This book is about the civilian dimension of African peace operations. It is a summary of the work that the African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) has done to date to develop the civilian dimension of AU peace operations, primarily through the development of the African Standby Force (ASF). The goal of this publication is to inform African Member States and other partners and stakeholders about the civilian dimension of the ASF. The book contains all the major policy documents relevant to the civilian dimension of the ASF, and thus serves, in one volume, as a stocktaking of what has been done to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF.

This edited volume was published by the AU PSOD, with the support of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) as part of the Training for Peace in Africa Programme with funding from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"This book is a valuable resource for all those engaged in operationalizing the ASF. EASBRICOM has implemented the recommendations of the Kampala Report. I commend ACCORD and its staff for stimulating and informing this critical debate."

Peter Macvea
Former Acting Director and Head of Political Affairs, EASBRICOM

"This book will assist the SADC community to further develop and inform the civilian dimension of the SADC Standby Force."

Tanki J. Mothae
Director, SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation

The success of any peace support operation requires a multidimensional body of which the civilian component is an integral part. With the military-heavy connotation simply evident from the word "Force" in "African Standby Force", it is essential to highlight the "civilianization" of the ASF. This book is an illustration of this mandate and clearly identifies what has been achieved and what remains to be done.

H.E. Ambassador Soad Shalaby
Director, Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution & Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA)

In making history, we create for our generation and those yet to come, a legacy of hope. In documenting our history, we provide for the world, a compass of where we have come from and where we can go. This book is a repository of the journey so far in the dialogue on civilians in peace support operations. And, I have no doubts that it will go a long way to further informing the conversations of the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force.

Linda Daritore
Research Fellow, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy
THE CIVILIAN DIMENSION OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

Peace Support Operations Division
of the African Union Commission

Edited by Cedric de Coning and Yvonne Kasumba
The recommendations and policies contained in this book have been generated through a number of initiatives aimed at developing the civilian dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF) between 2006 and 2010. These initiatives have been led by the Peace Support Operations Division of the of the African Union (AU) Commission, with the support of Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms, AU Member States, members of the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA), with civil society and international partners. This edited volume has been published by the Peace Support Operations Division of the African Union with support from the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), under the auspices of the Norwegian funded Training for Peace (TfP) in Africa Programme.

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African Union Commission
P O Box 3243
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia
Tel: +251 113 724724
Fax: +251 113 206592
Web: <www.africanunion.org>
Email: situationroom@africa-union.org

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South Africa
Web: <www.accord.org.za>
Phone: +27 31 502 3908
Fax: +27 31 502 4160
Email: info@accord.org.za

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### Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFDEM</td>
<td>African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Support Missions</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>APSTA</td>
<td>African Peace Support Trainers’ Association</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<td>AU SMLC</td>
<td>African Union Senior Mission Leaders Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C³IS</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>CADSP</td>
<td>Common African Defence and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination</td>
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<td>CMD</td>
<td>Conflict Management Division</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>Contingent Owned Equipment</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EASBRICOM</td>
<td>Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism</td>
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<td>EASF</td>
<td>East African Standby Force</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EGT</td>
<td>European Group on Training</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Ecole de Maintien de la Paix</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Standby Force</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographical Information Systems</td>
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<td>HPC</td>
<td>Hiroshima Peacebuilders Centre</td>
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<td>IAPTC</td>
<td>International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IMPT</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Planning Team</td>
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<td>IMTF</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Task Force</td>
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<td>IPCS</td>
<td>Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>Information, Technology and Communications</td>
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<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<td>LECIA</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mission Analysis Cell</td>
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<td>MAPEX</td>
<td>Map Exercise</td>
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<td>MOC</td>
<td>Mission Operations Centre</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPEC</td>
<td>Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
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<td>NARC</td>
<td>North African Regional Capability</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NORDEM</td>
<td>Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>NUPI</td>
<td>Norwegian Institute for International Affairs</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OCSE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Element</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<td>POW</td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PSD</td>
<td>Peace and Security Directorate</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>PSOD</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations Division</td>
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<td>PST</td>
<td>Peace Support Team</td>
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<td>RC/HC</td>
<td>UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Capability</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>RedR</td>
<td>Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief</td>
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<td>RMs</td>
<td>Regional Mechanisms</td>
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<td>RoL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSF</td>
<td>Regional Standby Force</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADC-RPTC</td>
<td>SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGTM</td>
<td>Standard Generic Training Module</td>
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<td>SRCC</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission</td>
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<td>SSF</td>
<td>SADC Standby Force</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>STR</td>
<td>Staffing, Training and Rostering</td>
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<tr>
<td>TfP</td>
<td>Training for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>ZIF</td>
<td>German Peace Operations Centre</td>
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</table>
The African Standby Force (ASF) is an important tool of the African Peace and Security Architecture for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on our continent. An appreciable amount of progress has been made towards its realisation, from the development of the foundational policy documents to aspects pertaining to the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Capability for the Force. It is, however, the reality that there still exists a limited understanding of the ASF concept.

Peace support operations (PSOs) have evolved into complex and multidimensional enterprises that require integration and cooperation amongst military, civilian and police elements. Despite this development, there is still a view that PSOs are the preserve of the military, and little is still known about the role and necessity of civilians in the theatre of operations.

There is a need, on one hand, to increase our advocacy and outreach efforts so as to better gain support for the ASF whilst, on the other, we have even more work to do in terms of getting a broader understanding of the multidimensional imperative in PSOs, and specifically the roles and functions of civilian experts. It is true that work on the civilian dimension of the ASF is far behind that of the military and police components. However, over the past few years, a lot of progress has been made in terms of developing policy documents which articulate who the civilian experts are, what their functions are within the PSO context, how they should be recruited, trained and managed. There has also been recognition that civilians are quite a diverse and disparate group, unlike their military and police counterparts.

This edited volume comes at a critical time when the AU Peace Support Operations Division needs to create better awareness about the work it has done on the development of the civilian dimension of the ASF. It collates all the relevant documents that have been produced to date, and helps us get to a better conceptual understanding of what the civilian dimension in the ASF context is, and what it is not. Without the necessary awareness amongst the relevant decision-makers it will be difficult to operationalise the various concepts and policies and, most importantly, to get the necessary civilian personnel on board at both the continental and regional levels so as to ensure the efficient daily management and coordination of tasks and functions.

Sivuyile Bam  
*Head of the Peace Support Operations Division of the AU.*
Introduction

Cedric de Coning*

One of the most significant developments in the African peace operations context is the initiative to establish an African Standby Force (ASF). It is significant because, for the first time, Africa now has a common position and action plan for the development of its peace operations capacity.

Although considerable progress has been achieved since the ASF concept was approved in 2003, the overall operationalisation of the ASF has been slower than anticipated, and has been predominantly focused on the military aspects of peace operations. One of the key remaining challenges is thus the need to develop the civilian and police dimensions of the ASF framework, so that the multidimensional nature of contemporary peace operations can be fully integrated into the African Union (AU) peace operations concept.

This book is about the civilian dimension of peace operations. It is a summary of the work that the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) has done to date to develop the civilian dimension of AU peace operations, primarily through the development of the ASF. The goal of this publication is to inform AU member states and other partners and stakeholders about the civilian dimension of the ASF, and thus serves, in one volume, as an update – or progress report – of what has been done to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF to date.

A good deal of work has gone into the civilian dimension, but our assessment is that the overall awareness of the role of the civilian dimension remains very poor. This lack of understanding of the role that civilians play in African peace operations is having a negative effect on the progress of this important aspect and, as a result, the overall development and operationalisation of the ASF is affected. Compared to the military and police dimensions of the ASF, the civilian dimension is lagging behind.

One of the aims of this book is to improve the general awareness of the civilian dimension of the ASF. We aim to provide a summary of the civilian dimension, and we include all the most relevant original policy documents, so that this book can serve as a single resource for all civilian dimension-related aspects. It is difficult for someone new to the civilian dimension of the ASF to be aware of – as well as be able to find – all the relevant documentation, and this book seeks to fill this need by providing the most important documents relating to the civilian dimension of the ASF in one volume.

This book uses three words for peace operations. There is thus a need to clarify these various terms and how they are used in this book. The first is ‘peace operations’, which refers, in

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* Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow with ACCORD and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).
the broad sense, to all international operations undertaken for the purposes of achieving or maintaining peace. This category excludes war, but includes international or regional operations with a prevention, stabilisation, protection of civilians, peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandate. Second, we use the concept of ‘peacekeeping’ more narrowly when referring to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, and this category would include all UN peacekeeping operations, as defined and described in the UN’s Capstone Doctrine.¹ Third, we use ‘peace support operations’ (PSOs) to refer to all the operations that have been undertaken by the AU or that are foreseen in the ASF. PSOs is the term used in the ASF doctrine and policy documents, and includes all operations undertaken in the support of peace, as provided for in the AU’s Peace and Security Protocol.

We hope that this book will contribute to a wider acceptance of the role of the civilian component in African peace operations and that it will improve the awareness of key decision-makers of what the civilian dimension is and why it is important. It is widely accepted that conflicts do not have a military solution, and yet we do, more often than not, use military peacekeeping operations as a substitute for a political process. Multi-dimensional peace operations that combine military, police and civilian components in the assessment, planning, management, coordination and evaluation of peace operations ensure that such operations benefit from a multifaceted and multidisciplinary approach, and therefore help to avoid overly rigid or single-facet approaches to international conflict resolution. Our hope is that this book is a humble contribution to making the multidimensional approach to peace operations a reality in Africa.

1. An Overview of the African Standby Force (ASF)

Yvonne Kasumba and Charles Debrah*

Ex Africa sempe aliquid novi –
Out of Africa always something new!

The ASF concept was approved in 2004 and was unprecedented in international peacekeeping. It was intended to provide the African Union (AU) with a means of responding to conflict in a manner that was timely and efficient and, for the first time, provided Africa with a common position and action plan for the development of its Peace Support Operation (PSO) capacity.

* Yvonne Kasumba is the Civilian Planning and Coordination Officer, ASF, AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). Charles Debrah is Acting Head of ASF, AU PSOD.
Background to the establishment of the African Union

The need and utility of the mechanism that is the African Standby Force (ASF) is best appreciated when considered against the political and contextual dynamics surrounding the move to transform the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). The main priority of the almost four-decade-old OAU was to secure independence for all African states, as well as to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The sanctity afforded these norms effectively meant that the OAU was not carved out to manage the complex security threats and the international concern for human rights and good governance that faced the continent after the Cold War.

Tragic scenes of conflict on the continent in the 1990s resulted in the deaths of millions of African men, women and children, and led to mounting criticism and internal reflection on the OAU’s inability to intervene adequately in the series of unfolding crises. The genocide of Rwanda, and the conflicts in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), served to motivate African leaders towards the revitalisation of the OAU into a body that was more progressive in promoting and achieving democracy, development and the human rights and basic security of African citizens. The restructuring of the continental body would provide an opportunity for African member states to seek ways of addressing the number of perennial challenges facing the continent collectively whilst, at the same time, promoting the unity of Africa and strengthening its ability to play a more dynamic role in both the regional and global arenas.

During the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, on 9 September 1999, calls were made for the establishment of the AU. This was followed by the adoption of the Constitutive Act during the OAU Lomé Summit on 11 July 2000. The Act came into force on 26 May 2001 and the inaugural meeting of the AU was held in 2002 in Durban, South Africa, with the convening of the 1st Assembly of Heads of States of the Union.

At the core of the new continental body was an aspiration towards the achievement of peace and security in Africa. This was underscored by the AU Constitutive Act, which recognised that “the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda”.¹

The most significant departure of the AU from its predecessor was the inclusion of Article 4(h) in the Constitutive Act, which recognises the right of the AU to “intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war, genocide and crimes against humanity”.² Presently, the AU is the only regional organisation that unequivocally recognises the right to intervene in a member state on the stated grounds. Clearly, the inclusion of this principle into the Constitutive Act was reflective of the resolve by member states to never again be paralysed to intervene by such notions of non-interference in the face of gross atrocities, such as those in Rwanda.

To buttress its plan to achieve its vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena\(^3\), the AU established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA really represents a desire for African states to affect a shift from \textit{default} to one of \textit{design} when it comes to managing the conflicts that have spectacularly devastated the continent. The APSA also symbolises a form of ‘walking the talk’ when it comes to finding \textit{African solutions to African problems}, as it provides an opportunity for the continent to break away from the characteristic over-reliance on the broader international community to assuming greater responsibility for preventing and managing its conflicts, and seeking avenues for achievement of durable peace and development.

The APSA brings together a number of key interconnected components that are concerned with political decision-making (the Peace and Security Council), the gathering and analysis of information (the Continental Early Warning System), mediation and advisory capacity (the Panel of the Wise), peace support operations (PSO) capacity (the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee), and a Special Fund. Within this framework lies a set of tools for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict on the African continent. The highest decision-making authority of the APSA is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which has the sole authority for mandating and terminating an AU peace operation.\(^4\) It utilises the early warning arrangement for the facilitation of a timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.\(^5\)

\textbf{Diagram 1: The AU Peace and Security Department}


\(^4\) However, the PSC seeks the approval of the United Nations Security Council for all missions – for reasons of legitimacy and also due to the fact that the Security Council’s approval is a prerequisite for accessing funds from the African Peace Facility.

A Commissioner for Peace and Security, along with his Peace and Security Directorate (PSD), supports the PSC. The PSD implements the decisions of the PSC and manages the AU’s objectives in so far as promoting peace and responding to various crisis situations. The divisions of the PSD are indicated in the illustration in Diagram 1. Each of them assists in terms of preventing, managing and resolving conflict situations.

The African Standby Force

In May 2003, the African Chiefs of Defence Staff adopted the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (hereafter, the framework document). The ASF concept was approved in 2004 and was unprecedented in international peacekeeping. It was intended to provide the AU with a means of responding to conflict in a manner that was timely and efficient and, for the first time, provided Africa with a common position and action plan for the development of its PSO capacity.6 The ASF is an implementation arm of the APSA. It is not meant to operate in isolation, but is firmly situated within continental peace and security dynamics and requires the political framework to provide legitimacy. Its main purpose is to ensure trained formations and troops, including police and civilian personnel, are rapidly available for deployment to AU-mandated peace operations.

The ASF vision, indicated below, is based on the recognition that multinational organisations bear greater credibility and legitimacy for such stated actions. It also recognises the AU’s sovereign rights to decide whether or not to participate in such multinational initiatives:

- a continent united in preventing and acting against conflict
- an AU with the necessary operational structures that enables it, unlike its predecessor, the OAU, to intervene in conflict zones and to project military power where and when necessary
- an AU able to address the comprehensive/multidimensional requirements in such situations, including capabilities in early warning, civilian crisis management (police, rule of law, etc.), peace support operations, post-conflict reconstruction, and peacebuilding.7

As per Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, the ASF is to be composed of “standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components, in their countries of origin and ready for deployment at appropriate notice”.8 The range of functions assigned to the ASF includes:

- observation and monitoring missions
- other types of peace support missions
- intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and 4(j) of the AU Constitutive Act
- preventive deployment to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing

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7 Adapted from Africa Standby Force: Vision 2010, AU PSOD internal discussion document.

8 PSC Protocol, Article 13.
violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement

• peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation
• humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters
• any further functions as may be mandated by the PSC or the Assembly of Heads of State.

The ASF is not intended to be a standing army, but rather is a standby arrangement that is constituted through pledges from AU member states and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). There are five regional standby forces that comprise the ASF: the East African Standby Force (EASF); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force (ESF); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force; the North African Regional Capability (NARC) Standby Force; and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force (SSF).

There are very obvious disparities in terms of the level of development that the respective RECs/RMs have been able to achieve in terms of their PSO capabilities, with some regions still far behind. There are also resource disparities amongst the different regions, both in financial and human resource terms – all owing to inherent peculiarities in the political and economic backgrounds of the different regions. Different regions have also opted to adopt varying forms in terms of their standby forces. Thus, for instance, the SADC region has opted not to establish a permanent brigade headquarter, but instead only to establish one when the brigade is called upon to deploy. The Planning Element (PLANELM) thus remains the only permanent standing structure of SADC. Furthermore, it is the case that some countries have multiple allegiances (i.e. belong to more than one REC/RM), and this has the potential to raise a number of difficulties. There is the need for more detailed guidance and clearer direction from the AU Commission (AUC) to the RECs/RMs to streamline some of these aspects. Without such strategic level guidance, the tendency for confusion as to the division of responsibilities increases.

Cooperation and coordination between the AU Commission and the RECs/RMs is facilitated through a memorandum of understanding (MoU), which was signed between the AU and RECs/RMs in 2008 to facilitate peace and security relations between the respective bodies, and commits them to working together to fully operationalise the ASF. The MoU details the modalities for cooperation including, inter alia, regular meetings and information exchange as well as the provision of liaison officers, which is an important step in terms of maintaining a communication link between the AU and the regions. Despite the existence of the MoU, a lot of work still needs to be accomplished by way of addressing specific issues, such as the legalities around the use/deployment of assets, more precisely.

Paragraph 3.17 of the ASF Policy Framework indicates that “the PSC, as the decision-making institution, should be the sole authority for mandating and terminating AU peace missions and operations…the political command and control of missions mandated by the PSC should be vested in the Chairperson, who should then submit periodic reports to the PSC on the progress of implementation of the relevant mandates of such operations and missions”. This statement clearly underlines the fact that the AU has political control over PSOs. RECs/RMs are, however,
not excluded from undertaking their own PSOs within their respective regions – but these would be classified as Regional Standby Force (RSF) operations. Such operations should also be in line with AU and UN principles, and the AU should be kept informed thereon.

The table below indicates the six possible scenarios under which the ASF could be deployed. The AU shall, where appropriate, cooperate with the UN and its various agencies, as well as with other regional and/or international organisations, member states and civil society, in this regard.

**Table 1: ASF Deployment Scenarios**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Deployment time frame (from issues of mandate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/regional military advice to a political mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Standalone AU/regional observer mission</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (peacebuilding)</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission, including those involving low-level spoilers</td>
<td>90 days, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations, where the international community does not act promptly</td>
<td>14 days, with robust military force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The policy framework called for the establishment of the ASF in primarily two phases. Phase I was to be implemented up until 30 June 2005 (but was delayed up to 2008 due to its late start), and some of the key aspects outlined for the operationalisation of the ASF included the establishment of a strategic-level management capability (PLANELM) at the level of the PSD of the AUC for the management of deployment scenarios 1 and 2, and brigade-size standby forces established at the level of the RECs/RMs. Specifically, this strategic-level management capability entailed the establishment of a full-time, 15-person staff at the AUC, complemented by an initial five-person capability within the PLANELMs at the RECs/RMs. This initial capacity would be responsible for managing the pre-deployment processes of the ASF. Additionally, during this first phase, the foundational policy documents of the ASF would be established, including those on *Doctrine; Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems (C3IS); Standard Operating Procedures; Logistics and Training and Evaluation.*

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In Phase II (from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010), it was envisaged that, by 2010, the AU would have developed its capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, whilst the RECs/RMs would continue to develop their capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for Scenario 4 missions. A significant amount of effort has been spent trying to recruit additional staff for the PLANELMs at all levels; staff training was stepped up to improve on professional competencies; and additional foundation documents were produced to further guide the development of the ASF. Moreover, this second phase was aimed at the overall evaluation and validation of the ASF.

**Challenges and opportunities**

What we see from the implementation of Phases I and II of the ASF is that there has been a lot of good progress made towards the establishment thereof. Specifically, the various policy documents indicated above have been developed (although they will have to be periodically revised in light of new developments and lessons learned), and the AU and the RECs/RMs meet regularly to discuss and coordinate the development of the ASF.

The AU and the RECs/RMs have also undertaken a series of Level I, II and III decision-making exercises, which aim to test the operational readiness of the ASF. These exercises will culminate in the conduct of a continental Level II Decision Making Exercise known as Exercise AMANI AFRICA, which is intended to evaluate the capabilities and procedures for the engagement of the ASF in a multidimensional peace operation. Furthermore, the exercise aims to practice the establishment of a mission headquarters for an ASF deployment, as well as to increase awareness of ASF capabilities, procedures and requirements with senior staff within the AUC and Member States.

The various regional exercises, as well as other lessons identified, have pointed to a number of strengths but also gaps that will need to be addressed in the next phase of implementation. For instance, there has been “too little, too late” incorporation of the civilian and police elements in both the pre-preparation and conduct of the various activities, thus compromising the aspect of multidimensionality. There was also a lack of clarity among the various decision-makers and role players in terms of the procedures that are involved in mandating a mission.

On the positive side, there is an Aide Memoir which outlines the AU decision making procedures, details all staff actions and guidance leading to the establishment of a mission mandate, up to the establishment of a Draft Mission Plan for a new mission. It is hoped that the Aide Memoir, if adopted, will guide the RECs/RMs in the development of their own systems and procedures.

There has also been relatively marginal but sure progress in terms of the development of the police and civilian components of the ASF. With regard to the former, in addition to policy development,

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10 These exercises include Map Exercises (MAPEX), Command Post Exercises (CPX), and Field Training Exercises (FTX).

11 The AMANI AFRICA Cycle is being undertaken in collaboration with the EU, using EURORECAMP as a tool to validate the ASF. EURORECAMP falls within the framework of the European Union action plan to strengthen African capabilities.

12 The exercise was officially launched on 21 November 2008 at the Ministerial Troika in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

management capabilities have been established at both the strategic and operational levels. On the civilian side, there has been a relatively appreciable amount of work done on the policy development side, but there is a critical need to follow this up with implementation. The next chapter of this book will detail the current status of the developments on the civilian dimension of the ASF further.

Several aspects mitigate against the ASF achieving its initial operational capability by 2010, which was the designated time frame. Apparent lack of conceptual buy-in by the relevant stakeholders is one such aspect. Without conceptual and political buy-in, the ability to achieve the ambitious vision of the ASF will be severely weakened. Further, as the ASF is a critical part of the APSA, there also needs to be understanding, support and cooperation thereof by the wider AUC. All sections need to understand the processes for planning, deploying and managing missions, and they also need to understand their intricate inter-departmental relationship and roles that they have in relation to each other in supporting the ASF concept. Also, understanding and cooperation with the RECs/RMs and the AU member states is very important. National-level support is particularly important as, without it, the ASF – and, indeed, the entire APSA – will likely not be able to succeed.

In looking forward, the AU has started to conceptualise and map out a number of critical steps for the next phase of implementation, spanning until 2015. These steps are either aspects outstanding from Roadmap I and II or are steps that have become necessary to incorporate, as a result of lessons learned from recent experience.

Advocacy or awareness-raising of the ASF remains a critical aspect, and is closely linked to the issue of political buy-in. Currently, it is quite evident that there is still a dearth of understanding of the ASF by decision-makers at the AUC, REC/RM and member state levels. Conceptually, the ASF is still misunderstood, and is often interpreted as an exclusively military response to conflict resolution. Little yet is understood about the multidimensional imperative (specifically the role of civilian experts), or about how to manage African PSOs throughout their entire life cycle. A collective dialogue needs to take place on a regular basis with all relevant stakeholders, so as to increase understanding and hopefully, in this way, promote broad-based support and buy-in. The AU PSOD should increase its outreach efforts via, for instance, holding AU and REC/RM seminars and keeping the website regularly updated with current documents and information on activities, and so forth.

What is also clear is that, despite much progress towards establishing strategic level capabilities, the AU PSOD has yet to develop the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations and, for their part, the RECs/RMs have yet to develop full capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for Scenario 4 missions involving AU/regional forces. This deficiency creates a high degree of risk for the ASF concept. Indeed, as the AU ASF Civilian Dimension Policy Framework states, “in this complex environment, the ability to manage, coordinate and integrate multiple components across dimensions and to create linkages with other stakeholders and partners have become a critical success factor in contemporary PSOs.”

