

***Report 03/09***

## **How the EU Organizes and Conducts Peace Operations in Africa EUFOR / MINURCAT**

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## Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>I. The European Union – A Rising Crisis Management and Peace Operations Actor .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>II. Authorizing EU Missions and Problems of EU-UN Cooperation.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>III. The Chad-CAR-Darfur Triangle of Conflict, Instability and Violence .....</b>	<b>13</b>
1. A Regional Conflict System of Enormous Complexity .....	13
2. Chad – a History of Poverty, Conflict and Instability .....	13
3. The Central African Republic (CAR) – Poverty, Instability, Bandits and Rebels .....	16
<b>IV. EUFOR/MINURCAT – Mandate and Division of Labour.....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>V. EUFOR Joint Action (JA), Troop Contributors, Financing and Headquarters.....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>VI. The EU and UN in Chad/CAR – A Complicated Liaison and Cooperation Partnership .....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>VII. EUFOR/MINURCAT – Deploying into a Volatile Theatre of Sand, Dust and Violence .....</b>	<b>24</b>
1. A Vast Environment .....	24
2. Headquarters and Logistical Challenges .....	25
3. Mandate and Impartiality Problems .....	26
<b>VIII. EUFOR – Transition to an UN Force and Preliminary Assessment .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>IX. Conclusion.....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>List of Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>35</b>

## Executive Summary

This article examines the European force in Chad and the Central African Republic as the most recent example of a substantial European contribution to peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa. EUFOR Tchad/RCA was authorized in fall 2007, parallel to the UN police mission MINURCAT, by the UN Security Council and the European Council and designed as a one year “bridging” mission. Its mandate will end on March 15, 2009.

The need to deploy an international presence to Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) was triggered by the dire humanitarian situation in both countries. In 2007 violence against civilians was rampant and the number of unprotected Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees had risen to unacceptable levels. The “refugee population” in Chad had risen to about 230 000, and that of IDPs to more than 120 000. In the CAR, the number of IDPs had climaxed at about 70 000, apart from a sizable numbers of refugees.

Assessing the impact and problems of EUFOR Tchad/RCA is not an easy task. Apart from the short duration of the mission, the complicated division of labour and the co-operation with its partner mission MINURCAT, EUFOR had to deal with a very complex decision-making and planning process as well as bureaucracy in Brussels. In addition, there is a very volatile theatre of sand, dust and violence as well as ethnic and political dynamics, the Darfur-Chad-CAR triangle, in which the mission had to deploy.

### **EUFOR - Capabilities and Logistical Challenges**

EUFOR Chad/RCA is the third and, at the time of writing, biggest military peace operation conducted by the EU. More than a dozen of EU member states agreed to send contingents of different size to Chad, as well as three non-EU countries. Therefore, its character as a truly European force cannot be denied, despite a strong French dominance.

Right from the beginning of EUFOR’s deployment there have been considerable problems with assuring sufficient capabilities in terms of troops and military hardware. It took the mission almost a year to reach its full operational strength, declared in September 2008. Getting enough helicopters and other kinds of sophisticated equipment was a particularly difficult. It needed Polish and finally, Russian helicopters to fill the gap. The latter are backed up by about a hundred support personnel.

Organizing logistics of EUFOR was not less demanding due to the long distances to be covered, and bad local transport infrastructure. The operating area covers approximately 280.000 square kilometres – larger than France. Most of the heavy equipment and supplies had to be shipped by sea via Douala in Cameroon – a two-week journey from Europe. From there, the containers, trucks and other vehicles faced an overland journey of almost 2000 kilometre, the distance from Rome to Stockholm.

Assuring sufficient drinking water for the international presence without damaging local supply was the third big issue. Even if consumption is reduced to 60 litres of water per person a day, supplying a daily amount of 204.000 litres (or an amount of 1.428.000 weekly) is a tremendous challenge in view of the long supply routes. By digging ditches at all EUFOR camps which can collect substantial amounts of rain water the EUFOR command has tried to ease this problem.

Camp Europe, near N'Djamena, has been nicknamed “little Venice” because of the network of ditches which crisscross the Camp.

### **EU-UN Cooperation - a Cumbersome Partnership**

The fact that the European Council in Brussels did not take long to follow-up the Security Council in New York in agreeing on a Joint Action in fall 2007 to authorize EUFOR proves that UN-EU cooperation is working well on the strategic level, if important member states on both sides have the will to act. The picture is very different when it comes to the lower levels of decision-making and planning. Profound structural differences render the cooperation between the two international organizations an often difficult and cumbersome affair, such as

- (1) the mix of intergovernmental (European Council) and supranational (EU Commission) approaches and activities within the EU, which complicates cooperation, increases the number of players involved and tends to confuse interlocutors in the UN about how the EU works and who is responsible for what;
- (2) different working methods in the areas of financing; ESDP funding mechanisms are more complicated than those of the UN;
- (3) over the decades the UN has developed a rather systematic and well entrenched approach to both, support and logistics; the EU is more difficult and may either use its own assets or those of member states, or – in case of a military operation – operate via the so-called Berlin Plus Mechanism which allows the EU to use NATO structures, mechanisms and assets (not the case with regard to EUFOR Tchad/RCA);
- (4) the UN and the EU also differ very much in their headquarters (HQ) structures; the chain of the European command is more complicated as it involves three levels: the Force HQ in the field, the Operations Headquarters, and the PSC (Peace and Security Council) in Brussels.

There is no denying that personnel on both sides try their best to overcome these differences. However, this does not alter the fact that increasingly mission personnel is more busy coping with these structures than with the task they are primarily deployed for – managing and solving conflict!

### **EUFOR/MINURCAT Mandate - Too Limited and Ineffective?**

There is a solid lesson learned from the Balkans, Rwanda, Somalia, the DR Congo and other cases: When an international peacekeeping mission deploys into a war-torn country local people expect protection and improvement, whatever the fine print of the mandate worked out in New York or Brussels says. The EUFOR/MINURCAT mandate is far from meeting these expectations, as its responsibilities are essentially limited to securing the refugee and IDP camps. This paper therefore takes a critical look at the reasons for the limitations of the mandate.

EUFOR's impartiality is another difficult issue. It was very much questioned from the beginning; due to the dominance of the mission by France and the quick accommodation of Chadian president Déby's demands by the UN Security Council as well the European Council. France is a long-time sponsor of Déby. However, efforts undertaken by the Operation Commander, General Nash, and the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, to dispel this suspicion seem to have had a positive impact, as had the conduct of the mission itself. The European Parliament also intervened by asking EUFOR to remain strictly neutral and to stay in particular separated from the existing French Force *Opération Epervier* in Chad.

### **EUFOR – Transition to a UN force**

The mandate of EUFOR ends on March 15, 2009. On January 14, the SC therefore approved a new (maximum) force of 5.500 peacekeepers, (4.900 for Chad and 600 for the CAR) as part of MINURCAT and led by the UN. Once again, mandate and capabilities are too weak due inter alia to a blunt refusal by Déby to accept a stronger and truly impartial force. This refusal, like the one in 2007 and mentioned above, is a clear indication of his true intention: abusing the international presence to ensure his survival. The same basically applies to the Bozizé regime in the CAR although it has pursued this interest less bluntly.

Worse even, UN member states are not rushing forward to provide the troops and equipment authorized for the new UN force. In view of the fact that several other peacekeeping missions and stabilization operations are struggling with getting more troops (UNAMID, AMISOM, Afghanistan) this is not surprising at all. The danger of a serious security vacuum caused by the transition from an EU to an UN force in spring 2009 is therefore looming. The UN Secretary-General hopes to prevent such a vacuum by convincing as many EUFOR troop contributors as possible to agree to a re-hatting of their contingents already in the field. A handful of countries, like Ireland, Poland, Austria, Finland, and Romania, indicated in late 2008 that they might be willing to do so. And Russia has declared its willingness to further provide its helicopters. Poland, however, will withdraw its contingent because of the impact of the financial crisis on the country. It remains to be seen to which extent France is ready to close the remaining gap by putting more of its troops under UN command.

### **Conclusion: A “Mega Conflict System” Developing in Northern Sub-Saharan Africa?**

The presence of EUFOR Chad/RCA, in conjunction with MINURCAT, has led to some improved sense of security. However, this effect is very much limited to the areas close to its camps. Due to its limited mandate and its being a military force, EUFOR was in particular not able to cope with the upsurge of banditry and criminality in both countries. Worse even, there is no significant indication that the deployment of EUFOR/MINURCAT has improved the overall outlook for peace and security in Chad and the CAR. Indeed, it may have given both regimes - which are above all busy with securing their survival by all means - a false sense of support and security. In hindsight, one has to credit DPKO with being right in 2006 to recommend to the SC to abstain from sending an international presence to Chad and the CAR. DPKO argued that the conditions for a successful mission did not exist. However, it was overruled by the SC and particularly pushed by France and Great Britain to come forward with another recommendation.

On the regional level, 2009 will become a defining year for the Greater Horn of Africa and its adjacent states. Apart from the difficulties to substitute EUFOR with a credible UN-led force in Chad and the CAR, three other peacekeeping missions in the region are in serious trouble or are about to face such trouble: UNAMID and UNMIS in Sudan and AMISOM in Somalia. The indictment of the Sudanese president Bashir in March 2009 by the International Criminal Court (ICC) might well derail the entire CPA process in Sudan and throw the country back into open war between the North and the South. This would have destabilizing effects beyond the borders of Sudan, and certainly on Chad and the CAR. However, the possibility to suspend the indictment of Bashir for at least one year (Art. 16 of the ICC Statute) could also be used to motivate Khartoum to be more forthcoming with regard to the North-South peace process and the situation in Darfur. A vigorous and sustained diplomatic initiative spearheaded by the new administration in Washington would be quickly needed to profit from this window of opportunity.

If one takes into account that developments in Sudan, Darfur, Chad and the CAR not only interact with each other but also with the unsolved conflicts/violence in northern Uganda, the north eastern DR Congo and even that between Ethiopia and Eritrea and their proxy war in Somalia, it is not an exaggeration to state that a “mega-conflict system” has developed in Northern Africa which seems to have moved beyond the control of Africa, Europe, the US and the international community at large.

The author therefore concludes his study by stating that a *profound rethinking* is needed by Africa, Europe, the US and the international community on how the decay of this huge region into more violence, banditry, smuggling, streams of refugees and IDPs and a backyard for international terrorism can be stopped.

## Introduction<sup>12</sup>

Since the early 90ies the European Union (EU) has progressively stepped up its crisis prevention and peacekeeping involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, not only with civilian and police elements but also with military deployments. Three of the latter have received particular international attention: *Operation Artemis* in the DR Congo in 2003, *EUFOR DR Congo* in 2006, and *EUFOR Tchad/RCA* in 2007/2008.<sup>3</sup> All three missions were launched in support of UN missions. *EUFOR Tchad/RCA* is the only one of these missions still active at the time of writing this article. It is also the biggest European military mission in Africa so far.

The need to send an international presence in parts of Chad and the *Central African Republic* (CAR) was mainly triggered by humanitarian demands. Violence against local civilians was rampant and the number of unprotected *Internally Displaced Persons* (IDPs) and refugees had risen to unacceptable levels. In his first Report in February 2007 the UN *Secretary General* (SG), Ban Ki-moon, reported that the "refugee population" in Chad had risen to more than 230,000, and that of IDPs to more than 120,000. In the CAR, the number of IDPs had climaxed at about 70,000, apart from a sizable numbers of refugees.<sup>4</sup>

*EUFOR Tchad/CAR* was authorized in fall 2007 by the UN Security Council and the European Council and declared operational in mid March 2008.<sup>5</sup> Being designed as a one year "bridging mission" only, it will come to a conclusion in mid-March 2009. Before, an effort to field a bigger UN-led military mission had failed in 2007 because the Déby government refused to agree to this mission, vested also with a more comprehensive mandate.

This article examines *EUFOR Tchad/CAR* as the most recent example of a substantial European contribution to peace and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Assessing its impact and problems is not an easy task, indeed. Apart from the complicated division of labour and co-operation with the UN in New York and the *Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad* (MINURCAT) in the field, *EUFOR* has a very complex decision-making, planning and command background of its own. In addition, there is also a very volatile theatre of sand, dust and violence, the Darfur-Chad-CAR triangle which has to be properly understood.

In its conclusion this analysis will be cautious to come to any definite assessment regarding the success of *EUFOR Tchad/CAR*. A deployment of one year as a "bridging force" makes such an assessment very difficult apart from the fact that the *EUFOR*'s impact cannot be evaluated in separation of that of MINURCAT and other missions in the region, like in particular the *AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur* (UNAMID).

