inclusive nature of the NCDDR, there remain several significant constraints to successful implementation of the DDR programme.

The first and most important has been political: the inability or unwillingness of the ex-warring parties to fully implement the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Accusing President Gbagbo’s government of bad faith, the Forces nouvelles insist that they will not cooperate with the process - which is to say, disarm their combatants - until after the elections. Related to this has been public impatience with the apparently slow pace of the programme. In the initial stages of the process, the DDR programme was hampered by complicated bureaucratic procedures which had been set as prerequisites to govern the process.

There have also been financial constraints. These have had to do with restrictions and prerequisites set by donors. Donors and bilateral partners have many prerequisites in the area of feasibility studies, quick-impact DDR projects, and procedures for recruitment. There are constraints related to bidding, as well as constraints in relation to the rehabilitation of DDR sites. Fortunately, in Côte d’Ivoire, the government has already pre-financed many of the requirements.
Under the Joint Operation Plans, FANCI were expected to return to barracks while the police and gendarmerie were to ensure internal security of lives and property. UNOCI were put in charge of disarmament and are expected to disarm the rebel forces. However, circumstances have dictated that the police and gendarmerie continue to provide security in the southern portions of the country in collaboration with the impartial forces (UNOCI), while security in the north of Côte d’Ivoire is provided by the police, gendarmerie and the New Forces.

The implementation of the DDR programme has been held in abeyance due to political bickering. Although its practical implementation remains to be seen, it should be noted that DDR starts with planning and preparation, and sensitization - not with disarmament, as is always assumed. A well planed DDR is much preferable to a rushed DDR programme that is likely to fail. On the positive side, the New Forces seem to be quite prepared to cooperate with the NCDDR, despite the blockage of the DDR process on the political level. A positive contribution is also to be expected to come from the UN Radio station which will be on air soon. It was recommended that the station should be used extensively to inform and sensitize the population and those to be disarmed.

The whole western African region should be concerned with the harmonization of DDR programs for a more efficient implementation. This includes the harmonization of databases for national programs, as well as special projects to avoid the risk of ex-combatants crossing borders to benefit from other DDR operations. There is also a need for continued and expanded knowledge and experience sharing between all DDR programs across Africa. Participants agreed that successful DDR will make the decisive difference between peace and a return to war in Côte d’Ivoire, but also acknowledged that DDR is a voluntary process, that cannot proceed as long as the political impasse persists.

37 The KAIPTC and the Institute for Security Studies are hosting an International Experts’ Workshop on Identifying lessons from DDR experiences in Africa. The workshop will be held at KAIPTC in Accra from 10-12 August 2004. The aim is to analyze each segment of the DDR process (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) to identify lessons that can be drawn for future practice in DDR programmes in Africa at an operational and technical level.
VII. Progress with Peace Implementation at the Political Level

1. Formation of the Government of National Reconciliation

The 24 January 2003 summit at Kléber, Paris, concluded with the endorsement of the appointment of the consensus Prime Minister Elimane Seydou Diarra, a seasoned diplomat and a former Prime Minister in a previous military regime under Brig. General Robert Guei. This was not an easy choice to make. Diarra’s past - as Prime Minister under coup-maker Guei - was a source of uneasiness among some of the key players involved. There was also concern over the imminent dissolution of the Government of President Gbagbo, whose Prime Minister, Pascal Affi Nguessan, was to lose his job.

The consensus Prime Minister was unable immediately to assume office in Abidjan. There were widespread public demonstrations in Abidjan against the arrangement, but he was eventually inducted into office at Yamoussoukro on 10 February 2003. The consultations on the formation of the Government of National Reconciliation were stalled over differences of views among the political leaders, in particular sharp disagreements over the allocation of the portfolios of Defence and of Internal Security to the Forces nouvelles, and the scope and terms of the delegation of the necessary executive authority to the Prime Minister, as envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. It was thanks to ECOWAS and its Chairman, President Kufuor of Ghana, in close cooperation with the SRSG, that the Round Table was convened in Accra from 6 to 8 March 2003. This historic Round Table defused the heightened tension over the underlying matters of discontent among the Ivorian parties.

It cleared up, as it were, the confusion over the disposition of ministerial portfolios, the decision of the Forces nouvelles to swap their preferred choice of the two portfolios of Defence and Internal Security for those of Communications and Territorial Administration (Local Government). It set up a National Security Council to oversee the interim administration of the Defence and Security portfolios and to establish a procedure for the eventual appointment of the two Ministers. It was equally necessary to dispel any rear-guard action from any quarters designed to erode the constitutional status, and the authority of President as Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and defender of the Constitution and institutions of State. It enunciated the principles of upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State and the accession to power by democratic means.

These points of agreement reached at the Accra II Round Table are worthy of note and constant reminder because they constitute the nugget of the disagreements, the lack of mutual trust and confidence, absence of cohesion within the government, and among the political forces not used to working together. They reflect to this day grievances uttered from some quarters of the

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38 This section draws extensively on the presentation by Ambassador James Aggrey-Orleans, Senior Political Adviser to UNOCI.
political arena in Côte d’Ivoire. Against this backdrop Accra II made possible the first successful attempt in the formation of the Government of National Reconciliation which was sworn in on 13 March 2003. It took subsequently three sessions of the Government in Yamosoukro, in the august presence of President Kufouor of Ghana, President Obansajo of Nigeria, and President Eyadema, before the Forces nouvelles agreed over objections of security risks, to take up their offices on 16 April 2003.

2. Programme of Peace Implementation

In accordance with the Linas-Marcousis Agreement and the decision of the UN Security Council, the Government of National Reconciliation presented to the National Assembly its draft Programme for the implementation of the Linas- Marcoussis Agreement. The Programme proposed mechanisms and a tentative time-table for addressing focal issues as envisaged under the Agreement. These were:

- Code of Nationality – citizenship;
- National identity and Status of foreign nationals;
- Electoral system;
- Eligibility criteria for election to the Presidency of the Republic;
- Land Tenure system;
- The Media; rights and freedom of the individual; rule of law and independence of the Judiciary;
- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR);
- National economic recovery, reconstruction and social cohesion; and
- National reconciliation.

It was envisaged that the texts of some 41 draft decrees and bills would be prepared and submitted to the National Assembly for adoption within a reasonable timeframe. As in all such cases, due to political disagreements, not to mention the bureaucratic red tape, the time-table set for implementing many of these measures has been more than elastic. The vast Programme envisages mechanisms to ensure the effective proof of Ivorian nationality consistent with applicable laws. These mechanisms include a National Commission on Naturalization to review the existing laws, study comparable legislation on the identification process in ECOWAS countries, and recommend residence permit requirements for ECOWAS nationals, as well as measures to improve the residence status of foreign nationals.
On the electoral system, the Government envisages restructuring the Independent Electoral Commission, introducing legislation to ensure a credible voters’ register, addressing the question of funding for political parties, and taking measures to guarantee the independence of the judiciary in adjudicating on electoral disputes.

On the related use of eligibility for election to the Presidency, the Government intends to adopt measures to set the minimum age of candidates at 35 years and limit the tenure of office to two five-year terms. The candidates must be Ivorian citizens with either of their parents born Ivorian. This issue will be plebiscited at a referendum.

As regards the rights and freedom of the individual, the measures envisaged include the setting up of a National Human Rights Commission, and the establishment of an International Commission to investigate cases of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have occurred since the outbreak of the conflict in September 2002.

With respect to the Media, the Programme envisages measures to be implemented over time, beyond the elections of October 2005. They would include legislation to ensure freedom of the press and to strengthen media regulatory bodies, as well as measures against abuses such as calumny, hatred and xenophobia, and steps to ensure the impartiality of state-owned media.