Related to this, adequate staffing, in terms of numbers and professional experience, is a critical aspect – the full achievement of which is mitigated by several challenges. Staffing at

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the PLANELMs of the AU and RECs/RMs has to be increased in terms of numbers, and also in terms of quality. There is presently a situation where a few capable individuals are placed under severe strain, due to overwhelming responsibility. It is also the case that, more often than not, staff appointments are made based on lines of national, political or equal geographical representation – versus genuine merit or professional experience in the related fields. There is also still an overwhelming military representation in staffing structures, at both the strategic and operational levels. It is, therefore, necessary to increase the number of civilian and police staff in order to develop a truly multidimensional capacity to manage all levels and types of complexities inherent in a PSO. Without sufficient personnel, there is a danger that planning and support for peace operations will be undertaken in an ad hoc manner and, thus, a key area for capacity-building for the PSOD will pertain to the development of more permanent structures for planning, managing and evaluating peace operations.\footnote{Derblom et al (2008) \textit{UN-EU-AU coordination in peace operations in Africa.} FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, p. 65.}

Another crucial area for attention pertains to logistics. The availability of troops is important, but you also need to have the capacity including equipment, communications, transportation and so forth to sustain those deployed in the theater of operation. Presently, there is a high degree of dependence by the AU on external partners for logistics and general service support management capabilities. Whilst this type of support is not to be completely discouraged, in excess, it can create complications in so far as mission success is concerned. A greater degree of self-sufficiency will help to avert some of the challenges experienced for instance, when the peacekeeping missions in Chad (early 1980s) ended abruptly with the withdrawal of United States and French support from the OAU, the latter of which was no longer able to sustain its deployment.\footnote{Bergman, E.G. (2002) \textit{African regional organisations’ peace operations: developments and challenges, African Security Review,} 11 (4), p. 40.}

The AU is still in the process of conceptualizing a logistics concept, which will see the development of a continental logistics base, supported by the five logistics depots. The location of the continental logistics base has yet to be decided upon. In order to effectively implement and manage the logistics concept, the necessary institutional, financial and administrative capacities will need to be duly developed by the AU and RECs/RMs, so as to support the project realistically. Presently, an MoU between the AU and UN is being considered and concerns the UN potentially availing access to the AU of the logistic depot in Brindisi on a repayment basis. Further, the UN already has a logistics depot in Entebbe thus making co-location of an AU and UN depot an option. Given these options, a revisit of the AU logistics depot concept might be necessary.

In addition to logistics, the ASF will also need to achieve predictable and sustainable access to funding. Without it, it becomes harder to reach the mandated mission strength; operational effectiveness is severely hampered as the focus becomes more myopic and short term in nature versus longer-term strategic planning; and multiple donor and reporting mechanisms place a heavy burden on the administrative, coordination and financial management systems of the AU.\footnote{Secretary-General (2009) \textit{Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorised by the United Nations.} \url{Available from: <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EGUA-7WBRWP-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf> Accessed on 9 June 2010.}}
As emphasised in the Prodi Report, if the AU is reliant on unpredictable funding sources there is a danger that, when required, essential capabilities may not be available. This serves to dissuade potential troop contributors who are unenthusiastic about committing to ill-resourced missions, where there is little or no guarantee that they will be duly reimbursed for their contributions. And herein lies the reality – which is that whilst donor funding can meet the need in the interim, it doesn’t necessarily lead to a longer-term in-house amassment of resources and capacity. Whilst a Special Fund was created to provide funding for peace operations, AU member states do not make the necessary contributions to it, and this serves to jeopardise overall institutional effectiveness and increases reliance on donor funding. Also, whilst a significant amount of funding is contributed by donors (for instance, through the African Peace Facility), there are delays on the part of the AU in programme implementation, and hence fund utilisation due to lack of institutional capacity and other related challenges. There is also a proliferation of support to the ASF project, but a lot of this support has largely been uncoordinated – which further exacerbates the problems for the AU in terms of its ability to manage and absorb the support effectively. All of these are issues that need to be addressed to ensure the future sustainability of the ASF and wider APSA.

**Conclusion**

The establishment of the APSA indeed represents the will of the AU to play a more dynamic and comprehensive role in the maintenance of peace and security on the continent. The various ASF objectives as described above are undoubtedly ambitious, and will require concerted political will by AU member states, as well as a front seat by the AU in terms of setting objectives and identifying benchmarks upon which to gauge success. A viable and operational ASF will need to be underpinned by a good degree of realism. Here, the AU will need to look at the broad array of aspects including, inter alia, strategic level management capacity, logistical and financial considerations, structural (in-house) capacity, the refinement of operational concepts, improved synergy and cooperation with the RECs/RMs and, perhaps most crucially, it will have to sell the concept of the ASF to garner greater political support.

As indicated at the start of this chapter, the ASF does not operate within isolation but is conceptually rooted within the context of the APSA framework. The decision to deploy the ASF is not a technical consideration, but rather a political one. Peacekeeping in general is not a first response to conflict, but rather should be maintained as a last resort measure. Even where missions are deployed as a first line measure to safeguard the lives of innocent and vulnerable civilians in conflict areas, durable solutions lie in the political realm of action.

Achieving full operational readiness of the ASF should not be seen as a race to the 2010 finish line. Efforts will most likely have to extend beyond the 2010 time frame, so that the numerous lessons identified can be better studied and meaningfully incorporated.

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19 The African Peace Facility was established in 2004 after a direct request was made by African leaders for the provision of support to African-led peace operations and related capacity-building initiatives.
2. The Civilian Dimension of African Peace Support Operations

*Cedric de Coning*

This chapter aims to address the role of civilians in peacekeeping in general, and to introduce the role of civilians within the ASF context. In particular, it covers the civilian functions that have been identified, the recruitment and deployment of personnel to fill these civilian positions and the training of these civilian personnel for the ASF.

*Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow with ACCORD/NUPI.*
THE CIVILIAN DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

When most people think of peace operations, they think of soldiers. Whilst it is true that soldiers play an important role in most peace operations, this stereotypical view of peace operations often results in people misunderstanding the central thrust of peace operations. Peace operations is a conflict management tool, and thus primarily entails diplomacy within a political process. Security is important, but only to the extent that it prevents us from making and building peace. It is a necessary part of peace operations, but it is not sufficient to manage a peace process. The most important part of any peace operation is how it manages the political aspects of the peace process. It should, thus, not come as a surprise that most peace operations have a range of staff dedicated to the political aspects of the mission.

One of the most significant, but often overlooked, developments in UN peacekeeping is the transformation from military to civilian-led multidimensional missions. The qualitative role of civilians in peace operations has changed exponentially and, as a result, the number of civilian functions has also increased considerably. Civilians now represent approximately 20% of all UN peacekeepers. As of 28 February 2010, the UN has deployed almost 22 000 civilians, including approximately 8 000 international staff.

The June 2009 Report of the UN Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict provides a useful summary of the core tasks that the UN is called upon to undertake in post-conflict peace processes, namely:

- Support to basic safety and security – including mine action; protection of civilians; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; strengthening the rule of law; and initiation of security sector reform;
- Support to political processes – including electoral processes; promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation; and developing conflict-management capacity at national and subnational levels;
- Support to the provision of basic services – such as water and sanitation; health and primary education; and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees;
- Support to restoring core government functions – in particular, basic public administration and public finance, at national and subnational levels;
- Support to economic revitalisation – including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works), particularly for youth and demobilised former combatants, as well as the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

Whilst it is clear that some of the tasks identified in the Secretary-General’s report need the support of military and police components, what is surprising to many casual observers is that most require civilian capacity. UN peacekeeping operations used to be military operations supported by a few political, administrative and logistical civilian staff. In the UN context, however, this changed around the end of the Cold War, when UN peacekeeping changed from being primarily about monitoring interstate ceasefires to supporting the implementation of peace agreements, following civil war or intrastate conflict.

This fundamental change in UN peacekeeping resulted in these new missions having to go far beyond providing military expertise directed towards the monitoring of soldiers and weapons, to now providing a range of services aimed at supporting the implementation of a comprehensive peace process. The new functions included support to ongoing political negotiations, support to constitution writing processes, and support to national reconciliation initiatives, such as national dialogues and truth and reconciliation commissions.

It also meant human rights monitoring, support to the establishment of human rights commissions and support to ensure that new constitutions and laws are in line with international standards; support to electoral processes – such as voter education, voter registration and training, mentoring and support to local independent electoral commissions; support for the restoration of state authority or the establishment of state services where these did not exist before, especially in the context of the rule of law (RoL); and support to various aspects of security sector reform (SSR) including, particularly, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegrations (DDR). UN peacekeeping operations also typically include a public information unit with print, radio and sometimes television capabilities, as well as specialised units dealing with child protection, gender, HIV/AIDS, protection of civilians (POC) and sexual exploitation and abuse.

Apart from these substantive categories of staff, UN peacekeeping operations are all backstopped by a mission support element, which includes civilian personnel responsible for finance, personnel, logistics, administration, engineering, information technology, communications and a range of related support functions. The UN peacekeeping recruitment system has a database of 24 occupational groups, with over 400 job titles that cover both the substantive and support categories of civilian staff.  

All of these developments resulted in a considerable increase in civilian functions in UN peace operations, and the UN now deploys more civilian peacekeepers than all other multilateral institutions combined. At the beginning of 2010, the European Union (EU) deployed approximately 2,000 civilian personnel, the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) approximately 3,000.  

In comparison to UN peace operations, the number of civilians in African peace operations have, to date, been rather limited. There were approximately 50 civilian staff in the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and approximately the same number of civilians in the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as at May 2010. By comparison, AMIS had a force (military) strength of approximately 7,000, and AMISOM has approximately 5,500. The civilians thus made up approximately one percent of AU operations in Darfur and Somalia. The civilian positions in these AU operations


4 E-mail correspondence with Professor Andrea de Guttry of Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, 19 November 2009.
have been very similar to those one would find in a UN mission. Apart from the head of mission and their staff, there is a focus on political affairs, human rights, public information and mission support.

There are a relatively high percentage of Africans in UN peace operations. According to the 2010 annual review of global peace operations, there were nine African countries among the top 20 contributors to UN missions in 2009, namely: Kenya (2\textsuperscript{nd} – 4.8\%), Ghana (7\textsuperscript{th} – 2.9\%), Sierra Leone (8\textsuperscript{th} – 2.7\%), Ethiopia (10\textsuperscript{th} – 2.3\%), Nigeria (11\textsuperscript{th} – 2.2\%), Uganda (14\textsuperscript{th} – 1.7\%), Cameroon (15\textsuperscript{th} – 1.6\%), Tanzania (17\textsuperscript{th} – 1.5\%) and Côte d’Ivoire (18\textsuperscript{th} – 1.3\%).\(^5\) In addition to the international staff, the UN has employed 15 442 local professional and general service staff in UN missions and, of these, 10 109 were Africans.\(^6\)

Perhaps it is useful to look into more detail in one professional category of staff. The civil affairs function is represented in most UN missions, and is aimed at consolidating peace in partnership with the civil administration and civil society of the host nation. At the beginning of 2010, there were approximately 500 civil affairs officers deployed worldwide in 13 UN peacekeeping operations. Of the approximately 500 staff, 40\% are from Africa, 25\% from the Americas, 10\% from Asia, 22\% from Europe and 3\% from Oceania.\(^7\)

**Recruitment and Deployment**

In contrast to the EU and OSCE that make use of secondments, the UN and AU advertise their vacancies, and any individual from one of the member states can apply. Those countries that rely on secondments typically experience a shortage of civilian experts, especially in certain specialised categories. A system relying on secondments suffers from these shortcomings because national capacities and policies will be reflected and amplified in the capacity potentially available for multinational missions. If there is a shortage of women judges at the national level in a given country, it will be reflected in the personnel it is offering for international deployment.

Whilst the UN generally do not experience a shortage of applicants, they do have problems with processing the large number of applications that they receive.\(^8\) The UN receives more than 150 000 applications per year for its civilian peacekeeping field positions.\(^9\) As a result of the

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5 See 2010 annual review of peace operations (New York, Centre for International Cooperation). According to the 2009 annual review of peace operations, the top 10 civilian contributors in 2008 were: USA (5.6\%), Kenya (4.8\%), Philippines (3.6\%), Canada (3.5\%), India (3.4\%), UK (3\%), Ghana (2.6\%), France (2.5\%), Sierra Leone (2.4\%) and Ethiopia (2.3\%). The next 10 are Nigeria, Serbia, Australia, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Cameroon, Germany, Croatia and Fiji.

6 See 2010 annual review of peace operations (New York, Centre for International Cooperation). The African missions were: MONUC (2 613); UNMIS (2 555); UNAMID (2 481); UNMIL (984); UNOCI (82); MINURCAT (398); BINUB (239) and MINURSO (157).


high number of applicants and the time it takes the UN to fill a vacant position, the UN can, at times, suffer from relatively high vacancy rates in its missions. The average vacancy rate of international civilian staff for UN operations between 2005 and 2008 has been around 22%.

In some missions, the figures are much higher – especially during the start-up phases. The UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) had a 56% vacancy rate in 2008, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had a 40% vacancy rate in 2005, and the UN Mission in Afghanistan had a 42% vacancy rate at the beginning of 2010.

The vacancy rate in UN peace operations is not – with a few exceptions – caused by a shortage of suitable applicants. Instead, the civilian capacity gap in UN operations is related to the time it takes to identify, recruit and deploy appropriate staff to the field. According to the Low-level Panel, the average number of days to process recruitment in 2000–2001 was 275, and the estimate for 2002–2003 was 200. In 2004, this figure was reported as 174 days, but “... from the day that a vacancy announcement began to be prepared to the day when a selection decision is made by the head of department”, rather than to when the recruit enters the system. The approximately 200 days that it takes the UN recruitment system to fill a vacancy indicates that the system is unacceptably slow and bureaucratic, and is clearly not designed for the unique needs of the peace operations context.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) also experiences shortages of candidates for senior management positions (P5 and above) – especially female candidates – because the other UN agencies offer better terms and conditions – including more family duty stations – than DPKO. Currently, approximately 30% of the civilians in UN peace operations are women, but there are still disappointingly few women in leadership and senior positions.

Training

The training of civilians for peace operations has traditionally been neglected. Most peacekeeping training centres have focused on military roles, and most missions have focused internally on training for mission support personnel. However, this situation has changed considerably over the last decade and a half, and there are now a number of centres in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America that specialise in, or provide training for, civilians.

The training centres that specialise in peacekeeping training have an international association – the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). At the annual meeting of the IAPTC, there are also meetings that take place among those that specialise in military, police and civilian peacekeeping training. The civilian training centres thus meet at least once a year


to exchange information, to learn about new initiatives from each other, and to coordinate new initiatives. There are also African and European training groups that meet in their own regions. The European Training Group has cooperatively developed a number of standard pre-deployment courses for EU civilian staff, and has agreed to share these courses among themselves so that every centre does not offer the same courses. The African Peace Support Trainer’s Association (APSTA) has entered into an agreement with the AU Commission, and actively supports the AU and, specifically, the training needs of the ASF. There is thus already a good degree of cooperation and coordination underway among the civilian training community.

Training should occur before recruitment, in preparation for deployment, or as an induction to a mission. Additional in-mission training can be offered to sharpen skills or to address new needs not previously covered. Most of the civilian centres referred to above conduct courses for civilians before recruitment. Some, like the German Peace Operations Centre (ZIF) are also responsible for managing a roster of nationals who can be seconded to EU and other missions and, in these cases, training and rostering are closely interlinked. Several training centres in Africa offer a foundation course for civilian peacekeepers, or a more general foundation course open to all peacekeepers. The UN and AU also conduct a Senior Leadership Course that includes civilians.

The organisation responsible for deployment (e.g. the UN) is typically also responsible for pre-deployment training, and all new UN staff now attend a course at the UN training centre in Brindisi before deployment. In some cases, the OSCE and others have outsourced this training to one of the civilian training centres. Most missions also offer an induction course for all new staff. This course will typically be conducted by the mission’s training cell, but there have been cases where these courses have also been conducted by civilian training centres. AMISOM has, for instance, used the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) to facilitate an induction course for all its headquarter staff, in February 2009. In a few cases, civilian training centres also conduct in-mission courses – i.e. training courses conducted for staff during the operation to hone certain skills, or to learn new skills.

The Ambiguity of the Civilian Concept

Whilst civilians now play an integral role in UN peacekeeping operations, this has not always been the case. The concept ‘civilian’ is a term framed by the military to refer to those that are not ‘military’, and by civilians to distinguish themselves from the military, especially in times of war. The latter distinction may, at times, be broadly associated with that drawn in international humanitarian law (IHL) between combatants and non-combatants but, in fact, IHL is much more nuanced than merely echoing civilian-military distinctions. It provides for military personnel to become non-combatants when they lay down arms – for instance, when they are wounded or prisoners of war. It also provides for civilians to be combatants when they are central to the war effort.

If we use the ‘civilians-as-non-military’ concept, then civilians in a peace operations context can include humanitarian aid workers, the local population, the host government, foreign diplomats, international contractors, etc. However, the civilian peacekeepers we are concerned with in this book are a much more specific category – namely those civilians working for an AU peace support operation or, by comparison, those working for a UN peacekeeping operation.

Another way to understand the term ‘civilian’ can be to say that it relates to those that are responsible for the ‘civil’ dimension of the peace process, as distinct from the military or security
dimension. ‘Civil’ in this context refers to how we use and understand the prefix ‘civil’ in concepts such as civil administration, civil society and civil affairs.

**The ‘Civilian’ Police**

Over time, the identity of the police in UN peacekeeping operations has shifted from being perceived as being closer to the military (uniformed), to being closer to the civilian – for instance, when it was referred to as civilian police (CIVPOL) – but it has now settled into its current status, where it is recognised as being a distinct third component. The UN and AU sometimes still make a distinction between uniformed and non-uniformed personnel, but now generally recognise three distinct components – namely military, police and civilian. To further confuse matters, some uniformed personnel – for instance, civil-defence, fire and rescue personnel and corrections advisors – are regarded as civilians. In the EU context, however, the police are regarded as civilian, and are included in the EU Civilian Crisis Management approach.

Whilst the Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF includes a section on the police component of the ASF, the AU has subsequently clarified that it does not see the police as part of the civilian component. In this book, we will thus follow the UN and AU distinction between police, military and civilian components, and the police is thus not covered as part of the civilian dimension. Police are deployed to UN and AU peace operations in formed units, or as individual police officers, but they remain in national employment and wear national uniform. They are thus temporarily seconded for short-term – typically one-year – deployments to UN or AU peace operations.

**Side Effects and Unintended Consequences**

There are many vexing questions related to the role of civilians in peace operations that fall outside the direct scope of this book, but at least two should be mentioned before we turn our attention to the civilian dimension of the ASF.

The first relates to the type of civilian roles that are appropriate in peace operations, and here the main criticisms relate to peace operations duplicating or displacing roles that should be performed by local authorities and/or other civilian agencies with appropriate mandates, both local and international.\(^\text{16}\)

Closely related is the question of national staff, and here the criticism is that peace operations – and other external actors – absorb the bulk of the existing national capacity, leaving the local authorities and civil society weak and undercapacitated, thus contributing to the very state fragility that international peace operations are trying to address.\(^\text{17}\)

The AU would have to consider both these aspects with great sensitivity to avoid making some of the same mistakes that the UN and others have experienced in this regard, but our present focus does not allow us to expand further on these aspects in this particular volume.

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THE POLICY FRAMEWORK OF THE CIVILIAN DIMENSION OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

From its earliest conceptualisation, the ASF was meant to have a multidimensional capacity with civilian, police and military components. For instance, Article 13 of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol provides for an ASF that shall be composed of multidisciplinary civilian and military components. The Protocol goes on to state that the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of “mission administration” and “civilian experts” to handle human rights, humanitarian, governance, reconstruction and DDR functions in future missions.

The framework document that has served to inform the establishment of the ASF further elaborates on the provisions of the PSC Protocol, and serves as the common African position on the establishment of the ASF. The ASF Policy Framework document states, in paragraph 2.1, that the generic components of a valid multidimensional peace support operations capability comprise the following: a legitimate political capacity to mandate a mission under the UN Charter; a multidimensional strategic-level management capability; a mission headquarters-level multidimensional management capability; and mission components for multidimensional peace operations. The ASF Policy Framework also provides for a “roster of civilian experts” to fulfil human rights, humanitarian, governance, demobilisation, disarmament, repatriation and reconstruction tasks.

According to initial planning, the ASF would be established in two phases. The first phase (up to 30 June 2005) had, as the AU’s objective, to establish a Planning Element (PLANELM) for the management of military advisory and observation missions, while the five regions would establish regional standby forces up to brigade size to achieve capabilities for more complex missions. For the second phase (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010), it was originally envisaged that, by 2010, the AU would have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the five regions will continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for such missions, involving AU/regional peacekeeping forces.

However, it was decided that the civilian dimension and roster of experts was not a phase 1 priority “because UN humanitarian, development and human rights elements, which do not require a UN Security Council mandate, could deploy in tandem with an ASF mission”. In fact, the draft AU Vision 2010 document states that “… although police and other civilian capabilities will form important components of the ASF, owing to the absence of a detailed related police/civilian policy, the focus at this stage had to be mainly on the military aspects…”

18 Article 13(1) of the PSC Protocol reads as follows: “In order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force shall be established. Such Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.”

19 Policy framework for the establishment of the ASF, Exp/ASF-MSC/2 (1), which was adopted by the Third Session of African Chiefs of Defence Staff on 15–16 May 2003 and noted by the Heads of State and Government at the Maputo Summit in July 2003.

20 AU Commission (PSO Division), draft discussion document, Addis Ababa, October 2005.
The Development of a Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension

In 2006, the AU PSOD decided that the development of the civilian dimension of the ASF is long overdue, and it embarked on a process that would start with the development of a policy framework for the civilian dimension of the ASF. The AU PSOD convened a Technical Experts Workshop at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, from 29 August to 1 September 2006. This workshop considered and refined the first draft of the ‘Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force’, and this policy framework was subsequently noted at the meeting of the Ministers of Defence and Security in March 2008. The Policy Framework is included in this edited volume in chapter 3.

The policy framework was premised on an important assumption, namely that AU PSOs are likely to operate in close cooperation with the UN and that, in some instances, the UN may take over responsibility for the PSOs of the AU. It also recognised that most African civilian, police and military peacekeepers are trained to deploy on both AU and UN missions. The policy framework thus aimed to achieve approximate coherence between AU and UN integrated management structures, as well as its police and civilian components, so that the ease with which missions and their personnel can transition between the AU and the UN would be enhanced.

The keyword here was ‘approximate coherence’ because, whilst the AU management structure and civilian components appear to be more similar to UN than, for instance, EU or OSCE mission structures, they are not an exact copy of the UN structure. This came about because there is a range of factors that result in AU missions having to operate in circumstances that are different to UN missions.

The most important difference is financial. Whilst UN peacekeeping operations are funded through the assessed contribution system, AU peace operations have to rely on voluntary contributions. One critical assumption that informed the policy framework was thus that the AU is likely to have to rely on much smaller – and therefore less specialised – civilian components than generally available to the UN. For instance, where UNMIS may have at its disposal separate human rights, child protection, protection of civilians and gender units, AMIS had to concentrate all those functions into one human rights unit.

The policy framework laid the foundation for a multidimensional management structure for AU PSOs. This multidimensional approach has been informed by the UN’s experience with multidimensional peacekeeping since the mid-1990s, as well as the more recent development of the UN’s integrated approach. In order to understand the AU’s approach to integration, it is necessary to first take a more thorough look at the UN’s Integrated Approach.

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The UN’s Integrated Approach

The changing nature of UN peacekeeping operations meant that those responsible for UN peacekeeping have to work more closely than before with those responsible for humanitarian assistance and development – including the relevant UN agencies – because all those involved came to realise that peace, security and development are closely interlinked. Combining such a diverse range of functions under one institutional framework has proven to be a daunting task for the UN. In order to manage these interdependencies in the field, the UN has developed the Integrated Approach model that is essentially aimed at enhancing coherence between the UN Country Team, which is humanitarian and developmental in focus, and the UN peacekeeping operation, which is focused on peace and security.23

Former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, released a Note on integrated missions that describes the concept as follows: “An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.”24 The UN missions in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Haiti (MINUSTA), Liberia (UNMIL) and Sudan (UNMIS), all have integrated mission management structures.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has reaffirmed the Integrated Approach as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, or a political or peacebuilding office – regardless of whether these missions are structurally integrated or not.25 The 2008 Secretary-General’s decision on the Integrated Approach states that an Integrated Approach requires “a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives, closely aligned or integrated planning, a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace, and agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation”.26

The Integrated Approach has been officially accepted as the UN’s mission structure of choice, and it will be the dominant management structure for UN complex peace operations27 in the near- to mid-term. It is likely that the EU, AU and others will try to apply some of its core features to their own future missions.


27 UN complex peace operations are Multidimensional in nature and supplements traditional peacekeeping missions with large civilian components to monitor elections, train or monitor police, monitor human rights and provide support to transitional administration within a post-conflict context.
The AU’s Integrated Approach

The AU has started to adopt some of the integrated missions’ terminology, both in its missions and in the ASF Policy Framework. It is important, however, to distinguish between the scope for integration that exists within the UN system and the AU. Whilst it is possible, under certain circumstances, to integrate the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) function in UN peace operations to establish an UN ‘Integrated Mission’, it is inconceivable that the UN RC/HC function can be integrated with AU, EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or any other non-UN peace operation, because the humanitarian and development coordination mandate has been entrusted to the UN system.\(^{28}\)

The opposite, however, is possible – and has been done in the case of Kosovo and Darfur. In Kosovo, the EU was responsible for a specific pillar, under the overall direction of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In Darfur, the UN and AU jointly operate a hybrid mission, with the AU nominally responsible for the military component of the peacekeeping force.