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<sup>1</sup> This paper was concluded in January 2009. It has originally been written for the Policy Seminar "From Eurafrique to Afroeuropa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", hold by the *Centre for Conflict Resolution* (CCR) at the University in Cape Town in Cape Town, South Africa, 11-13 September 2008.

<sup>2</sup> The author would like to thank Anja Muecke for her help in editing this article.

<sup>3</sup> The EU and UN have decided to use the French writing of Chad for the official acronym of the mission.

<sup>4</sup> Report of the Secretary General S/2007/97, 23 February 2007.

<sup>5</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007), 25 September 2007.

However, there are four general conclusions which the author feels can be drawn with sufficient certainty:

- (1) The presence of EUFOR Tchad/CAR, in conjunction with MINURCAT, has led to some improved sense of security. However, this effect is very much limited to the areas close to its camps. Being a military force, EUFOR was in particular not able to cope with the upsurge of banditry and criminality in both countries. Worse even, there is no significant indication that the deployment of EUFOR/MINURCAT has improved the overall outlook for peace and security in both countries. Indeed, it may have given both regimes - which are above all busy with ensuring their survival by all means - a false sense of support and security. It is not the promotion of democratization and rule of law but this survival which is driving the agenda of Déby and Bozizé!
- (2) On the strategic level the deployment of EUFOR/MINURCAT is a positive example of improved UN-EU cooperation. There is also no denying that on the levels below both sides try to do their best in terms of cooperation. However, the differences between the two organizations regarding their decision-making, planning, and financing, Headquarters and other bureaucratic structures and procedures are immense and make the coordination of EUFOR and MINURCAT as well as the other international and local actors in the field to very cumbersome. Indeed, increasingly mission personnel is more busy coping with these structures than with the task they are primarily deployed for – managing and solving conflict!
- (3) Finally, conflict, violence, and instability in Chad and the CAR are closely intertwined with the developments in Sudan/Darfur and the wider region of the Greater Horn of Africa. Regarding its stability, 2009 seems to become a defining year. Apart from the difficulties to substitute EUFOR with a credible UN-led force in support of MINURCAT, three other international peacekeeping missions in the region are in serious trouble or face trouble: the *United Nations Mission in Sudan* (UNMIS) and UNAMID in Sudan and the *African Union Mission to Somalia* (AMISOM). There is a very real danger that this region will be plunged into more conflict, violence and humanitarian disaster. Neither Africa, nor Europe or the international community at large seem to dispose of the ideas and means to control this process and to stabilize the region.

The author therefore concludes that a profound rethinking is needed by Africa, Europe, the US and the international community at large how the decay of this huge region into more violence, conflict, banditry and streams of refugees and IDPs can be stopped.



## I. The European Union – A Rising Crisis Management and Peace Operations Actor

The *European Union* (EU), similar to other regional organizations like the *African Union* (AU) and the *Economic Community of West African States* (ECOWAS), is a rather recent actor in the field of crisis management as well as peace operations. However, it was not the military who was asked to take the lead but the police. In January 2003 it deployed its first major mission, the *EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina* with about 500 male and female police officers from 30 countries. EUPM took over from IPTF (*UN International Police Task Force*) which had been sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996.

Since then, deploying police missions with a variety of functions and different in size has become a trademark of the EU. Some of its bigger missions are or have been:

- (1) *EUPOL Proxima* in the Former Republic of Macedonia (from March to December 2003),
- (2) *EUPOL DR Congo* (since April 2005), *EU BAM Rafah* in the Palestinian Territories (since November 2005),
- (3) *EUPOL COPPS* in the Palestinian Territories (since January 2006),
- (4) *EUPOL Afghanistan* (since June 2007).

When it comes to stabilizing conflict-ridden countries by strengthening the Rule of Law, policing tasks cannot be performed in isolation from those of the civilian rule of law experts. Therefore, the EU increasingly started to send out uniformed police personnel jointly with civilian experts. The *EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq* (EUJUST LEX, since July 2005) was the first of this kind, followed by the *Rule of Law Mission for Georgia*, EUJUST THEMIS (July 2004 until July 2005), and *EULEX Kosovo* deployed in February 2008. EULEX in Kosovo is presently the biggest and most ambitious non-military mission of the EU. Once it will have attained its full authorized strength, more than 1800 police officers and civilians will serve in the mission. In comparison, EU BAM Rafah in Palestine is a tiny mission. It has an international staff of less than twenty.

*Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Monitoring Missions (MM)* are other types of activities the EU is increasingly getting involved in. In *Aceh* (August 2005 until December 2006) and later on in *Georgia* (since September 2008), the EU and its member states proved their ability to quickly organize and deploy small and medium sized missions with experienced monitors who, as in the case of the *EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia*, serve side by side with police, or even the military, in joint patrols. The task of EUMM Georgia is to monitor the withdrawal of Russian troops behind agreed lines. Unlike the monitoring missions, the two rather small Security Sector Reform Support Missions, *EUSEC in the DR Congo* (since July 2005) and *EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau* (since June 2008), still have to prove their viability.

It comes as no surprise that the deployment of *military missions* was and is a much more controversial affair amongst EU member states than civilian and police missions. In the beginning many experts as well as politicians wondered: What is the rationale for creating a parallel European military structure to that of NATO? In particular, Britain and the US strongly opposed such a development, not least because it would not directly involve the US. (In those days France was much less favourable towards close cooperation with Washington than today under President Sarkozy. Germany, like several other European states, vacillated between the Anglo-American and the French position).

The breakthrough came when Britain dropped its opposition against a common European defence identity during the famous British-French Summit on the St. Malo Island in 1998. St. Malo prepared the ground for the Cologne European Summit in June 1999 on which the EU member states agreed to incorporate the tasks of the *Western European Union* (WEU) into the EU. The Cologne Summit also appointed Javier Solana as the first High Representative of Europe's *Common Foreign Security Policy* (CFSP), which had been adopted in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

Building-up the necessary military, police and civilian capabilities to fulfill the new tasks was agreed upon in December 1999 in the so-called Helsinki Headline Goals.<sup>6</sup> In 2003 a *European Security Strategy* (ESS), prepared by Javier Solana and his staff, was approved by the European Council in Brussels. Titled "A Secure Europe in a Better World" it is meant to guide the EU's international security strategy.

The first deployment of European military units under the *European Security and Defence Policy* (ESDP) took place in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, parallel to the before mentioned EU police mission EUPOL PROXIMA. Based on the so-called "Berlin plus" mechanism *EUFOR Concordia* used NATO assets and was considered a full success. After a few months it was replaced by a small *EU Police Advisory Team* (EUPAT). Not much time later *EUFOR Althea* became the EU's largest military operation on the Balkans. In December 2004, Althea took over from the *NATO Stabilization Force* (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Yet, it is not the Balkans but Sub-Saharan Africa which has turned out to receive the bulk of European military deployments. French interest and pressure played a decisive role in this development. Indeed, the first ESDP military mission intervening in Africa, *Operation Artemis* in the Eastern Congo (June to September 2003) was, although carrying the European flag, in substance a French mission embellished with a few liaison, logistical and medical elements from a handful of other European countries. Still, the mission managed to diffuse the danger of a Rwandan type genocide around the town of Bunia in the province of Ituri, and created a breathing space for the UN to restructure its *UN Mission in the DR Congo* (MONUC). In the

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<sup>6</sup>In particular these capabilities include the creation of 15 European Battle Groups each consisting of at least 1,500 soldiers and most of them multinational. The Battle Groups reached full operational capacity in January 2007. In 2004 France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands in addition agreed to build up an European Gendarmerie Force with a size of about 800-900 police officers and based in Vicenza, Italy.

Eastern Congo it was close to collapse because it had been given by the SC a much too weak mandate and totally insufficient capabilities for successfully dealing with the militias and rebel groups in this region.

Hardly three years later, a call for assistance from the head of the UN's *Department for Peacekeeping Operations* (DPKO) in December 2005, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, triggered the EU into staging another intervention in the DR Congo, *EUFOR DR Congo*. Its mandate was to support MONUC to assure the security of the historic 2006 Congolese presidential and parliamentary elections. This time, France and Germany jointly took the lead to get this mission accepted by the other EU member states. Germany, to the surprise of most (not least in Germany) agreed to take care of EUFOR's strategic Operation Headquarters, to be based in Potsdam near Berlin, whereas France took over the operational Force Headquarters in Kinshasa. Despite a number of operational limitations, not least regarding the German forces and some turmoil during the elections in Kinshasa, this truly European force successfully withdrew in November 2006.

Finally, *EUFOR Chad/CAR* is the third and, at the time of writing, biggest military peace operation conducted by the EU. Although the Operational Commander is a General from Ireland, Lt General Patrick Nash, the creation of this force was again very much inspired by French interest to safeguard the stability of Chad, after its ruler, Idriss Déby, had bluntly refused the deployment of a larger UN peacekeeping force. *EUFOR Chad/CAR* started deploying in January 2008 and was authorized by the UN Security Council in Res. 1778 (25 September 2007) to stay for one year, counted from the day it would be declared operational by the European Council. Despite the dominant French interest in this force more than a dozen of EU member states as well as three non-EU countries agreed to send contingents of different size to Chad. Therefore, its character as a truly European force cannot be denied, despite the reservation of Germany and Britain.

## **II. Authorizing EU Missions and Problems of EU-UN Cooperation**

The diversity of EU-missions in terms of size, tasks, type of personnel, length of stay is enormous. A "one-size-fits-all" approach is therefore even less applicable to them than in the case of UN missions. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the EU planning and decision making structures, i.e. the political bodies and the bureaucracy in Brussels, has been only reluctantly adapted to this task and to the needs of the missions in the field. The complexity of the planning, consultation and decision making process in Brussels is breathtaking!

The political-legal basis for all ESDP missions is a so-called *Joint Action* agreed upon by all EU member states represented in the European Council. In these Joint Actions (JA) the general tasks, basic objectives, length, size, basic financial arrangements etc. of the mission are laid down. Decisions on JAs have to be made by consent, which implies that each and every EU member state which prefers to oppose has a veto right in principle. Consent, however, does not

imply the obligation to actively participate – a practise which has considerably enhanced the chance for agreeing on a JA. (In the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR, for instance, Germany at the beginning strongly objected to the mission but then decided to withdraw its reservations). Experience also has shown that - if there is a strong lead by one of the bigger EU member states or a group of states - the outlook for agreement greatly increases. A JA is, of course, in terms of international law not a sufficient legal basis for military intervention. An authorization by the *UN Security Council* (UNSC) is indispensable and therefore consistent EU policy. This authorization may be less or, like in the cases of the two EUFOR missions in the DR Congo or EUFOR Chad/CAR, more explicit. Apart from the sometimes very complicated and highly political relationship between the UNSC resolutions and EU Council JAs there are also profound structural differences which often make EU-UN cooperation a cumbersome affair, like:<sup>7</sup>

- the mix of intergovernmental (European Council) and supranational (EU Commission) approaches and activities within the EU tends to complicate cooperation; it increases the number of players involved and confuses UN interlocutors about what the EU is, how it works and who is responsible for what;
- different working methods in the areas of financing are another factor<sup>8</sup>; whereas UN peacekeeping operations are fully funded from the assessed peacekeeping budget, the ESDP funding mechanisms are more complicated; Art. 28 of the Treaty on the European Union stipulates the principle that expenditures related to CFSP (and thus ESDP) activities shall be charged to the budget of the European Community, i.e. to the Commission; expenditures for military operations have to be funded separately and are split up in those cost for which the principle “costs lie for they fall” or “common costs” is applied; former, which are normally the bulk of expenditures, have to be carried by participating states; the so-called common costs, often less than 10 %, are dealt with by the “ATHENA” mechanism, established by the European Council in 2004.<sup>9</sup>
- thirdly, the culture, institutions and procedures for planning a field mission are very different; planning an ESDP mission under the authority of the European Council is a cumbersome and lengthy process (as an interactive Power Point guide worked out by the German Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) impressively demonstrates<sup>10</sup>), unless it concerns a small mission, like the civilian Aceh Monitoring

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<sup>7</sup> See the excellent summary of the basic differences by *Thierry Tardy*, UN-EU Relations in Crisis Management, Background paper for the conference on “Partnership. The United Nations, the European Union and the Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations”, Paris, October 2008, pp. 15.