The programme of DDR of former combatants has been formulated, drawing upon lessons drawn from the exercise in Sierra Leone. A team of experts, commissioned by the World Bank and UNDP assisted the Government through its National Commission on DDR (NCDDR) to design the Programme. This programme has come up against obstacles in its start-up due to political objections by the political wing of the Forces nouvelles. They now pose several pre-conditions to the implementation, in particular its time scheduling, the passage of certain laws, the election of 2005 etc.

As part of its overall objective to implement the Linas Marcoussis Agreement, the Government of National Reconciliation has embarked on a strategy aimed at gradually reunifying the country through the extension of State authority throughout the country, and restoring public services in the areas of the North and West under the control of the Forces nouvelles. This began on 22 May 2003, when the Prime Minister convened a symbolic meeting of Ministers in Bouake, the seat of the Forces nouvelles. Technical assessment missions comprising officials from banking institutions and utility companies were sent to the North to restore economic and social services.

These efforts have not met with much success. In early February 2004 the Minister of Education, with the support of the international agencies such as UNESCO and UNICEF, took concrete steps to reopen schools in the areas under the control of the Forces nouvelles. Examinations were
conducted to close the 2002-2003 academic year. These efforts are, unfortunately, being undermined through parallel measures declared and taken by the Forces nouvelles. Their design is to manage all these services, set up institutions and a parallel administration in a deliberate strategy to effect the increasing autonomy of the sectors under their control from the central government. Meanwhile, however, rail links have been successfully restored between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso and Mali.

As a complementary strategy, President Gbagbo and the Prime Minister have embarked on outreach diplomacy, either through meetings of ECOWAS or through special missions, to restore good relations with the neighbouring countries of Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Liberia, Ghana, Togo and Niger.

3. Strains in the Government of National Reconciliation

The Government of National Reconciliation enjoyed an initial brief spell of functioning from March to September 2003. On 12 September 2003, the formation of the Government was completed by the appointment of the three remaining Ministers of Defence, of Internal Security, and of Women, Family and Children. The full panoply of 42 Ministers, including the “consensus” Prime Minister, was expected to be effectively functioning as at that date. Unfortunately this was not to be, because of the protests of the Forces nouvelles, who objected to the procedure of appointment adopted by the President, asserting that it was in violation of the process agreed under the Accra II Agreement. They added other grievances, primary among which were their concerns over their personal security and over the delegation of “full executive authority” to the Prime Minister, as agreed under the Marcoussis and Accra II Agreements. Consequently, from 23 September 2003 until 6 January 2004, the Forces nouvelles suspended their participation in the meetings of the Government and of the Council of Ministers. The suspension only ended with the intervention of some ECOWAS leaders and the decision of ECOWAS to finance the cost of reinforcing the security for the Ministers of the Forces nouvelles.

Meanwhile, the atmosphere of general security has been fragile, because of tensions generated by hostilities which erupted between certain militia groups and elements of FANCI, on the one side, and on the other, the military wing of the Forces nouvelles. There have also been tensions created by the interchange of inflammatory declarations over the commitment of political forces to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.

This state of affairs necessitated the visit of a Special UN Security Council Mission to Côte d’Ivoire in June/July 2003 to assess the situation and advise on how to reinvigorate the peace process. The mission conveyed a firm message calling on all Ivorian parties to the peace process to demonstrate renewed commitment to the full and unconditional implementation of the
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The mission also drew attention to the wider repercussions of the conflict in the sub-region and the need for a mechanism of cooperation to develop a regional strategy to address cross-border issues such as the flow of arms, use of mercenaries and child soldiers, refugees and displaced persons, humanitarian assistance, DDR, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, and effective and cost efficient pooling of assets and logistics among the three contiguous UN Peace-keeping Operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.\(^{39}\)

The National Assembly is a key player and focal institution in the implementation of the Linas Marcoussis Agreement. Its proceedings reflect the pace of political developments. It is obviously the arena for political actors to play out their divergent positions. In its current state the National Assembly does not reflect fully the political spectrum: Its 223 deputies represent FPI, PDCI, UDP CI, UDCY and other independent groups calling themselves the Solidarity Group. There are no deputies belonging to the RDR, nor the Forces nouvelles.

The return on 6 January 2004 of the Forces nouvelles Ministers to the Government gave hope that with the full government in place, work will proceed to complete consideration of the relevant draft texts of legislation as required under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The President had instructed the Prime Minister to schedule additional meetings of the Council of Ministers to enable the texts to be approved and laid before the National Assembly. At the request of the President, the first extraordinary session of the Assembly convened to consider some of the draft texts relating to the identification of people and the residence status of foreigners; the establishment of the new Independent Electoral Commission; and the establishment of the National Commission on Human Rights. Later, the texts on Land Reform and others such as the financing of political parties, regulatory regimes for media, Press freedom and the financial independence of media were also tabled. However, among the several significant texts yet to be laid before the Assembly figure those on the Nationality Code, the amendment to Article 35 of the Constitution on the eligibility criteria to the Presidency.

Meanwhile, the activities of militias and youth groups disruptive of law and order re-emerged.\(^{40}\) These groups were involved in protests to obstruct the Minister of Justice in her administration of the judicial service under her purview. Her threats to resign from her post proved effective in securing official intervention to restrain the disruptive activities of these groups. However, the

\(^{39}\) The regional approach to the resolution of the conflicts in West Africa, including that in Côte d’Ivoire, involves the overall coordination by the periodic meetings of SRSOs from UNOWA, UNAMSIL, UNMIL and UNOCI. The military commanders have also set up a coordinating mechanism to address the cross-border issues.

\(^{40}\) Participants noted that there is radicalization and militarization of the youth in which the use of force or violence as instrument of policy has gained momentum worldwide. The youth are key actors in the Ivorian crisis and conflicts in the sub-region. The youth is tired of being told by elders to be patient and to wait for tomorrow - for them there is no tomorrow. Taking up the gun to make a living thereby giving perspective to a hopeless situation becomes more and more attractive. Strengthening state capacity is the key to addressing the symptoms and causes of conflict in which the youth play key roles.
long-standing grievances of the opposition parties, once championed by the Forces nouvelles, have been resuscitated under the leadership of PDCI.

The proximate cause was over the claim by the PDCI for their Minister of Economic Infrastructure to exercise his official discretion to appoint the Managing Director of the Independent Port Authority. Added to this, were the complaints by the opposition parties in government over impediments in the way of the smooth functioning of the Government of National Reconciliation and of their own performance of duties. These complaints led to the decision of the PDCI, on 3 March 2004, to instruct its Ministers to suspend their participation in the meetings of the Government and of the Council of Ministers. The decision was supported by 6 other opposition parties (RDR, Forces nouvelles, UDPCI and MFA).

In consultations immediately following this, the Group of 7 or the Coalition of Marcoussistes sprang into existence in the weekend of 6 to 7 March 2004. The Group thereafter galvanized itself in solidarity to withdraw from government thus deepening the impasse in the government and the rift between them and President Gbagbo together with his FPI party. A Memorandum of grievances prepared by the Marcoussistes was formally submitted to President Gbagbo and the Prime Minister.

In the face of this serious setback to the peace process, there was no end to the continuing flurry of diplomatic interventions and mediatory initiatives launched to urge President Gbagbo and the Ivorian parties to defuse the political tension. President Chirac of France, the Secretary General of the UN, President Kufuor, Chairman of the ECOWAS and other ECOWAS leaders proffered advice and their good offices in their attempt to bring about a solution to the crisis. The SRSG and the Monitoring Committee took leading initiatives to impress on all the parties, the need to remain in government and resume dialogue in order to resolve their differences and put the peace process back on track.