This does not imply that it is impossible for the UN development and humanitarian coordination system to work with AU, EU or NATO operations – such cooperation has been taking place with AU (Darfur), EU (Chad and Central African Republic) and NATO (Afghanistan) missions. However, the point is that it is inconceivable that they can be ‘integrated’ with the same technical meaning that this concept implies in the UN system context.

Instead, integration in the AU context is used in a generic sense to refer to multidimensional coordination and cooperation. For instance, the AU’s Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) refers to a mechanism where the military, police and civilian planning functions are combined in one process, as opposed to the UN’s Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF), which refers to the coming together of planners from the UN DPKO and planners from the UN Development Group (UNDG), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other UN agencies – i.e. a system-wide initiative. Integration in the AU and other non-UN contexts should thus be understood as combining certain functions – typically the military, police and civilian (which includes substantive and mission support functions) – in multidimensional or complex operations.

The Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF provides for a civilian head of mission, who is called the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC). The SRCC can be supported by one or more deputies, and/or a Chief of Staff. The SRCC leads a senior leadership team consisting of the SRCC, the deputy SRCCs, the Force Commander, the Police Commissioner and senior civilian heads of departments and the Head of Mission Support.

The policy framework also provides for an Office of the SRCC and supporting processes that allow for the mission-coordination mechanisms necessary to ensure coherence in a PSO of this nature, including a Mission Operations Centre (MOC), a Mission Analysis Cell (MAC) and a Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC). In addition, the policy framework allows for the multidimensional management structures at mission headquarters to be mirrored, for coordination purposes, at sector level.

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**Substantive and Support Components**

The substantive civilian components provided for in the policy framework include political affairs, public information, planning and coordination, human rights, humanitarian liaison, legal advice, conduct and discipline, child protection and gender. In addition – and depending on the mandate – they may include RoL, electoral affairs, DDR, civil affairs and SSR functions. The exact number of personnel, their seniority and the structure of the various substantive civilian components that will be needed in any given PSO will be informed by the mandate and scope of the mission, but a useful generic table of civilian functions has been provided in the policy framework and is available in Chapter 3 on page 42.

In addition, all AU PSOs shall require a mission support component that provides human resources management, financial management, logistics, procurement, engineering, geographical information services, information, technology and communications, transport, contingency owned equipment, security and integrated training services to the military, police and civilian components of the mission.

The enabling systems necessary to support the civilian dimension of the ASF include the necessary policy and guidance documents – together with the appropriate human resources policies necessary to ensure the timely recruitment of civilian experts for AU PSOs. In particular, the policy framework highlights the importance of ensuring that the recruitment and management processes of the ASF strive to attain gender mainstreaming and gender sensitivity, to facilitate the realisation of the AU principle of gender equality and to enhance the operational impact of African PSOs.

The policy framework also recommends that the AU should develop a comprehensive policy on conduct and discipline, including a clear definition and policy on SEA. Such policies should include the development and dissemination of an AU Code of Conduct – among others, through training – as well as developing mechanisms for investigation and disciplinary procedures.

The AU PSOD has acted on the recommendations in the policy framework and has, in particular, focused on the need to identify how the relevant civilian expertise can be identified, rostered, trained and deployed. Two major policy development workshops took place in 2008 and 2009. The Report of the ASF Civilian Dimension Staffing, Training and Rostering Workshop, which took place in Kampala in 2008 and was noted and acted upon at the 6th Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff and Heads of Safety and Security, and the Report of the ASF Civilian Component Technical Rostering Workshop, which was held in Dar es Salaam in 2009. Both are included in this volume as Chapters 4 and 5.

These workshops further refined what civilian functions are needed in AU PSOs, and how they should be identified, trained and rostered in the ASF. On the basis of the proposed mission templates (see page 67) the Kampala workshop recommended that each regional standby arrangement needs to develop the capacity to deploy 60 civilian peacekeepers within 90 days – and perhaps more later, as the mission develops (A list of these 60 positions are available on page 69). On the basis of these 60 posts that need to be filled at regional level, detailed proposals have been made for the approximately 300 persons that need to be on each regional roster hub to ensure that the regions are in a position to deploy the approximately 60 civilian posts, if and when necessary.

30 Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) refers to equipment owned and brought by troop and police contributing countries to peacekeeping operations to carry out their mandated tasks.
The workshops also made recommendations as to the structure and staffing of the civilian PLANELMs of the regional standby arrangements, the training and preparation of the civilian experts, and with regard to the development of an integrated civilian standby roster that links the AU with the regional standby arrangements.\textsuperscript{31}

**CONCLUSION**

As this volume illustrates, initial progress has been made to date with the development of the civilian dimension of the ASF. A policy framework has been developed, and various recommendations highlighted in the policy framework have subsequently been implemented. At this point, we now know exactly who the civilians are that should be recruited into the regional arrangements of the ASF. We know how many civilian experts we need, and what functions they need to perform.

The AU PSOD has also developed an overview of the training that civilian peacekeepers need to undergo, before being part of the ASF and during AU peace operations, and it has developed detailed guidance for the development of an ASF Civilian Standby Roster. Various peacekeeping training centres and institutes have been training civilian experts, and many of these have already been deployed to the AU missions in Darfur and Somalia.

Most of the regions of the ASF have, over the last 24 months, undertaken a series of map exercises (MAPEX), command-post exercises (CPX) and field training exercises (FTX). One of the preliminary observations from these exercises is that, compared to the police and military components, the civilian dimension of the ASF is lagging behind. The most serious challenge to the civilian dimension of the ASF is still the fact that it is included in most regional structures, planning and exercises as an afterthought, rather than as an integrated part of the ASF.

There seem to be two reasons why the civilian dimension remains marginalised. The first is the general lack of understanding that exists about what exactly the civilian dimension entails among the political leadership of the AU member states, within civilian ministries, within the defence and police establishments, and within the ASF PLANELMs. The second is that none of the regions – with the exception of the Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) – had a civilian PLANELM, or civilian staff dedicated to planning for the civilian dimension of the ASF, at the time when these exercises were planned and executed. The combination of a lack of general understanding and the lack of civilian staff, have undermined the operationalisation of the civilian dimension of the ASF thus far. Since then both the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has appointed civilian staff in their respective PLANELMs.

This volume has been published, in part, with the hope that it will help to address the lack of knowledge about the civilian dimension. It will have little purchase, however, if the remaining regions do not hire civilian staff in their regional PLANELMs. The ASF in general, and each region in particular, thus need to invest in the civilian capacity of its PLANELM staff, so that a foundation is in place upon which the further building blocks of the civilian dimension of the ASF can be laid. The most important next steps each region should be focused on is the development of their regional civilian standby rosters, as well as the training support that is linked to the population of these rosters.

This Policy Framework is the highest level policy guidance developed for the civilian dimension of the ASF. It places the civilian dimension policy in the context of other high-level AU policy guidance, and it contains sections on the multidimensional management structure and decision-making process, the main civilian roles and responsibilities, the mission support functions as well as the main police roles and responsibilities that need to be in place to support the civilian and police dimensions of AU peace operations. It was developed at the Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the ASF that took place from 29 August – 1 September 2006 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana. It was subsequently considered and noted at the meeting of the African Ministers of Defence and Security of March 2008.
A. INTRODUCTION

Background

1. Most contemporary Peace Support Operations (PSOs) are mandated to assist countries with the implementation of a ceasefire and/or comprehensive peace agreement aimed at managing a transition from a state of conflict to a future state of sustainable peace. As such, they have evolved far beyond the traditional peacekeeping concept of primarily military cease-fire monitoring operations. These new peace operations have complex mandates that cover the political, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions.

2. In order to manage these new multidimensional operations the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) have developed an integrated mission management structure that typically consists of a civilian Head of Mission, which in the AU context is the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC). S/he can be supported, depending on the mandate and scope of the mission, by one or more (civilian) Deputy SRCCs, a (military) Force Commander, a (civilian police) Commissioner of Police, various heads of substantive civilian components, and a (civilian) Head of Mission Support.

3. Such operations are also supported by a number of substantive civilian components that consist of functional specialists selected to address one or more of the elements of the mission’s mandate. These substantive civilian components include, amongst others, Political Affairs, Public Information, Planning & Coordination, Human Rights, Humanitarian Liaison, Legal Advice, Rule of Law, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Electoral Affairs, Child Protection and Gender.

4. Another element is the addition of a police component that has responsibilities, depending on the mandate, that can range from monitoring, mentoring, training and advising the police force of the country where the mission is deployed, to taking on some or all of the police responsibilities of the country in question.

Aim and Scope

5. This Policy Framework addresses the management structures and processes, and the police and civilian functions, of multidimensional PSOs carried out under the auspices of the AU, using the resources of the ASF system. It also describes the required enabling systems and recommends various steps that need to be taken to harmonize this Policy Framework with other areas of the ASF.

6. The Policy Framework is premised on the understanding that AU PSOs are likely to operate in close cooperation with the UN and that in some instances the UN may take over responsibility for the PSO of the AU. It also recognises that most African civilian, police and military peacekeepers are trained to deploy on both AU and UN PSOs. The Policy Framework thus aims to achieve approximate coherence between AU and UN

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1 Also known in some United Nations and African Union missions as ‘Chief Administrative Officer (CAO)’ or ‘Director of Administration (DOA)’.
integrated management structures, as well as its police and civilian components, so that the ease with which missions and its personnel can transition between the AU and the UN is enhanced.

**AU Mandate for a Multidimensional ASF System**

7. According to Article 13 of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol, the ASF shall be composed of multi-disciplinary civilian and military components held on standby in their countries of origin, and be ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. And the Protocol states that the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of “mission administration” and “civilian experts” to handle human rights, humanitarian, governance, reconstruction and DDR functions in future missions.

8. The framework document on the establishment of the ASF elaborates on the provisions of the PSC Protocol and serves as the common African position on the establishment of the ASF.

9. The PSC Protocol, Art. 13 (3), provides for several mission scenarios which include, amongst others, “intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security …” and “peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization”. These ASF missions imply a multiplicity of activities with profoundly political consequences that cover the full gamut of conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction and development.

10. The ASF policy framework document states in Paragraph 2.1 that the generic components of a valid multidimensional PSOs capability comprise the following: A legitimate political capacity to mandate a mission under the UN Charter; a multidimensional strategic level management capability; a mission HQ level multidimensional management capability; and mission components for multidimensional peace operations.

11. Effective command and control of the ASF will therefore require the installation of an appropriate integrated and interoperable command, control, communication and information system (C^3IS) infrastructure, linking deployed units with mission headquarters, as well as the AU Headquarters (HQ) and, where appropriate, with Regional Mechanisms.

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2 Article 13 (1.) of the PSC Protocol reads as follows: “In order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an ASF shall be established. Such Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.”

3 Policy Framework for the establishment of the ASF, Exp/ASF-MSC/2 (1), which was adopted by the Third Session of African Chiefs of Defence Staff on 15–16 May 2003 and noted by the Heads of State and Government at the Maputo Summit in July 2003.
12. As stipulated in the ASF Policy Framework, the standby brigades in each of the five regions will be composed of: a brigade headquarters and support unit; four infantry battalions; plus engineer; reconnaissance; helicopter; military police; logistic; and medical elements – as well as “a civilian support group consisting of logistical, administrative and budget components”.

13. The ASF Policy Framework also provides for a “roster of civilian experts” to fulfill human rights, humanitarian, governance, demobilisation, disarmament, repatriation and reconstruction tasks.

14. According to initial planning, the ASF would be established in two phases:

a. Phase 1 (up to 30 June 2005): The AU’s objective would be to establish a PLANELM for the management of military advisory and observation missions, while the five regions would establish regional standby forces up to brigade size to achieve capabilities for more complex missions.

b. Phase 2 (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010): It is envisaged that by 2010 the AU will have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the five regions will continue to develop the capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for such missions, involving AU/regional peacekeeping forces.

15. However, it was decided that the civilian dimension and roster of experts was not a Phase 1 priority “because UN humanitarian, development and human rights elements, which do not require a UN Security Council mandate, could deploy in tandem with an ASF mission.” In fact, the AU Vision 2010 document states that “… although police and other civilian capabilities will form important components of the ASF, owing to the absence of a detailed related police/civilian policy, the focus at this stage had to be mainly on the military aspects. …”4 This Policy Framework is intended to address this lack of detailed policy guidance on the civilian and police components of the ASF.

B. MULTIDIMENSIONAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

Introduction

16. The multidimensional nature of contemporary PSOs have created the need for integrated management and coordination structures at both the AU headquarter (strategic level) and mission (operational) levels. Integrated PSO management structures have to, on the one hand, coordinate, synchronize and ensure a coherent implementation of the mission mandate across the various multidimensional mission components and functions of the mission, and on the other hand, create synergy between the mission and other internal and external stakeholders and partners in the peace process. In this complex

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environment, the ability to manage, coordinate and integrate multiple components across dimensions, and to create linkages with other stakeholders and partners have become a critical success factor in contemporary PSOs.

17. The AU has recognised the need to ensure coherence between AU and UN PSO structures. The Policy Framework for the establishment of the ASF, states that: “Given the goal contained in the Protocol establishing the PSC to involve the UN in the conduct of missions in Africa, any mission HQ level structure should be able to be handed over to, or incorporated into, a UN PSO with relative ease. … For this reason the Meeting has based its advice on structures used in UN Missions. This approach is consistent with the endorsed recommendations of the Second ACDS Meeting.”

18. This approach has been further reinforced by the emerging policy of transferring Regional Mechanisms and AU PSOs to the UN once a given situation has been sufficiently stabilised.

**Strategic-Level Management Structure and Processes**

19. In accordance with Article 6 (Functions) and 7 (Powers) of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol, the PSC, has the sole authority for mandating and terminating AU PSO.

20. In accordance with Article 10 (The Role of the Chairperson of the Commission), the Chairperson is responsible for the overall management of AU PSO. The Chairperson shall submit periodic reports to the PSC on the implementation of the relevant mandates of such missions.

21. The Chairperson of the AU Commission appoints a Head of Mission, typically called the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC), one or more Deputy SRCCs, a Force Commander, a Commissioner of Police, and those heads of substantive civilian components that are appointed above a certain level of seniority. The composition of the senior management team will be informed by the mandate.

22. The Chairperson of the AU Commission will task the Commissioner for Peace and Security with the day-to-day management of AU PSOs. The Commissioner, through the Director of Peace and Security, will task the Head of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) with the functional responsibility to plan, manage and monitor AU PSOs.

23. The Head of the PSOD will make use of the AU Planning Element (PLANELM) to plan any new PSO. The AU PLANELM shall have the capacity to plan for all potential missions, as well as all the multidimensional aspects of such potential missions.

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6 For comparative purposes, the Chairperson of the Commission may be considered as the African equivalent of the UN Secretary-General, and the Commissioner for Peace and Security as roughly equivalent to the UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping.

7 The PSC Protocol, in Art. 13 (6),(7), provides for the appointment of a Special Representative and a Force Commander. This Policy Framework expands on this provision by adding the appointments of the other members of the senior management team of a typical multidimensional AU PSO.
The PLANELM shall develop appropriate mechanisms to ensure early coordination with all relevant stakeholders. This implies that the AU PLANELM shall have an appropriate management structure and supporting staff, including military, police and civilian experts, to ensure that it is capable of performing its mandate. The PLANELM should, as part of the planning process, constitute an integrated assessment team that can undertake an on-site assessment of the prevailing conditions likely to be met by the PSO.

24. The PLANELM is responsible for developing an integrated mission plan, in consultation with all stakeholders, i.e. other departments within the AU Commission, Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs), Regional Mechanisms, relevant members of the UN family and other international and regional organisations, bilateral partners, the parties to the conflict, where appropriate, and the Government and civil society of the country that will host the PSO. To facilitate this process the PLANELM shall establish, at the earliest opportunity, for each new mission envisaged, an Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) consisting of representatives of all AU units that may be called upon to play a role in the envisaged or mandated PSO, T/PCCs, and Regional Mechanisms. In addition, the PLANELM should establish a Planning Consultation Forum (PCF), which can serve as a vehicle for consultation and coordination with external (non-AU) stakeholders and partners.

25. Once the PSC has authorised a specific PSO the planning responsibility will transfer from the generic planning unit to a Mission Task Force (MTF)\(^8\) established for each new mission within the PLANELM. The establishment of an MTF should be one of the items addressed in the mandate of the PSO and it should be funded, in part, out of the mission budget.

26. Once a MTF is established, all mission planning, monitoring and support functions, including responsibility for the IMPT and PCF shall transition to the MTF. The AU PSOs Integrated Mission Planning and Management directive shall address and clarify the planning and management roles delegated to the Head of Mission, as well as the process for coordination and reporting between headquarters and the field.

27. The composition of the MTF shall flow from the mandate and should mirror, to the degree necessary for its purposes, the Mission-level Management structure of the PSO.

Recommendation

28. The African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) shall develop a comprehensive AU Peace Support Operations (PSO) Integrated Mission Planning and Management directive that shall clarify the role and responsibilities of the various office bearers in the AU Commission, as well as the mission planning and management processes that will be followed with the establishment and support of each new PSO.

29. The AU PSOD shall develop, as part of the AU PSO Integrated Mission Planning and Management directive, comprehensive guidelines on the role and function,

\(^8\) The Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) can serve as an one example of such a MTF. The UN DPKO’s Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) concept should also be studied in this context.
as well as participation in, the Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) and Planning Consultation Forum (PCF).

**Mission-Level Management Structures and Processes**

30. The mission-level or operational management structure will be informed by the mandate of the mission, but will typically consist of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC), one or more Deputy SRCC, a Force Commander, a Commissioner of Police, various heads of substantive civilian components, and a Head of Mission Support.

31. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) has the overall responsibility for the implementation of the mandate of the mission. This implies responsibility for the AU’s role in the peace process, as well as responsibility for the overall management and integration of the PSO. The SRCC reports to the Chairperson of the AU Commission, through the appropriate channels.

32. One or more Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (DSRCC) is responsible for coordination clusters of substantive civilian components as per the mission’s mandate. In some cases the SRCC may task one DSRCC with the responsibility to facilitate mission integration and coordination, and to act as the primary point of contact for humanitarian, development and other external partners. The principle DSRCC stands in for the SRCC whenever the latter is out of the mission’s area of responsibility. The DSRCCs report to the SRCC.

33. The Force Commander (FC) is responsible for achieving the military objectives of the mission’s mandate and commands the military personnel in the mission. The FC reports to the SRCC.

34. The Commissioner of Police (COMPOL) is responsible for achieving the police objectives of the mission’s mandate, and commands the police personnel in the mission. The COMPOL reports to the SRCC.

35. Each mission may have a number of substantive civilian components, each with their own head, depending on the mandate, and as discussed further in Section C - Civilian Components. Each head of a substantive civilian component will report to a DSRCC, or directly to the SRCC, depending on the specific organisational structure of the mission.

36. The Head of Mission Support (HoMS) is responsible for human resources, financial management, logistics, procurement, information technology, communications and administration. The HoMS reports to the SRCC.

**The Office of the SRCC**

37. The size and composition of the Office of the SRCC will be determined by the mandate and size of the mission, but is typically headed by a Director of the Office and various personal support staff of the SRCC.

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9 On the basis of the UN example, such clusters could be Rule of Law; Governance; Operations, etc.
38. The Office of SRCC has the overall responsibility for the multidimensional coherence and coordination of the mission. It shall thus have the capacity to coordinate all elements of the mission’s mandate and is supported by a senior mission management team; typically comprising the DSRCC(s), Director of the Office of the SRCC, Force Commander, Commissioner of Police, Head of Political Affairs, Spokesman and the other Heads of Civilian Components, as well as the Head of Mission Support, and others as directed by the SRCC. In turn the mission senior management is supported by a Mission Operations Centre (MOC), a Mission Analysis Cell (MAC) and a Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC). These supporting elements are coordinated by the Director of the Office of the SRCC, or a DSRCC, but are manned by staff seconded from other mission components.

39. The Mission Operations Centre (MOC) is a 24-hour monitoring centre where duty officers from the military, police, substantive civilian and mission support components monitor and coordinate mission operations. The MOC serves as a crisis management centre, dealing with incidents as they occur, and serves as the communications hub between all military, police and civilian headquarters and AU headquarters. The MOC is responsible for producing a Daily Situation Report (D-Sitrep) for the mission leadership and AU headquarters.

40. The Mission Analysis Cell (MAC) is a mission-wide information analysis and management function that monitors the peace process by collating and analyzing all the information gathered by the military, police and civilian components of the mission. The MAC consists of officers seconded from the military, police, and substantive civilian components and its reports reflect the political, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions of the peace process. The MAC is responsible for producing forward looking analytical reports on specific issues of concern.

41. The Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC) is responsible for conducting and facilitating mission-wide planning, including multi-year plans, annual plans, phased transition plans, planning for special events and eventually the planning for the drawing down of the mission. The MPEC is also responsible for analyzing and evaluating mission progress and will provide periodic reports to the mission leadership on progress achieved against plans to ensure that mission plans are adjusted to reflect changing conditions, capitalise on gains or counter unintended consequences. The MPEC is also responsible for identifying best practices and incorporating them into future plans and operations. The MPEC is also responsible for facilitating coordination between the mission, internal and external stakeholders and partners through hosting regular coordination meetings and by participating in those meetings hosted by other agencies. The MPEC consists of officers seconded from the military, police, substantive civilian and mission support components.

**Sector Offices**

42. When the size of a mission’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) is so large that it cannot be managed efficiently with one headquarters the mission will divide the AOR into multiple
Sectors and create an integrated Sector Headquarter for each. The Sector HQ will be headed by a civilian Head of Sector (HoS) who reports directly to the SRCC.

43. Each mission component that has an operational reason to be present in the Sector will be represented at the Sector HQ and there will be an integrated sector management structure that mirrors the mission headquarter structure, with a military Sector Commander, a Police Sector Commander, various sector heads of substantive civilian components, as informed by the mandate and the scope of the mission, and a Sector Head of Mission Support (S/HoMS).

44. The HoS facilitates coordination among the sector level components. The Heads of components report to their respective chains of command for operational purposes, with due consideration to sector-level coordination.

C. CIVILIAN COMPONENTS

Introduction

45. The ASF Policy Framework, para 3.14, envisages a civilian administration component and a range of substantive civilian components, as well as a standby roster that will aid the recruitment and deployment of civilian experts. The operative paragraph in the Policy Framework reads as follows: “...the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of mission administration, plus a roster of civilian experts to fill the human rights, humanitarian, governance, DDR and reconstruction component...”

46. This Policy Framework builds on the recommendations made in the ASF Policy Framework and describes the functions that will be performed by civilian components in most AU PSOs. Some civilian components may be augmented by staff seconded from the military and police components.

47. Multidimensional AU PSOs shall, as a minimum, include the following substantive civilian functions: Political Affairs; Public Information; Planning & Coordination; Human Rights; Humanitarian Liaison; Legal Advice; Conduct and Discipline; Child Protection and Gender. In addition, and depending on the mandate, they may include Rule of Law (RoL); Electoral Affairs; Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); Civil Affairs and Security Sector Reform (SSR) functions.

48. The exact number of personnel, their seniority, and the structure of the various substantive civilian components that will be needed in any given PSO will be informed by the mandate and scope of the mission.

49. All AU PSOs shall require a mission support component that provides human resources management, financial management, logistics, procurement, engineering, geographical information services, information, technology and communications, transport, contingency owned equipment, security and integrated training services to the military, police and civilian components of the mission.