<sup>8</sup> See *Claudia Major* on the 2006 DRC operation (“EU-UN Cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006”, Occasional Paper n°72, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2008). The After-Action Review on Chad recommends the drafting of “framework arrangements for UN-EU cooperation on financing and logistics aspects for EU operations undertaken under the EU Athena mechanism using as a model the Technical Arrangement established for EUFOR Chad/CAR”.

<sup>9</sup> For more details see the Factsheet on Financing ESDP operations:  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA\\_june\\_2007.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june_2007.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> See *Bastian Richter*, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) - An Interactive Guide, June 2008;  
[http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF\\_Presentation\\_ESDP\\_12.07.pps](http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Presentation_ESDP_12.07.pps)

Mission.

- support and logistics is another area of diversity between the EU and UN; over the decades the latter has developed a rather systematic and well entrenched approach to both; the EU is more difficult: it may either use its own assets or those of member states, or – in case of a military operation – operate via the so-called *Berlin Plus Mechanism* which allows the EU to use NATO structures, mechanisms and assets (it was agreed upon in 2003);
- the UN and the EU also differ very much on their headquarters (HQ) organizational structures; the main difference lies in the location and responsibilities of the different layers of command: at the UN, the operation HQ and Force Commander are in the field, the chain of command is short with the Force Commander directly reporting to DPKO in New York; procedures are different within the EU where the command at the strategic level belongs to the Operation Headquarters (OHQ), located either in one of the five European national Headquarters, in NATO's *Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe* (SHAPE) or within the EU Operations Centre; furthermore the EU draws a clear distinction between the OHQ and the Force HQ that commands the operation on the ground; the chain of command is also more complicated as it involves three levels: the Force HQ in the field, the OHQ, and the *Peace and Security Council* (PSC) in Brussels;
- finally, whereas all UN operations are normally placed under the political direction of a *Special Representative of the Secretary-General* (SRSG), EU Special Representatives or Special Envoys, do not have - when they exist - the same level of prerogatives as UN SRSGs regarding, for instance, the Force Commander or the Police Commissioner as the head of the police; instead, the EU often may have an *EU Special Representative* (EUSR) and a Head of Mission in parallel in the same theatre; lines of information, reporting etc. between the two are not clear and are often a reason for friction; theoretically, the EUSR is the highest European representative in theatre and therefore charged to promote the overall coordination of the different kinds of EU presence, ensure consistency and coherence of EU action and thirdly, to provide local guidance to the existing ESDP mission; however, at the same time the Council Joint Action for EULEX, for example, states that it is the Head of EULEX, and not the EUSR, who shall assume overall responsibility of this mission and exercise command and control of EULEX at the theatre level;<sup>11</sup> so, it is not at all clear who is in charge for what?

One could leave this rather dry description of the EU's planning and decision-making structures and the complicated reality of cooperation with the UN on the working level at that. However, it leads to a rather worrisome conclusion which: Increasingly mission personnel is more busy coping with these structures than with the task they are primarily deployed for - managing and solving conflict!

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<sup>11</sup> Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of Feb. 2008, Art. 8.

### **III. The Chad-CAR-Darfur Triangle of Conflict, Instability and Violence**

#### **1. *A Regional Conflict System of Enormous Complexity***

There is a tendency amongst academics, politicians and journalists to neglect the complex interactions between the stability in Chad, in the CAR and the wider region as a whole.<sup>12</sup> The linkage between conflict developments in Chad and Darfur is of greatest importance. But Darfur, being a province of the Republic of Sudan, is also very much part of the Sudanese North-South Sudan conflict system, and – accordingly - of the North-South *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (CPA), despite the existence of a separate, yet failed, DPA (Darfur Peace Agreement).

It is not an exaggeration to argue that this regional conflict system is more difficult to understand than that of the Balkans, apart from the fact that its geographic extension is much larger, in particular, if one takes into account that the unsolved conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea and in Somalia as well as those in Northern Uganda and the North Eastern DR Congo very much interact with developments in Sudan, Darfur, Chad and the CAR. Indeed, the Chad-Darfur-CAR triangle plus Sudan and the wider Greater Horn of Africa are on their way to become one of the “mega conflict systems” of the world.

It is beyond this article to detail the numerous factors, actors and dynamics which drive this complicated regional conflict and violence system.<sup>13</sup> The author will limit himself to extract those facts and features which are needed for a basic understanding of the kind of theatre EUFOR/MINURCAT deployed into.

#### **2. *Chad – a History of Poverty, Conflict and Instability***

Starting with *Chad*, it is the fifth largest country in Africa but one of its poorest and most corrupt, with a population of less than 10 m. For centuries, Chadians lived in poverty or survived as subsistence herders or farmers. Competition and fighting for land, water and, accordingly, power has been a continuous factor of economic and political life in Chad. A strong North-South dichotomy exist similar to several other countries in the Sahel Belt, (Sudan, Mauritania, Niger, Mali), as the country finds itself at the crossroads between the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa. This dichotomy is exacerbated by the existence of about two hundred different ethnic groups, with a similar number of languages spoken.<sup>14</sup> By focusing primarily on the economic development of the fertile South the French during their colonial rule did not help to ease this dichotomy. The territory was conquered by France before 1920 and then incorporated into French Equatorial Africa.

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<sup>12</sup> See *Paul-Simon Hardy*, Chad: Wading through a domestic and political crisis in a turbulent region, Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 5 December 2007, p.1.

<sup>13</sup> Readers are encouraged to have a look at the rich literature which exists insofar.

<sup>14</sup> See *Simon-Hardy*, op. cit. p. 2.

Islamic penetration is recorded in Northern Chad since the 11<sup>th</sup> century whereas the rather animist South was overwhelmingly Christianized during French colonization. Today more than 50% of the population is considered to be Muslim, about 35% Christian, and more than 10% Animist and other believes. Also the political organization of the two differed profoundly. The North was composed of centrally organized empires, like for instance Kanem-Bournou, whereas in the South communities were organized much more loosely and less hierarchical. The Northern empires played a significant role in the Trans-Saharan trade. Black African slaves were one of their most wanted “commodities”. Bands of slave traders from the North spread panic among groups in the South, whose village communities mostly where unable to resist their assaults.

This savage onslaught by “Arabs” is still deeply ingrained in the collective mind of “Africans” - a fact which is often underestimated by outsiders.<sup>15</sup> Distrust, if not open resentment and animosity persists in many so-called African communities towards the “Arabs”. Nevertheless, today the North and South of Chad are not any more as neatly divided between “Arabs” and “Africans” (or more correctly nomads, semi-nomads and peasants) as it has been the case centuries ago. Repeated migration, caused mostly by heavy droughts, has turned the country into an ethnic and religious mosaic. Yet, the “Arab-African” dichotomy continues to play a certain role in conflict dynamics. One may even argue that it has been revitalized by the discovery of considerable oil reserves as well as the increasing shortage of land and water, due to the climate change. Since 2003 crude oil has become the countries primary source of export earnings. Chad obtained independence in 1960 and its first President, François Tombalbaye, originated from the South. Since then the countries political fate has been one of rebellions, faction fighting, instability, abuse of power and increasing corruption.

Returning to the before mentioned close connection between the Darfur and Chad conflict, an important clarification regarding its origin has to be made: “The Chadian war is often described as a spill over from Darfur. This is a simplification. Darfur's war actually began as a spill over from Chad more than twenty years ago.”<sup>16</sup> In the late 80ies, Idriss Déby, Chad’s present ruler and a member of the Zaghawa clan which is living on both sides of the Chad/Darfur border had to flee to Darfur after a failed coup against Hissène Habré, a former military. He ruled Chad in a no less ruthless, corrupt and violent manner as Déby today. Habré had seized power in a successful coup in 1982, supported by of Khartoum; Déby had served as his minister of defence for several years.

In 1990, it was Déby’s who toppled Habré and returned to N’Djamena with his armed militias. Now Khartoum had empowered him to make such a move based on a deal similar to that which almost a decade before, it had struck with Habré: Each side would deny support to the other side's rebels. In 1996 Déby consolidated his power by winning the first free elections. He managed to get re-elected in May 2001, although this time the freedom and fairness of the

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<sup>15</sup> Parenthesis is used with respect to the terms „Arabs“ and „Africans“ as t is disputed how precisely these groups can be distinguished today in view of the intensive cultural and biological mix which has taken place over the past decades and centuries.

<sup>16</sup> *Alex deWaal*, Making Sense of Chad, 4 February 2008, <http://ssrc.org/bloqs/darfur/category/darfur/chad>, p.1.



elections were very much contested. Thereafter, his regime increasingly turned corrupt and abusive. Conflicts with the domestic opposition and rebel movements escalated. Accusations of abusing public funds as his personal property and of relying on a narrow circle of kinsmen to secure his power augmented.

Today, Déby's poor health is well known and contributes to the perception of his regime as one in decay. His deteriorating relationship with his erstwhile sponsors in Khartoum is an even more menacing factor as Déby has become unable to keep his side of the deal. Darfurian rebels operate from Chad against Khartoum and used its territory as a safe-heaven, very much to the disliking of the Bashir government. In danger of being completely isolated in his own tribe, the Zaghawa, Déby had to change sides in 2005 and started to give support to one of the leading Darfurian rebel movements, the *Justice and Equality Movement* (JEM). (The Zaghawa, although a rather small tribe, form the military backbone of JEM). It took not long that Khartoum retaliated by starting to support Chadian rebels.<sup>17</sup>

There have been a number of regional and international efforts since 2005 to mediate the conflict loaded Déby-Khartoum relationship - with little success. The "battles" for N'Djamena in 2006 and in 2008 have been the two most dramatic demonstrations of the failure to appease this relationship. The battle of 2008, beginning on February 2, when about 2,000 Khartoum supported Chadian rebels entered N'Djamena after a three-day advance from the East with more than 250 4x4 armed pick-up trucks and Toyota Land cruisers, almost finished Déby's regime. The rebel force was initially successful in taking a large part of the city and attacking the presidential palace. The latter, however, never fell. The late but sudden intervention of the French Air force played a decisive role in this turn of events. Paris, most probably in accordance with Washington, had in the last moment come to the conclusion that a regime change in N'Djamena, bringing Khartoum supported rebels into power, was intolerable. Two days later, Déby's troops had pushed the rebels out of the city. Once again, Déby's game of forcing his international allies to choose between him and unpalatable rebels, after having successfully blocked and decimated the civil opposition, had paid off.<sup>18</sup> The old problem of French interventions in Africa of having to bail out corrupt, dictatorial regimes in fear of a worse alternative persisted.

Yet, France, which has a Defence Agreement with Chad since 1960 and has always kept a sizeable military presence in the country, is not the only extra-regional actor influencing Chad's fate. Washington is very much present, too. Esso and Chevron, together with a Malaysian company, are the main exploiter of Chadian oil on the basis of concessions granted to them by Déby. France quest for such concessions was deliberately rebuffed by Déby in 2003. In 2008, however, Washington agreed very much with Paris that a possible regime change in N'Djamena was not desirable. *Libya* and *China* are also important actors in this triangle. Libya has a history

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<sup>17</sup> For an overview of the rebel groups in Chad see *Paul-Simon*, op. cit.; Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic S/2007/97, 23 February 2007 and S/Res/1778 (2007), 25 September 2007.

<sup>18</sup> Alex de Waal, op. cit. p. 1.



of an armed border conflict with Chad (occupation of the disputed Azou Strip by Libya from 1973 to 1994). Since the peaceful resolution of this conflict based on an international court decision, Ghadafi has changed strategy and likes to put himself forward as a mediator in Chad's domestic and the Chad-Sudan conflict. He wants nobody to forget that under his rule Libya is a leading regional power and peace broker! *China's* appearance in Chad is more recent, following a sudden switch of diplomatic ties by Déby from Taiwan to the PR China. Beijing responded to this more by signing several contracts in the oil, mining and energy sector, worth millions of Dollars and embellished by a promise of strictly no interference into Chad's internal affairs, i.e. Déby's dismal human rights and democratization agenda.

### **3. *The Central African Republic (CAR) – Poverty, Instability, Bandits and Rebels***

The story of the *Central African Republic's* instability will be raised here just briefly, in accordance with the fact that only a very minor part of EUFOR/MINURCAT has been deployed there. The CAR has a population of less than 5 m with the Baya (33%), Banda (27%), Mandjia (13%), Sara (10%) being the main ethnic groups. About 50% of the population is of Christian believe, 35% maintain indigenous, mostly animist believes and about 15% are Muslim. From 1910 to 1960, the territory was under French colonial rule and, like Chad, part of French Equatorial-Guinea.