All these mediatory demarches proved of no avail in dissuading the Marcoussistes from organizing the 25 March demonstrations, which resulted in clashes with the security forces that led to the death of many people. The impasse had reached critical and tragic proportions, and there could be no heeding appeals for the return of the Marcoussistes to government and the recourse to dialogue and negotiations to redress outstanding grievances. After due consultations, the Secretary General appealed to President Gbagbo to take the initiative to undertake measures aimed at bringing all parties to the negotiating table. Among the other measures he recommended taking were the annulment of the decree banning demonstrations; recognizing the civil liberties of citizens; an international inquiry into the events of 25 March 2004; and offer of compensation to victims of the tragedy.
As a follow-up to his initiative, the Secretary General dispatched Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary General for Peace-keeping Operations, to lead a high-level delegation comprised of representatives of three of the Permanent Members of the Security Council (USA, UK and France), the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, and the representative of the African Union. The objective of the mission was to talk to all Ivorian parties and to encourage them to assume their collective and individual responsibility for implementing the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and to put the peace process back on track by demonstrating their reciprocal commitment to the effective implementation of the mandate of UNOCI. The mission conveyed a firm message to all in consonance with the expectations of the UN and the international community. There was an undercurrent message that the international community was getting impatient with any adverse actions by any party to undermine the peace process.

In a Presidential statement, the Security Council subsequently urged all Ivorian parties to show commitment to the application of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement failing which the Security Council would advise itself on what measures it could take against such recalcitrant party.

The message has produced ripples among the political class and public in Côte d’Ivoire. Various parties have been allowed to organize activities and demonstrations with safe conduct guaranteed by the FANCI and supported by the impartial forces of UNOCI and LICORNE. The UN International Commission of Inquiry has been to Côte d’Ivoire and completed its mission. These developments have somewhat provided a stimulus for the active initiatives currently being undertaken behind-the-scenes by the President and the Prime Minister to revive the peace process. These initiatives are aimed at bringing together all parties in the government for negotiations over the pending grievances. The good offices of certain ECOWAS leaders will also be summoned to provide political encouragement and blessing to the process.

Unfortunately, the “leak” of the report of the UN International Commission of Inquiry has somewhat “muddied the waters” as it were. The findings in the report have provided grounds for mudslinging in the political arena. This has not augured well for the prospects of a resumption of dialogue and a return of the Marcoussistes to government.

4. The Role of the Monitoring Committee

The Monitoring Committee was a product of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The ten-member Committee comprises representatives of the following: The UN SGGR, Prof. Albert Tevoedjre as Chair; a representative of France; a representative of the USA (nominally representing the G8); the Presidency of the EU; the European Commission; ECOWAS; the African Union; the International Organization of Francophonie; the World Bank; and the IMF. In attendance at the meetings, as technical advisors, are the Force Commanders of Licorne and UNOCI.
The complex interplay of political actors, punctuated by sharp differences of positions and the concomitant impasse, has provided “grist to the mill” of the Monitoring Committee. The Committee oversees the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The committee ordinarily meets once a week; but it often meets in special or informal sessions because of the persistent eruptions of misunderstandings, boycott of government and other actions which disrupt the general political and security situation. Their meetings are confidential and follow the Chatham House rule - i.e. non-attributable statements and positions. Members prefer to bring to bear on the work of the Committee their individual leverages in their continuing contacts with all political actors - from the President, Prime Minister, through to leaders and groups of political forces and members of civil society. They exchange ideas, decide on the courses of action desirable to assist in mediating any issues and divergences among political forces. Their consultations follow the road-map delineated in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. They are open to receiving representations concerning grievances from all political forces. Most of the grievances reveal differences of interpretation of the terms, letter and spirit of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The Committee offers explanations or mediates differences of views, as appropriate.

The overall thrust of the Committee’s efforts is intended to promote mutual trust and confidence among all political actors. The Committee keeps under review its method of work. It has delineated a tentative programme work in order to ensure its oversight of the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. This involves a ten-point agenda or cluster of issues:

1. Analysis of the political tasks arising from the mandate of UNOCI (e.g. from implementation of DDR through to steady progress in the peace process leading to the 2005 elections, economic reconstruction and national reconciliation);
2. The implementation of the DDR Programme, in particular the time-table of operations by the military;
3. The draft texts of legislation and decrees laid before the National Assembly, notably among them the Amendment to Article 35 of the Constitution: eligibility criteria for election to the Presidency; the Nationality Code; Financing of Political Parties; the Media, Press freedom; and financial independence of the media;
4. The difficult issues relating to the Identification process, in particular the methodology, structure and progress of its administration;
5. Reunification of the country; extension and deployment of the administration and services throughout the country;
6. Institutional questions, in particular the reconstitution of the Independent Electoral Commission, the National Office of Identification and the Constitutional Court;
7. National coverage to be given by State-owned media; the Television and Radio Service;
8. Equal access of all political forces to public media;
9. Security arrangements to protect leaders of political parties and candidates for Presidential elections; and
10. Detailed measures outlining the stages of national reconstruction.

The weight of the political leverage wielded by the Monitoring Committee rests on the collective co-operation between the representatives of the international community and international institutions.

VIII. Summary and Conclusions

In sum, the Workshop was an extremely informative and rewarding exercise. Contributions and ensuing discussions were frank, differentiated and rich. In particular those from the field provided a rich source of facts and information. Peace operations undertaken and the ones in progress in Côte d'Ivoire were reviewed and unsolved problems identified in addition to the lessons learned. This resulted in an appraisal of the entire peace process in Côte d'Ivoire, as well some basic recommendations.

Côte d'Ivoire’s peace process has made significant advances in a remarkably short period of time. The ceasefire agreement, signed over a year ago, has largely been observed. The period of actual combat was relatively short, and the levels of destruction and casualties suffered during the crisis have been low – indeed, way below that suffered in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, with which the Ivorian crisis has been linked.

The character of the conflict itself raises questions as to whether the genocide in Rwanda or the state failure in Liberia is the right model of comparison for understanding the conflict dynamics in Côte d’Ivoire. The humanitarian catastrophe that was feared - the real fear of an ethnic cleansing campaign - has not happened, although parts of the country have suffered from shortages of basic necessities. Thus The Liberian dynamics of state failure and greed driven violence is perceived as closer to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire than the Rwandan genocide. This notwithstanding, genocidal events cannot be ruled out in Côte d’Ivoire.

Nevertheless, a comprehensive peace agreement, though controversial, has been signed, and all the warring parties have accepted its principles and many of its details. A large UN force, backed by a muscular French military presence, and which incorporated troops from ECOWAS states, has been deployed. A comprehensive programme of disarmament and demobilization of combatants has been worked out, and awaits full implementation.
ECOWAS was initially instrumental in getting the parties to the conflict talking, resulting in securing a Ceasefire Agreement in Lomé on 17 October 2002. ECOWAS, the UN, France and the African Union facilitated the Round Table which gave birth to the Linas–Marcoussis Agreement on 24 January 2003. The Conference of Kléber, assembled by France and facilitated by the UN Secretary General gave action and moral integrity to the Agreement on 26 January 2001. The subsequent convening of the UN Security Council stamped its endorsement and authority on the Agreement. The Council (by Resolution 1474 of 4 February 2003) authorized the deployment of ECOWAS troops supported by the Licorne force with the monitoring presence of a fledgling UN peace mission later to be baptized as MINUCI, (in the charge of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Albert Tevoedjre who is also chair of the Monitoring Committee of ten representatives of States and international institutions, established by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement).

This is an instructive example of the Security Council’s establishing a peace mission side by side with endorsing peacekeeping operations by ECOWAS forces under regional arrangements, with the support of a virtual Rapid Response Capability provided by the French Licorne forces, composed initially of troops stationed in Côte d’Ivoire under a bilateral Defence arrangement.

The intervening military forces acting in Côte d’Ivoire from 2003 (Operation Licorne, ECOMICI, UNOCI) were complementary in their operations. Operation Licorne served, largely, as a major stabilizing factor. Two developments might have contributed in particular to the positive perception of the French military intervention. The first is the fundamental change in the character of French intervention and how it is conducted; and secondly that the perception of Africans regarding French interventions has changed accordingly. Yet, at least for some, the colonial past may still challenge the legitimacy of such interventions.