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10 In this Policy Framework, the term ‘Mission Support’ is used to refer to the administrative and logistics support function referred to as ‘civilian administration’ in the original ASF Policy Framework.
## Substantive Civilian Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</table>
| Political Affairs      | • Monitor and analyze the political aspects of the peace process and provide the mission leadership and headquarters with advice and reports on short, medium and long term developments and prospects  
                          • Undertake conflict prevention and peacemaking initiatives and partake fully in the implementation of any ceasefire and peace agreements as may be required  
                          • Draft the Reports of the SRCC to the Chairperson of the AU Commission  
                          • Facilitate the work of the Mission Analysis Cell (MAC)                                                                                                                                            |
| Legal Advice           | • Monitor mission planning and operations and provide legal advice to the mission on the legal implications of any intended actions and their consequences                                                                 |
| Planning & Coordination| • Facilitate the mission planning process (multi-year, annual, phase transitions, special events, drawing down, etc.)  
                          • Analyze and evaluate mission progress and provide periodic reports to mission leadership on progress against plans, problem areas and unintended consequences  
                          • Facilitate coordination between mission, internal and external stakeholders and partners  
                          • Facilitate mission coordination processes and mechanisms, including the Mission Operations Centre (MOC) and the Mission Planning and Evaluation and Cell (MPEC) |
| Public Information     | • Act as Spokesperson for the SRCC and mission  
                          • Develop and implement an effective public information campaign to keep the general public, mission members, stakeholders and partners informed of developments in support of the peace process and role and activities of the mission  
                          • Develop a media strategy, proactively gather and generate mission information and conduct regular press briefings  
                          • Develop regular public information guidelines that will assist mission staff with sharing a coherent mission view with all stakeholders and the media                                                                 |
| Humanitarian Liaison   | • Facilitate the establishment of a positive relationship between the humanitarian community and the various mission components, based on recognition and respect for humanitarian principles, including independence  
                          • Explore ways in which the mission can support the humanitarian community and coordinate mission support to the humanitarian community, in coordination with the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) section of the military component, where relevant |
| Human Rights | • Facilitate the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and other vulnerable persons, through: human rights monitoring and reporting, advice and education to the parties to the conflict, monitor and advise new institutions on human rights issues  
• Coordination human rights issues with stakeholders and partners |
| --- | --- |
| Gender | • Provide policy and technical advice to the senior mission leadership, the host government and partners on strategies for advancing gender equality and women’s rights in accordance with the African Union instruments on gender equality and women’s rights and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security;  
• Provide expert technical advice to inform policy and operational activities of Mission components and ensure the delivery of appropriate training for all levels of personnel;  
• Strengthen and expand partnerships including with the national machinery for the advancement of women’s rights and gender equality;  
• Document and disseminate good practices and lessons learned to inform policy decisions. |
| Child Protection | • Facilitate and promote child protection in the peace process through advice, education and coordinating the child protection efforts among stakeholders internally and networking with external stakeholders and partners. |
| Conduct and Discipline | • Disseminate, promote and familiarise AU staff with the AU PSO Code of Conduct;  
• Monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct and the AU PSO Conduct and Discipline policies, and investigate all complaints according to the AU PSO Conduct and Discipline policies;  
• Undertake proactive training and monitoring to prevent cases of sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA) |
| Rule of Law (RoL) | Judicial  
• Monitor the judicial process and provide advice and assistance to promote the independence of the judiciary, highlight any improper pressure on judges, prosecutors and courts  
• Provide expertise to improve the quality of justice and access to justice through reform of criminal law, policy and practice  
• Collect, analyze and disseminate criminal justice data  
• Assist the government to re-establish the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout the territory  
• Coordinate closely with the police and other state security services to ensure a coherent and system-wide rule of law approach  
• Corrections  
• Monitor and advise on reforming the correction services  
• Police  
• Refer to section D - Police Component |
### Electoral Affairs
- Provide technical and logistical advice and support to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
- Facilitate and participate in the monitoring of elections

### Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
- Assist the parties to the conflict, in consultation with all stakeholders and partners, with the design and implementation of the national DDR programme

### Civil Affairs
- Facilitate liaison between the mission and national, provincial and local authorities and civil society to assist with the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of social services and the extension of state authority
- Coordinate with other stakeholders and partners active in this area
- Facilitate inter-communal dialogue and consultations as a confidence building measure

### Security Sector Reform (SSR)
- Advise SRCC, Force Commander, Commissioner of Police and other relevant components on issues or initiatives associated with Security Sector Reform.

### Mission Support Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Resources</strong></td>
<td>• Human resources services, including recruitment and contract management of local and international personnel, managing staff conduct and behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provision of staff welfare and counselling services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide insurance and medical services including emergency medical evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial</strong></td>
<td>• Financial management services, including budgeting, accounting, cash management, payments and contractor management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procurement</strong></td>
<td>• The procurement of all aspects of logistical support, including life cycle management, for the mission. Including provision of: mission assets to all mission components, fleet management, provision of an integrated communications infrastructure system (CIS) including design, installation, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logistics</strong></td>
<td>• Logistics and integrated support, including distribution of mission assets to all mission components, including vehicles, computers and stationery and provide bulk supplies of water, fuel products and foodstuffs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engineering</strong></td>
<td>• Provide accommodation, building management and civil engineering services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D. POLICE COMPONENT

Introduction

50. The role of international police in PSOs is to help establish and maintain law and order and ensure the long term capacity of the local law and order forces through monitoring, advice and training. While police and military components in PSOs often have similar goals – establishing and maintaining security and stability – it is important to note that their roles and functions are fundamentally different. The police function in PSOs is focussed on long-term capacity-building through monitoring, mentoring, training and advice. However, some PSO police actions, such as crowd control and executive policing, depending on the mandate, may contribute to short-term stabilization goals.
51. AU Police are professional police officers from any of the AU Member States, who are seconded to the AU for PSOs, in compliance with a request to Member States to contribute police personnel. AU police must have the ability to work as a cohesive team, and be able to make a transition from one assignment to another within the Police structure whenever mission requirements dictate. AU police may serve as individual experts on mission, under a multinational (AU) chain of command, or they may be members of a Formed Police Unit contributed by their government as an integral asset.

52. AU Police personnel will inevitably come from a wide variety of policing cultures. Such personnel may be general patrol officers, managers, or police specialists, and will be accustomed to different policing methods in their home countries. It is therefore essential that common AU Police standards and procedures be developed and followed. While in the mission area, all AU Police personnel are under the command of the Commissioner of Police (COMPOL) and are directly answerable to the Commissioner for their conduct and the performance of their duties.

53. An AU Police component may be deployed in multidimensional PSOs, at all levels and in all lines of operations to generate and implement plans that contribute to the establishment and maintenance of the Rule of Law, which is critical to building stability and economic growth in the long term.

54. While the mandate of an AU police component may change from mission to mission, most of its activities will conform with international police activities, which tend to fall under three broad categories:

   a. *Monitoring, mentoring and advising* of local law and order forces, if they exist, to ensure that they perform their duties in a manner consistent with internationally-accepted standards;

   b. *Reform and restructuring* – the development of local police infrastructure, including training of local law and order forces and agencies, as well as recruitment and mentoring functions; and *Executive functions* – typically include powers of arrest, search and seizure, detention, crowd control and investigation. These tasks may be carried out by individual police officers, specialised units or FPUs. In such missions, FPU are a very useful primary intervention tool.

55. The police may play a significant role in the course of operations, in situations ranging from instability to stability in a PSO. Even in the most extreme circumstances, where military force is required as an intervention to stabilise a failing state or to protect the population from genocide or humanitarian disaster, among other tasks, the police should be required to advise the military, civilian components and humanitarian agencies on the contingency steps for the restoration of civil order.

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Roles and Functions

56. The AU fact finding mission will provide guidance as to the precise roles and functions of AU police for any particular mission. Factors to be considered during the fact-finding phase of mission planning include: capability of local police and law enforcement agencies; the state of a rule of law infrastructure; the potential for short, medium and long term development of an indigenous police and law enforcement capacity; quantifying the demands and needs of the police component of the potential PSO; compiling reports and recommendations for political decision making; and creating initial Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for police in conjunction with other elements of the PSO. Nevertheless the roles and functions described briefly below are illustrative of the range of tasks that AU police will be expected to perform.

Police Advice

57. AU Police may provide advice at the political, strategic, operational and tactical level. At the political level, senior police advisers may be co-located with ministers, state or regional representatives and the special representatives of organisations like the UN, European Union (EU) and AU, or their offices. Their activities may include: assessments of policing capability and capacity; assessment of internal/regional security; drafting of strategic plans for police development; investigation strategies on sensitive enquiries; and contributions to national security infrastructure.

58. At the strategic level, senior police advisers may be co-located with chiefs of police or directors of other law enforcement agencies. Their activities may include advising on: the strategic direction of the organisation; addressing organisational development; and human resources strategies.

59. At the operational level, police advisers may be co-located with host nation police and other law enforcement agencies or specialist departments. Their activities may include advising on: operational strategies (e.g. patrolling, protecting, anti-terrorism capability); development of specialist capability (e.g. riot control, forensics, and specialist investigation squads); use of formed police units; and conflict management strategies.

60. At the tactical level, police advisers may be co-located with national police units. Their activities may include advising on: patrol skills; community policing; confidence building; crime and crime scene investigation; report writing; communication procedures; receipt of complaints; detention and handling of suspects; and conflict management and negotiation skills.

Police Training

61. Police training may fall into strategic, operational and tactical levels with varying trainer skills and experience necessary in each area. Training will be aimed at inculcating democratic policing values, principles and procedures.
62. At the strategic level, the development and training of senior officers may be part of an overall strategy to improve the calibre of leadership, command and management in local law enforcement agencies. In this case, senior AU police officers with leadership and management training experience will provide the core trainer capacity. These trainers may also be called upon to assist in the establishment of appropriate training institutions i.e. police academies and training schools, including developing subject curricula and courses to international standards.

63. At the operational and tactical levels, police trainers will often be deployed in multi-disciplinary teams. These are designed to address the particular training needs identified for the national police according to international standards. The teams will also create appropriate training conditions for the delivery of training. Training may require field, mobile and temporary site training locations and activities. At this level training may include subjects such as: recruitment procedures; induction; correct use of force and firearms; driving instruction; investigation; human rights; policing violence against women and children, code of conduct; communication; and conflict management.

64. An important function in the training spectrum is that of contributing to institutional capacity-building, including training of trainers and curriculum development. Building the capacity of national police and other law enforcement agencies is essential to establishing and consolidating rule of law.

**Police Monitoring**

65. In many PSOs, AU police will not have executive powers and will generally be unarmed. The authorisation for their presence in the AOR is generally drawn from agreements made between conflicting parties and the AU and will be set out in the mandate of the PSO. Police mandates will usually require AU police to monitor the activities of the national police and other players, follow up on investigations, and to report to both local authorities and through the ASF channels on breaches of provisions contained within cease-fire and/or comprehensive peace agreements. The focus of the monitoring activity will sometimes be on violations by local police of International Humanitarian law and human rights standards. This is a difficult and sensitive role because, although the police officers may not have executive powers, mission mandates often create high expectations of their ability to influence the host-nation and to police local communities.

**Police Mentoring**

66. In addition to programs of training or development of the national police, there is often a need for particular individuals or groups to be mentored and developed, often in their work environment. Mentoring has been shown to be a successful tool in helping individual police officers, particular senior officers or specialists, gain confidence and professional competence. Mentoring can take place whilst individuals are performing their normal duties. Police mentors work with their local counterparts, often in close proximity and on a one-to-one basis. They will often accompany their local
counterparts to professional or operational events to provide immediate guidance or support as well as close observation of the individual’s conduct for later feedback and influence. Mentoring is a long-term process; it requires considerable skills and experience on the part of the mentor.

**Law Enforcement**

67. In circumstances contemplated under UN Chapter VII and Art. 4(h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act, AU police may be mandated by the PSC to deploy with executive authority. Executive missions may be authorised where there is a total or a significant partial collapse of law and order institutions, or where the local police is either non-existent or ineffective. Such circumstances may include: residual result and effects of war/occupation; request from governments with significantly failing institutions for support; and/or failure of the existing government to maintain law and order or to protect its population.

68. A law enforcement role for AU police will most likely be linked to a military intervention for stabilisation purposes. Police deployment will depend on the security situation. The manner of deployment will also depend on the type of activity expected in the mission. Where a situation is still hostile, there may be a requirement to introduce formed police units to provide initial police capacity alongside ASF military.

69. Where AU police have an executive authority mandate, a key issue will be the applicable law to be enforced in the mission area. If host nation laws are considered contradictory to acceptable international legal standards, it is essential that the mission mandate and the strategic level AU leadership provide clear guidance as to the applicable law to be enforced.

**Specialist Police Capabilities**

**Formed Police Units**

70. Formed police units (FPUs), which in the ASF Policy Framework document may include elements of *gendarmerie*, are groups of police officers who are selected and trained as members of specialised units in their home countries. FPUs enter the mission area as an integrated entity with their own equipment including vehicles, communications, weapons and other specialised equipment required for their role. FPUs are therefore expected to be self-sustaining for a minimum period after deployment.

71. Crowd control, major incidents response, assistance to local police in the maintenance of law and order, and security of major events are some of the duties for which FPUs were originally conceived. While the main body of a FPU is commonly constituted of public order police, there are also specialists attached to FPUs, (e.g. forensics, criminal analysis, anti-terrorist experts, etc.) It follows therefore that in PSOs the structure of FPUs and the capability they have for managing disorder and other destabilising activities makes them a very useful primary police intervention tool.
Most usefully they can relieve the military in areas of policing action where there is still some potential for instability. In some ASF missions, FPUs may be required to operate in close cooperation with the military. However, FPUs will remain under command and control of the Commissioner of Police (COMPOL).

72. Formed police units also support other police actions in PSOs, particularly in situations where security and stability has improved, but where there is still a need for a robust policing response to assist in the maintenance of law and order.

Recommendation

73. The AU PSOD shall undertake a study to determine the equipment and logistical needs of the police component in AU PSO, including formed units, and on the basis of its findings, harmonize the logistics system envisaged for the military component with that of the civilian and police components.

Use of Force and Firearms

74. Regardless of whether or not they have law enforcement responsibilities, the security situation could dictate that AU Police may sometimes be armed, in accordance with the decision of the mandating authority (PSC). While military PSO forces are issued with clear rules of engagement (ROE), the use of force and firearms by AU Police will be governed by more stringent international instruments and standards. For each mission where AU police are deployed with arms, the AU PSOD will issue clear policy directives regulating the use thereof.

Strategic-Level AU Police Structures

75. The ASF Policy Framework document clearly stipulates that the police component is an integral part of multidimensional PSOs. As such, it is necessary that policing issues and the mission of the police component become an integral part of the policy, planning and mission management structures of the AU and ASF at all levels. Towards this aim the AU PSOD shall appoint an AU Commissioner of Police.

76. The PLANELM at AU headquarters shall include at least one senior police representative and an appropriate number of officers, who shall also participate in the Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) and other strategic level planning forums.

77. There shall also be senior police participation in every Mission Task Force (MTF) that is established, whenever the mandate of the mission requires a policing role.

Recommendation

78. At the level of the AU PSOD, a Commissioner of Police shall be appointed. The AU Commissioner of Police will serve as the principal advisor to the Chairperson of the Commission on all policing matters. S/he will also be the
head of an appropriate police policy, planning and mission management team that will serve within the PSOD.

Mission-Level AU Police Structure

79. The most senior police officer in an AU PSO is the Commissioner of Police (COMPOL). The Commissioner of Police reports to the SRCC and has an indirect reporting line to the AU Commissioner of Police in the PSOD.

80. The Commissioner of Police will nominate AU police officers to provide support to, or serve in, the Mission Operations Centre (MOC), Mission Analysis Cell (MAC), Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC), Mission Logistic Centre (MLOC), and other such integrated bodies.

81. The AU police organisation at mission HQ level will be determined by the mandate. However, the basic mission HQ structure may include:
   a. Office of the Commissioner of Police (COMPOL)
   b. Deputy Commissioner of Police (D/COMPOL)
   c. Chief of Staff
   d. Chief of Personnel and Administration
   e. Chief of Operations
   f. Chief Liaison Officer
   g. Chief of Logistics

82. The functions and responsibilities of each of the key mission HQ, regional and sector police staff will be spelled out in detail in the ASF SOPs.

E. ENABLING SYSTEMS

Introduction

83. This section address the enabling systems that need to be in place in order for the mission management structures, police and other civilian components to be fully integrated into AU multidimensional PSO structures and the ASF.

Policies and Procedures

84. This Policy Framework on the Civilian Dimension of the ASF builds on the work already undertaken by the AU in the context of the overall development of the ASF system. This includes a series of policy documents, namely the ASF Policy Framework, the Vision 2010 discussion document and the ASF Roadmap. It also includes a number of ASF documents such as the ASF Doctrine, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); Logistics; Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems (C³IS) and
Training and Evaluation reports generated by a series of technical expert workshops undertaken in 2005 and 2006. This Policy Framework has attempted to use the same terminology, systems and structures where possible, but its focus on the police and other civilian components have also necessitated some innovation and occasionally attempted to clarify specific structural arrangements. As a result, harmonization will be required between this Policy Framework and some of the work that has already been undertaken in the military, police and civilian context.

85. The AU PSOD shall undertake a harmonization exercise to ensure that the policies envisaged for the military, police and civilian components of the ASF are coherent and appropriately balanced, and shall revise the ASF Policy Framework accordingly.

**Recommendation**

86. The AU PSOD shall develop an implementation plan that will identify a timeline for operationalising the various action steps contained in the Policy Framework.

**Human resources**

**Standby Rosters, Recruitment & Deployment**

87. Whilst military and police peacekeepers are serving members of their respective national defence and police forces, temporarily deployed to the AU for a specific period, civilians can be recruited in a number of ways and their deployments can last as long as the life of the mission itself. Civilian mission personnel can be serving staff of the AU Commission seconded to the mission, they can be civil servants working for an AU Member State or a Regional Mechanism that is seconded to the AU for the mission, or they can be individuals directly hired by the AU on a contract basis. In order to make optimum use of all these possible recruitment avenues the AU shall make use of the following three-tiered mission staffing structure for deploying civilian staff to AU PSO.

88. In the first tier, the AU shall make use of existing staff to undertake mission assessments and to staff core positions within a start-up mission headquarters. Making use of existing AU staff has various advantages. AU staff with existing contracts should be able to be deployed in a very short period of time, and they are already familiar with AU policies and procedures in their specialised field. AU staff procedures shall be modified to enable such deployments to field missions to occur.

89. The second tier shall consist of an AU PSO civilian standby roster, and/or a series of interlinked Regional Mechanism PSO standby rosters, that can be used to identify and recruit civilian staff for AU PSOs. The AU PSOD shall encourage coordination and inter-linkages between the civilian standby rosters, the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) and other training service providers. The third tier would be normal recruitment of individuals directly by the AU. Vacancies would need to be advertised for a given period, qualifying candidates need to be selected, their information verified, short-listed, interviewed, contracted and finally deployed.
90. The AU PSOD should aim to achieve approximate coherence between UN and AU conditions of service to ease the transition of staff between UN and AU missions.

Recommendations

91. The AU PSOD shall undertake a work study on the basis of the provisions of section B - Multidimensional Management Structures and Processes, and related ASF guidelines, in order to determine the number and categories of personnel that will be needed at the AU PSOD to ensure that it has the capacity to execute its mandate.

92. The AU PSOD shall explore the establishment of a Rapid Deployment System, similar to that of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), with a view to deploying a start-up mission headquarters with core military, police and civilian functions for a period of 60 to 90 days\textsuperscript{12}. Such a rapid deployment capacity will give the AU’s normal recruitment system time to hire a fuller complement of replacement civilian HQ staff.

93. The AU PSOD shall develop, or outsource the development of, an AU PSO civilian standby roster that will consist of existing civil servants of AU Member States, Regional Mechanisms, other African intergovernmental bodies and civil society\textsuperscript{13}. Such a standby roster shall seek to develop standard pre-agreements with Member States and other institutions to release their staff for AU PSO, so as to ensure the shortest possible time between recruitment and deployment.

94. The AU PSOD shall develop generic job descriptions and vacancy announcements for those civilian functions discussed in Section C – Civilian Components, and the PLANELM shall develop a series of generic HQ and Sector HQ staffing tables for different mission scenarios to aid budgetary planning and the rapid deployment of mission staff.

95. The AU PSOD shall undertake a study to determine whether the existing AU human resources processes are adequate for the recruitment, selection, evaluation, leave and wellbeing of AU PSOs mission staff, or whether additional policies and procedures need to be put in place to manage the recruitment and deployment of civilian staff for AU PSOs.

\textsuperscript{12} The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has set up civilian Rapid Deployment Teams among its HQ staff. The supervisors of the staff on the Rapid Deployment Teams agree in advance to release them for temporary duty on mission assessment teams and to initiate and support a field operation. The effectiveness of the DPKO Rapid Deployment Teams stems from the fact that they are comprised of serving UN staff members that have been pre-selected and cleared. DPKO has also introduced an incentive in that HQ staff are required to go on mission from time to time in order to be promoted, and there is an agreement that staff can return to their original HQ positions if they return within a specific time period. This roster system has increased DPKO’s capacity to rapidly deploy a civilian headquarter component.

\textsuperscript{13} One such example is the Southern African Civilian Stand-by Roster for Humanitarian Relief and Peacekeeping Missions (SAFDEM). In October 2003, the Norwegian-funded Training for Peace (TfP) programme and SAFDEM entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) providing for a mutually supporting relationship where TfP provides training for civilian specialists and SAFDEM provides and maintains a Civilian Stand-by Roster for those that have been trained. The SAFDEM roster is currently maintained at about 250 trained and pre-screened candidates.
Gender Mainstreaming

96. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003), and the AU Heads of State and Government Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa commits African Government and civil society, amongst others, to protect and respect the rights of women in situations of armed conflict. In addition, the Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security (2000) spells out the need for integrating a gender perspective and ensuring women’s participation in all decision-making processes throughout all stages of armed conflict and recovery. The AU instruments and this UN Resolution call for the inclusion of women and gender perspectives at all levels and in all areas of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

Recommendation

97. The AU PSOD shall ensure that the recruitment and management processes of the mission management team, and the military, police and other civilian components, strive to attain gender mainstreaming and gender sensitivity in order to facilitate realisation of the gender equality principle of the AU and to enhance the operational impact of its PSOs. The AU shall develop a gender responsive human resource policy to guide the recruitment and management of AU field missions.

Conduct and Discipline

98. The AU must ensure that the ASF is well-disciplined, and that its members uphold the highest standards of conduct. The recent exposure of conduct and discipline problems, including Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), by peacekeeping and peacebuilding personnel in Africa has been particularly damaging to UN peacekeeping. The AU should learn from the steps that the UN has subsequently taken in the form of adopting clear and robust policies, disseminating those policies to Member States and ensuring they are understood through training and public information campaigns in missions, monitoring the behaviour of its staff in the field, and empowering missions to act by providing them with the means to investigate complaints and act on their findings with a range of disciplinary steps.

99. The AU PSOD shall take proactive steps to create a work and social environment that is sensitive to the unusual and stressful working conditions of staff deployed in AU PSO. Such proactive steps can include appropriate leave policies, opportunities for counselling, and access to facilities for entertainment, exercise, and communication with family and friends.

Recommendation

100. The AU PSOD shall develop a comprehensive policy on Conduct and Discipline, including a clear definition and policies on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA).
Conduct, amongst others through training, as well as developing mechanisms for investigation and disciplinary procedures.

**Mission Support and Logistics**

101. The AU PSOD shall undertake a Multidimensional Mission Support Study that will consider the mission support and logistics needs of AU PSO.

102. The Study shall, amongst others, consider the appropriateness of existing AU procurement, financial and related rules and regulations for AU PSO. On the basis of its findings, the Study should make recommendations for AU PSO procurement, financial and related rules and regulations. The Study should consider putting in place a number of pre-agreed standard contracting agreements for commonly used logistic supplies that can be brought into play at short notice to enhance rapid deployment and mission start-up capacity.

**Recommendation**

103. The AU PSOD shall undertake a Multidimensional Mission Support Study that will consider the mission support and logistics needs of the mission management structure, as well as the military, police, substantive civilian and mission support components, and develop an overall, integrated mission support system.

**Training Requirements**

104. The AU PSOD shall facilitate, in consultation with African and partner training institutions, the development of a system of generic-, pre-deployment, specialised- and in-mission training services for AU PSOs. Such a system will be aimed at ensuring that military, police and civilian peacekeepers have been appropriately prepared for deployment and will be fully operational once deployed in as short a time as is possible.

105. The training of military, police and civilian peacekeepers shall be undertaken by Member States and Regional Mechanisms, in collaboration with regional peacekeeping training centres, NGOs and partners.

106. The AU PSOD shall facilitate the development of AU training standards and guidelines for its PSOs staff, and it shall facilitate the accreditation of training centres, and/or the recognition of training courses, that provide training according to AU standards and guidelines.

107. The AU PSOD shall ensure that there is a training function at the AU PSOD, as well as in each mission, and that each mission provides adequate induction briefings for all new military, police and civilian staff.
108. The AU PSOD shall undertake an AU PSO Training Needs Analysis (TNA) Study, in close cooperation with the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA).

**Recommendation**

109. The AU PSOD shall undertake an AU PSO Training Needs Analysis (TNA) Study to determine the level and standard of training military, police and civilian peacekeepers need to undergo prior to, and during deployment in AU PSOs.

**Best Practices**

The AU PSOD shall take steps to capture lessons identified and best practices, and to manage the institutional memory generated by such initiatives, and establish processes for improving future PSO through the implementation of those recommendations adopted by the AU.

The AU PSOD shall ensure that mechanisms and processes for capturing lessons identified and best practices is established in each AU PSO, amongst others through the Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC). And that each PSO has the necessary processes in place for transforming such knowledge into practice, as well as for sharing that knowledge with the AU PSOD.