Today, the CAR is heavily dependent upon foreign aid and the presence of NGOs. They provide most of the services the government fails to deliver. These organisations and their personnel have become an important source of revenue for many Central Africans. The country and its regime are hooked up on international aid despite the fact that it could be self-sufficient in food supply! Most of the population therefore continues to live at a very modest subsistence level. Livestock improvement is made difficult by the Tsetse Fly.

In September 1993 the CAR enjoyed its first truly free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections. Ange-Felix Patassé, who had served as prime minister in the horror regime of Bokassa in the 70ies (and then had helped to bring him down), was the clear winner of these elections. In 1999, he again managed to prevail with more than 50%. Nevertheless, resistance against his rule started to grow and in 2003 the present ruler, François Bozizé, advanced on the capital Bangui with mercenaries hired in Chad and elite soldiers from the Chad presidential guard. He took over power without much resistance. President Patassé happened to be outside the country on a regional summit meeting. Paris clearly had encouraged Bozizé to topple Patassé and very much encouraged the *Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale* (CEMAC) to field a small peacekeeping mission in October 2002<sup>19</sup> to Bangui, the so-called *Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC)*, to assist in stabilizing the country.

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<sup>19</sup> The mandate of FOMUC was prolonged and adapted after the toppling of Patassé.

Bozizé is still in power. After his coup a new constitution has been approved in a referendum in December 2004, and multi party presidential and parliamentary elections were held in spring 2005. Despite winning these elections, Bozizé's rule is also contested by a variety of ethnic and political opposition groups and rebel alliances, the two most important ones being the *Union des Forces Démocratique pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR) and the *Armée Pour la Restauration de la République et de la Démocratie* (APRD). The UFDR is operating primarily in the North-eastern CAR and suspected to be supported by Khartoum as well as rebel movements from Chad; the APRD is controlling parts of North-western CAR and supported by the former ruler Félix Patassé.<sup>20</sup>

In February 2006 and on other occasions, there were reports of widespread violence in the northern part of the CAR. Thousands fled their homes, caught in the crossfire of battles between government troops and rebel forces. More than 7,000 people fled to neighbouring Chad. Those who remained in the CAR told of government troops systematically killing men and boys suspected of cooperating with rebels. It is also this North-eastern part of the CAR, which is always in danger of being effected by events in Chad and therefore covered by the mandate of EUFOR/MINURCAT.

In April 2008, the CAR government and the APRD, followed by two other rebel groups like UFDR, concluded the *Libreville Peace Agreement*. In June 2008 this agreement was reinforced by a national political dialogue including civil society, opposition, as well as rebel groups. A 15 member committee was charged to take care of the national dialogue. In parallel, FOMUC responsibilities were transferred to the *Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique* (MICOPAX), disposing of a strength of about 370 military, 150 police officers and 15 civilians. Yet, hopes for a sustained peace process were quickly chattered. In his Report to the SC in August 2007, the SG had already recognized this weakness by stating that the national dialogue seemed to have brought little improvement. In fall 2008, APRD and UFDR, followed by other groups, abandoned the national dialogue accusing the government of not abiding to the Libreville Agreement.

In December 2008, the *International Crisis Group* (ICG) came therefore to a most blunt statement regarding the true character of peace processes in the CAR: "Il s'agit seulement d' un simulacre de réconciliation qui ne sert qu'à masquer les arrière-pensées de chacun. C' est un chimère qu'on caresse pour se concilier les faveurs de la communauté internationale, en attendant le moment propice pour s' emparer du pouvoir."<sup>21</sup>

However, even before this fragile peace process rebel groups were not the only security concern of the country. Ruthless bandits, like in particular the so-called "Zaraguinas", are roaming different parts of the country with their well armed and highly mobile groups. The CAR army, poorly armed and trained, is not a serious match for them. The Ugandan *Lord's Resistance*

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<sup>20</sup> For more details of the rebel groups in the CAR see: *International Crisis Group*, République centrafricaine: débloquer le dialogue politique inclusive, Policy Briefing, Afrique No. 55, 9 décembre 2008.

<sup>21</sup> *International Crisis Group*, op. cit. p.2.

Army (LRA), known for its extreme atrocities, is another source of insecurity in the Eastern CAR. The BBC is probably not exaggerating when it concludes in late Dec. 2008 that the government “controls little more than half the country.”<sup>22</sup>

The fact that in 2008 the Bozizé government signed a contract with the French company Areva on starting the exploitation of Uranium reserves in Bakouma, 800 km east of Bangui, will most probably not help to calm the situation. The incentive for controlling power in the CAR to get access to this source of enrichment will grow. (Areva's Uranium exploitation activities have also been very much at the beginning of the violent and ongoing armed conflict between the Tuareg and the rulers in Niger).

All things considered, Chad as well as the CAR<sup>23</sup> fulfil all the criteria to be labelled as “failed states”. Their weak and – to put it diplomatically - problematic regimes would not last for long without being propped up by allies like France and, more recently and less directly, international peacekeeping missions like EUFOR/MINURCAT. Without them and the very presence of international aid and humanitarian actors, substituting the state in providing survival services for the population, these regimes most probably would collapse.<sup>24</sup> Into this volatile environment EUFOR/MINUCAT had to deploy in early 2008.

#### **IV. EUFOR/MINURCAT – Mandate and Division of Labour**

On September 25, 2007, the SC in Res. 1778 agreed on the mandate for a joint EUFOR/MINURCAT mission in Chad and the CAR. A difficult process of negotiations between the UN-Secretariat and the Déby government finally came to an end. Indeed, it started with a Report by the SG to the SC in December 2006 in which he reported the results of an assessment team sent by DPKO to the two countries. The team did not come back with an encouraging result but, as the SG stated in this Report, concluded that “The conditions for an effective United Nations peacekeeping operation do not...seem to be in place...”.<sup>25</sup> However, DPKO was overruled with its negative assessment of the conditions of an international mission in Chad and the CAR by the SC. In particular France and Great Britain insisted that DPKO should send another team and come forward with a “better” recommendation.

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<sup>22</sup> BBC News 23.12.2008.

<sup>23</sup> In March 2009, the SG's Special Representative, F. Lonsény Fall, reports progress in negotiating a peaceful settlement in the CAR. Three committees have been established in Bangui by various actors to deal with the areas of politics and governance, security and armed groups and socio-economic questions. It remains to be seen how successful these committees will be. See UN News, 11 March 2009.

<sup>24</sup> In Chad, the situation of the Déby regime became even more volatile in early 2009. Chad's eight main rebel groups have joined together to form a unified insurgency which is preparing fresh military action. See: <http://www.france24.com/en/print/4448987>, 19 January 2009. In the CAR, Bozizé had announced to form a new, more open government. However, hopes of opposition and rebel movements to be substantially included in this government were not fulfilled.

<sup>25</sup> See Report S/2006/1019, 22 December 2006, p.v84.

In this process the international community had to make substantial concessions to the Chad government. In the Report preceding this Res. 1778 the SG, Ban Ki-moon, pointed out that the mandate given to the international mission was far from what he (and DPKO) had envisaged. In an earlier Report to the SC in February 2007, he had submitted a very different proposal regarding mandate and structure of the planned international presence and had asked “for a Chadian and United Nations police presence to be complemented by the deployment of a mobile and well-equipped UN (!) military force, which would be capable of taking robust action to protect civilians at risk, deter conflict, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, reduce tension and contribute to the establishment of a more secure environment in its area of operation. The size of the force needed was estimated to be upwards 11,000 to be able also to provide wide-area security, in particular as a prerequisite for the deployment of a police presence”.<sup>26</sup> In other words, Ban Ki-moon originally had envisaged a much more comprehensive mission under the exclusive command of the UN.

In the course of informal discussions held on March 23 by the SG with the Chadian Minister for External Relations, Ahmad Allam-Mi, it however became clear that the Chadian government had no intention to agree to an UN mission with such a wide ranging mandate. Obviously, Déby did not consider it to be favourable for his kind of rule. He therefore ordered his ministers to counter with a significantly different proposal which - most importantly - did not include an UN military component. The ensuing deadlock between the Chadian government and the UN brought the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bernard Kouchner, into the negotiations. In June 2007, he travelled to N’Djamena to discuss the situation with Déby. Subsequently, the UN was informed by the Chadian Minister that Kouchner and Déby had agreed on the deployment of an international military presence in eastern Chad composed not of UN, but of French and other European Union forces. Ban Ki-moon immediately dispatched another UN delegation to Chad and the CAR, in order to consult with the authorities of both countries and to clarify the options for such an international presence.

The results of these consultations are contained in the September 12, 2007 Report of the SG. In this Report Ban Ki-moon did not fail to point out, although in a very diplomatic manner, the significant concessions which the UN had had to make to the Déby government to come to an agreement. He explicitly stated that “The revised concept therefore included three significant adjustments to the proposals made in my Report of 23 February”:<sup>27</sup>

- (1) The tasks and functions of the military component, which are required for the effective functioning of the international presence, would be *performed by a European Union military force (ital. add.)* that has been accepted by President Déby. This arrangement would be in place for a period of 12 months from the time of the deployment of the force, subsequent to which an appropriate follow-on arrangement, including a possible United Nations successor operation, would be put in place.

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<sup>26</sup> See Report S/2007/97, February 23, 2007.

<sup>27</sup> See Report S/2007/488 10 August 2007, p. 5.

- (2) There would be *no direct involvement (ital. add.)* of the multidimensional international presence in the border area. It would also not be directly involved with security in the refugee camps. In particular, EUFOR soldiers have no mandate to enter these camps.
- (3) *Thirdly* the Chadian police and gendarmes selected to maintain law and order in the refugee camps and internally displaced person sites would *continue to serve under national authority (ital.add.)*. However, they would be trained, monitored and mentored by the United Nations police component and provided with direct logistical support from the United Nations.

As indicated above, the UNSC finally adopted the mandate for the international presence in Res. 1778 in the last week of September 2007. Determining that the situation in the border area between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic constitutes a “threat to international peace and security”, it approved the establishment in Chad and the Central African Republic of “a multidimensional presence to intend to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, *inter alia*” by (1) contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons, and civilians in danger, (2) facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, and (3) creating favourable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas.

A distinguishing feature of this mandate is that it resulted in the deployment of an operation with a quite unique structure, consisting of three very distinct elements:

- (1) *MINURCAT*, a multidimensional UN presence in Chad and the CAR, consisting of civilian staff in the areas of civil affairs, human rights, rule of law and mission support, as well as UN police and a number of UN military liaison officers. To select, train, advice and support the *Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire (PTPH)* is the key responsibility of MINURCAT, in liaison with the UN country team. But it has also been encouraged by the SC to assist the Governments of Chad and the CAR in the promotion of the rule of law. (One might argue that this is nothing more than a fig leave covering the significant concessions made by the UN to the Déby government). To fulfil this task the SC authorized a maximum strength of 300 international police, 50 military liaison officers and an appropriate number of civilian staff.
- (2) *PTPH*, a Chadian police component, serving under the authority of the Chadian government but made up of police officers and gendarmes who would be screened, selected, trained and supported logistically and materially by the United Nations presence. This special Chadian police contingent would be established exclusively to maintain law and order in the refugee camps, key towns and surrounding areas associated with concentrations of internally displaced persons and humanitarian activities in the eastern part of Chad.
- (3) *EUFOR Chad/CAR*, the European Union military force is the *third* and final element of the

international presence. Unlike MINURCAT this force is explicitly authorized to act under Chap. VII of the UN Charter for the period of one year (from the date that its initial “operating capability” is declared, see later) in supporting the above elements and authorized to take “all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic”, to fulfil the following tasks: (a) to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; (b) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations; (c) to contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations, and associated personnel.

## V. EUFOR Joint Action (JA), Troop Contributors, Financing and Headquarters

The fact that the European Council in Brussels did not take long to follow-up the Security Council in New York and agreed on October 15 on a JA to authorize EUFOR on behalf of the EU proves that UN-EU cooperation is working on the strategic-political level, if both sides have the will to act.<sup>28</sup> On September 12, the EU Council had already accepted the *Concept of Operations* (CONOPS) for the planned European military operation. In this CONOPS an overall strength of about 3,700 troops to be deployed was envisaged, with France taking the lead by providing up to 2,000 troops. An additional strategic reserve of 600 would be kept in Europe bringing the overall authorized strength of EUFOR to 4,300.