ECOMICI had some strengths and also encountered some weaknesses. Its strengths were reflected in the common cultural background of the ECOMOG forces with the local population; knowledge of the environment; the bilingual status of most officers (although differences in language still remain a fundamental problem for ECOWAS contingents); the culture of discussion encouraged among local actors; and prior training and exercises in relevant peacekeeping institutions including, in particular, the KAIPTC. The shortcomings centred on: the lack of financial resources; lack of support and no clear directives from the ECOWAS Secretariat, especially at the beginning of operations; differing views on priorities; lack of leverage on contributing countries; and the lack of an integrated logistics plan.

UNOCI has to contend with the usual patterns of delay of UN deployment. ECOWAS forces greatly facilitated its presence through the rehatting of ECOMICI into UNOCI. Currently UNOCI is confronted with the problem of keeping a peace that is non-existent. There is neither peace nor war. The population is insufficiently informed about the mandate of UNOCI, with particular re-
gard to the limits of the mandate. Better information via the UN Radio, therefore, would be cru-
cial in preventing further disappointment in the population and abuse by parties to the conflict.

ECOMICI, MINUCI (and now UNOCI), France and the Licorne force - have been the pillars of the
regional and international community in facilitating the construction of the building blocks and
laying the foundations for the peace structure in Côte d’Ivoire. The central actors, obviously,
are the Ivorian political forces, signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.

The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement lays out the road map for the peace process to guide the ac-
tions of all: Ivorians, ECOWAS and sub-regional leaders and communities, especially the immedi-
ate neighbours of Côte d’Ivoire; France in its special historical relations with Côte d’Ivoire, the
UN (from MINUCI to UNOCI); the Monitoring Committee and the military forces on the ground;
ECOMICI (now UNOCI); Licorne; and the Military Liaison Officers of MINUCI, working to forge
cooperation between FANCI and the Armed Wing of the Forces nouvelles Movement.

Yet, there are some problematic aspects. For one, it appears that the Accord might be overambi-
tious, especially with regard to the timeframe of its implementation. The Accord also seems to
give legitimacy to rebel factions which had striven for unconstitutional change in the country.
Judging from other peace processes, pushing too hastily for a comprehensive implementation of
the Accord might lead to an explosive situation. Patience is thus needed, and the timing and
sequence of the implementation has to be adjusted to the situation on the ground.
Again, despite some hopeful progress made in the Ivorian peace process, implementation re-
ains the basic and totally unsolved problem of the Accord. At present the process is blocked,
for several reasons:

1. All parties to the conflict seem to have a hidden agenda although they have signed the
   Accord;
2. There is a complete lack of confidence and trust on all sides;
3. Due to this mistrust and the uncertain political climate, the Government of Reconcilia-
   tion which is crucial for the implementation of the Accord is not functioning; and last
   but not least
4. A high level of impunity on all sides is obstructing the peace process.

The peace process is therefore at a crossroad, and the situation is becoming very tense. There
seems to be a real danger of secession by the North, while there is growing dissatisfaction
within the population about the lack of progress in the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire. This has
translated into the loss of confidence in UNOCI activities and its initial limited impact.
Three major difficulties are identified as blocking the peace process. Firstly, the anti-government Forces nouvelles, accusing the Gbagbo government of bad faith, have refused to be disarmed ahead of the elections in 2005. The government on its part claims that logistical arrangements with respect to the electoral process are hampered by the fact that the rebels are holding on to half of the country, preventing officials from gaining unimpeded access to those areas. Similarly, humanitarian assistance to some parts of the country controlled by the rebel forces has been impossible because of logistical and security reasons.

Secondly, there is a marked reluctance on the part of both parties to adhere fully to the provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, but there is no alternative to the full implementation of the agreement if the peace process is to go ahead. Thus, in effect, The Government of Reconciliation is not functioning due to the fact that the opposition and rebel groups have abandoned it.

Thirdly, critical issues concerning the legal regulation of land tenure and ownership, electoral law, citizenship and the eligibility as president have not been resolved.

Some controversies characterise the effectiveness of the State in Côte d'Ivoire with regard to whether the State is still functioning and if the government in Abidjan is the only legal and legitimate actor. The fact remains, however, that the basic elements of a functioning state are still in place: the constitution, president, government, and infrastructure. The UN and other key actors also face the challenge of managing the issue of the legality of the government in Abidjan and the broader legitimacy of the peace process as initiated by the Marcoussis Accord.

The crisis of youths equally features as a central factor in the Ivorian crisis with much emphasis on youth radicalization and violent actions in the course of the conflict. It is evident that the youth is tired of being told by elders to be patient and to wait for tomorrow - for them there is no tomorrow. In view of the high rate of unemployment such an attitude is not very surprising. Taking up the gun to make a living and for giving perspective to a hopeless situation becomes more and more attractive. There is a very real danger that the legitimacy of the ballot will be substituted by the legitimacy of the bullet.

The practical implications of the crisis of the youth, how it should be addressed, and the extent to which it becomes a decisive issue for the DDR programme need further appraisal towards the facilitation of the conflict management and resolution processes in Côte d'Ivoire.

Refusal of the rebel factions to disarm before elections has presently blocked the DDR programme. The planning of the DDR programme, which is under the national authority of Côte d'Ivoire, seems to be of high quality. Nevertheless, the following points are particularly noteworthy:
1. In addition to the difficulties in the field, the first stages of the planning of DDR pro-
gramme were hampered by complicated administrative procedures which had been set
as prerequisites by donors and bilateral partners.

2. On the military level, the Forces nouvelles seem to be quite prepared to cooperate de-
spite the blockage of the DDR process on the political level.

3. A positive contribution is also to be expected to come from the UN Radio station which
will be on air soon. It was recommended that the station should be used extensively to
inform and sensitize the population and those to be disarmed.

4. The harmonization of the various DDR programmemes in West Africa is urgently needed
due to the interlinked nature of the conflicts in the region.

5. All combatants recruited after the failed coup of 19th September 2002 are to be dis-
armed and demobilized (about 4,000 fighters from the South, and 25 - 30,000 from the
North). Each disarmed individual will receive $ 900 subsistence payment.

6. It may be difficult to distinguish between Ivorians and non-Ivorians in the disarma-
ment process.

Implementation of the DDR programme has not yet begun due to its political blockage and as a
result, its practical difficulties remain to be seen. A successful DDR will, however, make the deci-
sive difference between peace and a return to war.

There has been no lack of efforts to persuade the Ivorian parties to “come into their own”; as-
sume their responsibilities; put an end to the undesirable resort to the practice of boycott of
the government; agree to pursuing continual dialogue and negotiations over their mutual
grievances and differences within the framework of the Government; and ensure the smooth
passage of legislation as envisaged under the Linas Marcoussis Agreement. That way the Gov-
ernment of National Reconciliation would advance, without unnecessary obstacles, towards the
organization and conduct of free, fair and transparent elections scheduled for October 2005.

The political impasse in the government, aggravated by the events of 25 March 2004 and the
ripples produced by the findings of the International Commission of Enquiry, all have cast an
ominous shadow on the peace process. A lot needs to be done to heal wounds and regain a firm
handle on the situation in order to address the challenges facing the peace process.

The first of these is the risk of “moral fatigue” with the peace implementation process in the
face of the current agonizing stalemate in Côte d’Ivoire. In effect we need to look into the
prospects and challenges of external involvement as against external interference. We may
start with the UN’s involvement – peace making, peace building and peacekeeping - by the side of the Ivorian actors in strict compliance with decisions of the UN Security Council. We should then proceed to examine and see where to prevent any action from any quarter which might smack of “interference” with a hidden agenda contrary to the letter and spirit of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. That way we can redress the balance between positive involvement and the risk of indifference and disengagement.