**Recommendation**

110. The AU PSOD shall undertake, or commission, studies that will capture lessons identified and best practices during all phases of an AU PSO, and at all levels, including at the level of the AU Commission.
This chapter is about the civilian structures, recruitment and staffing methods and the issue of maintaining a live and dynamic civilian standby roster system for the ASF, as well as the type of training necessary for civilian peacekeepers. These recommendations are contained in the report of the African Union ASF staffing, training and rostering workshop that took place from 10 to 12 July 2008 in Kampala, Uganda. The report was subsequently noted and acted upon at the 6th Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff and Heads of Safety and Security of May 2009, and the decision of this meeting on the civilian dimension is contained in point 7(i) of the annex to this chapter.
1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), in partnership with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), embarked on a project to develop the civilian dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2006. The first phase was aimed at developing an official AU and ASF policy on the civilian dimension, and a Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF was produced in September 2006. The policy framework clarified the policy context, the multi-dimensional management structure, the main civilian roles and responsibilities, the main police roles and responsibilities and the mission support functions that are needed to be in place to support the civilian and police dimensions of the ASF.

In April 2007, the policy framework was developed into an implementation plan, which contained recommendations for the operationalisation of the civilian dimension of the ASF in a number of key areas, including: conduct and discipline, gender, HIV/AIDS, human resources, training, integrated missions planning, capacity building and the raising of awareness.

The AU PSOD conducted an ASF Training Implementation Workshop in October 2007, to develop a training plan for the ASF. During the workshop, it was recognised that there was a need to focus ASF training more on civilian and police aspects.

During a planning meeting conducted in February 2008 it became apparent that for civilian training issues to be meaningfully discussed there would also be a need to address the staffing, recruiting and rostering aspects of the civilian dimension of the ASF. Consequently, a Civilian Staffing, Training and Rostering (STR) Workshop was convened in Kampala in July 2008, to generate recommendations relating to the staffing, recruitment, rostering and training of the civilian dimension of the ASF. The workshop was also aimed at harmonising the approach of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), with regards to the civilian dimension of the ASF.

Working on the staffing of the civilian dimension of the ASF, the workshop developed a list of civilian functions that should be provided for in each regional ASF capacity. The workshop recommended that each regional capacity should be able to deploy approximately 60 civilians, and should develop a civilian standby roster of approximately 300 civilian specialists. The workshop also recommended that the deployment of the civilian dimension should take place in waves, with the first wave reflecting the most important civilian elements – without which a multidimensional mission should not deploy. The deployment would then build up in later waves, until full civilian strength is reached. The workshop further recommended that, in order to manage the development of this civilian capacity, the AU PSOD and each of the Regional Brigade Planning Elements (PLANELMs) should have four civilian members – namely a training and rostering officer, a planning and coordination officer, a logistics officer, and a head for the civilian component of the PLANELM.

With regard to recruitment, the workshop considered the merits and demerits of direct hiring and secondments for those civilian positions in the ASF civilian standby rosters, as well as those in the PLANELMs. It recommended that the existing AU and REC human resources and recruitment policies be augmented with policies that are specifically aimed at meeting the needs of the AU and RECs to deploy civilians on peace operations and related field missions.
Such policies should provide for both direct hiring and secondments, as may be appropriate, and should consider a range of contracting options to ensure the rapid deployment of certain categories of civilian staff, as well as continuity among civilian staff in the PLANELMs.

The workshop also considered three models of civilian standby rosters. The first was a combination of an ASF rapid deployment roster, made up from existing AU and REC staff, augmented by an external roster, provided by an organisation like AFDEM. The second model was an integrated ASF and REC roster, and the third model was an ASF stand-alone roster. The workshop recognised that the first and second models would establish the most wide-ranging and interlocking capacities, whilst the third model would establish the most focused capacity. The first model was recommended, as it was felt that it was probably the most pragmatic option in that it provides for a limited internal rapid deployment capacity at the level of the AU and RECs/RMs, as well as an outsourced medium- to long-term standby roster capacity. It was strongly emphasised that, whichever model was decided upon, it would need to be simple, manageable, and easy to use and resource.

With regard to training, the workshop recommended that training for all civilian personnel of the ASF should be a mandatory requirement prior to deployment. It was recommended that the AU should, in cooperation with the RECs/RMs and training service providers, set civilian training standards and develop an ASF training policy. It was stressed that civilian peacekeepers would, at times, be deployed in hostile and hazardous environments, and they need to be prepared for the related challenges. It was strongly recommended that the training methodology should, where appropriate, include practical field and simulation training in addition to a classroom component. Thus, the participation of civilians in Levels I, II and III Decision Making Exercises (MAPEX, CPX and FTX) would be important. There should also be an emphasis on problem-based learning, which allows participants to identify and discuss particular issues and come up with solutions. It was recommended that civilian training should consist of both integrated and single-component training, and that the regional training centres of excellence and other civil society organisations that provide training for civilians should, through the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA) framework, continue to cooperate closely, not only among each other but also with international civilian training partners.

On the whole, the workshop provided a forum for the AU, RECs/RMs, member states and civil society to consider and make recommendations regarding the staffing, recruitment, rostering and training of the civilian dimension of the ASF. In addition to the recommendations summarised above, and discussed in more detail in the body of this report, the workshop agreed on the following short- to medium-term follow-on actions:

The AU PSOD and the regional brigade PLANELMs should work jointly on developing job descriptions for the approximately 60 civilian positions agreed upon.

The AU and RECs/RMs should develop and harmonise their respective human resources policies for peace operations and field missions, including streamlined recruitment procedures that provide for the rapid recruitment of staff through a civilian standby roster capacity.

An AU Commission/REC/RM task team should be established to design an ASF civilian standby roster, based on the discussions of the workshop.

The AU and RECs/RMs, in cooperation with APSTA, should start the process of generating training standards for civilian ASF staff.
The regional brigades should start with the identification, recruitment and training of the approximately 300 civilians needed in each regional civilian standby roster, to be able to deploy approximately 60 civilians each. This process would be informed by the job descriptions, training standards and roster models discussed above but could, in the interim, start with the integration and involvement of civilians in ASF-related training courses and exercises.

The main recommendations of the STR Workshop were subsequently endorsed by the 3rd Ordinary Meeting of the Specialised Committee on Defence, Safety and Security, 15 May 2009, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (See page 93).

2: BACKGROUND

IN 2006, the AU PSOD, in partnership with ACCORD and in association with African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA), embarked on a project to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF. The first phase was aimed at developing an official AU and ASF policy on the civilian dimension. To this end, a Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF was discussed and produced at a Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the ASF, which took place from 28 August to 1 September 2006 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana.

The policy framework clarified the policy context, the multidimensional management structure and decision-making process, the main civilian roles and responsibilities, the main police roles and responsibilities, and the mission support functions that need to be in place to support the civilian and police dimensions.

At this stage, the police component was still regarded as “civilian”, and the policy framework thus also addressed the police dimension. Subsequently, it was decided to manage the police component separately.

The next phase was aimed at developing an implementation plan for the policy framework. Consequently, a Technical Experts Task Team Meeting was held from 11 to 13 April 2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the task team produced an implementation plan. This plan contained recommendations for the operationalisation of the civilian dimension of the ASF in a number of key areas, including conduct and discipline, gender, HIV/AIDS, human resources, training, integrated missions policies, capacity building and the raising of awareness.

From 29 to 31 October 2007, the PSOD, in collaboration with APSTA, conducted a Training Implementation Workshop in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to finalise a training plan for the ASF by collating the training schedules of the ASF regional brigades into one continental training schedule, leading up to 2010. As a result of this workshop, the PSOD noticed that the regional brigade training plans were focused on the military aspects of training, and did not reflect the multidimensional nature of the ASF.

On 6 February 2008, the PSOD convened a planning meeting to prepare a workshop that would further strengthen the civilian dimension of the ASF. The AU and RECs/RMs present recognised that, for civilian training issues to be meaningfully discussed, the workshop would also have to address the staffing and rostering aspects of the civilian dimension of the ASF, as recommended in the ASF Civilian Dimension Implementation Plan. The planning meeting thus decided to broaden the scope and organise a Civilian STR Workshop. The key objective
of the workshop would be to harmonise the approach of the AU and the RECs/RMs with regard to the civilian dimension of the ASF. Further, the workshop would aim to devise a training plan for the civilian dimension, including looking at a generic civilian structure and the issue of maintaining a roster of civilians for ASF deployments. It was therefore important to approach the four aspects – staffing, recruitment, rostering and training – in a complementary manner.

3: THE CIVILIAN STR WORKSHOP

The Civilian STR Workshop was held from 10 to 12 July 2008 at the Speke Resort and Conference Centre in Kampala, Uganda. There were 67 participants, representing the AU, RECs/RMs, AU member states, APSTA, the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the European Union (EU), regional and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and civil society organisations involved in civilian capacity building; as well as research and academic institutions. Apart from civilian experts, the workshop included key military and police representatives from AU member states and the regional brigade structures, so as to ensure that the workshop benefited from a multidimensional perspective.

3.1. Welcome and the opening of the workshop

The workshop was opened by the head of the PSOD, Mr Bereng Mtimkulu, who emphasised that, whilst a considerable amount of preparation had gone into the planning for military structures and procedures for their deployment, for instance, there still seemed to be an impression among some that the “civilians just arrive” on their own accord. He argued that the ASF process has not invested sufficient time and resources into exploring which civilian functions were required, the exact timing that they should be deployed, under which sorts of contracts and other related considerations. He also touched upon the growing realisation, especially among military planners and member states of the AU, of the need to revise the tendency for the usage of overly militaristic terminology when referring to the ASF, and the need rather to develop terminology that was more embracing of the multidimensional character of the ASF.

In addition, Mr Mtimkulu reflected on the challenges that beset the AU missions in Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) and the financial, institutional, physical and security challenges that had plagued these missions. These challenges had served to cast a shadow of doubt over the long-term ability of the AU to manage multidimensional peacekeeping operations on the continent. Mr Mtimkulu encouraged the workshop participants to consider the following crucial issues during the three-day deliberations:

- the process and/or method for deploying civilians
- considering the financial limitations facing the AU, the extent to which the organisation could merge with UN standards and mirror its thinking on peacekeeping
- suggestions as to what the non-military components of the force should look like
- the types of structures that should be provided at the regional, headquarters and mission levels, taking into consideration the constraints and challenges faced
Mr Mtimkulu ended his welcome address by stating the importance of the ASF not becoming synonymous with “cheap peacekeeping”, especially in light of its scheduled operationalisation in 2010. He further stressed that a good deal of work still needed to be contributed to the effort, so as to ensure a drastic change in the manner in which African peacekeeping was conducted. He thanked the Norwegian Government for the financial support it had rendered to the project through the Training for Peace (TfP) in Africa Programme, which included the funding of the STR Workshop.

3.2. Workshop goals and objectives

In his overview of the aims and objectives of the workshop, Mr Cedric de Coning emphasised that the workshop should have, as its key focus, the civilian staff that would be required, how they would be recruited, the type of rostering system that would be employed and the type of training they would require both before and after deployment. Clear recommendations would be required to inform and guide the AU, RECs/RMs and the standby brigades and the planning elements on their work vis-à-vis planning, recruiting, rostering and training for the ASF. An underlying purpose of the workshop would be that all stakeholders and partners share a common understanding of the civilian dimension, which would, in turn, ensure inter-operability and coherence in approach.

3.3. Overview of the ASF and the role of the civilian dimension

In his presentation on the overview of the ASF, Mr Mtimkulu pointed out that the ASF was composed of multidisciplinary elements with civilian, police and military components in their countries of origin, and was ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. He also noted that ASF missions should focus on observer and monitoring missions; intervention in a member state; post-conflict reconstruction; peacebuilding; humanitarian assistance; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); and preventive deployment. A particular challenge that was raised pertained to the deployment of an ASF mission within 14 days of a mandate of the Assembly, in countries where gross human rights activities were underway.

His overview highlighted the status of the various structures of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which not only served to set the broad context within which the ASF was situated but also gave the workshop group a better appreciation of the mutually supportive role of its components. Mr Mtimkulu enumerated the components of APSA as:

• the Peace and Security Council (PSC) – which is at the heart of the APSA
• the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP)
• the Military Staff Committee (MSC)
• the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)
• the Panel of the Wise (POW)
• the ASF
• the Peace Fund.

It was stressed that the ASF was not envisaged as Africa’s contribution to world peace, and was not a replacement of the UN’s work insofar as peace and security was concerned.
Mr Mtimkulu also gave a brush-stroke summary of the work that had been done over the last three years on the development of the ASF – namely that Africa went from having nothing in place to establishing a phased approach, as indicated below, within which to develop the ASF:

- **Phase 1**: Establish the baseline documentation policy and tools for the ASF.
- **Phase 2**: Consolidate the policy documents, seek their approval, and develop the concepts of operations and a training plan.
- **Phase 3**: Test the documents in ASF-related training exercises.

What became more evident in the above processes was that there was insufficient attention to the civilian dimension of the ASF, and that unless it is actively sought to develop this aspect, with an emphasis on establishing requisite standards and procedures, this state of affairs would inevitably persist. This line of thinking gave further impetus to the Civilian Dimension Project.

With regards to the civilian dimension, it was further shared that the AU should manage centrally a roster of mission administration, civilian experts for human rights, humanitarian, governance and DDR posts, which would be filled by civilian professionals. In addition to this, the process should also involve tapping into the experiences of the resources of UN agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as well as of international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB).

The floor was opened for questions and answers, and the following key points were raised:

- The question was raised whether there was the need to establish civilian and police component bodies similar to the MSC, which would advise the PSC on deployment and security-related matters in so far as civilians and police were concerned. The military nature of the MSC was acknowledged as another example of the over-preoccupation with military issues during the conceptualisation of the ASF, and that in future there would be need for further debate and discussion on how to go about improving the multidimensional character of the ASF in general, and the MSC in particular.

- There was a need to give greater consideration to the issue of the myriad of economic, political and security groupings that had emerged on the continent, and to which AU member states belong. Particularly, it was suggested that there was a need to rationalise the membership of these various groupings to avoid AU member states having overlapping membership of the regional ASF brigades. The implications for successful interface in such instances needed to be examined in the context of the developments in and around the ASF structure, as well as to minimise the potential for a duplication of efforts and wastage of already-scarce resources. Ultimately, this issue remained a political one, and the solution lies essentially with the political domain of the respective regions.

- There was a need to establish a structure of civilian posts within the PSOD, so as to ensure smooth and steady follow-up and progress vis-à-vis developing the civilian aspects of the ASF. The PSOD had recognised this limitation and had been working jointly with ACCORD and the UNDPKO-AU Peace Support Team (PST) on consolidating a new staffing structure at the division. It was also working to reverse the current situation in which military personnel were undertaking the tasks and responsibilities that, ideally, were better suited for implementation by civilian personnel.
It would be an important next step to develop a focus and future timetable for the further development of the police dimension of the ASF.

4: WORKSHOP THEMES

The programme agenda divided the workshop discussions along the lines of four key themes, namely staffing, rostering, recruitment and training. Prior to each of the respective themes being discussed, a background paper thereon was shared to set the tone for the discussions, as well as to introduce the key areas for consideration. The workshop participants were then divided into focused working groups to consider and come up with relevant recommendations. The entire group then reconvened in plenary to share and discuss the outcomes of the working group sessions.

4.1. Theme 1: Civilian staff of the ASF

4.1.1. Purpose

The goal of this section of the workshop was to generate recommendations on the type and number of civilian positions needed in the ASF, so that the AU PSOD and regional brigades could have clear guidelines on the capacity of the civilian dimension that they need to develop. The workshop was introduced to the relevant policies in place, as well as to the main issues that should be taken into consideration when discussing the ASF civilian staff requirements.¹

The Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF² provides for a civilian-led multidimensional mission management structure and various substantive and support civilian components. It also provides for a mission-level management structure that would typically consist of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC), one or more deputy SRCCs, a Force Commander, a Commissioner of Police, various heads of substantive civilian components, and a Head of Mission Support.³ Table A contains the full list and description of the substantive and mission support functions provided for in the policy framework.

¹ This section of the report is based on a background paper prepared by Cedric de Coning for the workshop on the Staffing of the Civilian Dimension of the ASF. It is available from ACCORD and the AU PSOD.

² This policy framework was considered and refined at the Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, which took place from 29 August to 1 September 2006 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana. It was considered and noted at the meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence and Security, and the meeting of the Ministers of Defence and Security of March 2008.

³ In the policy framework, the term “mission support” is used to refer to the administrative and logistics support functions, referred to as “civilian administration” in the original ASF policy framework. This is the same terminology as is used by the UN, and thus ensures inter-operability.
4.1.2. ASF civilian staff

Since its inception in 2000, the AU has deployed three major multidimensional peace operations, namely the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003–2004, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004–2007 and the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMIB had approximately two dozen international civilian staff, consisting of a civilian head of mission, as well as a deputy head, support staff and substantive components such as political affairs, human rights and mission support staff. AMISOM is the most ambitious mission yet, from a civilian staffing perspective, with a staffing table that provides for approximately 500 international and local civilian staff. There has thus been a small but meaningful increase in civilian staff from AMIB to AMIS, with a considerable increase potentially projected for AMISOM. Two considerations need to be borne in mind when discussing the civilian dimension of African PSOs. The first is the financial reality, and the second is the type of missions that the AU and RECs/RMs are likely to undertake.

The financial realities dictate that AU and REC/RM PSOs that depend on external financial support would always be constrained in scope and size, compared to UN missions under similar circumstances, which are funded through the UN-assessed contribution system. Compare, for example, the scope, size and budgets of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and AMISOM. The AU should thus be conservative in its planning when it comes to the civilian dimension of AU and REC/RM PSOs, so that it is in a position to do more with less, rather than plan for larger UN-type civilian components that are unlikely to be approved or funded. The civilian dimension of the ASF should thus be designed with this limitation in mind, and provide for fewer, but more broadly functioned, civilian staff.

The second, and perhaps interlinked consideration, is the scope of missions that the AU and RECs/RMs are most likely to undertake. If the AMIB, AMIS and AMISOM trend is followed, then it can be deducted that the AU is likely to undertake limited stability-type of operations for a period of approximately 12 to 24 months, and that the UN may, in cases where sufficient stability has been achieved, follow on with longer-term peacebuilding-type missions. This trend has been seen with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) becoming the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), AMIB becoming the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), and AMIS becoming the African Union – United Nations Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

Accordingly, ASF missions should be designed with the above-mentioned considerations in mind. This implies the capacity to deal with the political dimension of peace processes, conflict resolution, human rights, humanitarian liaison and environment shaping (public information). It also implies that such AUC and REC/RM missions are unlikely to take on post-conflict reconstruction functions such as DDR, SSR and RoL reform, other than laying the foundations for these aspects in the initial stages of the transition process. These issues should, at the

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4 The various smaller observer missions and the recent enforcement mission in the Comoros are not listed, as the focus of the paper is multidimensional missions that include civilian staff.

5 Note that planning projections have not yet been approved, nor deployed.

6 AU RECs/RMs are unlikely to receive the funding required to undertake long-term peacebuilding missions. The UN system has the comparative advantage of having, under one umbrella, the political, security, development and humanitarian instruments necessary for post-conflict reconstruction and development.
minimum, be taken into consideration when planning and liaising with other key actors who would be primarily responsible for assessments, and planning for post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

On the basis of the above considerations and for purposes of discussion, the workshop was presented with an AU civilian mission template that consists of the following functions:

• **SRCC and Deputy SRCC**
  ◊ An office of the SRCC that consists of:
    ■ personal staff of the SRCC and Deputy SRCC
    ■ personal protection for SRCC and other key mission personalities
    ■ legal advice
    ■ gender advice
    ■ protection advice
    ■ HIV/AIDS advice
    ■ conduct and discipline advice
    ■ post-conflict reconstruction and development advice.

• **Mission Planning and Coordination Unit**

• **Political Affairs Unit**

• **Human Rights Unit**

• **Public Information Unit**

• **Mission Support component.**

The deployment of the civilian dimension could occur in stages, with the first group reflecting the most important elements without which a multidimensional mission should not deploy, then building up in later phases until full civilian strength is reached. Considering the highly unstable operating environment in which an ASF mission might be deployed, the first phase of civilian deployment should start with the minimum essential staff, and this capacity may be increased gradually as the risk reduces. It is important that the civilian, military, and police components of the rapid deployment capability be trained together, and they should have the same timeframes and standards. See Table B for suggested phased deployments.

As alluded to earlier, the smaller size of the civilian dimension of AU missions compared with, for instance, UN missions with similar mandates, would mean that the AU civilian units would have to be more multidisciplinary and cover more functional areas, with less specialisation. For example, the Political Affairs section would have to undertake political analysis, support the peace process and provide liaison services with national and local government authorities and civil society – i.e. cover the same work that the separate political affairs and civil affairs units in a typical UN mission would cover. The Human Rights section would have to provide human rights advice, monitoring and training, as well as covering areas such as child protection, the
Table A: The deployment of the civilian members of an AU mission

### Civilian Personnel for Wave 1 = 15

- **O/SRCC x 6**
  - 1 x Planning and Coord
  - 1 x Spokesperson
  - 1 x CAO
  - 1 x PA of CAO
  - 1 x Finance & Personnel
  - 1 x Admin & Log
  - 1 x IT
  - 1 x Comms

- **AU PK Force**
- **AU Police**
- **Political Affairs x 1**
- **Public Information x 1**
- **Mission Support x 6**

+ Local staff for HQ & Sector level
  - e.g. Interpreters, Drivers, Administrative Assistants etc.

### Civilian Personnel for Wave 2 = 30

- **O/SRCC x 7**
  - 1 x Planning and Coord
  - 1 x Legal Adv

- **Mission Operations Centre (MOC)**
- **Planning and Coordination x 5**

- **AU PK Force**
- **AU Police**
- **Human Rights x 2**
- **Political Affairs x 5**
- **Public Information x 3**
- **Mission Support x 8**

+ Local staff for HQ & Sector level
  - e.g. Interpreters, Drivers, Administrative Assistants etc.

Per Sector (Assumption is 3 Sectors)
- 1 x Political Affairs (Head of Sector)
- 1 x Planning and Coordination

2 x HQ and 3 x Sectors

1 x SRCC
1 x PA
4 x VIP Protection
1 x Comms
protection of civilians, gender rights, etc. – thus covering a number of related functions that would typically be handled by several different units in a UN peacekeeping operation. The capacity of these units could be augmented and strengthened by adding senior specialist advisors to the office of the SRCC, so that the mission has specialist expertise at its disposal that could inform the planning, liaison and operational functions of the mission.

In addition to the civilian functions, another important consideration would be the number of civilians that the ASF should be able to deploy. Whilst it is understood that the type of functions and number of personnel of each mission would be determined by its mandate and available resources, the AU and regional PLANELMs would need to develop a generic civilian capacity in each of the “brigades”.\(^7\) For discussion purposes, it was suggested that each brigade should develop a capacity that provides for approximately 60 civilian positions in the ASF structure, supported by a civilian standby roster with approximately 300 persons. See Table B for a breakdown of these positions.

### 4.1.3. ASF PLANELM structures

In order to manage the civilian components of the regional brigades it was suggested, for discussion purposes, that the AU PSOD and each regional PLANELM have at least four civilian staff members, namely a training and rostering officer, a planning and coordination officer,

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\(^7\) “Brigade” is placed in parenthesis here, because, as noted at the March 2008 Ministers of Defence and Security meeting, the terminology is not useful when actually describing a multidimensional PSO capacity that consists of military, police and civilian components, and that is headed by a multidimensional management structure, headed by a civilian Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC).
Table B: Proposed ASF brigade civilian capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Position in Regional Brigade</th>
<th>Number in roster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRCC</td>
<td>1 x ASG/D1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRCC</td>
<td>1 x D1/D2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant to the SRCC</td>
<td>1 x P3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Assistant to the SRCC/DSRCC</td>
<td>1 x GSA</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal protection for SRCC/DSRCC</td>
<td>8 persons ranging from P4 to P1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/Aids Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct and Discipline Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict Reconstruction Advisor</td>
<td>1 x P4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Coordination Unit, including Humanitarian Liaison</td>
<td>6 persons ranging from P5 to P3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affairs Unit</td>
<td>6 persons ranging from P5 to P3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Unit</td>
<td>6 persons ranging from P5 to P3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information Unit</td>
<td>3 persons ranging from P5 to P2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Unit</td>
<td>1 x P3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>20 persons ranging from D2/P5 to P3</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
<td><strong>300</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order for the AU PSOD and the regional brigade/PLANELMs to operationalise the policy framework and identify, train and incorporate the civilian dimension into the ASF, the workshop needed to consider and generate specific recommendations as to:

- the type and number of civilian positions needed in each regional brigade
- the type and number of civilian positions needed in the rapid deployment capacity of each brigade
- the type and number of civilian positions needed in each regional PLANELM.