Despite the fact that the EUFOR faced considerable deployment problems in its start-up phase (see later), its *Initial Operating Capability* in terms of the SC mandate was declared on March 15, 2008 by the European Council. According to this mandate the force is designed to serve only as a “bridging mission” for one year. Its mandate therefore will terminate on the very same date in March 2009. Afterwards a UN force is “envisaged” to take over (SC Res. 1778, para 10). EUFOR reached its (almost) full strength only six months later, on September 18, 2008, with a troop strength of about 3,400. Next to the issue of troop strength the JA also addresses *financing* as well as *headquarters* issues. In Art. 13 it stipulates that the overall costs of the mission, initially estimated to be EUR 99,200,000 (in the meantime gone up to more than 150 m) will be considered to be 50% common costs, administered by the ATHENA mechanism. For all other costs the principle “costs fall where they lie” applies, i.e. they have to be carried by the contributing states.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> See Official Journal of the European Union, 2.10.2007, L 279/ pp. 21.

<sup>29</sup> There is, however, a little known exception to these financing rules: Denmark does not participate in financing the common costs according to the ATHENA mechanism. This is due to an annex it negotiated to the Treaty on the European Union which clarifies that Denmark neither participates in the elaboration nor the implementation of Joint Actions. It therefore also has no obligation to finance.

The *headquarters* and the *command and control* issue is dealt with in the JA more concretely. In Art. 2 following it designates the EU Operational Headquarters to be located in Mont Valérien in Northern France, with Lt. General Patrick Nash from Ireland as EU Operation Commander. The command of the Field Headquarters in Chad was given to a French (Brig. Gen. Jena-Philipp Ganascia), like in the two EUFOR missions in Africa before. In view of the overall French dominance as a troop contributor and its special interests in the Chad and CAR this comes to nobody's surprise.

However, as outlined in the chapter on the EU structures, these commanders will have to act under the close supervision of Brussels. According to Art. 6 of the JA the overall political and strategic direction rests with the *Political and Security Council (PSC)*. The PSC is the only body which has the right to change the planning documents, like the *Operation Plan (OPLAN)*, the Chain of Command and the *Rules of Engagement (RoEs)*. Under the PSC the *EU Military Command (EUMC)*, based in Brussels, monitors the "proper execution of the military operation" and "receives reports from the EU Operation Commander at regular intervals" (Art. 7). It is the Chairman of this EUMC who then regularly reports to the PSC regarding the conduct of the mission, and not the Operation Commander Gen. Nash, himself! Surprisingly (at least for those who are not familiar with the EU), there is in the JA no reference to any obligation of the Operational Commander or his superiors in Brussels to directly report to the SC or the DPKO in New York, despite the fact that EUFOR has been authorized by the UN. The SC merely has "requested" the EU in Res. 1778 "to report to the Security Council, in the middle and at the end" of its one year deployment.<sup>30</sup>

## **VI. The EU and UN in Chad/CAR – A Complicated Liaison and Cooperation Partnership**

Those who have to run the joint EUFOR/MINURCAT mission do not have an easy job. Despite the fact that both missions operate under one mandate given by the SC they have to cope with a multitude of governmental and non-governmental actors in the field as well as outside, in particular in Brussels and New York. The SC in Res. 1778 has acknowledged this complex partnership structure and therefore wrote down a list of actors which in particular MINURCAT is obliged to "liaise" with, like

- the national army of Chad, the gendarmerie and police forces, the nomad national guard, the judicial authorities and prison officials in Chad as well as in the Central African Republic
- the Chadian Government and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for

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<sup>30</sup> See Res. 1778 (2007), para. 12.



Refugees (UNHCR) in support of their efforts to relocate refugee camps

- the Sudanese Government, the African Union, African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UNAMID, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA)
- MICOPAX and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) to exchange information on emerging threats to humanitarian activities in the region
- last but not least, the UN country team with its numerous participants.

In addition, in his Report for Res. 1778 the UNSG has been quite explicit on the extensive need for liaison and co-location between EUFOR and MINURCAT to “ensure full coordination and to maximize the integration of the operations”.<sup>31</sup> For the theatre he recommended at least a coordination and liaison office in N'Djamena, co-location of the EUFOR and MINURCAT headquarters in Abéché as well as in the regional headquarters. For Brussels he recommended the deployment of UN liaison officers to the Council Secretariat as well as to the Operational Headquarters in Mont Valérien in France.

The European Council seems to have worried less about coordination and the need to liaise. In its JA it does not spend much time on this issue. However, like the UNSC, it recognizes the fact that EUFOR is part of a wider effort of regional stabilization by explicitly linking the mission to the need for “regional security” and in particular to the existence of UNAMID.<sup>32</sup> In Art. 8 of the JA under the title of “Coherence of EU Response” it also asks the key actors and persons involved on the side of the EU to “ensure close coordination of their respective activities”. (One would have assumed that this goes without saying). In particular, it obliges the EUFOR Force Commander - in addition to his reporting obligations with regard to Brussels - to “consult and take into account political guidance from the *EU Special Representative* (EUSR) in the region, in particular on issues with a regional dimension...”.<sup>33</sup> The Council, however, does not, as has been described before, provide a clear delineation of the rights and duties of the EUSR and of the Operation Commander.

There is another important EU actor in the field which the EUFOR Commander, the EUSR as well as those in charge of MINURCAT have to be aware of: the European Commission. It has been mandated to contribute about EUR 50 m to the joint UN-EU initiative. Inter alia, it will support the UN police mission financially. In total, the Commission will spend about EUR 299 m in Chad and EUR 137 m in the CAR over a five year period.<sup>34</sup> Again, the European Council remains rather unspecific on the details of this cooperation although it is well known that cooperation with the European Commission and its actors in the field often is not an easy one.

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<sup>31</sup> See para. 48 following in the SG Report S/2007/488, 10 August 2007.

<sup>32</sup> See para. 1 of the Joint Action of October 15, 2007.

<sup>33</sup> Torben Brylle from Denmark has been appointed as EUSR for Sudan by the EC in April 2007.

<sup>34</sup> See: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080929\\_FACTSHEET\\_EUFOR\\_TCHAD-RCA\\_version6\\_EN.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080929_FACTSHEET_EUFOR_TCHAD-RCA_version6_EN.pdf)



Altogether, the call for the “Coherence of the EU Response” sounds somewhat hollow. Surprisingly, the Council is more specific when it comes to the need for liaison by the EU Force Commander with New York: He is asked (a) to liaise with DPKO in New York, (b) to maintain close contacts with MINURCAT, local actors as well as other international actors, and (c) to enter into the necessary arrangements with the UN regarding the modalities for mutual assistance and cooperation.<sup>35</sup>

Taken altogether, EUFOR/MINURCAT is a very busy mission in terms of coordination and liaison. Much liaison personnel is needed and triggers additional coordination demands. The impression that the EU and UN in their joint effort to contain more human suffering and conflict in the Chad and CAR have produced *de facto* a “coordination and cooperation hydra” does not seem to be too far fetched. Much of the coordination burden rests with the EUFOR Operation Commander and his staff: In addition to all the liaison and cooperation needs enumerated above he has to make sure to keep the EU member states (and “third states”) happy and on board, in particular those who have contributed troops.

## **VII. EUFOR/MINURCAT – Deploying into a Volatile Theatre of Sand, Dust and Violence**

### **1. A Vast Environment**

In an exchange with the press in late January 2008 the Operation Commander Lt. General Patrick Nash left no doubt that he was very much aware of the difficult theatre EUFOR would deploy into. He identified some of the particular challenges:<sup>36</sup>

- vastness of the region (unpopulated areas),
- austere landscape,
- severe climate (rainy season / heat),
- lack of viable infrastructure and low economic development in Chad and the CAR,
- endemic political instability,
- transiting rebel groups and bandits as additional destabilizing factors.

To be able to cope with this environment and the different requirements of the displaced civilian population, Nash explained that the activities of the operation would be split into three areas:

- in the Northern area, where most of the Darfur refugees are concentrated, EUFOR would maintain a general presence for security operations if necessary;

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<sup>35</sup> Art. 9, European Council Joint Action, 15 October 2007.

<sup>36</sup> EUFOR Press Conference with Lt. General Patrick Nash, 29 January 2008.

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/98479.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/98479.pdf)

- a more robust security presence would be stationed in the centre, where there are both refugees and internally displaced people in considerable numbers;
- in the South, special operation forces would be deployed in the border area between Chad and the Central African Republic to deter rebel attacks.

As has been stated earlier, it took EUFOR six months to move from its Initial Operational Capability in March 2008, to its (almost) Full Operational Capability of about 3,400 troops in September 2008. Since then, about 25 European states actively participate in the mission in one or the other way, 19 of them have troops in the field. France (1177), Ireland (447), Poland (421), Austria (169), Italy (104), the Netherlands (71), and Sweden (about 10) are the main contributors. Germany and Britain, not being enthusiastic about this mission only posted a few liaison officers in the headquarters of EUFOR, like a few other EU member states.<sup>37</sup> With 25 member states participating at headquarters level and 19 with troops in theatre EUFOR Tchad/CAR has to be qualified as the most European force ever carried out in Africa, despite the clear dominance of France.

From the very beginning it has been a feature of ESDP missions to be open towards the participation of non-EU states, so-called “third countries”. In the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR this became very important as it helped Brussels to resolve a key problem of the mission – lack of helicopters. In the beginning, the mission was far from being able to get the planned number of transport and combat helicopters. Eight French and two Irish helicopters were the first in place but not sufficient in numbers. Three Polish helicopters followed in July 2008 after having been reconditioned for desert conditions. Calls for more helicopters in particular to EU member states remained unanswered. After long negotiations Moscow finally provided 4 additional helicopters. In November 2008, around one hundred military personnel from the Russian Air Force and four MI 8 helicopters arrived on board of an Antonov Jumbo and became operational in mid-December. Albania already had sent about 60 soldiers in the early phase of the mission, Croatia later on fifteen. In Art. 10, para. 4 the JA, stipulates that “third states making significant contributions to the EU military operation shall have the same rights and obligations as the EU Member States.” This privilege is, of course, limited to the day-to-day management of the operation.

## **2. Headquarters and Logistical Challenges**

Abéché in Chad has been chosen as EUFOR's local Force Headquarters. Near by, in Abéché town, EUFOR has deployed its Special Forces unit consisting of elite specialists from Austria, Sweden, Ireland, Finland and Belgium. EUFOR's three forward bases in Goz Beida (South), Forchana (Centre) and Iriba (North) are supported from Abéché. A fourth camp is run by a small contingent of French troops in Birao in the CAR. EUFOR's *Operational Headquarters* (OHQ) is based outside the theatre in Mont Valérien in France, as has been pointed out before.

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<sup>37</sup>See: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081210%20Force%20Stengt%20by%20Nations%20inO10122008.pdf>

Organizing the *logistics* of EUFOR is no less demanding.<sup>38</sup> The EUFOR operating area covers approximately 280,000 square kilometres – an area larger than France. The long distances create particular challenges logistics.<sup>39</sup> Most of the heavy equipment and supplies have to be shipped by sea to Douala in Cameroon – a two-week journey from Europe. From there, the containers, trucks and other vehicles face an overland journey of almost 2,000 kilometre, a distance similar the distance from Rome to Stockholm, however on roads far worse. The distance between N'Djamena and Abéché is 760 kilometer by air. By road, it would take five days in the dry season to travel the 1,380 kilometers, not to speak of the time needed in the rainy season.