Secondly, we should learn to manage the complex nexus of relations represented by international pressures exerted on the Ivorian actors, the active involvement of the international community in encouraging programmes of stabilization, security, democratic governance, economic reconstruction, observance of norms of Rule of law and Human Rights.

Thirdly, we need to examine the competing demands, on the one hand, between resources expended on emergency programmes of peace-keeping including humanitarian assistance and pacification; and, on the other, resources devoted to “preventive peace building” which constitutes an “agenda for development”. This concept is inspired by the fundamental objective of meeting peoples’ aspirations and needs for security, sense of identity and worth, and a reasonable standard of living.

Finally, the practical challenge is to take firm measures to assist ECOWAS to improve and re-enforce its institutional capacity to undertake its increasing responsibilities to prevent and manage conflicts particularly in close coordination with the United Nations. These challenges, like the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, constitute a substantial menu of prescriptions to offer relief and remedy for the sufferings of the people of Côte d’Ivoire. The capitals in West Africa as well as the leading international powers and international organizations have to vigorously re-engage to put the peace process back on track. This will need a clear political will and strong diplomacy. The blockage of the peace process and in particular the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord has to be overcome. Otherwise the presence of international peacekeepers will be in vain. There is a very real danger of the country plunging back into violence.

The potency of these prescriptions, and the very future of the peace process, and the country, depends effectively and ultimately on the will of the Ivorian people.
Appendices

Appendix A - Linas-Marcoussis Agreement

1. At the invitation of the President of the French Republic, a Round Table of the Ivorian political forces met in Linas-Marcoussis from 15 to 23 January 2003. It brought together the following parties: FPI, MFA, MJP, MPCI, MPIGO, PDCI-RDA, PIT, RDR, UDCY and UDPCI. The conference was chaired by Mr. Pierre MAZEAUD, assisted by Judge Keba Mbaye, former Prime Minister Seydou Diarra and facilitators appointed by the UN, the African Union and ECOWAS.

Each delegation gave its analysis of the situation in Cote d'Ivoire and made proposals aimed at restoring confidence and overcoming the crisis. The vision shown by delegations enabled the Round Table to bring the positions together and arrive at the consensus described below, in which all elements - principles and annexes - have the same status:

The Round Table welcomes the cease-fire made possible and guaranteed by the deployment of ECOWAS forces supported by French forces, and demands strict compliance with it. The Round Table calls on all parties immediately to put a stop to all exactions and consecrate the peace. It calls for the immediate release of all political prisoners.

2. The Round Table reiterates the need to maintain the territorial integrity of Cote d'Ivoire and respect for its institutions and to restore the authority of the State. It recalls its commitment to the principle of democratic accession to and exercise of power. To this end it agrees as follows:

a) A Government of National Reconciliation will be set up immediately after the conclusion of the Paris Conference to ensure a return to peace and stability. It will be charged with strengthening the independence of the justice system, restoring the administration and public services and rebuilding the country. It will implement the appended Round Table programme which includes, in particular, provisions in the constitutional, legislative and regulatory spheres.

b) It will prepare an electoral timetable with a view to holding credible and transparent elections and set dates for them.

c) The Government of National Reconciliation will be led by a consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next Presidential election, in which he will not be able to stand as a candidate.

d) This government will be made up of representatives appointed by each of the Ivorian delegations taking part in the Round Table. In assigning Ministries a balance will be struck among the parties throughout the term of office of the government.

e) To discharge its duties the government will have executive powers in accordance with the delegation of authority provided for in the Constitution. The political parties represented in the National Assembly which took part in the Round Table undertake to
guarantee the support of their Members of Parliament for the implementation of the
government’s programme.

f) The Government of National Reconciliation will, immediately upon taking office, at-
tend to rebuilding an army committed to the values of integrity and republican morality. The government will restructure the defence and security forces and may, for this purpose, receive the counsel of outside advisers and in particular the assistance offered by France.

g) In order to contribute to restoring security of persons and property throughout the
national territory, the Government of National Reconciliation will organise the regroup-
ing and subsequent disarming of all forces. It will ensure that no mercenaries remain
within the country’s borders.

h) The Government of National Reconciliation will seek the help of ECOWAS, France and
the United Nations to arrange for their forces to guarantee these operations.

i) The Government of National Reconciliation will take the necessary steps to ensure re-
lease and amnesty for all military personnel being held on charges of threatening State
security and will extend this measure to soldiers living in exile.

4. The Round Table decides to set up a committee to monitor implementation of the Paris
Agreements on Côte d’Ivoire in charge of ensuring compliance with commitments made.
This committee will report to national, regional and international authorities all cases
of obstruction of the Agreements and failure to apply them, to ensure that appropriate
remedies are implemented.

5. The Round Table recommends to the Conference of Heads of State that the monitoring
committee be set up in Abidjan and made up of representatives of the countries and or-
ganizations called on to guarantee implementation of the Paris Agreements, and in par-
cular:

   a. the representative of the European Union,
   b. the representative of the Commission of the African Union,
   c. the representative of the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS,
   d. the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who will co-
      ordinate UN bodies,
   e. the representative of the International Francophone Organization,
   f. the representatives of the IMF and the World Bank,
   g. a representative of the G8 countries,
   h. the representative of France.

6. The Round Table calls on the French government, ECOWAS and the international
community to provide for the security of the persons who took part in it and if need be
for that of the members of the Government of National Reconciliation until such time as
the latter is in a position to fully perform this task.
7. The Round Table pays tribute to the mediation provided by ECOWAS and to the endeavours of the African Union and the UN, and thanks France for its role in organizing this meeting and achieving this consensus.

Done at Linas-Marcoussis, 23 January 2003

FOR THE FPI
   Pascal AFFI N’GUESSAN

FOR THE MFA
   Innocent KOBENA ANAKY

FOR THE MJP
   Gaspard DELI

FOR THE MPCI
   Guillaume SORO

FOR THE MPIGO
   Felix DOH

FOR THE PDCI-RDA
   Henri KONAN BEDIE

FOR THE PIT
   Francis WODIE

FOR THE RDR
   Alassane Dramane OUATTARA

FOR THE UDCY
   Theodore MEL EG

FOR THE UDPCI
   Paul AKOTO YAO

THE CHAIRMAN
   Pierre MAZEAUD
Annex

Programme of the Government of National Reconciliation

I - Citizenship, Identity, Status of Foreign Nationals

1. The Round Table considers that Law 61-415 of 14 December 1961 on Ivorian citizenship, as amended by Law 72-852 of 21 December 1972, which is based on complementarity between jus sanguinis and jus soli and makes broad provision for naturalization by certificate issued by the public authorities, is a generous and well-drafted text.

The Round Table considers on the other hand that there are many difficulties in implementing the law, as a result either of lack of awareness among populations or of administration and police and security force practices which disregard the law and human rights.

The Round Table has observed a degree of legal difficulty in applying Articles 6 and 7 of the Citizenship Code. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that in practice the certificate of citizenship is valid for three months only and that the person holding it must prove his citizenship each time it is renewed by producing a number of documents. However, the Code has heretofore been applied.

Therefore the Government of National Reconciliation will:

   a. immediately promote increased recourse to existing naturalization procedures, based on better information and possibly co-operation projects implemented with the support of international development partners;

   b. submit, on an exceptional basis and within six months, a naturalization bill aimed at settling in a simple and accessible manner the cases of those persons deemed ineligible and considered to be in the country illegally (in particular cases concerning persons formerly covered by Articles 17 to 23 of Law 61-415 as repealed by Law 72-852 and persons residing in Cote d'Ivoire prior to 7 August 1960 who did not exercise their option within the prescribed deadline), and supplement the existing text by including in new Article 12 foreign men married to Ivorian women.