The main issues that emerged from the discussions are:

- **the type and number of civilian positions needed in each regional brigade:**
  - There was a general consensus/agreement on the numbers and positions for the regional brigades and the standby roster.
  - The exact roles and responsibilities of the various positions need to be explicitly detailed, so as to avoid an overlap in functions.
  - Brigades could have less than the proposed number of 60 persons and each REC/RM would have to decide upon the exact numbers, based on the unique circumstances of the brigade in question. Furthermore, the specific needs on the ground, as indicated by a mission mandate, would determine the exact number of persons to be deployed.
  - It was recommended that the staffing tables of each brigade include a humanitarian liaison officer/advisor.
  - The legal advisor and post-conflict advisor should be increased to two persons each.
  - The Head of Mission should be supported by a deputy Head of Mission.

### Table C: Suggested regional brigade civilian PLANELM structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of Civilian Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANELM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Rostering Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Coordination Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• **The number and type of civilian positions needed in the rapid deployment capability of each brigade**

◊ At the outset, it was agreed that, when it comes to the number and type of civilians required, one size does not fit all, and the realities and needs on the ground would be the guiding considerations.

◊ The SRCC and his/her team would need to be deployed on the ground as a matter of priority.

◊ There would be a need for humanitarian affairs officers, protection officers (to deal particularly with vulnerable groups such as women and children), and public information officers to keep the local population informed on the intervention and the evolving situation.

◊ In situations where genocide has taken place and there are mass graves, forensic experts would be required – although it is recognised that, in certain countries like Nigeria and Ghana, these may be police rather than civilian persons.

◊ It was recommended that in the second wave (See Table A), instead of two human rights officers, one could be replaced by a gender advisor.

• **The type and number of civilian positions needed in each regional PLANELM:**

◊ Regions should be free to propose their own variations to the basic structure, and should be able to make respective determinations as to what officers should be brought in at the strategic level.

◊ It was suggested that four key positions be established within the PLANELM – namely a training and rostering officer, a planning and coordination officer, a logistics officer, and a head for the civilian component.

◊ The civilian components should be included in all Technical Assessment Missions.

◊ A “civilian” civil-military coordinator should also be included.

Some of the more general aspects that were highlighted and discussed under the theme of staffing are:

• Regional contributions were a major topic of discussion, particularly when pertaining to the kind of capacity that RECs/RMs would develop for their respective regions and for the AU. The sources of the contributions of civilian capacity were also discussed, and it was suggested that the AU recruitment process should primarily involve contributions from the RECs/RMs. In this way, RECs/RMs should be cognisant of the fact that, as they develop their own capacity, this capacity may also be utilised for the AU. Whilst the RECs/RMs cannot provide the 600 – 1 000 personnel as in the UN system, a realistic expectation or goal should be in place to guide and determine the structure of an AU PSO.

• It was shared that the office of the SRCC may not have the time and/or resources to undertake the daily coordination associated with interdepartmental briefings and meetings, and that this and related tasks could be implemented by a Chief of Staff (a very senior manager). Alternatively, it was suggested that, considering the limited human resources capacity, such daily mission management functions could be undertaken by the deputy SRCC, who could also serve in place of the SRCC when he/she is unavailable.

• There was a strong feeling that the mission and component planning cells should be distinguished from each other, so as to ensure that there would be no overlap and
unnecessary multiplicity of roles and functions. Some planning would take place at mission level and would be undertaken by the mission planning cell, consisting of military, police and civilian staff. Additionally, there should be component planning cells that would focus on planning for their individual components. The civilian component would thus have its own planning staff that would focus on planning civilian operations, as well as having representation on the mission planning cell.

- A question was raised in the area of humanitarian activities, as to what the role of the mission would be in dealing with displaced persons. The response was that the bodies responsible for internally displaced persons (IDPs) would be the UN agencies, international NGOs and local authorities, but there would be a need for coordination between them and the AU mission, which would most likely be responsible for overall security. It was suggested that, at the planning and coordination level, a humanitarian liaison position be created to ensure good coordination between the AU mission and the humanitarian community.

- Some participants were of the strong opinion that a generic civilian staffing structure should be developed that could work across the regions; this to the end of ensuring harmonisation of approach throughout the continent.

- The situation on the ground, and the time and financial constraints involved in preparing and bringing civilians on board, would be the key factors determining the numbers of civilians required at each deployment phase.

- Some comments for reflection focused on the element of time with regard to the waves of civilian deployment. The timing of waves is critical and sometimes difficult to predict; however, it would be important that the most experienced people are deployed in the first wave, so that they can deal adequately with functional gaps.

- There was a note that, when an African PSO is handed over to the UN, a core AU presence should remain on the ground to ensure continuity. The AU would typically establish an AU office that would replace its PSO when such a mission ends, or is handed over to the UN.

### 4.2. Theme 2: Overview of recruitment options

#### 4.2.1. Purpose

The goal of this element of the workshop was to generate recommendations on the types and methods of recruitment of civilian personnel for the ASF, so that the AU PSOD and RECs/RMs can have clear guidelines as to how they should go about identifying and recruiting civilian personnel for the ASF. The workshop was briefed on the relevant policies in place, as well as the key areas for consideration when discussing recruitment of ASF civilian staff.8

#### 4.2.2. Background

Recruitment refers to the identification and hiring of civilian staff for the ASF. It occurs in two contexts: firstly, civilian staff for the PLANELMs at the AU PSOD and regional brigades,

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8 This section of the report is based on a background paper prepared by Cedric de Coning for the workshop on the Recruitment of the Civilian Dimension of the ASF. It is available from ACCORD and the AU PSOD.
and secondly, civilians on standby for potential deployment as part of the regional brigades themselves. For the former, the recruitment of permanent or contract staff working for the PSOD and the regional PLANELMs is referred to and, for the latter, this refers to recruiting persons into a standby arrangement, and involving them in the training courses and exercises meant to operationalise the ASF, with a view of them being pre-screened, pre-trained and potentially available for recruitment for future AU or REC/RM PSOs. For the latter context, some of the civilians could be assigned to fill specific positions for brigade exercises, etc.

Civilian PSO staff differ from military and police personnel in two important aspects. Firstly, they are not necessarily civil servants working for AU member states, and made available to the ASF on an offer or secondment basis. They could also be individuals directly recruited from the private sector or civil society. For instance, most civilians working in UN peacekeeping operations are individually recruited by the UN on a contract basis for specific missions. Secondly, it is not possible to assign individuals to positions in a regional brigade and assume that they would be readily available for deployment, in the same way that an infantry battalion is available to the ASF once offered. It is thus necessary to recruit more staff into a standby roster system. In this way, several persons would be available for each of the positions identified. Some required skills may differ from mission to mission – language skills, for example – and it may thus be wise to have several people that could fill the same position, but with different language and other such skills.

Once the brigade PLANELMs have developed civilian staffing tables, and defined the positions contained therein (in other words, the job descriptions), they could then begin to recruit civilian personnel into a standby roster for the brigades. It is foreseeable that the individual vacancy announcements may become over-subscribed (more applicants per post than could be accommodated in the standby roster). In this instance, apart from the requirements listed in the job description and vacancy announcement (such as level of education, experience and health), the regional PLANELMs would likely also have to consider issues such as gender balance, language balance, religious balance and geographical representation. The regional brigades and the AU would thus have to address the kind of balances that they would like to see reflected in their rosters. Attention to these types of details would also ensure that any future AU or REC/RM PSO would have at its disposal personnel who have the requisite skills necessary to operate anywhere in its potential area of deployment.

4.2.3. Secondments and direct recruitment

The workshop was also tasked with considering whether the ASF should make use of secondments from member states or direct hiring by the AU or RECs/RMs. The implications of each should be carefully weighed.

4.2.3.1. Secondments

Secondments imply that member states respond to PLANELM vacancy announcements by offering some of their nationals – most probably current-serving civil servants – to fill these civilian positions. It may also imply, depending on how the arrangement is structured, that the sending state retains the responsibility for the basic salary of the persons it is seconding to
such a PLANELM, whilst the PLANELM assumes responsibility for any additional allowances and related costs. Most, if not all, military and police staff officers currently serving in regional PLANELMs are seconded to these bodies, so both the PLANELMs and the member states are familiar with these arrangements. Most civilians working for the AUC and RECs/RMs, and for similar bodies such as the UN or the EU, are however individually recruited. It is thus important to understand the merits and demerits of both types of recruitment processes.

**Merits of secondment**
- Recruitment is made easier in that the onus is on member states to offer, instead of on the PLANELM to fill, positions. When there are vacancies, the PLANELM could call on the willingness of member states to offer personnel.
- If member states contribute to the cost of the participation of their nationals in the regional brigade’s roster, training and exercises, it would lessen the brigade’s dependency on support from partners.
- In some cases, specialised skills may not exist in the private sector and, in such cases, PLANELMs could turn to member states to second specialised staff.

**Demerits of secondments**
- Member states may be reluctant to release some of their civil servants for service with the regional PLANELMs, especially when these persons are fulfilling critical functions in their national civil service.
- Some of the specialised categories of staff may not have equivalents in the civil service, or may be in such short supply that member states may not be willing to release their specialists.
- Thus, PLANELMs may not necessarily get the most qualified or best suited personnel, as they would have to make do with the personnel offered by member states.
- Once a person has been offered through secondment and is found to be unsuitable, it is extremely difficult to replace them, as issues of national sentiments and formal PLANELM to member state relations have to be taken into consideration. The UN and others have found this problem to be particularly difficult to deal with.
- Accepting personnel offered by member states may make it difficult for the PLANELM to meet all its criteria, such as gender, language, religion and geographical representation.

### 4.2.3.2. Direct hiring

The direct hiring of staff implies that the individual is hired on his/her own merit on contract basis by the organisation responsible for the PSO, e.g. the AU, in the cases of AMIB or AMIS, or a REC like ECOWAS. This typically implies that staff vacancies are advertised in public and through member states; that applicants apply in their individual capacities; that the responsible organisation selects a shortlist of candidates, interviews those selected, makes a final choice, and makes an offer of employment to the selected candidate. If the candidate accepts the offer, then an employment contract is entered into with the candidate. The net effect is that the responsible organisation hires civilian staff on an individual basis from the civil service, private
sector or civil society. If the person so hired is a serving civil servant, he/she should be released from service for duty with the PLANELM on either a secondment basis, or on an unpaid leave basis, or released altogether – depending on the respective policies of the member state and the responsible organisation.

**Merits of direct hiring**

- The key advantage of the direct hiring system is that the responsible organisation could hire individuals on merit.
- The responsible organisation could satisfy its gender, language, religious and geographic balance requirements more easily.
- Once persons are hired, the responsible organisation employing the individual has control over the evaluation, advancement or release of the person on merit.

**Demerits of direct hiring**

- There may be highly qualified staff available in the civil services of member states who may not be interested in such positions if they are not advertised on a secondment basis, and thus requires them to leave the civil service.
- There may be specialised skills that are not available in the private sector or civil society.
- Direct hiring may require more effort on the side of the responsible organisation, and may take longer and require more resources.
- Direct hiring of civilian staff implies that the responsible organisation would assume full responsibility for the remuneration of its civilian staff. This arrangement may put more stress on the financial resources of the organisation, and eventually lead to over-reliance on external partner support.

4.2.3.3. Combining secondments and direct hiring

It is also possible for the AU and RECs/RMs to choose to make use of both systems. They may use secondments for certain positions, and direct hiring for others – depending on the availability of certain skills, or on the availability of resources. Or they may choose to use secondments as a first choice, and then revert to direct hiring to fill those positions that they are not able to fill via secondments, or to meet some of its own criteria such as gender, language, religion and geographic representation.

4.2.4. Recruitment for PLANELMs

Recruiting staff for service in PLANELMs should follow the normal procedures for hiring staff in their respective organisations, or could be a test case for the specific hiring processes established for ASF purposes.

4.2.5. Recruitment for regional brigades

The recruitment of civilian staff for regional brigades could take two forms. In regions where a small brigade HQ exists, civilian staff hiring would follow the same process as for hiring staff for the PLANELMs.
In most cases, however, civilian staff would be recruited onto standby rosters for the regional brigades, and this process requires special consideration as it is a completely different form of “recruitment”. It is unlike “normal recruitment” in that the persons are not offered employment directly, but placed on a standby roster that may eventually lead to employment. However, to ensure a fast-track employment process, personnel are pre-selected for specific appointments. Should the need arise, there is no delay in them being offered the opportunity and their employment contracts could be swiftly processed.

This process would require that regional PLANELMs need a recruitment policy, a standby roster, and a rapid-recruitment employment and deployment process that could fast-track PSO requirements.

The civilian standby rosters need to be designed on the basis of the civilian staffing tables agreed upon by the PLANELM (see Table B). Each position should be filled by several persons on the standby roster, giving a range of personnel to choose from who meet mission-specific criteria (such as language, etc.). When the standby roster is designed, a ratio of persons per post would need to be decided on for each category of post.

Such a roster would thus be populated by following a type of recruitment process:

- advertising the positions
- screening and selecting applicants
- selecting applicants
- entering into some kind of contract or arrangement with them
- exposing them to training opportunities, and making use of them for regional brigade exercises
- replacing them with new personnel when they are no longer available.

### 4.2.6. Rapid recruitment and deployment

The type of contract or arrangement entered into requires special consideration. Depending on the level of rapid deployment required, a PLANELM may want to enter into a temporary contract with staff for a limited period, to ensure their availability. For instance, should Regional Brigade X be placed on high readiness status for a certain period, e.g. 30 days, the PLANELM may wish to ensure that it is able to deploy the required civilian staff on short notice. It would thus pre-select, from the roster, the required civilian staff for the first wave of deployment, and offer them a special contract wherein they agree to be available for deployment for that set period of time. This implies, for instance, that they agree not to take up other employment over that period, or that they are required to give a certain number of days’ notice if they do. Such contracts may not necessarily require a remuneration component, but could include a nominal amount to meet legal requirements, or an honorarium.

PLANELMs may also wish to make use of such short-term contracts to recruit civilian staff for regional brigade exercises. Such an arrangement would both ensure the availability of key civilian staff for such exercises, and test the PLANELM or RECs/RMs’ short-term rapid recruitment/employment/deployment systems.
Another possibility for the PLANELMs is to have virtual contracts in place with a number of civilian staff at any given time, which could be activated at short notice when needed, following a specific procedure. In other words, it could enter into a formal recruitment process with a number of civilian staff who are on a standby roster, and undertake all the selection and screening processes necessary, up to and including entering into a draft or virtual contract with the prospective employee. In this case, should employment become necessary, there would be no delays due to screening, the checking of qualifications and references, the obtaining of health certificates, etc., as they would already have been completed. The only steps necessary would be a formal offer of employment, and acceptance by the candidate.

The same process could be tested and followed for short-term contracts, for participation in brigade exercises. Having such a process in place would greatly add to the operational capability and high-readiness of a regional brigade. However, it would also imply certain maintenance costs, as the number of persons on this level of readiness would have to be constantly maintained, and this implies continuously processing new candidates as others leave the system due to changes in their availability status.

The third element of the process is a rapid deployment capacity, and the PLANELMs would have to consider what systems are necessary to ensure that civilian staff, once employed, can be sent to the mission area as soon as possible.

4.2.7. Key issues emerging from the plenary discussion

To ensure the smooth – and in some cases rapid – recruitment of civilian personnel for AU and REC/RM PSOs, the regional PLANELMs need to consider a number of issues related to the recruitment, employment and deployment of civilian staff. The workshop was thus required to consider and make recommendations as to:

• the type of contracts that may be needed for the different categories of employment, e.g. for PLANELM staff, for brigade staff (i.e. persons on the civilian standby roster), and a sub-category earmarked for rapid deployment (and which may need contracts that can be activated at short notice).

The workshop group deliberated the issue of recruitment under three key priority areas:

◊ Recruitment methods – secondment versus direct hiring:

• It was recommended that recruitment policies be developed to guide the AU PSOD and the RECs/RMs in the process for acquiring civilian staff.

• The majority of participants viewed the process of secondment as an attractive option, as it would serve to ensure member states’ buy-in and ownership, more than the process of direct hiring. With secondment, member states could be actively engaged in the process of identifying and nominating key civilians.

• Headhunting – i.e. actively seeking to fill specific positions, regardless of whether through secondments or direct hiring – was also viewed as an acceptable method for the recruitment of specific key positions.
• In considering candidates for recruitment, the RECs/RMs should take advantage of the diversity and scope of expertise that exists within civil society.

• Whilst some felt that the position of the head of the civilian component of the PLANELM should be filled through the process of secondment (as it allowed for linkage and ownership between the member states and the respective PLANELM), others felt equally strongly that the head of the civilian component should be selected through a process of direct hiring – as this allowed for continuity and institutional memory. It was further emphasised that the head of the civilian component should have significant mission experience, should be politically neutral and should pledge allegiance and commitment to achieving the objectives of the region and not those of the contributing country – all of which further strengthen the argument that the individual be recruited through direct hiring. In deciding which method to employ, it was felt that the respective REC/RM or AUC should be given the flexibility to determine the most suitable option.

• With regards to the more technical civilian positions within the PLANELM, there was a general agreement that these positions could be recruited through direct hiring, so as to ensure access to a broader pool of expertise that may not reside within the capacity of member states, and/or limited-supply expertise that may not be available for release to the PLANELM.

◊ The types of contracts needed for PLANELM staff:

• At a minimum, the contracts should be for two to three years, with a six-month probationary period, to allow for more depth and sustainability as well as to guard against a loss of institutional memory. At the AUC, three-year secondment periods are the current practise, and this could also be applied to the RECs/RMs. The contracts should be renewable, and should be timed appropriately so that there is no loss of institutional memory and no gaps between staff changes.

• There was a concern raised regarding the fact that donors and partners also determine the length of contracts which may limit the control of the AUC and the RECs/RMs in deciding the exact time frames for these contracts.

◊ Contracts for brigade staff:

• Short-term rotational (and renewable) contracts of up to three years could be explored.

• It was suggested that four to six positions within the brigade be pre-selected and placed on standby. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or letter of intent would then be concluded between the individuals and the roster. When an individual determined that he/she was no longer available for standby, he/she should inform the brigade so that a replacement could be identified.
4.3. Theme 3: Proposed roster models for the ASF

4.3.1. Purpose
During this section of the workshop, the concept of civilian standby rosters as a tool for the rapid mobilisation and deployment of skilled civilians for peace support and humanitarian missions was considered.\(^9\)

4.3.2. Background
In light of the difficulties associated with identifying and recruiting civilian personnel in a wide array of PSOs and post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction tasks, a number of standby rosters have been developed to increase the efficiency and speed with which civilian personnel can be recruited and deployed.

Once a standby roster is populated with suitable candidates, it offers obvious benefits as a recruitment tool, including speed and responsiveness, transparency, homogeneity, accessibility and low maintenance costs. Rosters also encourage merit-based selection, as the easiest way of filtering candidates is by searching for relevant qualifications and experience. The use of civilian standby rosters in various forms has led to the creation of a number of different types of rosters. The UN currently recognises seven national rosters\(^10\), two regional rosters\(^11\) and three international NGO rosters.\(^12\)

4.3.3. Costs
While there are obvious benefits associated with utilising a roster system, the development of rosters inevitably involves considerable costs and expertise. The most significant human resources and financial cost of roster management relates to the process of screening and “clearing” candidates for placement on a roster, and then ensuring their retention. These costs vary with the size of the roster, the number of applications it contains, and the screening strategies that the ASF decides to adopt.

A number of strategies have been employed by the AU Conflict Management Division Roster, the African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace-building Missions (AFDEM), and other renowned roster/database institutions, for instance, to limit the human resources/screening costs.

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\(^9\) This section of the report is based on a background paper prepared by Nhlanhla Dube and Eustace Chiwombe for the workshop on the Rostering of the Civilian Dimension of the ASF. It is available from ACCORD and the AU PSOD.

\(^10\) Canadian Civilian Reserve (CANADEM, Canada); France Cooperation Internale (FCI, France); ZIF Experts Pool, Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF, Germany); Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM, Norway); Swiss Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding; UK Stabilisation Unit; and Civilian Reserve Corps, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (USA).


\(^12\) African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Missions (AFDEM); International Legal Assistance Consortium; and Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief.
These include:

- limiting the size of the roster
- adopting just-in-time, competitive screening
- reducing the costs of “in-house” screening
- incremental screening in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity
- developing targeted advertising strategies
- introducing automated, electronic techniques to filter out unsuitable applicants
- pooling personnel information
- linkages (e.g. with training and deploying agencies).

4.3.4. Effectiveness

Roster effectiveness and functionality is largely determined by the personal will, commitment and availability of the candidates. An ASF roster would have to devise commitment and retention mechanisms to ensure that candidates remain committed to availing themselves for AU and REC/RM deployments. If not, resources would be invested in candidates who may not have an obligation to make themselves available for the AU missions. One option that needs to be considered is member states seconding civilian personnel through the RECs/RMs to the ASF roster, but this adds additional layers of bureaucracy and more stakeholders that need to be coordinated – first at national level, and then at regional level.

4.3.5. Potential ASF roster models

Three potential models, which illustrate the different options available to the AU and RECs/RMs, were presented to the workshop. The models were not exhaustive but formed a base for discussion.

4.3.5.1. Model 1: ASF rapid deployment roster and an external roster

The ASF might create and manage an internal rapid deployment roster of pre-screened, pre-trained, and pre-agreed “available” individuals who are already working in the AUC REC/RM system. These individuals would provide the core staff for the mission start-up phase, i.e. for the first 60 to 100 days of a new mission. Agreements have to be reached and honoured so that, when individuals are needed, they would be released within an agreed time frame by their respective departments. By having an internal rapid deployment roster, core positions could be filled by individuals who already have knowledge of the AU and REC/RM systems, procedures, culture and ethics. It also allows the ASF the lead time in which to recruit and deploy the medium- to long-term staff, who would replace the mission start-up group deployed via the rapid deployment roster.

For the second phase of recruitment, the AU may enter into a formalised agreement, possibly in the form of an MoU, with one or more already-existing African rosters. The agreement
signed between the two parties should set the parameters of the relationship, with clear roles and responsibilities of each party. The MoU would be a mechanism that assures the AU, or RECs/RMs, of commitment and responsiveness from an organisation functioning from outside its structures.

These independent rosters would, based on the MoUs, establish and maintain a civilian standby roster of African specialists on behalf of the AU and the RECs/RMs. The number and type of candidates would be determined by the AU and RECs/RMs, and would be specified in the MoU. The candidates should be pre-trained and screened, against specific ASF-approved positions.

If the AU or RECs/RMs require a rapid deployment capability, then a number of candidates – as determined by the AU and RECs/RMs – could be placed in a high-readiness category. Typically, this would imply that this group has pre-approved contracts that could be activated within a short time frame. If their availability needs to be guaranteed, they could be asked to sign a short-term availability contract, against a retainer, on a 30-day high-readiness (24-hour notice) period. This is obviously an expensive capacity, and it is recommended that the AU and RECs/RMs rather make use of the internal rapid deployment roster (suggested earlier) for its rapid response capacity.

The use of independent rosters for the medium- to long-term deployment needs of the ASF system allows for more effective and efficient use of roster resources, as the same roster capacity could be used for other AU and REC/RM purposes, e.g. election monitoring, mediation support, post-conflict reconstruction, etc. It is also flexible enough to serve the UN and other international and regional agencies and NGOs. The AFDEM roster, for instance, has current agreements with AMISOM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), the Swedish Rescue Services, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and ACCORD.

**Operational arrangements of Model 1**

- The ASF would identify what types of civilian personnel it needs, as well as the number of personnel in each category it would be likely to deploy, and generate generic vacancy announcements for these positions.

- The independent roster would use the generic vacancies to identify, select and register individuals that meet the ASF requirements onto the roster.

- Candidates selected for the ASF roster would need to meet the education, training and experience requirements specified in the vacancy announcements, and would undergo further specific ASF training to remain active on the roster. Some of these candidates would be selected by the AU and RECs/RMs to participate in ASF and regional brigade exercises.

- The MoU between the AUC, RECs/RMs and the roster(s) would specify a liaison arrangement that would ensure regular reporting, monitoring and verification of the candidates on the roster, as well as regular training and exercises to ensure that the recruitment arrangements between the roster and the AUC or RECs/RMs are regularly tested and exercised.

- Within the AUC and REC/RM structures, a specific focal point (e.g. one of the civilian planning officers in the AUC and REC/RM PLANELMs) should assume responsibility for the AUC or REC/RM roster – both the internal rapid deployment roster and the external medium- to long-term roster.
**Merits of Model 1**

- Using already-serving AU employees for the crucial role of a mission start-up rapid deployment roster assures that the initial mission structures are staffed by personnel familiar with AU procedures, rules and regulations. This would improve mission effectiveness, especially in the first crucial months when staff who know the system would be much more effective.