*Drinking water* is another logistic nightmare EUFOR has to cope with. Even if consumption is limited to 60 litres of water per person a day supplying a daily amount of 204.000 litres or an amount of 1,428,000 weekly is, with these long supply routes, a tremendous challenge. EUFOR knew from the beginning this would be a major problem and a huge Russian made Antonov cargo plane, the second largest transport aircraft in the world, was chartered to haul bottled water to Chad. Then the French tried to drill their own wells not to infringe too much on the resources of the local population. This did not fully work and EUFOR therefore had to take water from the local wells causing a lot of resentment amongst the local people. By digging ditches at all EUFOR camps which collect substantial amounts of rain water the EUFOR command has tried to ease this problem. Camp Europe, near N'Djamena, has been nicknamed “little Venice” because of the network of ditches which crisscross the Camp.<sup>40</sup>

### **3. Mandate and Impartiality Problems**

EUFOR did not only struggle with the lack of helicopters and difficult logistics but also very much with the limitations of its mandate. When an international peacekeeping mission deploys into a war-torn country local people expect protection and improvement what ever the fine print of a mandate says. Reading and understanding complicated limitations of mandates negotiated in New York and Brussels is beyond their daily challenge of survival. EUFOR therefore had a difficult time to explain the local population as well as to the NGOs the narrowness of its mandate. The same was true regarding the complex, not to say confusing, set-up of the EUFOR/MINUCAT architecture. Soon after reaching its Preliminary Operation Capability, the mission undertook a series of information campaigns to clarify its role and the limitations of its mandate. How successful these campaigns were in convincing the population and the NGOs are arguable. In May 2008 during a visit of EU foreign policy Chief Javier Solana many aid workers were wearing black arm bands and placed black flags on their vehicles to demonstrate their conviction and that of the local population that EUFOR should do more.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> For a more detailed description of the logistic challenges of EUFOR see *Bjoern H. Seibert, African Adventure? Assessing the European Union's Military Intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic*. MIT Security Program Working Paper, November 2007.,

<sup>39</sup> *Raymond Frenken*, EU Chad/CAR force aims to enhance stability and protection. In: ESDP Newsletter, July 2008, No. 6, pp. 7 -14.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* p. 13.

<sup>41</sup> See: <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx>

Finally, it will be to nobodies surprise that - after the concessions which had been made to the Déby government and in view of the French dominance of the mission –EUFOR's *impartiality* was questioned from the very beginning. Amongst the local population suspicions were running high that it had come to save the Déby regime. To counteract this impression the European Parliament immediately was very explicit in asking EUFOR to remain strictly neutral and to stay clearly separated from the existing French Force *Opération Epervier*.<sup>42</sup> General Nash as well as Javier Solana also spared no effort to declare that the forces would main strictly neutral and impartial with respect to the Chadian domestic and foreign policy.

Still, a number of observers continued to wonder how this would be possible in practice considering the obvious attempt of both regimes to hide behind the international presence in order to survive.<sup>43</sup> Chadian rebel movements immediately dismissed the claim of impartiality and threatened that they would attack the European force if it would stand in its way. However, only minor incidents occurred between EUFOR and the rebels. This, in turn, angered Déby who started accusing EUFOR of effectively aiding rebel groups thereby sparking of a diplomatic row with Brussels and EUFOR. Members of his government later appeared to back away from Déby's accusations.<sup>44</sup> Indeed, in the end Déby's anti-EUFOR rhetoric turned out to be beneficial for enhancing EUFOR's credibility as an impartial force.

## VIII. EUFOR – Transition to an UN Force and Preliminary Assessment

Almost in parallel as EUFOR reached its full operational strength, the UNSG had to start thinking about the follow-up force to EUFOR. As mentioned earlier, the latter has only been conceived as a one year “bridging force”, terminating in March 2009.

In September 2008, Ban Ki-moon therefore outlined to the SC the concept of a new UN led force and highlighted the following elements as being key:<sup>45</sup>

- (1) the area of operations of the new MINURCAT force would be enlarged and would include the Ennedi Est department and the Wadi Fira, Ouaddai and Salamat regions in Eastern Chad;
- (2) acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charta the force would provide the security necessary to protect civilians at risk, enhance the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of the MINURCAT mandate, and protect United Nations personnel and installations; these objectives would be achieved through a concept of deterrence based on force presence;

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<sup>42</sup> See: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2008-0190&language=EN>

<sup>43</sup> See for instance the comment „EUFOR in Chad and the CAR – The EU's most taxing mission yet“ In: IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 14, Issue 04 May 2008 ([www.iiss.org.uk](http://www.iiss.org.uk)) .

<sup>44</sup> See: <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200806200006.html>.

<sup>45</sup> Report of the SG S/2008/601, 12 September 2008, para. 63 ff.

- (3) an information, surveillance and reconnaissance capability would also be required to gather situational awareness, demonstrate presence and provide deterrence;
- (4) to ensure its freedom of movement, the force would require mobility assets integral to the military component. Owing to the terrain and distances involved, this could only be achieved by a robust military helicopter fleet (a military air component of 18 utility helicopters and an armed aerial reconnaissance unit would, in the view of the SG, provide the necessary aviation assets);
- (5) owing to the volatility of the security situation, the force would require an “over the horizon” capability of approximately one battalion group with appropriate support requirements;
- (6) concerning MINURCAT it would continue to support the establishment of what was now called the “*Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS)*”, the former PTHP; the Government of Chad had requested that the total strength of DIS was being raised from 850 to some 1,700 elements;
- (7) finally, the impartiality of the force would be fundamental to its success.

The SG made no secret of the fact that an increased number of well equipped troops would be needed to ensure the credibility of this concept. He asked for at least 6,000 troops, not including the “over the horizon” force which would be needed to support them. In defence of this number, he reminded the SC that this number was not much higher than that of EUFOR if the latter would be realistically counted, i.e. including all the logistical and aerial support EUFOR is receiving on a bilateral basis. The new force also would have to cover a more extended area than EUFOR. The number of additional troops which would be needed for the CAR was left open by the SG.

It is obvious that DPKO with this concept tried to revive elements of its original proposal of a more comprehensive, more extended and truly impartial mission, as contained in its February 2007 Report. This endeavour, however, was not met with much enthusiasm, neither in the SC nor by the Chad regime. Although the Res. 1834 (September 24, 2008) of the SC in principle welcomed the SG’s proposal, several members of the Council signalled that they considered the number of troops and helicopters he was asking for as unrealistic. The reaction of the Déby government was even blunter. In October 2008, the Permanente Representative of Chad at the UN sent a letter to the President of the SC and the SG in which it demanded:<sup>46</sup>

- (1) the operation to be undertaken by the United Nations force “should not be a conventional peacekeeping one implying some kind of ‘neutrality’, ‘impartiality’ or ‘good offices’ within the framework of any type of peace agreement”,
- (2) the force should not exceed 3,000 troops and that it should be better equipped than EUFOR.

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<sup>46</sup> See Report of the SG S/2008/760, 4 December 2008 para.40 and 57.

Déby's refusal to accept a "non-neutral, non-impartial" UN force, thereby challenging the very nature of UN peacekeeping, once more revealed the true intentions of his regime: It wants to instrumentalize the international presence for its survival. Again, DPKO had to bend over to accommodate N'Djamena. It needed three visits of the Undersecretary-General of the *Department of Field Support* (DFS), of the DPKO Military Advisor and finally of SG Ban Ki-moon himself, apart from a renewed visit of the UN technical assessment team to work out a more "refined" concept, to get N'Djamena to agree to a force of 4,900.<sup>47</sup>

It is this number which the SG finally proposed in his December 2008 Report to the SC signalling the painful compromises DPKO had to make by stating that "in developing this concept, careful consideration has been given to the continued concerns expressed by the government of Chad". He also does not hesitate to voice his concerns regarding the minimum strength of the now proposed force: "The refined force concept reflects adjustments to the helicopter support troops, signals units, special forces and reconnaissance units, as well as some logistical elements. They are deemed operationally achievable, although not ideal, as they reduce the logistical support and enablers to the minimum. Any further reduction in the force would significantly impact on its effectiveness and situational awareness."<sup>48</sup>

Altogether, the history of negotiating *first* a mandate for EUFOR/MINURCAT and *then* for the new MINURCAT force is a sobering demonstration of how much so-called political considerations have taken precedence over the need for effectiveness in international peacekeeping!<sup>49</sup> It is particularly stunning to which extent the "representatives" of the international community, above all the members of the SC, were ready to accede to the demands of the Déby regime! One has to commend the often blamed DPKO for having made the right recommendation in 2006: The conditions for a successful international presence did not exist!

The fact that the design of the concept was not preceded by a systematic, thorough and honest assessment of the wrongs and failures as well as of the successes of EUFOR/MINURCAT fits into this picture.<sup>50</sup> Of course, the time frame of less than one year in which EUFOR as well as MINURCAT have been truly operational would have made such a thorough assessment difficult. Most likely it would have come to the conclusion that only a highly improved mandate and mission, similar to that proposed by the SG in February 2007, would really have made sense. The results of the cursory evaluation undertaken by a joint EU-UN evaluation team and presented by the SG in his September 2008 Report very much support this assumption.<sup>51</sup> They show how limited the impact of EUFOR/MINURCAT was in improving the situation. Here are some of the results regarding Chad presented by the SG in his December 2008 Report.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid, para. 47 ff and 57 ff.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, para. 57 ff.

<sup>49</sup> The genesis of UNAMID in Darfur is another example for his tendency.

<sup>50</sup> It least to the author none such systematic and thorough evaluation is known.

<sup>51</sup> For a short appraisal of the achievements EUFOR see also *Hans-Georg Ehrhardt*, *Assessing EUFOR Chad/CAR*, European Security Review no. 42, December 2008, ISIS Europe page 20 – 21.

<sup>52</sup> SG Report S/2008/601, (Sept. 2008), para. 11 ff., and SG Report S/2008/760 (Dec. 2008) para. 4 ff.

- (1) The security situation, particularly in eastern Chad, remains volatile. Over the last few months, both the *Chadian National Armed Forces* (FANT) and rebel groups were reported to have strengthened positions on their respective sides of the Chad-Sudan border in anticipation of a possible offensive.
- (2) Carjacking, armed robberies and crime targeting national and international humanitarian staff continued during the reporting period. With the end of the rainy season, the possibility of renewed rebel attacks has increased.
- (3) Eastern Chad currently hosts over 290,000 refugees and more than 180,000 internally displaced persons, who continue to rely on humanitarian aid for their survival. Up to 700,000 individuals among the host communities are also estimated to have humanitarian needs. The security situation continues to seriously undermine the capacity of humanitarian workers to deliver assistance. Over \$1.5 million worth of non-food items and vehicles were lost.
- (4) Investigations into criminal acts by the local authorities, if they take place at all, are usually not completed. Since the attack on its staff member on 26 July, the International Committee of the Red Cross has suspended its activities in displaced persons sites pending an investigation into the incident by national authorities.
- (5) In the Am Nabak refugee camp (Wadi Fira region), on 6 October 2008, a group of women forcibly entered an area where staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were registering refugees. The incident degenerated into a violent attack against UNHCR and NGO workers. Gendarmes from the *Commission Nationale pour l'Accueil et la Réinsertion des Réfugiés* eventually restored order with the help of EUFOR and evacuated the humanitarian workers. To date, the security situation in the camp has precluded their return.

The SG also did not hide his concerns regarding the political developments in Chad, in particular regarding the organization of elections and the therefore needed electoral reforms. In his September 2008 Report he cautiously acknowledges “some progress” concerning these reforms. Three months later, in the December Report, his language has turned even more cautious: only “some limited progress” has been made in the meantime.<sup>53</sup>

Regarding the assessment of EUFOR’s, there is no denying that there are also positive elements. A Report by Oxfam published in September 2008 points out that “EUFOR has made many feel safer by patrolling the main roads, destroying unexploded ordnances, and by positioning battalions around camps during rebel and government fighting.”<sup>54</sup> But the sense of increased security EUFOR was able to generate, is unfortunately, limited mostly to the areas close to its camps. EUFOR, due to its character as a military force, was also not capable of dealing with the upsurge in banditry and criminality.” (This banditry and criminality will also

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<sup>53</sup> September 2008 Report, para. 2 and December 2008 Report, para. 4.

<sup>54</sup> Roland Van Hauwermeiren, *Insecurity reigns in eastern Chad as the EU-UN mission struggles to protect civilians*, Oxfam International, 10 September 2008 p. 1-3.



not be dealt with by the new Chadian DIS police as its responsibility is limited to the refugee and IDP camps).

Regarding MINURCAT, its main achievement so far has been that the total number of trained officers for DIS rose to the number of 418. The next course, for 222 officers, started on 24 November. The SG hopes that “if suitable candidates are available and the current training schedule is maintained, the target of training 850 DIS officers may be achieved by January 2009.”<sup>55</sup>

In view of the limited achievements of EUFOR/MINURCAT and the doubtful mandate of the new MINURCAT mission, it is not surprising that the SG is having huge difficulties in finding the 4,900 troops for the new force. In his December 2008 Report he sums up what he has been able to achieve so far:<sup>56</sup>

- 16 countries have “indicated” a willingness to positively consider contributing troops
- one potential contributor has positively indicated to contribute to the helicopter requirement

This is a meagre result, indeed, if one takes into account that (at the time the Report was written) only three months were left until the take over of the new force on March 15, 2009. In early 2009, the situation has not much improved although the SC on January 14 has approved a maximum force of 5,500 peacekeepers, (4,900 for Chad and 600 for the CAR). UN member states are not rushing forward to provide troops and equipment.<sup>57</sup> The danger of a security vacuum caused by the transition from an EU to an UN force is still imminent. SG Ban Ki-moon hopes to prevent this by convincing as many EUFOR troop contributors as possible to agree to a re-hatting of their contingents. A handful of countries, like Ireland, Poland, Austria, Finland, and Romania, already indicated in late 2008 that they might be willing to do so.<sup>58</sup> And Russia has indicated its willingness to further provide its helicopters. Poland, however, will withdraw its contingent because of the impact of the financial crisis on the country. It remains to be seen to which extent France is ready to close the remaining gap by putting more of its troops under UN command.