2. To cope with the uncertainty and slow pace of the identification process and with the mistakes and abuses to which security checks can give rise, the Government of National Reconciliation will take further action with respect to registration and identification of individuals, in particular:

   a. Suspension of the current identification process pending decrees implementing the Law and timely establishment of a National Identification Commission, headed by a judge and made up of representatives of the political parties, to be charged with supervising and overseeing the National Identification Office.

   b. Ensuring strict consistency of the Law on Identification with the Citizenship Code regarding proof of citizenship.
3. The Round Table finds that the foreign nationals residing in large numbers in Cote d'Ivoire have made a major contribution to national wealth and helped confer on Cote d'Ivoire its special position and responsibility within the sub-region, which has also benefited the countries of origin of these foreign nationals, and considers that the petty annoyances perpetrated by the administration and the police and security forces, which often disregard the law and human rights and which often affect foreign nationals, can be caused by willful misapplication of identification provisions.

a. The Government of National Reconciliation will therefore immediately eliminate the residence permit requirement under Article 8 paragraph 2 of Law 2002-03 of 3 January 2002 for nationals of ECOWAS countries and will carry out the immigration inspection needed by using means of identification not subject to fraudulent misuse.

b. Moreover the Government of National Reconciliation will consider introducing legislative and regulatory provisions to improve the status of foreign nationals and protect their property and persons.

c. The Round Table also calls on all ECOWAS Member States to ratify, in a timely manner, the existing protocols concerning free circulation of persons and goods, to practice strengthened co-operation in controlling migratory flows, to respect the fundamental rights of immigrants and to diversify areas of development. These actions can be implemented with the support of international development partners.

II - Electoral System


2. The Government of National Reconciliation:

a. will ensure impartiality of the measures taken to identify voters and draw up voter lists;

b. will submit several amendments to Law 2001-634 aimed at achieving better representation of the parties taking part in the Round Table within the central committee of the Independent Electoral Commission, including its Officers;

c. will submit, within 6 months, a bill relating to the status of the opposition and to the public funding of political parties and election campaigns;

d. will submit within one year a bill on illicit personal enrichment and will organize effective inspection of the personal asset disclosures filed by those elected;

e. take all appropriate measures to ensure the independence of the justice system and the impartiality of the media with respect to both election disputes and
election propaganda.

III - Eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic

1. The Round Table considers that Article 35 of the Constitution on the Election of the President of the Republic must avoid referring to concepts without legal content or deriving from legislation. The Government of National Reconciliation will therefore propose that the conditions governing eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic be laid down as follows:

"The President of the Republic is elected by universal suffrage to a five year term of office. He can be re-elected only once. The candidate must be in possession of his civil and political rights and be at least thirty-five years of age. He must have only Ivorian citizenship and have a father or a mother born Ivorian."

2. The Citizenship Code will be amended by adding to the conditions under which Ivorian citizenship can be revoked, under Article 53, the following words: "holding elective office abroad or serving as a member of a foreign government".

3. The President of the Republic shall publish a report on his state of health once a year.

IV - Land Tenure Regime

1. The Round Table considers that Law 98-750 of 23 December 1998 on Rural Land Tenure, adopted unanimously by the National Assembly, constitutes a reference in a field that is legally difficult and economically crucial.

2. Nevertheless the Government of National Reconciliation:

   a. will support the progressive implementation of this regime by carrying out a campaign to explain it to rural populations in such a way as to work toward true security of tenure.

   b. will submit an amendment to better protect acquired rights under Article 26 of the law on heirs of landowners holding rights predating the enactment of the law but not fulfilling the conditions of ownership set out in Article 1.

V - Media

1. The Round Table condemns the incitement to hatred and xenophobia propagated by certain media.

2. The Government of National Reconciliation will within one year overhaul the general regime governing the press so as to strengthen the role of the regulatory authorities, guarantee neutrality and impartiality of the State broadcasters and foster the financial independence of the media. These measures may receive the support of international development partners.
3. The Government of National Reconciliation will immediately restore free broadcasting of the international radio and television media.

VI - Rights and Freedoms of the Individual

1. The Government of National Reconciliation will immediately set up a National Human Rights Commission to ensure protection of rights and freedoms in Cote d'Ivoire. The Commission will be made up of delegates of all Round Table parties and be chaired by a person accepted by all.

2. The Government of National Reconciliation will call for the establishment of an international board of enquiry to investigate and establish the facts throughout the national territory in order to identify cases of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law since 19 September 2002.

3. Based on the report by the international board of enquiry, the Government of National Reconciliation will determine which cases should be brought to justice in order to put an end to impunity. The Round Table particularly condemns the actions of the "death squads" and those giving them orders as well as those carrying out summary executions throughout the country, and considers that those guilty of and those aiding and abetting these acts must be brought to justice before an international criminal jurisdiction.

4. The Government of National Reconciliation will endeavour to facilitate humanitarian operations to aid the victims of the conflict throughout the country. Based on the report of the National Human Rights Commission, it will take steps to compensate and rehabilitate victims.

VII - Regrouping, Disarming and Demobilizing

1. Immediately after assuming office, the Government of National Reconciliation will undertake the process of concomitant regrouping of the forces on the ground, under the supervision of ECOWAS and French forces.

2. In a second phase it will set out the measures to be taken with respect to disarming and demobilizing these forces, also under ECOWAS and French force supervision.

3. All recruits enlisted after 19 September will be immediately demobilized.

4. The Government of National Reconciliation shall ensure the social reintegration of military personnel of every origin with the help of Disarmament - Demobilization - Repatriation - Resettlement - Reintegration (DDRRR) type programmes which can be implemented with the support of international development partners.

5. The Government of National Reconciliation will take the necessary steps to ensure the release and amnesty of all military personnel detained on charges of threatening State security and will extend the benefit of these measures to soldiers living in exile. The amnesty law will under no circumstances mean that those having committed serious economic violations and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law will go unpunished.
6. The Government of National Reconciliation will carry out an audit of its armed forces and determine, in a difficult economic context, the level of sacrifice which it can accept in order to meet its obligations with respect to national defence. It will on that basis restructure the armed forces and request, for this purpose, outside assistance.

VIII - Economic Recovery and the Need for Social Cohesion

1. The Government of National Reconciliation will restore free circulation of persons and goods throughout the national territory and facilitate the resumption of educational, administrative, economic and social activity.

2. It will prepare, in a timely fashion, a plan for infrastructure reconstruction and development, national economic recovery and strengthening of social cohesion.

3. The Round Table recommends to international institutions and international development partners that they provide support for the process of rebuilding Cote d'Ivoire.

IX - Implementation

The Government of National Reconciliation will ensure that the constitutional, legislative and regulatory reforms arising from the decisions it is required to make are introduced without delay.
# Appendix B - WORKSHOP AGENDA

## Monday, 31 May 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Presenter</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>08:30 – 09:00</td>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>09:00 – 09:20</td>
<td>Welcome and introduction</td>
<td>Brig Gen Charles Mankatah, Commandant, KAIPTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>09:20 – 09:30</td>
<td>Overview of workshop rationale and objectives</td>
<td>Mark Malan, KAIPTC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Session 1: The Peacemaking Package: Political Challenges</strong></td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>09:30 – 10:30</td>
<td><strong>Keynote address:</strong> The ECOWAS role in the Ivorian peacemaking process</td>
<td>Hon. Nana A.D. Akuffo-Addo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ghana</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>10:30 – 10:45</td>
<td>Tea</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>12:45 – 13:00</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Chairperson / Rapporteur</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>13:00 – 14:30</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<td><strong>Session 2: Humanitarian Situation and Human Rights – Challenge and Response</strong></td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>14:30 – 15:30</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance and civil-military co-ordination in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Prof. Francis Akindès, University of Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>15:30 – 16:30</td>
<td>Human rights: Key issues of promotion and protection</td>
<td>Mr. Mike McGovern, International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>16:30 – 16:45</td>
<td>Tea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>16:45 – 17:30</td>
<td>Discussion and summary of recommendations</td>
<td>Chairperson / Rapporteur</td>
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### Session 3: The Protagonists
Chairperson: Mark Malan, KAIPTC

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>09:00 – 09:30</td>
<td>Forces Armees Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI)</td>
<td>Col Miezou Kadjo, Chief, Joint Operations Centre Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>09:30 – 10:00</td>
<td>MPCI, MPIGO, MPJ</td>
<td>Mr. Takwa Z. Suifon, WANEP/ ECOWAS Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10:00 – 11:00</td>
<td>“Special Actors”: Mercenaries and the youth</td>
<td>Dr Kwesi Aning, ASDR</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>11:00 – 11:15</td>
<td>Tea</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11:15 – 12:00</td>
<td>DDR Challenges: Progress and recommendations</td>
<td>Mr. Alain-Richard Donwah, President Côte d’Ivoire NCDDR/ Capt Christian Lupuleasa, UNOCI DDR Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12:00 – 12:30</td>
<td>Discussion and further recommendations</td>
<td>Chairperson / Rapporteur</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>12:30 – 14:00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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### Session 4: Intervening Actors - Lessons of Key Contributors
Chairperson: Lt Col Phillipe Troistorff, KAIPTC

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>14:00 – 15:00</td>
<td>Force Licorne</td>
<td>Lt Col Nicolas Casanova, former Licorne Battle Group commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>15:00 – 16:00</td>
<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>Maj Babacar Gueye, former ECOMICI Supply Commander/ Col Dixon Dikio, ECOWAS MPMC</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>16:00 – 16:15</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>16:15 – 17:15</td>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>Brig Gen Abdul Hafiz, Deputy Force Commander UNOCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>17:15 – 17:30</td>
<td>Wrap-up and summary of lessons</td>
<td>Chairperson / Rapporteur</td>
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### Session 5: Comparative Perspectives – towards operational guidelines for ECOWAS

**Chairperson:** Lt Col Nicolas Casanova, ECOWAS Secretariat

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>08:30 – 09:30</td>
<td>Phase I: Force preparation, build - up and deployment</td>
<td>Panel: Licorne, ECOWAS, UNOCI</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>09:30 – 10:30</td>
<td>Phase II: Conduct of operations and sustainment</td>
<td>Panel: Licorne, ECOWAS, UNOCI</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>10:30 – 10:45</td>
<td>Tea</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11:45 – 12:00</td>
<td>Discussion and summary of guidelines</td>
<td>Chairperson / Rapporteur</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>12:00 – 13:30</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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### Session 6: The Way Forward

**Chairperson:** Mark Malan, KAIPTC

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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>13:30 – 14:30</td>
<td>UNOCI Mandate and Concept of Operations</td>
<td>Col Nicholas Seymour, Chief, UN DPKO Military Planning Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>14:30 – 15:30</td>
<td>ECOWAS contribution to implementation of S/RES/1528 (2004)</td>
<td>Mr Frank Afanyakonson, ECOWAS Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>15:30 – 16:30</td>
<td>Towards effective implementation at the operational level</td>
<td>Panel: UNOCI, Licorne, ECOWAS, OCHA, UNHCR</td>
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<td>16:30 – 16:45</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>16:45 – 17:15</td>
<td>Summary of lessons, guidelines and other recommendations</td>
<td>Dr Winrich Kühne, Director, ZIF</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>17:15 – 17:30</td>
<td>Closing remarks</td>
<td>Brig Gen Charles Mankatah, Commandant, KAIPTC</td>
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## Appendix C - PARTICIPANTS

1. Col Seydou Adams  
   Chief Instructor, KAIPTC
2. Mr Prosper Addo  
   Research Fellow, KAIPTC
3. Mr Frank Afanyakonson  
   ECOWAS Secretariat
4. Col H.W.K. Agbenuzah  
   ECOWAS Planning Team, Ghana
5. Amb James Aggrey-Orleans  
   Principal Political Advisor, UNOCI
6. Prof. Francis Akindes  
   University of Bouake, Côte d’Ivoire
7. HE Mr Emmanuel Tanoe Amon  
   Ambassador of Côte d’Ivoire
8. Dr Kwesi Aning  
   African Security Dialogue & Research
9. Mr Léandre Anoma-Kanie  
   NCDDR, Côte d’Ivoire
10. HE El Hadj Mamadou Falilou Bah  
    Ambassador of Guinea
11. HE Mr Alì Essa Bangura  
    Ambassador of Sierra Leone
12. HE Mr Jean-Pierre Tété Banissan  
    Ambassador of Togo
13. Mr L. Bappah  
    Nigeria High Commission
14. Lt Col Nicolas Casanova  
    French Military Advisor, ECOWAS
15. Ms Louise Corbin  
    Canadian High Commission
16. Mr Jean-François Curtis  
    NCDDR, Côte d’Ivoire
17. Col Dixon Dikio  
    ECOWAS Secretariat
18. Mr Alain-Richard Donwahi  
    President of NCDDR, Côte d’Ivoire
19. Lt Col Lee Drakeley  
    UK Military Advisor, ECOWAS
20. Brig Gen Fadu-Amanfoh  
    ECOWAS Planning Team, Ghana
21. Mr Alfred Fawundu  
    UN Resident Coord/UNDP local rep
22. Mr James Fennell  
    UK Regional Conflict Advisor (WA)
23. Mr Lansana Gberie  
    Research Fellow, KAIPTC
24. Dr Charles Grimm  
    US Military Advisor, ECOWAS
25. Ms Dorothea Groth  
    German Embassy
26. Maj Babacar Gueye  
    Senegal
27. Brig Gen Abdul Hafiz  
    Deputy FC UNOCI
28. Lt Col Matthias Hochhausen  
    German Embassy, Abuja
29. Lt Col Kim Hooper  
    US Embassy
30. Lt Col Jonathon Howard  
    Office of the UK High Commission
31. Mr Richard Kaminski  
    US Embassy
32. Lt Col Leopold Kohou  
    Embassy of Côte d’Ivoire
33. Col Patrice Kouassi  
    NCDDR, Côte d’Ivoire
34. Cdr Phil Harris  
    Acting Head of PSD, KAIPTC
35. Col John Kane  
    Executive Director, KAIPTC
36. Ms Mireille Kouadio  
    NCDDR, Côte d’Ivoire
37. Mr Andrew K Kronyanh  
    Counsellor to the Ambassador of Liberia
38. Dr Winrich Kühne  
    Executive Director, ZIF
39. HE Mr Mohamed Mahmoud Ben Labat  
    Ambassador of Mali
40. Capt Christian Lupuleasa  UNOCI DDR Advisor
41. Mr Mark Malan  Head of CPMRD, KAIPTC
42. Brig Gen Charles Mankatah  Commandant, KAIPTC
43. Mr Mike McGovern  International Crisis Group
44. Mr Marcellin N’gessan  Ministry of Defence, Côte d’Ivoire
45. Maj Julius Nwadioha  ECOWAS Secretariat
46. Lt Gen S.K. Obeng  Chief of Defence Staff, Ghana
47. Hon Akwasi Osei-Adjei  Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ghana
48. Lt Col Tim Park  Training Department, KAIPTC
49. Lt Col Charles Richter-Addo  Training Department, KAIPTC
50. Col Robert Sackey  Deputy Commandant, KAIPTC
51. Col Nicholas Seymour  UN DPKO Military Planning Service
52. Mr Abdoulaye Sow  Embassy of Guinea
53. Mr Takwa Suifon  WANEP/ECOWAS Liaison Officer
54. Mr Daniel Sueckers  ZIF
55. Mr Chikouna Sylla  NCDDR, Côte d’Ivoire
56. HE Mr Hassane Ali Toure  Ambassador of Niger
57. HE Md Traoré  Ambassador of Burkina Faso
58. Lt Col Phillipe Troistorff  Training Department, KAIPTC
59. Dr Anne Wagner  German Embassy
60. Cdr Markus Worhler  US Embassy
61. Ms Afi A. Yakubu  Associate Director, FOSDA
Appendix D - UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1528