- Utilising already-existing independent rostering service providers that have experience in roster management means that the ASF would take advantage of already-established systems, and would thus save on the time and resources that would otherwise be invested in establishing such systems.

- The creation of rosters requires substantial resources, both human and financial. Independent rosters have their own resources and, by entering into an agreement with the type of employment arrangements, e.g. secondments from member states, the direct hiring of individuals, or a combination of both.

- An already-existing roster, the ASF would leverage existing investments. AFDEM is, for instance, funded by Norway, which means that the AUC and RECs/RMs could rather use their own resources for other purposes.

**Demerits of Model 1**

- One of the biggest challenges for the mission start-up phase is the commitment of the various departments that would have to release their staff from their crucial day-to-day duties, at short notice, with no immediate replacements. The UN DPKO tried to establish a similar internal rapid deployable system, but it was not effective because departments were reluctant to release their staff. In addition, the missions often extended staff contracts beyond the initial 90-day period, because they were unable to find replacements within that period.

**4.3.5.2. Model 2: ASF/REC integrated roster**

The second model provides for an ASF roster, established and managed by the AU, with subsidiary rosters at each of the RECs, linked up into one overall ASF roster. Candidates registered onto the RECs’ rosters would be made available for the AU-led missions, as well as missions led by the respective RECs/regions. The main ASF roster would retain control over the selection process for ASF missions. There would be a roster coordinator at the AUC and at each REC/RM, who would manage each respective roster and liaise between the REC/RM and the AUC. The AUC should provide a central database capacity and staff, with satellite capacities at each REC/RM. If the AU and RECs choose to make use of secondments from member states, mechanisms could be created to establish further subsidiary satellite coordinators and databases at a national level. The training of roster candidates would be coordinated by the AUC and REC/RM training officers.
Merits of Model 2

- The rosters would be owned and managed by the AUC and RECs/RMs.

Demerits of Model 2

- The AUC, and most of the RECs/RMs, do not have the additional staff capacity, civilian specialists and resources to establish, maintain and follow up on such civilian standby rosters. If this option is preferred, additional donor support and external expertise would be necessary.

- If the AUC and RECs choose to make extensive use of secondments in this model, it may end up having less influence on choosing the best personnel for any given mission, as it would have to make use of the personnel offered by the member states. Member states may face the same problems as the AUC and RECs, i.e. they might be reluctant to make crucial staff available for AU or REC/RM missions, especially at short notice.

- This option would require a significant investment in additional resources for the AUC and RECs/RMs.

- This model risks duplication with the independent rosters.

4.3.5.3. Model 3: ASF stand-alone roster

In this model, the AUC would be responsible for the development and maintenance of an ASF civilian standby roster with no direct links to similar rosters, if any, at the level of the RECs/RMs. The roster could be housed at the PSOD or the Human Resources Department of the AUC, and would cater specifically for AU PSOs. The PSOD/Human Resources Department would be responsible for the development and management of the roster as well as the identifying, selecting, registering and training of candidates from across the continent. The assumption underlying this model is that it would be too expensive, both in terms of human and financial resources, to operationalise Model 1 and Model 2. Apart from establishing a roster at the AU level, these models also require establishing a roster at each REC/RM (Model 2) or an independent roster (Model 1). Model 3 thus assumes that it would be more effective and efficient to develop this capacity only at the level of the AU.

Also, if the AUC relies on the RECs/RMs, and if all the RECs/RMs have not developed their respective regional civilian rosters, the AUC may end up in a situation where it is unable to ensure overall continental representation in its missions. If the AU takes responsibility for creating a continental standby roster, it could ensure that all the regions, languages, religions, etc. are proportionally represented. Model 3 is most in line with the way that the UN DPKO operates, and the standby roster and recruitment system could then be designed as one overall system, where those recruited also automatically become part of the roster, for potential future deployments.

Merits of Model 3

- The AUC would be in full control of the roster and its own mission needs, and it would thus not be dependent on independent rosters, or the RECs/RMs.

- The standby roster and recruitment system could be integrated, similar to the DPKO system.
Demerits of Model 3

- This option would require a significant commitment and investment in additional resources for the AUC. If not, there is the danger that it would end up with more or less the existing recruitment system, without a meaningful standby roster capacity.

- The model risks duplication with those RECs/RMs that are planning to establish their own standby rosters, in line with their own regional and overall ASF expectations.

- The model risks duplication with the independent rosters.

Two key recommendations were proposed to the workshop, including that:

- The AU and RECs/RMs would have to take into account the potential resources available for establishing this capacity, as well as the likelihood of investing these resources in the context of competing priorities.

- Models 1 and 2 would establish the most wide-ranging and interlocking capacities, whilst Model 3 would establish the most focused capacity. Model 1 is probably the most pragmatic option, as it provides for a limited internal rapid deployment capacity at the level of the AU and RECs/RMs (although not all the RECs/RMs are likely to operationalise such a capacity equally), as well as an outsourced medium- to long-term standby roster capacity.

4.3.6. Key issues emerging from the plenary discussion

With the above discussion in mind, the workshop group also aimed to consider the various rostering options for the ASF. Three panellists presented papers, which shared regional and international best practise, an overview of standby rosters and the civilian database that is being established by the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the AUC. The key areas of discussion are summarised as follows:

- Generally, participants were in favour of Model 1 – the ASF rapid deployment roster and an external roster, as it also caters to the issue of rapid deployment. Additionally, it was suggested that the model should also include time frames for the deployment of the various personnel. The model had more chances of being “live” and less costly than the other proposed models. One of the disadvantages of Model 1, however, was that some felt that it does not afford the AUC and RECs/RMs sufficient ownership of the rosters. As a means of overcoming this limitation, over and above the MoU and day-to-day coordination, it was recommended that a governing board – consisting of representatives from the AUC and RECs/RMs, who could meet regularly to oversee the management of the independent roster(s) on behalf of the AU and RECs/RMs – be established.

- It was recommended that the AUC should provide civilian start-up capacity for Wave 1 (Table A) deployments, whilst the rosters for the RECs/RMs should be utilised for Wave 2 and Wave 3 deployments. However, it was stated that the AUC and RECs/RMs would, in reality, not have the ability to deploy even the first 15 to 20 civilian staff from within existing AU or REC/RM staff. This is because the AU and RECs/RMs do not have 15 to 20 people to spare, with these requisite skills, that it could deploy for a period of 60 to 90 days, due to human resources limitations. The AUC and
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REC/RM human resources departments also do not have the additional capacity at present to manage the range of tasks required for civilian rostering and recruitment for the ASF.

- It was strongly emphasised that, whichever model was decided upon, it would need to be simple, manageable and easy to use and resource. Quality control mechanisms should also be built into the roster, and these could include competencies, qualifications and the training history of the individuals, among other aspects. These individuals should also be exposed to periodic training and testing, and should also be incorporated in simulation exercises.
- The roster should be populated through governments/ministries of foreign affairs, NGOs, civil society organisations and public advertisements.
- There needs to be awareness that there could be competitors vying for a limited pool of African civilian experts such as the UN, NGOs, etc., which could present a challenge to building and sustaining a healthy roster.
- A recommendation was made that a technical workshop – focusing on the process, required infrastructure, technical expertise, etc. of rostering – be organised, so as to increase understanding and discuss ways in which to coordinate the development of an ASF roster. The workshop would bring together the AUC and RECs/RMs, as well as institutions and individuals who have rostering expertise and knowledge. As a core principle, the AUC should assume the lead and work towards the establishment of an interlinked network amongst the commission and regions, coordinated by the commission.

4.4. Theme 4: Training for the civilian staff of the ASF

4.4.1. Purpose

This aspect of the workshop aimed at discussing the issue of the training of civilians for ASF PSOs, which is a critical consideration – bearing in mind that the operational capability of the ASF would be dependent on the level of preparedness of its various components, amongst other factors.13

4.4.2. Background

One of the key features associated with the paradigm shift from traditional to complex multidimensional peacekeeping has been the increase and diversification of the civilian functions included in peacekeeping mandates including, inter alia, electoral assistance, the promotion of human rights, the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the protection of vulnerable groups. The expansion of civilian roles has also resulted in increasing training needs for civilian peacekeepers. The fact that civilians are not deployed in identifiable groups like the military and police components, and the fact that they represent a large number of different functions, has resulted in training for civilians happening in a largely ad hoc fashion. Consequently, there has been a lack of sufficiently trained and qualified civilian personnel (in terms of knowledge and skills) for PSOs.

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13 This section of the report is based on a background paper prepared by Yvonne Kasumba for the workshop on the Training of the Civilian Dimension of the ASF. It is available from ACCORD and the AU PSOD.
Over the last decade, however, the situation has improved owing to, among other factors, greater recognition and understanding of the roles and functions of civilian peacekeepers and an increase in the amount of funding available for civilian training, both on the African continent and beyond. A number of training initiatives have been developed by various African peacekeeping training centres to provide specialised training for civilian peacekeepers. Most African peacekeeping training centres also offer opportunities for integrated civilian, police and military training. In addition, African civilian personnel have been able to benefit from peacekeeping and peacebuilding-related training offered by international institutions.

However, the need to develop a civilian capacity for the ASF would significantly increase the need for civilian peacekeeping training, and calls for a much more systematic approach than has been followed to date.

4.4.3. Levels and types of training required

Most civilians who are currently deployed in UN or AU missions have not benefited from any specific peacekeeping training. Individual civilian peacekeepers are experts in their chosen profession, e.g. lawyers, journalists, political analysts, etc. but they need guidance on how to apply their expertise in the highly physically and psychologically challenging, multicultural and dynamic peace operations environment. Being a lawyer in such a context could be an altogether different thing to being a lawyer in a “normal” peace-time and national context.

Training for civilian peacekeepers in the ASF context could include the following types/levels of training:

- **Mission preparedness (generic) training**

  This takes the form of a foundation course for civilians interested in serving in a variety of roles in AU missions, and aims to provide participants with the core knowledge and skills they would require to serve in PSOs. Such training could also be provided to civilians who are already deployed in missions, with the aim of improving upon their knowledge and qualifications. This training should orientate participants to the key functional areas and the main actors involved in AU PSOs, and would include, inter alia:

  ◊ the modern AU PSO environment
  ◊ the roles and responsibilities of the civilian, police and military peacekeepers
  ◊ key functional skills such as assessments, planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation
  ◊ cross-cutting issues such as human rights; gender; protection, conduct and discipline, HIV/AIDS and cultural awareness.

- **Mission-specific training**

  This is training that is tailored to reflect the mandate or specific environmental context within which a mission is deployed, as well as reflecting the specific roles and responsibilities of the civilian, police and military peacekeepers; other partners and local authorities; and the specific political, security, development and social-cultural context of the conflict system where the mission would be deployed.
• **Specialisation training**

This is advanced training that targets civilians who are already engaged in, or earmarked for, specialist activities (for example, conflict management; mission planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation; and management). The training aims to build on the existing skills of the civilian peacekeepers, and to prepare them for more specialised, senior or management positions, by learning from resource persons with extensive knowledge in that particular field. Specialised courses may be offered as mission preparedness, mission-specific or in-mission courses, as appropriate.

• **End-of-mission “training”**

The learning process, both for the individual civilian specialist and the ASF, should not terminate once the individual’s contract expires. Some form of end-of-mission “training” should be provided, and should focus on such aspects as debriefing and evaluation, to help the ASF draw out lessons learned that may inform future training.

In addition to the above, the training of civilian staff of the AUC and the secretariats of RECs or RMs should be targeted as a matter of priority. Persons working at this level undertake their regular tasks without necessarily appreciating the fact that they also have a role to play in terms of support to, or as participants in, AU or REC/RM PSOs. A lack of awareness by persons operating at this level, especially those in positions of leadership and who have critical decision-making roles, could serve to hinder the development and eventual deployment of AU or REC/RM PSOs. They need to understand that the preparation for and deployment of peace support missions is an all-encompassing affair involving, for instance, all AUC departments either directly or indirectly, and is not limited to only the AU PSOD. This requires the involvement of political affairs, finance, administration, human resources and legal departments, and so forth. Training at this level should focus on a general orientation to PSOs and the roles of their respective departments (for e.g. finance) in preparing and supporting these operations.

### 4.4.4. Course curricula

Quite importantly, the course curricula for civilian training needs to be approached from the perspective of an integrated mission which, in the AU context, refers essentially to the multidimensionality (civilian, police and military) of a mission as well as the coordination and cooperation that exists between these components and the overall multidimensional mission management and support structures. All civilian personnel working within the mission would need to have a good working level understanding of the integrated mission concept, in both the AU and UN contexts. Integrated training should, very importantly, also target those at senior leadership level and persons who would work closely together at both the HQ and sector levels on key aspects such as assessments, planning, coordination, management and evaluation.

Thus, a module on integrated missions should be incorporated into the various training courses, with the aim of fostering a general awareness of the concept (i.e. the intent and objectives thereof) versus its structures and mechanisms, which may differ from mission to mission. Such awareness of the integrated mission concept should serve overall to inform the
ethos and attitudes of personnel, and should inform their daily work. Training on integrated missions could be delivered at all levels and in all types of training.

Two possible options for integrated training are: The military, police and civilian components can participate in a fully integrated course where they are learning together consistently for a one-to-two week period, e.g. in staff officers, integrated planning or civil-military coordination courses.

- The military, police and civilian components have their own specialised training courses parallel to each other over the same time period, and come together for specifically selected modules, e.g. civil military coordination, conceptual frameworks, integrated missions or conflict management. In this example, a regional PSO training centre would conduct a military staff officers’ course, an AU police officers’ course and a civilian mission preparedness course alongside each other at the same venue, or in the same vicinity, and bring the three groups together for integrated sessions on the topics mentioned, as well as for an overall integrated exercise.

Some opportunities for integrated training include:
- **AU senior management level training**

  The AU Senior Mission Leaders Course (AU SMLC) is a good example of a fully integrated (military, police and civilian) course that targets those at the senior management level. This course, though consistent with UN doctrine and practise, is very much tailored to the African context. Accordingly, it makes good use of African structures, approaches, case studies, facilitators etc.

  The curriculum at this level of training may include such modules as:
  - conflict analysis
  - ASF vision/concept
  - strategic leadership
  - resource management
  - partnerships and UN support
  - planning
  - gender.

  Continuing challenges at this level include ensuring appropriately qualified participants are nominated/selected for the course, and improving the AUC/REC/RM/member state coordination so as to ensure timely response to requests for nominations, among other things.

- **ASF and regional brigade training exercises**

  There are also a number of ASF training exercises that have been charted by the RECs/regions, brigades, PLANELMs and centres of excellence, some jointly with external partners. The relevant civilian training service providers should participate in exercises including assisting in the exercise planning process; assisting as monitors, observers, resource persons etc. and participating in post-scenario evaluations. One of the key benefits of participating in such exercises would be that the lessons learned and other observations deduced could be used to further inform an institution’s training.
• Civilian training courses

Specific training courses aimed at the civilian components of AU and REC/RM PSOs would prepare civilians to serve in AU PSOs alongside their military and police counterparts. The course curriculum should incorporate a selection of the modules listed below. This is not an exhaustive list, but a representation of some of the minimum modules that should be contained in a curriculum. These modules should always be informed by the realities on the ground and the needs of the ASF:

◊ conceptual frameworks: introduction to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding
◊ institutional frameworks: the AU, UN, sub-regional organisations
◊ multidimensional peace operations, including core functional areas
◊ the role of the military, police, civilian
◊ civil-military coordination
◊ cultural awareness and cross-cultural communication
◊ mental preparation and stress management
◊ human rights
◊ international humanitarian law and human rights law
◊ humanitarian assistance
◊ DDR
◊ SSR
◊ gender perspectives
◊ protection of vulnerable groups
◊ sexual exploitation and abuse
◊ HIV/AIDS
◊ media relations
◊ conflict management including conflict analysis, negotiation, mediation and facilitation
◊ working with interpreters.

The above may also be complemented by modules on practical aspects such as:

◊ map reading
◊ radio communications
◊ road safety
◊ mine awareness
◊ personal safety, hostage taking and crisis management.

These practical types of modules could be supported by military and/or police training institutions, which typically have the field exercise terrain and equipment necessary for this type of practical training, and provide further opportunities for civil-military cooperation.
4.4.5. Course methodology

The course methodologies employed would differ from institution to institution, based on factors pertaining to available resources and capacity. A general note of guidance, however, should be that institutions should strive to ensure a methodology that fosters an adult learning type or participatory learning approach. A good range of didactical techniques should be employed as and where relevant, including substantive presentations, discussions, case studies, group work and various audiovisual aids. Training could also incorporate a mix of facilitators with academic and practical experience (so as to inform on best practice); high level/high profile facilitators (SRCCs, Force Commanders or Commissioners of Police, ambassadors); and panel discussions, highlighting both divergent and complementary views and approaches.

4.4.6. Standards

The AU, together with its training partners, should develop minimum standards for civilian training. ASF training policy states that training should be designed and conducted with due consideration of ASF doctrine, AU guidelines, UN Standard Generic Training Modules (SGTM) and any other relevant AU and UN documentation. It should also take into account actual events and developments at the regional and global levels. Training standards for the ASF should be in line with UN standards, where they exist.

Course curricula and the methodologies employed by individual institutions could also serve to set the yardstick for minimum standards for ASF training. Those institutions that do not meet minimum standards should not be sidelined but should receive support to enable them to meet standards.

Ultimately, when it comes to training for civilians of the ASF, the AU should aim at the realisation of a system of civilian peacekeeping that is professional, efficient and available on demand. Once the AU has completed the identification, recruitment and rostering aspects as pertaining to civilian specialists for PSOs, preparation of these individuals becomes another critical link that would facilitate their overall operational capability. Training should not only be limited to civilians that the AU intend to deploy, but should also target those at the AUC and various REC/ RM levels, those working in peacekeeping and peacebuilding-related fields, and persons coming from national foreign ministries.

4.4.7. Key issues emerging from the plenary discussion

Overall, the workshop was tasked to discuss the various aspects related to ensuring a more systematic and long-term preparation of civilian personnel for the ASF. An important priority would be to ensure that training for civilian personnel is integrated into efforts that have already been undertaken, to ensure the readiness of military and police personnel. In addition to a presentation on an overview of the various training options, the AU PSOD delivered a presentation on the ASF training plan, and the (APSTA) presidency briefed the workshop on the ASF-APSTA relationship. The key discussion areas were:

• The training of all civilian personnel of the ASF should be a mandatory requirement prior to deployment. The achievement of this would be challenging, particularly as the core civilian staff for the ASF would be contributed not from within the RECs/RMs and AUC staff complement but from contributions from a number of sources (as highlighted above), including the member states, civil society organisations, the private sector etc. Organising training for these persons would require greater coordination and cooperation from the diverse body of training service providers on the continent.

• Civilian training service providers should strive to provide training that meets the minimum standards of training, as set out in the ASF training policy (which, in turn, is designed to be consistent with UN policy). It was shared that, amongst the regional training partners, there is a critical need to develop and agree upon the modalities for streamlining the curriculum and methodology for civilian training.

• In addition to the function-specific modules indicated in the background paper, participants also stressed the importance of the inclusion of modules such as basic communication skills, safety and first aid, personal and physical security, mine awareness, cultural communication, driving and road safety, and map reading. The emphasis on these types of modules serves to reinforce the fact that African civilians would be deployed in oftentimes hostile and hazardous environments. In this way, they would need to be physically and mentally prepared for the related challenges. Other types of modules to include would be information management, reporting and conflict management and, particularly at the senior mission leadership level, training should focus on assessment, planning and coordination.

• It was strongly recommended that the training methodology should, where appropriate, and in addition to a classroom component, include practical field and simulation training. Thus, participation of civilians in Levels I, II and III Decision Making Exercises (MAPEX, CPX and FTX) would be key. There should also be an emphasis on problem-based learning, which allows participants to identify and discuss a particular issue and come up with solutions.

• Training should consist of both integrated and single-component training.

• Facilitator exchange should be encouraged, both amongst regional training partner institutions and regional and international partner institutions, so as to allow for the exchange of experiences and the broadening of perspectives.

• The regional training centres of excellence and other civil society organisations that provide training for civilians should (through the APSTA framework) continue to cooperate closely, not only amongst each other but also with the international civilian training partners. Obtaining an appropriate profile for course participants was identified as a challenge, which requires more clearly defined selection criteria and more discerning screening of profiles. In order to avoid the current situation, in which the same individuals are repeating courses at different institutions, the regional training partners would have to work closely on devising suitable and ethical methods for sharing respective details on persons who have been trained.

15 For example, the Center for International Peace Operations (Zif), the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT).
5: CONCLUSION

The workshop had, as its main objectives, determining the type of civilian staff that would be required for the ASF, recruitment options, possibilities for the establishment of a rostering system, and the type of readiness training that would be required to ensure a professional and readily available civilian cadre of personnel for African PSO missions. In this way, it could be said that further strides were made to the ends of effecting a more systematic, thorough and coherent approach to the operationalisation of the civilian dimension of the ASF.

The workshop provided a forum in which the AU and RECs/RMs could discuss and share ideas on these aspects, both among each other and with the various other stakeholders and partners involved and/or interested in the area of civilian capacity building. It also served to create a greater awareness and understanding of the civilian dimension of PSOs – an area that is, relatively speaking, still grey, considering the decades-long dominance of the military in the peacekeeping domain.

As follow-on actions, the following recommendations (to be undertaken in the immediate short-term) were put forth by the workshop:

- Both the AUC and the RECs/RMs should work jointly on developing job descriptions for the 60+ functions that have been agreed upon, as well as developing the recruitment process for these positions.
- The AU and RECs/RMs should develop human resources policies for PSOs that address the particular needs of mission staff.
- The RECs/RMs should start with the identification of and recruitment for the 60+ positions, which translates into between 300 and 400 personnel for the roster.
- An AUC/REC/RM task team should be established to design an ASF roster, based on the discussions of this workshop.
- Funding would be critical to ensuring operationalisation. Consequently, the AUC and RECs/RMs, together with international partners, should identify adequate funding channels.
1. We, the members of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) of the African Union (AU), met at our 3rd Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 May 2009, to review the progress made in the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) to further identify the challenges ahead, in order to chart the best way forward to achieve operationalization by 2010. Our meeting was preceded by the 6th Meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff, Safety and Security and the Meeting of Experts from 11th to 14th May 2009.

2. This meeting was held within the framework of the relevant provisions of:

   a. the AU Constitutive Act;

   b. the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which, in terms of Article 13, provides for the establishment of the ASF in order to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and interventions, pursuant to Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, which stipulates that the ASF shall be composed of standby multi-disciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components, in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice;

   c. the Policy Framework on the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC, as adopted at the 3rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa in July 2004, which, inter alia, provides for the establishment of five regional brigades to constitute the ASF.

3. Our meeting afforded us an opportunity to take stock of the progress made in the establishment of the ASF as spelt out in the PSC Protocol. In this respect, we recognise...
the adoption of the ASF Roadmap II during the Consultative Meeting held in Addis Ababa from 30th to 31st July 2008, between the AUC and RECs/RMs and the Chiefs of Staff and Brigade Commanders of the regional brigades.

4. While welcoming the significant progress made in many countries and regions as a result of the steadfast efforts exerted at the level of the AUC, the RECs/RMs and individual AU Member States, we continue to be deeply concerned about the continued scourge of conflicts and instability on the continent, which cause immense suffering among African people, as well as undermine efforts towards socio-economic development.

5. Against this background, there is need to intensify the efforts aimed at making the ASF fully operational as an enforcement tool of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), to ensure that the continent is adequately equipped to meet the daunting challenges of peace, security and stability. In this respect, we:
   a. stress the urgency of the operationalization of the ASF as an important component of the APSA designed to support African efforts at conflict prevention, management and resolution;
   b. undertake to fully support the AUC, the RECs/RMs and our respective nations in the endeavour to ensure the operationalization of the ASF in the framework of APSA;

6. In assessing the different steps taken in pursuance of the relevant provisions of the PSC Protocol, we would like to:
   a. commend the Commission for the initiatives it has taken, in close collaboration with the RECs/RMs, to implement the ASF Policy Framework, guided by our recommendations, in particular through the formulation of the ASF Roadmap II, the ongoing efforts to improve upon the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) Concept, the Continental Logistics Bases (CLBs), work on the Strategic Lift Capability Concept, the Formed Police Unit (FPU) Concept, development of the Civilian Dimension and the elaboration of an ASF Training Plan 2009 – 2010, as well as the various training efforts;
   b. encourage the Commission and the RECs/RMs to vigorously pursue their efforts in order to meet the 2010 deadline for the full operationalization of the various ASF components;
   c. express our gratitude to the AU partners within the international community for having provided the essential financial support for the policy development process.