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<sup>55</sup> December 2008 Report, para. 23.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. para 64 ff.

<sup>57</sup> Surprisingly, the SG in his Report does not mention the plan, negotiated by the so-called *African Dakar Contact Group*, to deploy about 2,000 Sudanese and Chadian troops at both sides of the Sudanese-Chad border in early 2009 as a bilateral monitoring force. Obviously, he does not seem to consider them as a reliable force. The past history of Sudanese-Chadian peace negotiations does, indeed, not give any confidence that anything reliable is resulting from these bilateral understandings.

<sup>58</sup> See: <http://www.tchadactuel.com>, 3 October 2009.



## IX. Conclusion

There is no doubt that spring 2009 will be a defining moment for the future of the international presence in Chad and the CAR, and for peace and stability in the region at large. Apart from the difficulties of substituting EUFOR Tchad/CAR with a credible UN force, three other international peacekeeping missions in the region already are, or are heading towards, serious trouble:

- (1) In neighbouring *Darfur*, UNAMID continues to struggle for survival with less than half of its originally authorized strength (25,000). Helicopters are still lacking although the mission was launched more than one and a half years ago, in July 2007. There is little hope that the mission will reach its full strength in 2009 although more formed police and military units are arriving. The security situation in Darfur in early 2009 is not much less worrying as it was in early 2008.<sup>59</sup> In January 2009 Khartoum conducted a quite substantial aerial bombing campaign against rebel positions. The prospect of successfully negotiating a peace remains dim.
- (2) Regarding the *North-South peace process* in *Sudan*, two events in 2009 will be decisive:
  - the *indictment* of President Bashir by the International Criminal Court in March 2009. It is not yet how disruptive Khartoum will react to it; Bashir may threaten the continuation of the entire peace process and the presence of UNMIS; in that case a relapse into open war between the North and the South is to be feared, which would have repercussions well beyond the borders of Sudan; however, it is also possible that those groups dominating the Khartoum government will not perceive a new war with the South as an option favourable for them and therefore will look for other solutions;
  - the *elections* scheduled for July 2009; they are the next decisive step in implementing the CPA; holding them as scheduled is already in question, not only because of the indictment of Bashir, but also because of other logistical and political problems; yet, the decision to postpone these elections would be more than merely a technical issue and may shake up the entire CPA process (in conjunction with other unsolved problems, like acceptance of the result of the census, unresolved border issues etc.)
- (3) In the eastern neighbourhood, *Somalia* is continuing its decay into violence, conflict, and destruction. In January 2009, the *Transitional Federal Government* (TFG) has fallen apart and Ethiopian troops are leaving the country. They provided at least some stability, despite being deeply resented by the majority of Somalis and constant attacks by Islamist groups. With the Ethiopian withdrawal a mixture of forces of the government and the *Islamic Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia* (ARS) immediately took over positions from the Ethiopian army in Mogadishu. In central Somalia, Islamist groups have started fighting each other. Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca, a relatively new

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<sup>59</sup> See Report S/2008/781 of the UN Secretary General to the SC on Darfur from 12 December 2008.

Islamist group, has declared a holy war on another radical Islamist rebel group, called al-Shabab. AMISOM, the *African Union Peacekeeping Mission to Somalia* is deeply in trouble without the security umbrella of the Ethiopians. (In terms of troops it never reached more than a strength of about 3,500, despite its authorized strength of 8,000.) Uganda and Burundi, the only two African countries which have provided troops for AMISOM, have threatened to withdraw their troops if the AU is not able to quickly strengthen the mission in terms of troops, armament and mandate. In turn, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Nigeria have signalled in early January 2009 their willingness to strengthen the mission by sending further battalions.

- (4) Finally, in 2008 the UN Mission UNMEE, monitoring the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, had to withdraw. Eritrea had ended its consent to its presence. All efforts to get the two parties, in particular Ethiopia, to implement the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission have failed. Instead, both sides have considerable numbers of troops positioned at the border. A resumption of the war might be easily triggered because of the deep animosity between the two ruling regimes.

In sum, there is a very real danger that in 2009 the entire region of the Greater Horn of Africa - extending from the Chad-Dafur-CAR triangle of conflict, violence and destabilization on the western side of the Sudan and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea on its eastern side - may escalate into more conflict, violence and humanitarian disaster. Neither Africa, nor Europe or the international community at large seem to dispose of the ideas and means to control this process and to stabilize the region. As this analysis has shown,

- (1) mandates of the existing missions are much too restricted and weak (with a certain exception of UNMIS);
- (2) capabilities in terms of troops, policy and other kinds of personnel as well as military equipment, like in particular helicopters and other high value elements, are insufficient;
- (3) regimes as well as the armed groups and rebel movements have very much learned their lessons how to abuse and manipulate the different kinds of international presences to their advantage;
- (4) the hope that the creation of so-called "peacekeeping partnerships" between multilateral organizations like the UN, EU and AU will lead to more effective and better equipped peacekeeping missions has not materialized; quite on the contrary, these kind of partnerships rather seem to breed cumbersome, bureaucratic cooperation and coordination monsters.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> This finding confirms a conclusion drawn by a recent Workshop jointly organized by Berlin *Center for International Peacekeeping Operations* (ZIF) and the New York *Centre on International Cooperation* (CIC) on "Towards an Understanding of Peacekeeping Partnerships", held in Berlin in June 2008 with a number of high-level and field experienced experts from the UN, AU, EU etc. The Report of the Workshop concludes: "Partnerships must be recognized for what they are: operational formulations driven primarily by political compromises, dictated by the situation at hand, both by actors in the theatre of operation and at the international headquarters level. At times, partnerships have added unnecessary levels of complexity to peace operations, negatively spread accountability across actors involved and left space for spoilers to apply 'divide and conquer' political strategies. See the Report on the ZIF's website: <http://www.zif-berlin.org/de/analyse-und-informationen/veroeffentlichungen.html>

Obviously, profound rethinking is needed by Africa as well as Europe, the US and the international community at large how the decay of this huge region into more violence, conflict, banditry and streams of refugees and IDPs can be stopped. In early 2009 more than 10 m IDPs and about 2.5 m refugees dwell in numerous smaller and bigger refugee camps in the Greater Horn of Africa and the adjacent states. The international community, in particular Africa, Europe and the US, are caught in a deep dilemma between the moral call for preventing further humanitarian catastrophes in the region and the realistic insight that they do neither provide of the convincing strategies nor the necessary means to do so.

## List of Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APRD	Armée Pour la Restauration de la République et de la Démocratie
ARS	Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
AU	African Union
BONUCA	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic
CAR	Central African Republic
CEMAC	Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l' Afrique Centrale
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahelo-Saharan States
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
COC	Centre on International Co-operation
CONOMPS	Concept of Operations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DIS	Détachement Intégré de Sécurité
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EU BAM	Border Assistance Mission
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUJUST	EU Rule of Law Mission
EUMM	EU Monitoring Mission
EUPM	EU Police Mission
EUPOL COPPS	EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
EUSEC	EU Assistance for Security Sector Reform
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FANT	Chadian National Armed Forces
FOMUC	Multinationale en Centrafrique
HQ	Headquarters
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IPTF	International Police Task Force
JA	Joint Action
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MICOPAX	Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique
MINURCAT	Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad
MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OPLAN	Operation Plan
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PTPH	Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire
Res.	Resolution

RoEs	Rules of Engagement
SC	Security Council
SG	Secretary General
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UFDR	Union des Forces Démocratique pour le Rassemblement
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNAMID	AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
WEU	Western European Union
ZIF	Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze / Center for International Peace Operations

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Deutsch)

Dieser Artikel befasst sich mit der europäischen Friedensmission EUFOR im Tschad und der Zentralafrikanischen Republik (ZAR). *EUFOR Tchad/RCA* gilt als jüngstes Beispiel eines substantiellen europäischen Beitrags zu Frieden und Sicherheit in Afrika. EUFOR wurde im Verbund mit der VN-Polizei Mission MINURCAT im Herbst 2008 vom Sicherheitsrat der VN und dem Europäischen Rat in Brüssel als eine einjährige „bridging“ Mission autorisiert. Die erschreckende Entwicklung der humanitären Lage in beiden Ländern war der Anlass für die Entsendung dieser internationalen Präsenz. Die Zahl der IPDs (*Internally Displaced Persons*) und Flüchtlinge, aufgefangen in ungeschützten Lagern, war in beiden Ländern 2006 und 2007 dramatisch angestiegen - allein im Tschad auf über 120.000 IDPs und 230.000 Flüchtlinge.

Die vorliegende Studie unternimmt eine vorläufige Einschätzung der Probleme EUFORs *erstens* bei der Planung und Entsendung und *zweitens* bezüglich des Mandats und der Effektivität der Mission vor Ort. Letzteres trifft angesichts der Kürze der Stehzeit der Mission von einem Jahr, dem schwierigen Schauplatz aus Sand, Hitze, Gewalt mit einem komplexen politisch-ethnischen Beziehungsgeflecht sowie der Arbeitsteilung mit MINURCAT allerdings auf einige Schwierigkeiten.

Da das Mandat von EUFOR am 15. März 2009 ausgelaufen ist, schließt die Untersuchung mit einer kurzen Bewertung der Übernahme der Aufgaben von EUFOR durch eine VN geführte Militärmission.

### **EUFOR –Kapazitäten und logistische Herausforderungen**

EUFOR Tchad/RCA ist der dritte und zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung dieses Artikels größte militärische Friedenseinsatz der EU. Über ein Dutzend EU-Mitgliedsstaaten und drei Nicht-EU Länder haben Truppenkontingente unterschiedlicher Größe entsandt. Anders als bei der ersten EU-Truppe in Afrika, *Operation Artemis* im Kongo 2003, ist der im Prinzip europäische Charakter dieser Mission deswegen zu bejahen, trotz der starken französischen Dominanz.

Von Beginn an sah sich EUFOR erheblichen Schwierigkeiten hinsichtlich einer ausreichenden Ausstattung mit Truppen und Material gegenüber. Es dauerte gut ein Jahr, bis die Mission ihre (fast) volle Einsatzstärke erreichte. Sie wurde im September 2008, nur ein halbes Jahr vor dem Ende der Mission also, durch Brüssel erklärt. Die Ausstattung mit genügend Helikoptern war das größte Problem. Diese Lücke konnte schließlich erst mit Hilfe von vier russischen Helikoptern (plus ca. 100 Mann Supportpersonal) im Herbst 2008 geschlossen werden.

Die *logistische* Versorgung von EUFOR erwies sich als nicht weniger schwierig, vor allem wegen der großen Distanzen und der wenig funktionsfähigen Transportinfrastruktur im Tschad und der ZAR. EUFORs Einsatzgebiet erstreckt sich über ca. 280.000 km<sup>2</sup>, also eine Fläche größer als Frankreich. Schweres Material und das nötige Zubehör müssen zumeist von Europa aus nach

Douala (Kamerun) in einer ca. zweiwöchigen Seereise verschifft werden. In Afrika haben die Container, Lastwagen und andere Fahrzeuge dann eine fast 2.000 Kilometer lange Fahrt über Land vor sich – eine Distanz vergleichbar mit der Strecke Rom-Stockholm.

Die dritte große Herausforderung war die ausreichende Versorgung der Truppe mit *Wasser*. Selbst bei einer Reduzierung des Wasserverbrauchs auf 60 Liter pro Peacekeeper und Tag – umgerechnet ein Tagesbedarf von 204.000 Litern und ein Wochenverbrauch von 1.428.000 Litern – bedeutet dies angesichts der langen Transportwege eine gewaltige Aufgabe. Die Gefahr einer Belastung der ohnehin schon knappen lokalen Trinkwasserversorgung war groß, mit entsprechend negativer Rückwirkung auf die Akzeptanz der Mission in der Bevölkerung. Die Führung von EUFOR versuchte diesem Problem unter anderem dadurch beizukommen, dass sie in den EUFOR Lagern Gräben zum Auffangen von Regenwasser ausheben ließ. *Camp Europe* nahe N'Djamena erhielt den Spitznamen „little Venice“ - wegen der vielen Gräben, die das Lager durchziehen.

### **EU-UN Zusammenarbeit – eine schwerfällige Partnerschaft**

Die Tatsache, dass der Europäische Rat in Brüssel im Herbst 2007 nur kurz nach dem VN-Sicherheitsrat in einer *Joint Action* der Entsendung von EUFOR zustimmte, beweist, dass die VN-EU Kooperation, zumindest auf der strategischen Ebene, funktioniert – jedenfalls dann, wenn wichtige Mitgliedsstaaten auf beiden Seiten den Willen zum Handeln haben. Auf den Ebenen der Planung und Entscheidung sieht das allerdings anders aus. Tiefgreifende strukturelle Unterschiede behindern die Zusammenarbeit der zwei Organisationen:

- die Mischung aus intergouvernementalen (Europäischer Rat) und supranationalen (EU Kommission) Verfahrensweisen innerhalb der EU; sie verkomplizieren die Zusammenarbeit mit den VN, erhöhen die Zahl der beteiligten Akteure und verursachen Verwirrung bei den VN-Mitarbeitern über die Verantwortlichkeiten und Funktionsweise in der EU;
- verschiedene Verfahrensweisen im Bereich der Finanzierung; die Mechanismen in der EU sind um einiges komplizierter als die der VN;
- die VN haben über die Jahre ein relativ systematisches und gut eingefahrenes Verfahren bei Logistik und Unterstützung ihrer Missionen entwickelt; in der EU ist das anders: es werden entweder, soweit vorhanden, die eigenen Ressourcen oder die der Mitgliedsstaaten in Anspruch genommen; im Falle eines militärischen Einsatzes kann auch der sog. *Berlin Plus Mechanismus* zur Anwendung kommen, der die Inanspruchnahme von NATO Strukturen und Kapazitäten vorsieht (nicht der Fall bei EUFOR Tchad/CAR);
- sehr stark unterscheiden sich die EU und UN auch in der Organisationsstruktur ihrer Hauptquartiere; die Hauptunterschiede finden sich beim Standort und den

Verantwortlichkeiten der verschiedenen Kommandoebenen; letztere sind bei der EU relativ komplizierter: das Force HQ im Feld, das OHQ (*Operational Headquarters*) in Europa und der PSC (Peace and Security Council) in Brüssel.

Zweifelloso hat das Personal in Brüssel und in New York ebenso wie in den Missionen vor Ort sein Möglichstes getan, um trotz dieser Differenzen eine gute Zusammenarbeit zu gewährleisten. Das ändert jedoch nichts an der Tatsache, dass *de facto* das Personal in den Missionen ebenso wie in den Hauptquartieren immer mehr mit der Bewältigung der komplizierten politischen und bürokratischen Strukturen beider Organisationen und weniger mit der Erfüllung der ihm eigentlich übertragenen Aufgaben beschäftigt ist, nämlich der Bewältigung und Lösung der Probleme und Konflikte vor Ort!

### **Das EUFOR/MINURCAT Mandat – zu restriktiv und ineffektiv?**

Aus den Erfahrungen mit den Friedenseinsätzen auf dem Balkan, Ruanda, Somalia, der DR Kongo und weiterer ergibt sich eine klare Erkenntnis: Wenn eine internationale Friedensmission in ein vom Krieg zerrüttetes Land eintrifft, dann erwartet die lokale Bevölkerung Schutz und eine Verbesserung ihrer Situation – was auch immer das in New York oder in Brüssel beschlossene Mandat im Einzelnen sagt. Das EUFOR/MINURCAT Mandat war jedoch weit davon entfernt, diesen Erwartungen Rechnung zu tragen. Es sah im Wesentlichen nur den Schutz der IDP- und Flüchtlingslager vor, nicht aber der lokalen Bevölkerung. Die Gründe für dieses restriktive Mandat (und der entsprechend begrenzten Kapazitäten) werden in diesem Artikel kritisch beleuchtet.

EUFORs „*impartiality*“ war ein weiterer Schwachpunkt und wurde vor allem zu Beginn der Mission stark in Frage gestellt. Das lag einmal an der Dominanz Frankreichs in der Mission und zum anderem an dem schnellen Nachgeben des VN-Sicherheitsrates und des Rates in Brüssel gegenüber der Forderung von Déby nach einem restriktiven, die Herrschaft seines Regimes nicht behelligenden Mandat. Frankreich ist ein langjähriger Sponsor Débys. Javier Solana, Hoher Repräsentant der ESVP, und EUFOR Kommandeur, General Nash, bemühten sich deswegen in ganz besonderem Maße darum, dem Eindruck der „Parteilichkeit“ entgegenzuwirken. Das Europäische Parlament intervenierte ebenfalls und forderte EUFOR auf, sich im Sinne einer strikten Neutralität von der bereits existierenden französischen Militärpräsenz im Tschad, *Opération Epervier*, fernzuhalten. Schließlich war es dem umsichtigen Verhalten von EUFOR selbst bei verschiedenen Gelegenheiten zu verdanken, dass das Misstrauen gegenüber der Unabhängigkeit EUFORs wenigstens teilweise ausgeräumt werden konnten.

### **EUFOR – Ablösung durch eine VN-Truppe**

Das Mandat von EUFOR endet Mitte März 2009. Seine Verlängerung war durch den Rat der EU von Anfang an strikt ausgeschlossen worden. Der VN-Sicherheitsrat beschloss daher am 14. Januar



2009, EUFOR nun durch eine VN-Truppe mit einer maximalen Truppenstärke von 5.500 (4.900 für den Tschad und 600 für die ZAR) als Teil von MINURCAT zu ersetzen.

Mandat und Ausstattung dieser Truppe müssen jedoch, wie in dem Artikel ausgeführt wird, wiederum als völlig unzureichend beurteilt werden. Ein wesentlicher Grund dafür ist die erneut strikte Weigerung Débys, eine starke und wahrhaft „unabhängige“ internationale Präsenz zuzulassen. Wiederum scheint es ihm gelungen zu sein, wie schon 2007, die internationale Präsenz stattdessen für sein eigenes politisches Überleben zu benutzen. Die Unlust verschiedene Mitglieder des SR, sich für das ursprüngliche und weitergehende Konzept von DPKO einzusetzen, kam ihm dabei entgegen. (Ähnliches gilt für das Bozizé Regime in der ZAR, obwohl es seine Interessen nicht so unverblümt wie Déby verfolgt.)

Angesichts dieser Analyse überrascht es daher nicht, dass die VN größte Probleme haben, die notwendigen Zusagen im Hinblick auf die notwendigen Truppen und Ausrüstungen zu bekommen. Es bleibt abzuwarten, inwieweit es dem Generalsekretär gelingt, das beim Abzug von EUFOR drohende Sicherheitsvakuum abzuwenden, in dem er eine möglichst große Zahl von EUFOR-Truppen zu einem „re-hatting“, also einer Fortsetzung ihrer Anwesenheit unter VN-Kommando, bewegen kann. Eine Handvoll Staaten (Irland, Polen, Österreich, Finnland und Rumänien) hatte sich dazu Ende 2008 im Prinzip bereit erklärt und Russland inzwischen den Verbleib seiner Helikopter angekündigt. Polen dagegen wird seine Truppen zurückziehen. Inwieweit Frankreich bereit sein wird, seine Truppen unter VN-Kommando zu stellen, um die verbleibende Lücke zu schließen, bleibt abzuwarten.

## **Fazit**

Insgesamt hat der Einsatz von EUFOR (und MINURCAT) nicht zu einer signifikanten Verbesserung der Aussicht auf Frieden und Sicherheit im Tschad und der ZAR geführt, obwohl ein gewisses Gefühl der Sicherheit zeitweise geschaffen werden konnte. Allerdings war dieser Effekt auf die nähere Umgebung der Basen von EUFOR beschränkt. Gewaltkriminalität und Banditentum jedoch, Hauptprobleme im Tschad und der ZAR, blieben weitgehend unbehelligt. Aufgrund seines rein militärischen Charakters wäre es EUFOR wohl auch schwer gefallen, gegen diese systematisch vorzugehen, ganz abgesehen von seinem restriktiven Mandat.

Unter dem Strich muss man deswegen sowohl bezüglich von EUFOR/MINURCAT als auch der nun neu entstehenden VN-Mission wohl zu dem Ergebnis kommen, dass sie zu einer Verbesserung der Lage im Tschad und der ZAR nur minimal beigetragen haben bzw. beitragen werden. Stattdessen vermitteln sie durch ihre Präsenz den Regimen beider Länder ein falsches Gefühl der Unterstützung durch die internationale Gemeinschaft. Entsprechend unflexibel verhalten sie sich daher im Hinblick auf einen Ausgleich mit der internen Opposition. Und der Peacekeeping-Abteilung der VN muss man nachträglich bestätigen, dass sie mit ihrer ursprünglichen Empfehlung (Herbst 2006), von einer Mission in diesen beiden Ländern ganz abzusehen, durchaus richtig lag. DPKO wurde dann aber vom SR, insbesondere den ständigen

Mitgliedern Frankreich und England sehr energisch aufgefordert, seine Empfehlung noch einmal zu überdenken und einen neuen Plan vorzulegen. Das geschah 2007.

### **Ausblick – ein „Mega-Konfliktsystem“ im nördlichen Subsahara-Afrika**

Die geringen Erfolgchancen der internationalen Präsenz im Tschad und in der ZAR wiegen umso schwerer, als drei weitere internationale Missionen in der Region Anfang 2009 in großen Schwierigkeiten sind oder in solche kommen könnten: UNAMID und UNMIS im Sudan und AMISOM in Somalia. Denn UNAMID in Darfur hat weiterhin nur ca. 60% seiner geplanten Stärke und die für ein effektives Vorgehen notwendige Zahl von Helikoptern bei weitem nicht erreicht. AMISOM seinerseits ist so schwach, dass sie ihre Soldaten mit Mühe in ihrem Quartier in Mogadischu gegen islamistische Kräfte verteidigen kann, von einem effektiven Schutz der Bevölkerung und Stabilisierung der Lage in Somalia gar nicht zu reden.

Der größte Unsicherheitsfaktor für die weitere regionale Entwicklung ist jedoch die im März 2009 (also nach Fertigstellung dieser Untersuchung) erfolgte Anklage von Präsident Bashir durch den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof (IStGH). Die längerfristigen Auswirkungen dieser Anklage sind gegenwärtig ungewiss. Schlimmstenfalls kann es zu einem Zusammenbruch des Nord-Süd Friedensprozesses kommen, obwohl dieser 2009 mit den im Sommer geplanten Wahlen eigentlich in seine entscheidende Phase geht. Tritt dieser Zusammenbruch ein, dann ist ein erneuter Krieg zwischen Nord und Süd wohl unausweichlich. Seine destabilisierenden Auswirkungen weit über die Grenzen des Sudan hinaus dürften dramatisch sein.

Es sind allerdings auch andere, sogar positive Auswirkungen der Anklage Bashirs denkbar. Das hängt u.a. davon ab, inwieweit die internationale Gemeinschaft die Möglichkeit einer Stornierung der Anklage gem. Art. 16 des Statuts des IStGH dazu nutzen kann, Bashir zu einem konstruktivem Verhalten in Bezug auf den Nord-Süd Friedensprozess und Darfur zu bewegen. Die neue Regierung in Washington müsste insoweit möglichst schnell die Führungsrolle übernehmen und einen intensiven diplomatischen Prozess starten.

Abschließend gibt der Autor zu bedenken, dass sich – weit über den Tschad und die ZAR hinaus - im nördlichen Schwarzafrika ein „Mega-Konfliktsystem“ größten Ausmaßes aufgebaut hat, das nicht nur der Kontrolle Afrikas, sondern der internationalen Gemeinschaft insgesamt weitgehend entglitten ist. Denn die Konflikte im Tschad, der ZAR und dem Sudan (Darfur und Nord-Süd), interagieren nicht nur mit denen im nord-westlichen Uganda und nord-östlichen Kongo, sondern auch – mehr oder weniger stark - mit denen in Somalia, bedingt durch die ungebrochene Feindschaft (Grenzkonflikt) zwischen Äthiopien und Eritrea und deren indirekter Austragung in der gesamten Region.