Adopted unanimously by the Security Council at its 4918th meeting, on 27 February 2004

The Security Council,


Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d’Ivoire, and recalling the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Recalling that it endorsed the agreement signed by the Ivorian political forces in Linas-Marcoussis on 24 January 2003 (S/2003/99) (the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement) approved by the Conference of Heads of States on Côte d’Ivoire, held in Paris on 25 and 26 January 2003,

Taking note with satisfaction of the recent progress, in particular the return of the Forces Nouvelles to the Government, the agreement reached on the implementation of the programmeme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the talks between the President of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire and the Forces nouvelles,

Considering that the Ivorian parties have made the progress called for by the Secretary-General towards the steps mentioned in paragraph 86 of his report on Côte d’Ivoire of 6 January 2004 (S/2004/3), as confirmed to the Council on 4 February 2004, and encouraging the Ivorian parties to continue their efforts in that direction,

Calling on the parties and the Government of National Reconciliation to take all necessary steps to prevent further violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and to put an end to impunity,


Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

Deeply concerned by the deteriorating economic situation in Côte d’Ivoire and its serious impact on the subregion as a whole,

Welcoming the commitment of the African Union in supporting the process of national reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire,

Recalling its full support for the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and France to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and welcoming, in particular, the effective action taken by the ECOWAS forces in order to stabilize the country,
Taking note of the message addressed to the Security Council on 10 November 2003 by the President of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, in which he requested the transformation of the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) into a peacekeeping operation,

Taking note of the request made by ECOWAS to the Security Council on 24 November 2003 to establish a peacekeeping operation in Côte d’Ivoire,

Noting that lasting stability in Côte d’Ivoire will depend on peace in the subregion, especially in Liberia, and emphasizing the importance of cooperation among the countries of the subregion to this end, as well as the need for co-ordination of the efforts of the United Nations Missions in the subregion to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on Côte d’Ivoire of 6 January 2004 (S/2004/3 and addenda 1 and 2),

Taking note of the letter of the President of the General Assembly of 8 January 2004 (S/2004/100) addressed to the President of the Security Council,

Aware of the persistent challenges to the stability of Côte d’Ivoire and determining that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides to establish the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) for an initial period of 12 months as from 4 April 2004, and requests the Secretary-General to transfer authority from MINUCI and the ECOWAS forces to UNOCI on that date, and decides therefore to renew the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) until 4 April 2004;

2. Decides that UNOCI will comprise, in addition to the appropriate civilian, judiciary and corrections component, a military strength of a maximum of 6,240 United Nations personnel, including 200 military observers and 120 staff officers, and up to 350 civilian police officers, as required to perform the mandated tasks described in the following paragraph 4;

2.bis. Requests the Secretary-General to encourage the United Nations missions in West Africa to share logistic and administrative support, to the extent possible, without prejudicing their operational capabilities with respect to their mandates, in order to maximize effectiveness and minimize the cost of the missions;

2.ter. Requests UNOCI to carry out its mandate in close liaison with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, including especially in the prevention of movements of arms and combatants across shared borders and the implementation of disarmament and demobilization programmes;

3. Reaffirms its strong support for the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and approves his full authority for the coordination and conduct of all the activities of the United Nations system in Côte d’Ivoire;
4. *Decides* that the mandate of UNOCI, in coordination with the French forces authorized in paragraph 11 below, shall be the following:

**Monitoring of the ceasefire and movements of armed groups**

(a) To observe and monitor the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003, and investigate violations of the ceasefire,

(b) To liaise with the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) and the military elements of the Forces Nouvelles in order to promote, in coordination with the French forces, the re-establishment of trust between all the Ivorian forces involved, as stated in its resolution 1479 (2003),

(c) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in monitoring the borders, with particular attention to the situation of Liberian refugees and to the movement of combatants,

**Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement**

(d) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in undertaking the regrouping of all the Ivorian forces involved and to ensure the security of their cantonment sites,

(e) To help the Government of National Reconciliation implement the national programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the combatants (DDR), with special attention to the specific needs of women and children,

(f) To coordinate closely with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia in the implementation of a voluntary repatriation and resettlement programme for foreign ex-combatants, with special attention to the specific needs of women and children, in support of the efforts of the Government of National Reconciliation and in cooperation with the Governments concerned, relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations and donor nations,

(g) To ensure that the programmes mentioned in paragraphs (e) and (f) take into account the need for a regional approach,

(h) To guard weapons, ammunition and other military matériel handed over by the former combatants and to secure, neutralize or destroy such matériel,

**Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians**

(i) To protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment, provide the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of National Reconciliation, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment,

(j) To support, in coordination with the Ivorian authorities, the provision of security for the ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation,

**Support for humanitarian assistance**
(k) To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions,

**Support for the implementation of the peace process**

(l) To facilitate, in cooperation with ECOWAS and other international partners, the re-establishment by the Government of National Reconciliation of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire,

(m) To provide oversight, guidance and technical assistance to the Government of National Reconciliation, with the assistance of ECOWAS and other international partners, to prepare for and assist in the conduct of free, fair and transparent electoral processes linked to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, in particular the presidential election,

**Assistance in the field of human rights**

(n) To contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire with special attention to violence committed against women and girls, and to help investigate human rights violations with a view to help ending impunity,

**Public information**

(o) To promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNOCI among local communities and the parties, through an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of a United Nations radio broadcasting capability,

**Law and order**

(p) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organizations in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d'Ivoire, and to advise the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the internal security services,

(q) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Côte d'Ivoire;

4.bis. Requests the Secretary-General to give special attention to the gender and child-protection components within the staff of UNOCI;

5. Authorizes UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

6. Requests the Secretary-General and the Government of National Reconciliation to conclude a status-of-force agreement within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel, and notes that, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;
7. **Stresses** the importance of the complete and unconditional implementation of the measures provided for under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, and demands that the parties fulfil their obligations under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement so that, in particular, the forthcoming Presidential election can be held in 2005 in accordance with the constitutional deadlines.

7.bis. **Calls upon** all parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of UNOCI, in particular by guaranteeing the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel as well as associated personnel throughout the territory of Côte d’Ivoire;

7.ter. **Reaffirms**, in particular, the need for the Government of National Reconciliation to undertake the complete and immediate implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, including the disbanding of all armed groups, in particular the militias, the curbing of all kinds of disruptive street protests, especially of the various youth groups, and the restructuring of the armed forces and the internal security services.

8. ** Urges** the international community to continue considering how it might help further economic development in Côte d’Ivoire with a view to achieving long-term stability in Côte d’Ivoire and the whole subregion,

9. **Requests** the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the implementation of the mandate of UNOCI, and to report to it in this regard every three months, including a review of the troop level with a view to a phasing down in light of the progress achieved on the ground and the remaining tasks to be fulfilled;

10. **Decides** to renew until 4 April 2004 the authorization given to the French forces and ECOWAS forces through its resolution 1527 (2004);

11. **Authorizes** for a period of 12 months from 4 April 2004 the French forces to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI in accordance with the agreement to be reached between UNOCI and the French authorities, and in particular to:

   - Contribute to the general security of the area of activity of the international forces,
   - Intervene at the request of UNOCI in support of its elements whose security may be threatened,
   - Intervene against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so require, outside the areas directly controlled by UNOCI,
   - Help to protect civilians, in the deployment areas of their units;

12. **Requests** France to continue to report to it periodically on all aspects of its mandate in Côte d’Ivoire;

13. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.