7. In order to consolidate the progress made thus far, and achieve our goal within the stipulated timeframe, we:
   a. endorse the proposal to develop Rules of Procedure for the STCDSS to enable the committee deliberate on issues appropriately and without waste of time;
   b. undertake to set up a Finance Committee to make proposals in respect of finding predictable and sustainable means of funding for AU missions and the ASF;
   c. considered the trends that emerged from our deliberation on the issue of the CLB and the view that the discussions should not be limited to the choice of the location of the CLB, but that priority should be given to the establishment of the five regional logistics depots, while the issue of the CLB should be settled subsequently. On this note, we decide that:
(1) the organizers should also pay attention to the establishment of the five regional logistics depots;

(2) the reports drafted by the experts mandated by the Commission in 2007 and 2009 should be distributed to member states;

(3) the issue of the CLB will be decided subsequently in the light of the original reports of the technical evaluation missions carried out in 2007 and 2009;

d. request the AUC to come out with the cost implications of the Communication and Information Systems (CIS) requirements of the PSOD and that Africa should look inwards in provisioning for the requirements, in view of African ownership and the sensitivities that go with information;

e. take note of the ongoing work in respect of further develop the ASF Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) concept and urge the Commission to go ahead and conduct the remaining workshops of the RDC concept and harmonize it for further action;

f. recognize the work in respect of the Strategic Lift concept and request the Commission to ensure that those tasked to develop the concept should work closely with those regions that have already taken the lead in working on their strategic lift concept, in order to enrich their final product. The concept should cover legal aspects as well;

g. urge the Commission to ensure that Exercise AMANI AFRICA is conducted within schedule. Similarly we encourage member states to second officers to the AU PSOD for Exercise AMANI AFRICA and be able to sustain them during the period of their secondment.

h. On the issue of Police Component development we urge the Commission to:

(1) develop Police Standby Databases at the AUC for Strategic Level Police Mission leaders and the RECs/RMS for Individual Police Officers (IPOs) and Formed Police Units (FPU);

(2) take necessary steps to enhance advocacy/sensitization of Police Contributing Countries (PCC) and Police Chiefs and Heads of Gendarmerie on ASF Police activities;

(3) take action to increase the staff level at the AUC and the RECs/RMs. The recruitment of Police Commissioner at the AUC should be taken as a matter of priority;

(4) review the Police Standby Arrangement upwards from the 240 Individual Police Officers (IPOs) per REC/RM to 720 and the FPU from 2 to 6 per REC/RM;

(5) conduct Police Training Needs Analysis (TNA) and develop curriculum to enhance the operationalization of the ASF Police Component;

(6) urgently address the issue of ASF Police RDC composition and capability in liaison with the RECs/RMs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs);

(7) harmonise the existing differences in Police Structure at the AU and RECs/RMs in line with identified core functions as a matter of urgency;

i. request the Commission to take the following actions in respect of the development of the Civilian Component:
(1) work jointly with the RECs/RMs to develop job descriptions for the more than 60 functions (that have been agreed upon) as well as developing the recruitment process for these positions;

(2) encourage the RECs/RMs to start with the identification and recruitment for the more than 60 positions (approximately 400 for the roster);

(3) establish an AUC/REC/RM Task Team to design an ASF roster based on the discussions of the Civilian Dimension Staffing, Training and Rostering workshop. The development of a roster by the AU and RECs/RMs should not preclude the AU from recruiting directly in the event that the individuals in the roster do not meet the requirements for the vacancies;

(4) develop human resource policies for PSOs that shall address the needs of mission staff and encourage RECs/RMs should be encouraged to do the same;

(5) inform member states about the vacancies so as to give them the opportunity to identify and submit names of candidates for the posts. Undertake further consultations with Member States on the vacancies and RECs/RMs should be able to recruit for the vacancies. Additionally, regional equity should be taken into consideration while filling the vacancies;

(6) ensure alignment of capabilities and capacities between the AU and the RECs/RMs.

(7) establish the Civilian Component, where applicable, following a similar process to that of the other ASF components.

(8) request the Commission to proceed with the short – term (six months) recruitment of a civilian specialist to assist in kick-starting the ASF Civilian Planning Element;

j. on the issue of some member states belonging to more than one regional brigade, we are of the view that such a decision is a matter of national sovereignty, choice, and capacity to fulfill their obligations to both brigades at the same time;

k. agree that the name ASF be retained for the continental mechanism, while the capabilities at the regional level should be changed to regional standby forces, to reflect a common nomenclature for the force at all levels.

l. on the issue of PSOD recruitment, we request that:

(1) the Commission should adhere to the principles of rotation, transparency and equitable geographical distribution regarding all types of positions within the PSOD and to be in accordance with the recruitment procedure of the AUC;

(2) the Commission should take urgent steps to provide further details i.e. Cost implications, Terms of Reference of the respective vacancies (for the 58 posts) to enable the member states respond appropriately.

m. urge the Commission to ensure that documents for meetings are provided in all AU working documents at all times.
This Chapter is about the need to develop a standby roster for the ASF, and builds on the roster issues addressed in the Kampala report, covered in Chapter 4. These recommendations are contained in the report of the ASF civilian dimension technical rostering workshop that took place in Dar es Salaam from 1 to 3 July 2009. These recommendations will be considered at the meeting of the African Ministers of Defence and Security scheduled for October 2010. The report recommends that the AU and RECs/RMs develop an integrated standby roster for the ASF civilian dimension. The design of the roster should take into consideration the present capacity of the AU and RECs/RMs and the type of peace operations the ASF is likely to undertake in the future. It also recommends guidelines, principles and time frames for the establishment, management and maintenance of the ASF Civilian Standby Roster.

* Zinurine Alghali and Lamii Kromah are in the Peacekeeping Unit at ACCORD. Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow with ACCORD/NUPI. Charles Debrah is Acting Head of ASF, AU PSOD.
1. Executive Summary

The African Standby Force (ASF) Civilian Dimension Technical Rostering Workshop was held from 1 to 3 July 2009 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The workshop was organised by the African Union (AU) with support from the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). The workshop was funded by the Government of Norway under the auspices of the Training for Peace in Africa (TfP) Programme.

The aim of the workshop was to generate clear recommendations to the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) as to which civilian standby roster model is best suited for the needs of the ASF. Participants at the workshop included representatives from various AU Commission (AUC) departments, RECs/RMs, members of the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA) – which includes a number of training centres of excellence and civilian training service providers – and regional and international institutions that specialise in civilian training and/or rostering.

The workshop recommended that an integrated ASF and REC/RM civilian standby roster be established. However, due to the current lack of civilian ASF Planning Element (PLANELM) staff in the AUC and most RECs/RMs, the workshop recommended that the ASF Civilian Standby Roster be established in two phases. In the first phase, the AUC and RECs/RMs should harness the support of a specialised service provider that could assist them in creating the roster system, while concurrently training the required number of AUC/REC/RM personnel needed to manage and maintain the roster system. The personnel trained to maintain the roster will then serve as the focal point for the roster system and will be able to take over the management of the roster on completion of the capacity-building phase. The recommendations provide for a capacity-building phase for a period of three years. In the second phase, the AUC and RECs/RMs shall take full responsibility for the management of the civilian standby roster. This two-phased approach should allow for quick operationalisation, borrowing from the capacity of established rosters whilst providing for the building of capacity within the AUC and RECs/RMs, as well as full ownership and control by the AUC and RECs/RMs of the process and mechanisms needed to establish and manage the roster.

The workshop agreed on a number of principles that should inform the establishment of an ASF Civilian Standby Roster. These included ownership of the roster by the AUC and the RECs/RMs; that the roster should be transparent and user-friendly, and be responsive to the requirements of the ASF; that it should be merit-based; and that it should take into account regional and gender balance. The workshop also generated a number of operational recommendations, including:

- The roster should be professionally maintained, updated and compatible with other roster systems.
- The roster should collaborate with other international roster systems, to avoid overlap and to increase experience-gathering opportunities for candidates to serve in other missions offered by other organisations.
- There should be close collaboration with the AUC Human Resources Department in setting the selection criteria for candidates for the roster.
• The roster should be interactive and dynamic in order to retain candidates through the provision of pre-deployment and leadership training for middle/senior level management, as well as specialised training to keep candidates ready and prepared for deployment.

• The roster should have a minimum of 300 candidates for each REC/RM, with the aim of ensuring that 60 deployable personnel can be generated at any given point.

2. Background

2.1 Over the past three years, the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), with support from ACCORD, has been working on a project to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF, with the overall aim of building the capacity of the AU to undertake multidimensional peace support operations (PSOs). The starting point was the Civilian Dimension Policy Framework for the ASF in September 2006, followed by the Civilian Dimension Implementation Plan in April 2007, and the Civilian Dimension Staffing, Training, and Rostering (STR) Report in July 2008.

2.2 The Technical Rostering Workshop was a follow-up to the ASF Civilian Component Staffing, Training and Rostering (STR) Workshop that was held from 10 to 12 July 2008 in Kampala, Uganda. One of the aspects that remained unresolved during the STR Workshop concerned civilian rostering for the ASF. The AU thus decided to organise a technical expert workshop on this topic, with the purpose of developing clear recommendations on the design and establishment of a standby roster for the civilian dimension of the ASF.

3. Introduction

3.1 The AU PSOD convened a Technical Rostering Workshop in Dar es Salaam from 1 to 3 July 2009 to develop clear recommendations for the establishment of an ASF civilian dimension standby roster. The workshop was a follow-up to the decisions of the 6th Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence, Staff and Heads of Safety and Security, and the 3rd Ordinary Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security, which met in Addis Ababa from 11 to 15 May 2009. At this meeting, the Commission of the AU was tasked to establish an AUC/REC/RM task team to design an ASF roster, based on the discussions of the AU ASF STR Workshop that took place in Kampala from 10 to 12 July 2008.

3.2 The participants at the workshop included representatives of the AUC, the RECs/RMs, the APSTA – which includes a number of training centres of excellence and civilian training service providers – and regional and international institutions that specialise in civilian training and/or rostering.

4. Opening remarks

In his opening remarks, ASF Training Officer, Col. Charles Debrah, gave an overview of the Civilian Dimension Project. He reflected on the progress made to date, as well as the objectives that still need to be met before the AU will have achieved a full multidimensional PSO capacity. He confirmed that the AU was in the process of implementing the Civilian Policy Framework,
and that it has made progress with the staffing, training and recruitment of civilians for the ASF. He expressed his appreciation to the many participants that were in attendance at the workshop, who have played a role in this process. He emphasised the important role that an ASF Civilian Standby Roster will play in further improving the capacity of the ASF to respond to the need for an AU PSO rapid deployment capacity.

5. Workshop objectives

In his outline of the workshop objectives, Cedric de Coning, Senior Research Fellow at ACCORD, indicated that the objectives of the Technical Rostering Workshop were twofold: first, to increase understanding of the utility of a roster for the civilian component of the ASF; and second, to develop clear recommendations on the design and establishment of a standby roster for the civilian dimension of the ASF. De Coning briefed the meeting on the development of the civilian dimension of the ASF, and highlighted the role that a civilian standby roster would fulfil in the context of the overall recruitment, staffing and training system.

6. Status of the civilian dimension

The workshop considered the current status of the civilian dimension of the ASF, as well as the kind of PSOs that the AU is most likely to undertake in the medium to long-term. The workshop was guided by the AU’s PSO experiences in the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the current African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). On the basis of these experiences as well as projected future needs, the civilian dimension of the ASF has been designed to meet the needs of stability and peace support operations. The workshop also considered the limited financial support that is likely to be available internationally for AU PSOs, and took note of the Kampala recommendation for 60 civilian positions within each REC/RM’s standby capacity. The design of the ASF civilian dimension is thus based on a conservative capacity model that can be scaled up if the type of mission requires more staff, and if available funding increases.

7. Concept of the roster

7.1 The workshop considered the available international roster options against the specific needs of the ASF and the current challenges of the AU in generating capabilities for its current missions. The workshop recommended that an integrated ASF and REC/RM civilian standby roster be established.

7.2 The July 2008 Kampala STR Workshop recommended that the AU PSOD and each REC/RM have a civilian PLANELM consisting of a minimum of four persons – including a Unit Head, a Training and Rostering Officer, a Planning and Coordination Officer and a Logistics Officer. However, the workshop noted that neither the AU PSOD nor the RECs/RMs currently have the recommended civilian ASF PLANELM staff in place. The AU PSOD and the RECs/RMs thus currently do not have the necessary capacity to develop, maintain and manage an ASF Civilian Standby Roster. To address this shortcoming, the workshop recommended a phased implementation approach, which takes into account
that the development of the roster needs to go hand-in-hand with the development of the
civilian capacity needed for the management of the roster at the AUC and the REC/RMs.

7.3 The workshop recommended two phases. In the first phase, the AUC and RECs/RMs
should harness the support of a specialised service provider that could assist them in
creating the roster system, while concurrently training the required number of AUC/REC/
RM personnel needed to manage and maintain the roster system. The personnel trained
to maintain the roster will then serve as the focal point for the roster system, and will be
able to take over the management of the roster on completion of the capacity-building
phase. The recommendations provide for a capacity-building phase for a period of three
years. In the second phase, the AUC and RECs/RMs shall take full responsibility for
the management of the civilian standby roster. This two-phased approach should allow
for quick operationalisation, borrowing from the capacity of established rosters whilst
providing for the building of capacity within the AUC and RECs, as well as full ownership
and control by the AUC and RECs of the process and mechanisms needed to establish
and manage the roster.

PROPOSED PHASED IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH OF THE CAPACITY-BUILDING
PROJECT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
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<th>Duration</th>
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<th>Output</th>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1a</td>
<td>Design of the roster</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Technical advice</td>
<td>Detailed Roster Design and Implementation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1b</td>
<td>Establishment of the roster and mid-term evaluation</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>Technical assistance, training and mentoring</td>
<td>ASF roster established with initial operational capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Maintenance and evaluation of the roster</td>
<td>18 months</td>
<td>Handover of responsibility to trained AU/REC/RM staff at end of project period</td>
<td>ASF roster established, tested and with full operational capability</td>
</tr>
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</table>

7.4 The terms of reference of the technical service provider should be twofold. On the one
hand, the service provider should be responsible for the design, establishment and
initial maintenance of the roster, in close coordination with the AUC and RECs/RMs.
On the other hand, it should train and mentor the AUC/REC/RM personnel needed to
manage and maintain the roster in future. The personnel trained to maintain the roster
will then serve as the focal point for the roster system, and should be able to take over
the coordination and operation of the roster on completion of the capacity-building phase.
The project should include a mid-term evaluation, aimed at informing the improvement
and adjustment of the project, as well as an end-of-term evaluation to certify the product
before it is handed to the AUC/RECs/RMs.
8. Principles

The following principles shall guide the design, development and maintenance of the roster:

8.1 Coherence with the AU Framework.

The roster shall be developed in accordance with the AU Constitutive Act, the Protocol on Peace and Security and the ASF Policy Framework.

8.2 Coherence with the ASF Framework.

The roster shall be coherent with similar initiatives in the police and military dimensions, and shall be mindful of the principle of integration and unity of effort.

8.3 Integration.

There shall be only one ASF Civilian Standby Roster. The AUC and RECs/RMs shall jointly design and review the roster, and ensure that it meets the requirement of being one coherent and integrated roster, with one central (AUC) coordinating point and five (REC/RM) hubs. Both the AUC (in the case of an AU peace operation) or the RECs/RMs (in the case of a regional peace operation) shall have the right to make use of the roster.

Figure 1: One integrated ASF civilian standby roster

8.4 Linkage between rostering and deployment.

The roster shall be as integrated as possible with existing human resources policies and procedures of the AUC/RECs/RMs, so as to ensure the closest possible link between the rostering and deployment of civilian peace operations personnel. This implies that the respective AUC/RECs/RMs human resources departments need to be part of all the processes involved in designing, developing and managing the roster.

8.5 Merit-based roster.

The roster shall be merit-based, i.e. all the persons recruited onto the roster – regardless of whether they have been generated via secondment or individual contracts – shall be selected from a number of candidates, in accordance with AUC/RECs/RMs human resources policies.

8.6 Transparency.

The roster shall be transparent, i.e. the available positions on the roster, terms of reference,
recruitment procedures, selection criteria, etc. shall be public knowledge, so that the credibility of the roster can be maintained. The roster shall, however, safeguard the confidentiality of individuals’ private information.

8.7 Representation.

The roster shall respect AUC/RECs/RMs policies regarding geographic and gender representation at all levels. This principle will also ensure that the roster will be able to generate personnel with the appropriate profile, regardless of the region within which an AU or REC/RM peace operation may have to operate.

8.8 Professionalism.

The roster shall be professionally designed and maintained, in accordance with international best practices and standards. The roster shall collaborate with other international rosters to avoid overlap, share resources where desirable and share knowledge.

8.9 Dynamism.

The roster shall be interactive and dynamic to retain candidates through the provision of pre-deployment and leadership training for middle/senior level management, as well as specialised training to keep candidates ready and prepared for deployment.

9. Project management

The Technical Rostering Workshop also recommended that the following project management aspects be taken into consideration when the ASF Civilian Standby Roster is being established:

9.1 The AU shall steer and coordinate the overall policy, design and evaluation of the roster.

9.2 The respective RECs/RMs shall participate in the overall policy, design and evaluation of the roster, and establish and maintain the regional hubs of the roster.

9.3 The AUC/RECs/RMs shall establish a joint ASF Civilian Standby Roster Committee, which will be responsible for the management of the roster. The committee shall consist of representatives of the AUC and the RECs/RMs, and shall be convened and chaired by the AU PSOD. The committee shall meet as often as deemed necessary, and shall be responsible for overseeing the phased implementation of the overall project, including evaluating its progress.

9.4 Each REC/RM shall establish a working group responsible for managing the regional hubs of the roster, and each working group shall include all the departments and units that are relevant for the civilian dimension of the ASF, including especially those responsible for human resources management and the regional centres of excellence responsible for training civilians.

9.5 The AUC should consider the relationship between the ASF Civilian Standby Roster, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Experts’ Database and the proposed roster for mediation experts and mediation support, in order to avoid duplication or overlap.
10. Implementation

10.1 The roster should be established as soon as is reasonably possible, as it is urgently needed – as evidenced by the challenges of finding civilian personnel for the AU’s operations in Sudan and Somalia, the preparations for Exercise AMANI AFRICA and the various regional exercises currently underway. It is, therefore, recommended that the AUC convenes the proposed joint ASF Civilian Standby Roster Committee as soon as possible after these recommendations have been considered by the appropriate decision-making bodies within the AU/RECs/RMs.

10.2 The joint ASF Civilian Standby Roster Committee should be responsible for the overall supervision of the joint project to establish the roster, while the regional working groups should be responsible for the supervision of the establishment and management of the regional hubs. The critical consideration here is the limited human resources available at the AUC and at each REC/RM to establish and manage their respective hubs on a day-to-day basis. The need for dedicated staff and resources are considered crucial for the development and maintenance of a professional roster.

10.3 The workshop participants were of the opinion that, with a well-designed project proposal, it would be possible to mobilise funding for the ASF Civilian Standby Roster Project, including the technical support of an external service provider. It was consequently recommended that a consultant be engaged to prepare the project proposal.

11. Scope and specifications

The following scope and specifications were recommended for the ASF Civilian Standby Roster:

11.1 The AUC/RECs/RMs shall be guided by the 60 ASF civilian positions identified at the July 2008 Kampala Workshop, and this implies that each REC/RM shall develop a capacity capable of fielding up to 60 civilians for a AU/REC/RM peace operation, at any given time.

11.2 The AU/RECs/RMs shall further be guided by the proposed approximately 15 positions that need to be rapidly deployable, and those in this rapid deployment category would have to be pre-authorised by the respective AU/REC/RM’s human resources systems, so that they can be deployed without delay.

11.3 The roster shall be developed with at least a 1:5 ratio between the ASF civilian positions and the number of persons on the roster, depending on the type of position, so as to ensure that some of the persons are available at any given time, as well as to ensure that there is a range of geographic, language, gender, etc. options in the roster.

11.4 All the candidates on the roster shall be selected through a transparent process that ensures that they are pre-screened, interviewed and vetted and ready for deployment.

11.5 The roster shall be populated by a combination of merit-based secondments and individually contracted staff to ensure flexibility and diversity within the roster.

11.6 The candidates in the roster shall be allocated against the specific 60 ASF positions, but they will also be recorded against a broad set of cross-cutting competencies, so that the roster can generate new skills set enquiries that may arise in the course of missions.
11.7 The candidates on the roster will have undergone some training prior to selection, and this should be further augmented with ASF-specific training, in close collaboration with the ASF’s training partners.

11.8 The roster should be interactive and dynamic, and should offer training and other incentives to candidates to ensure that it is vibrant and attractive to prospective candidates. For instance, the committee can consider whether a percentage of candidates on the roster can be shared with partners to ensure a continuous flow of deployments in periods when AU deployment needs are low, to assist with testing the operational readiness of the system, and to make the roster attractive to the candidates by offering them other deployment opportunities.

11.9 The candidates on the roster should be used as the primary source for ASF-related training and exercises.

11.10 The roster should be regularly tested, and the candidates that have been deployed or utilised in exercises should be evaluated to ensure that the roster has been able to generate the right candidates, within the required time, and that they have been deployed in time. These validations should be system-wide, in the sense that they evaluate the whole value chain including the training, rostering, deployment and operational capability of the candidates.

12. Conclusion

12.1 The workshop recommended that the AU/RECs/RMs establish, as soon as possible, an integrated ASF Civilian Standby Roster, with the aim of enabling the timely deployment of civilian personnel for African PSOs.

12.2 The workshop considered a number of principles that should guide the design, development and maintenance of the ASF Civilian Standby Roster including, principally, that the roster shall be developed in accordance with existing AU and ASF policy frameworks, that it shall be transparent and merit-based, and that it shall be geographically and gender balanced.

12.3 The workshop considered the design of the roster and recommended that it should be one coherent and integrated roster, with the AUC as overall coordinator and each of the RECs/RMs responsible for their respective hubs. The roster should be developed and managed in close cooperation with the respective human resources departments of the AUC and the RECs/RMs.

12.4. Due to the current lack of civilian ASF PLANELM staff in the AUC and most RECs/RMS, the workshop recommended that the ASF Civilian Standby Roster be established in two phases. In the first phase, the AUC and RECs/RMs should harness the support of a specialised service provider that could assist them in creating the roster system, while concurrently training the required number of AUC/REC/RM personnel needed to manage and maintain the roster system. The personnel trained to maintain the roster will then serve as the focal point for the roster system, and will be able to take over the management of the roster on completion of the capacity-building phase. The recommendations provide for a capacity-building phase for a period of three years. In the second phase, the AUC
and RECs/RMs shall take full responsibility for the management of the civilian standby roster.

12.5 The workshop recommended that a joint AUC/REC/RM ASF Civilian Standby Roster Committee be established to develop and oversee the Joint ASF Civilian Standby Roster Project. Once the project is approved, the committee, in close cooperation with the regional working groups, will be responsible for managing and evaluating the project.
This book is about the civilian dimension of African peace operations. It is a summary of the work that the African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) has done to date to develop the civilian dimension of AU peace operations, primarily through the development of the African Standby Force (ASF). The goal of this publication is to inform African Member States and other partners and stakeholders about the civilian dimension of the ASF. The book contains all the major policy documents relevant to the civilian dimension of the ASF, and thus serves, in one volume, as a stocktaking of what has been done to develop the civilian dimension of the ASF.

This edited volume was published by the AU PSOD, with the support of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) as part of the Training for Peace in Africa Programme with funding from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"This book is a valuable resource for all those engaged in operationalizing the ASF. EASBRICOM has implemented the recommendations of the Kampala Report. I commend ACCORD and its staff for stimulating and informing this critical debate."

Peter Marwae
Former Acting Director and Head of Political Affairs, EASBRICOM

"This book will assist the SADC community to further develop and inform the civilian dimension of the SADC Standby Force."

Tanki J. Mothae
Director, SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation

The success of any peace support operation requires a multidimensional body of which the civilian component is an integral part. With the military-heavy composition simply evident from the word "Force" in "African Standby Force", it is essential to highlight the "civilianization" of the ASF. This book is an illustration of this mandate and clearly identifies what has been achieved and what remains to be done.

H.E. Ambassador Shad Eldalaby
Director, Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution & Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA)

In making history, we create for our generation and those yet to come, a legacy of hope. In documenting our history, we provide for the world, a compass of where we have come from and where we can go. This book is a repository of the journey so far in the dialogue on civilians in peace support operations. And, I have no doubt that it will go a long way to further informing the conversations of the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force.

Linda Darikwa
Research Fellow, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy