



**Report 08/07**

## **Asian, European and African Policies, Practices and Lessons Learned in Peace Operations in Africa**

### **DR Congo, Sudan and the Darfur Conflict**

An Indian – European Dialogue in the Context of the German EU Presidency 2007

*Organized by the  
Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)  
and the  
United Service Institute of India – Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping  
(USI-CUNPK)*

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## Introduction

The *Joint Action Plan* of the India-EU Strategic Partnership, concluded on the EU-India Summit in New Delhi in September 2005, states that “India and the EU have a common interest in UN peacekeeping and in post-conflict political and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.” More dialogue on “UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding to exchange perspectives on conceptual and operational aspects of Peacekeeping Operations, including post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation” is one of the activities asked for in the Action Plan.

The *United Service Institute of India – Centre for UN Peacekeeping (USI-CUNPK)* and the German *Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)* therefore hosted a Joint Workshop in New Delhi in June 2007 on

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The Workshop was held in the context of the German EU-Presidency and organized in close cooperation with the Embassy of the Federal Republic in India, the German Federal Foreign Office and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The topic was chosen because of the high level of Indian as well as European involvement in African crisis prevention and conflict resolution. Its key purpose was to develop a joint understanding and to work out recommendations on how the EU, India, Africa and the International Community at large can improve their strategies, capabilities and cooperation to contain violence and conflict in Sudan, its neighboring states and the Horn of Africa.

This *Report* summarizes the extremely rich and frank statements and discussions of the Workshop. To facilitate a thorough and field oriented debate the organizers had brought to New Delhi a number of highly qualified practitioners and experts who have either served in missions of the Workshop’s topic or are closely related with its topic due to their diplomatic, political or academic work (Statements and conclusions of the Report cannot be attributed to individual participants as the discussion followed Chattam House rules).

On behalf of the organizers I would like to thank the German Federal Foreign Office for generously funding the Conference and the German Embassy in India as well as the Indian Ministry of External Affairs for assisting with support and advice. My most profound personal gratitude I would like to express to Lt. General (ret.) Satish Nambiar, Director of USI, and to Lt. Col. Datta from USI-CUNPK who have been such excellent and professional partners in organizing and bringing the Workshop about. Without their dedication the Workshop would not have been possible. The same holds for Gundula Stein, Till Mletzko and the rapporteur Tobias von Gienanth from the ZIF staff.

*Dr. Winrich Kuehne*  
*Director ZIF*

## I. MONUC, EUFOR and Other International Actors in the DR Congo

### Speakers:

*Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck*, Commander Bundeswehr Operations Command, Germany

*Brigadier Jag Verma*, former Deputy Commander MONUC Brigade, India

### Discussants:

*Brigadier General Carl Modey*, Commander MONUC Brigade, Ghana

*Stefan Mair*, Research Director, German Institute for International and Security Studies (SWP)

### 1. Lessons Learned from EUFOR RD Congo

The *European Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (EUFOR RD Congo) was deployed to the DRC from May to November 2006 with the full agreement of local authorities and in close cooperation with the *UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (MONUC). EUFOR was tasked to guarantee the stability of the country during the critical election period. The commander of EUFOR as well as participants agreed that this goal was fully accomplished and identified various reasons for this success.

One key factor was the constant and close cooperation between the political leadership in the different national capitals, at EU headquarters and EUFOR's military command. Cooperation started already in the planning phase and, as a result, the mission was provided with a clear and realistic task and the practical means to achieve it.

In particular, EUFOR was able to field sufficiently large, robust and flexible forces, including a strategic reserve "over the horizon" and intelligence assets. All components were specifically trained and equipped for the operation. Both, the mandate and the rules of engagement (RoEs) provided a solid foundation for their work on the ground in and around Kinshasa.

Furthermore, EUFOR's approach of asserting the minimum necessary force and seeking personal contact to the local population combined with a public information campaign communicating EUFOR's specific goals contributed significantly to gaining both credibility and acceptance for the mission among the Congolese. Finally, while financial arrangements were not without difficulties, the EU's *Athena* mechanism ultimately proved capable to provide the necessary funding.

From the very beginning EUFOR paid great attention to establishing and maintaining close coordination with the other international missions active in the DRC, particularly MONUC but also the *EU Security Sector Reform Mission* (EUSEC DR Congo) and the *EU Police Mission* (EUPOL Kinshasa). Day-to-day cooperation on the ground between MONUC and EUFOR was described by the commander of the force as smooth, one key element being the establishment of a *Combined Tactical Command Post*.

However, certain deficiencies that should be addressed in future missions were also identified. According to several participants, the joint pre-mission planning by the UN and the EU clearly left room for improvement. Equally, a general technical agreement between the two organizations is necessary to streamline future support arrangements. Care should also be taken to ensure a closer cooperation between the military mission and international civilian actors on the ground in order to utilize the latter's local knowledge and minimize negative effects of military measures on civilian activities. Finally, it was noted that language problems made it impossible for some EUFOR units to communicate efficiently with local political and military leaders and with the population.

Looking beyond the DR Congo, several participants felt that EUFOR had significantly advanced the ability to plan and deploy peace operations in the context of the *European Security and Defence Policy* (ESDP). Its success had strengthened the willingness of the political leadership in some EU member states, notably Germany, to engage in future operations in Africa. Others countered that immense political capital had to be invested in European capitals to mobilize significant resources for a mission with such a limited mandate, small area of operation and short period of deployment. They wondered whether this form of engagement would be sustainable in more demanding circumstances, particularly as public opinion in many EU nations is still very critical of deployments in Africa.

Some participants also cautioned that although the elections were a remarkable achievement, they were only a stepping stone in a much longer process of transition towards stability requiring intense and sustained international support. They questioned whether the EU would remain fully committed to this effort in the light of numerous other more urgent international crises and perhaps the feeling of having "done enough already" for the DRC with the successful completion of EUFOR.

## **2. Hybrid Missions – A Promising Model?**

Participants felt that EUFOR was certainly an encouraging example for the cooperation between different international organizations in the field. The discussion thus turned to the question, whether so called "hybrid missions" are generally a promising model for future peace operations, particularly in the face of the growing demand for peace operations, limited UN capacities and the ensuing need for greater involvement of regional and sub-regional organizations.

It soon became clear, however, that there existed no consensus among participants on the defining characteristics of a hybrid mission. Some experts advocated a narrow definition under which only fully integrated missions where different international organizations operate under

a single chain of command would qualify as “hybrid”. Among existing missions, only UNMIK in Kosovo comes close to meeting these requirements.

Others used a broader definition that included all parallel and even sequential operations where the UN works side-by-side with, precedes, or follows a multinational or bilateral mission. MONUC/EUFOR fits this broad definition, as do numerous other past and current operations that demonstrate the variety of possible combinations. They include the case of Afghanistan, where the civilian UNAMA cooperates with the NATO-led ISAF military force; Côte d’Ivoire where both UN blue helmets and French units are deployed in UNOCI and Opération Licorne, respectively; Timor Leste where UNMIT with a large police contingent is supported by the military Operation Astute led by Australia; and of course the present situation in the DRC where alongside the UN’s largest military operation (MONUC) two EU security sector reform missions (EUSEC DR Congo and EUPOL Kinshasa) are deployed.

Such combined and parallel operations which maintain *distinct spheres of responsibility*, are thus common and their implementation in the field is well understood. However, several participants pointed out that the experience with multi-actor missions *sharing functional responsibility* in the same realm—whether called “hybrid” or not – was mixed at best. The structures of both UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and UNOSOM II in Somalia, for example, were deeply flawed, with disastrous consequences in both cases. The absence of clear lines of command, reporting lines and common rules of engagement as well as incompatible budgeting systems between the participating actors were named as key deficiencies of such multi-actor missions.

In spite of these problems, many participants felt confident that hybrid missions offer a way towards more efficient and sustained international engagements, above all in Africa. Strengthening in particular UN-EU-AU cooperation was seen as a solution to the dilemma that many African states are politically willing to participate in regional crisis management operations yet their troops lack logistics, equipment and finance. These gaps could be filled with UN and EU assistance.

Others expressed a preference for more easily managed “pure” UN operations yet admitted that this approach would depend on a significant increase of troop contributions from the developed countries to UN peace operations. This was judged to be unlikely.

## II. Peacebuilding in the DR Congo after the Elections

### Speakers:

*Daniela Krosiak*, Africa Research Director, International Crisis Group (ICG)

*Major General Bikram Singh*, Addl. Director General Perspective Planning, Indian Army

### Discussants:

*Lt. Col. Thierry Baud*, Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management, Council of the European Union

*Brigadier General Christian Houdet*, Senior Advisor Chief of Defence Staff, France

### 1. Key Challenges: SSR and DDR

As the immediate post-conflict transition period in the DRC was successfully concluded with the holding of the presidential and parliamentary elections, the two greatest challenges to long-term stability are now the complex national *Security Sector Reform* (SSR) process and the *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (DDR) of militias in the east of the country. Participants agreed that these challenges can only be overcome if both, the large number of unresolved conceptual and technical problems of SSR and DDR as well as the underlying causes of the continuing political conflicts in the DRC are addressed.

The success of efforts to reform the security sector depends to a large degree on Congolese authorities taking responsibility for the process and developing and implementing a national SSR concept. Apart from a rebuilding of the security apparatus, this program must include concrete steps to combat the pervasive corruption and politicization of the security forces.

A further key requirement is to tackle the reform of the closely linked military, police, justice and penal sectors simultaneously. Experience from other peace operations clearly shows that otherwise any progress in one sector will be immediately be undone by shortcomings in other, yet unreformed sectors. In addition, sound financial foundations must be created to sustain the SSR process. The Congolese government's ability to pay security sector wages on time and in full is an especially important condition for success.

The magnitude of this task makes a long-term capacity building engagement by the international community in the areas of SSR and DDR indispensable. It must consist of *firstly* of conceptual support in an advisory role to overhaul the legal framework of the security sector, *secondly* of operational support in a monitoring and mentoring role to improve the performance of local security actors, and *thirdly* of technical support by providing equipment and training. Close coordination of these activities among all international and local actors in order to avoid costly overlapping or even competing activities was a key demand of all participants.

Finally, all international actors will have to find a careful balance between long-term reform efforts that will not yield immediate results and quick and tangible improvements in the delivery of security and justice to the Congolese population. Without the latter the DRC

government and its international supporters will quickly lose all credibility and legitimacy gained through the successful elections.

After the discussion of the international involvement, participants listed a number of concrete steps and measures that urgently need to be taken by the Congolese authorities in order to move the process forward. Oversight mechanisms for the *Congolese Armed Forces* (FARDC) have to be established to combat the still frequent cases of human rights violations by FARDC members and hold the perpetrators accountable. To this end, a *Defense Commission* must be created in parliament and an *Army Inspector General* has to be appointed as head of the FARDC's internal oversight body. Parliament also should as soon as possible pass laws to rationalize the army structure, to strengthen command and control structures, and to clarify its role in internal security matters.

Finally, security forces that have until now been left outside the SSR program – most importantly President Kabila's bodyguard, the *Guarde Republicaine* – must be included in the reform process. On the financial side, the findings of the *Public Expenditure Review* held by the Congolese government and the World Bank to ensure the predictable and transparent financing of the security sector must be implemented.

## **2. The Eastern Provinces**

To conclude the panel, the discussion turned to the specific challenges facing the SSR and DDR processes in the volatile eastern provinces of the DRC. Several participants noted that Kabila's election victory had successfully de-linked the local conflicts in North and South Kivu and the Ituri area from the national power struggle so that they did no longer endanger the overall stability of the DRC. However, the security situation in the East is still desperate, with over 100.000 people displaced since the beginning of this year by violence, some of the attacks being committed by members of the Congolese security forces.

Participants reported that the SSR and DDR processes are failing. Loyalty in the armed forces continues to run along ethnic lines, resulting in some units refusing to undergo "brassage" (retraining and integration into the FARDC) and others showing signs of disintegration after brassage. DDR efforts are hamstrung by insufficient coordination between implementing agencies and, more importantly, an almost total lack of employment or educational opportunities for demobilized militia members. In addition, certain armed groups are still in open rebellion against the government and refuse to join the DDR process.

Several experts with local knowledge pointed out that while improvements of the technical aspects of DDR and SSR programs were important, they were insufficient to stabilize the eastern provinces of the DRC. Meaningful reforms were in their view dependent on addressing the



political root causes of the conflicts on the regional, national and local level. Relationships with the neighbouring countries Rwanda, Uganda and Angola, exploitation of natural resources, land allocation, and ethnic tensions between communities were named as key conflict factors that are in need of improvement or regulation.

Clearly, there is still an urgent demand for continued international engagement in the DRC. In view of this fact, a number of participants voiced their concern about what they saw as a growing hands-off approach by the international community. They described this political disengagement in the middle of a long-term peace process as a grave mistake endangering the progress achieved so far and urged all international actors to continue their support of the stabilization and reform process in the DRC. In particular, the planned draw-down of MONUC at the end of 2007 was seen as premature. The establishment of firm timelines for the withdrawal or reduction of international peace operations was criticized. Participants argued that such a decision should instead be based on the achievement of pre-set benchmarks in the stabilization process.

### **III. Implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan**

Speakers:

*Peter Schumann*, Regional Representative and Coordinator Southern Sudan, UNMIS

*Colonel P.J.S. Pannu*, former COO, UNMIS, India

Discussants:

*Brigadier General Kai Vittrup*, Police Commissioner, UNMIS

*R.R. Bhatnagar*, Inspector General Headquarters of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police

#### **1. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the North-South Peace Process**

There was general agreement among participants that the past approach of implementing the *Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)* and solving the Darfur conflict simultaneously is now unworkable as the Darfur conflict is still far from a solution and the North-South peace process urgently needs international attention. The international focus on the violence in Darfur has negatively affected the CPA implementation process. There is a growing risk of the *Government of Sudan (GoS)*, led by the *National Congress Party (NCP)*, playing the two issues off against each other.

The impression that Khartoum is backsliding on important CPA commitments is strengthened by a closer look at the current state of the CPA implementation. Only parts of this lengthy and highly complex process are on track: a *Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)* led by the *Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)* has been created, Southern representation at the national level is progressing, the *Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)* and *Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)*

units have been redeployed, *Joint Integrated Units* (JIUs) have been formed, a number of bilateral commissions have been established and staffed.

However, at the same time the implementation is dangerously lagging in four crucial areas: security arrangements, border demarcation and transition areas, wealth sharing, and legal and technical preparations for the elections and the self-determination referendum. In spite of the deadline in early July 2007 for their full withdrawal, SAF units are still stationed in several oil-rich areas of Southern Sudan (Bentiu, Malakal). The SPLA on its part has not withdrawn from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. There are also indications that the SAF continues to support anti-SPLM/A militia groups in the South that are held responsible for several attacks on civilians in recent months. The process of integrating these so-called *Other Armed Groups* (OAGs) into either the SAF or the SPLA has stalled, posing a lingering threat to the broader effort to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former combatants. In addition, Khartoum has in recent months created a force known as “Oil Police” consisting of former militia members in police uniforms that guard oil installations on Southern territory. This development is in clear violation of the CPA that places all security forces in Southern Sudan under the control of the GoSS. Furthermore, participants reported that the great majority of JIUs exist on paper only. Any meaningful integration is prevented by strong mutual suspicion between the SAF and SPLA elements.

The still unsettled border demarcation between North and South Sudan was pointed out as another cause for concern. This demarcation is of crucial importance as most oil deposits straddle the North/South border and minor changes in territory can lead to huge gains or losses in revenue. The exact course of the border laid down in the CPA – the provincial borders as of January 1, 1956 – is strongly disputed between the parties. The fate of the three Transitional Areas (Abyei, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile) remains open as well. Particularly the Abyei question has, in the opinion of several participants, the potential to derail the CPA. Abyei has large oil reserves which the North seems determined to keep under its control. Khartoum has accordingly rejected the report of the *Abyei Boundary Commission* and proposals for administrative arrangements and is currently banning all UNMIS monitoring activities in the area.

Oil is also the source of the third main challenge to CPA implementation. The transfer payments of oil revenues from Khartoum to the GoSS mandated by the CPA are low and irregular, resulting in deficit financing of the Southern budget. Khartoum prevents oil sector transparency, making it impossible to calculate the amount of transfer payments owed to the South. The financial crisis facing the GoSS is aggravated by the fact that transfers of non-oil revenue have also slowed to a trickle.

The fourth worrying development is the slippage of the timeline set out in the CPA for the political process that will determine the future of Sudan. By July 2009, the citizens of Sudan must have voted for the President, members of both houses of parliament, state governors and assemblies, and local council members. In addition, Southerners must have elected the President of the GoSS and the members of the legislative assembly of Southern Sudan. A precondition for these elections is the holding of a national census as a basis for the voters' lists and the creation of a legal framework, including the electoral law, the *Political Parties Act* and the establishment of an independent national election commission.

The July 2007 deadline for the election law and the census has already been missed and been moved to October and November 2007, respectively. Any further delays could lead to postponements of the various elections which in turn could have negative repercussions on the referendum in Southern Sudan scheduled for 2011.

Participants interpreted these delays as the result of the NCP's strategy to obstruct the implementation of the CPA as much as possible without risking an open breach of the agreement. Fear of the growing popularity of the SPLM among voters in all parts of Sudan as well as the possible independence of Southern Sudan as an outcome of the referendum were mentioned as major causes of Khartoum's obstructionist strategy.

Most participants therefore regarded an uncompromising commitment by the international community to the full and timely implementation of the CPA without any linkage to progress in Darfur as the key to a successful conclusion of the fragile North/South peace process. Several noted specifically that coordinated pressure on both parties but particularly on Khartoum was more important than additional international troops. UNMIS' military component is sufficiently large to fulfil its mandate to monitor and verify the CPA implementation, assist de-mining and DDR activities, ensure the freedom of movement of UN and other humanitarian personnel, support other UN agencies, and protect civilians under imminent threat. Unfortunately, UNMIS is still short of qualified civilian personnel, forcing military units to take on civilian functions for which they were often poorly qualified. The creeping "cannibalization" of UNMIS in Southern Sudan as more and more UN assets are transferred to Darfur is another worrying development.

## **2. UNMIS Police**

The role of the UNMIS police component in promoting the Rule of Law by supporting the reform of the *South Sudan Police Service* (SSPS) was the next issue discussed. UNMIS police are now making progress in spite of serious handicaps. Like all international actors in Sudan, UNMIS police have to operate over huge distances in a territory practically without infrastructure and under considerable risk to its personnel from diseases, mines and armed militias.

The current condition of the SSPS is also not conducive to progress. The state of its equipment and facilities is deplorable and two thirds of its officers are illiterate. The majority are former SPLA soldiers with no police training. There is very little communication between local SSPS offices and state or central police headquarters or between the SSPS and other security actors. Strategic police planning is virtually absent. Often it is not even clear which laws police officers have to enforce as the validity of several conflicting law codes – local customary law, Islamic Sharia law and official codified law – is unclear. Police primacy in internal security has yet to be instituted. In many areas the SPLA is still acting as the de facto police force. Urgently needed reforms in other Rule of Law sectors such as the judiciary, justice administration and the penal system have not even been started.

In the face of these daunting obstacles, UNMIS has developed a range of measures, some aiming at short-term results in improving the quality of police work in Southern Sudan, others in support of a long-term reform effort. Most quick-impact projects consist of construction or renovation of SSPS stations and other facilities. Training courses, both basic instruction and specialized courses for senior officers as well as for a *Formed Police Unit* and a *Special Investigation Unit*, will take longer to make their impact felt. Other steps include a co-location scheme by which UNMIS officers advise SSPS colleagues in their daily work, and the establishment of a dialogue between the SSPS, UNMIS, and local stakeholders to introduce the concept of community policing.

In spite of these developments, some participants pointed out that given the current state of the SSPS and taking into account past experiences in police and Rule of Law reform, for example in Kosovo or Afghanistan, the international community would have to remain engaged in Southern Sudan for decades rather than years.

#### **IV. Containing Violence in Darfur: The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)**

Speakers:

*Brigadier General Yogesh Saksena*, India, former Force Commander and Senior Political Adviser  
*Abiodun Bashua*, Director of Political Affairs, UNMIS

Discussants:

*Udo Möller*, Senior Police Advisor to the African Union (AU)

*Colonel P.J.S. Pannu*, former Chief Operations Officer, UNMIS, India

##### **1. Challenges to AMIS**

Strong political pressure on Khartoum by international and regional organizations such as the UN, the AU and the *Intergovernmental Authority on Development* (IGAD), and other actors like the US, Russia, China, India, and the EU constitutes the single most important precondition for containing further violence in Darfur. However, such a forceful as well as coherent approach by

the international community was judged to be unlikely in the foreseeable future by most participants. In spite of growing public concern about the humanitarian situation in Darfur, the pivotal decision making-body – the UN Security Council – remains divided on the merit of forceful measures against Khartoum.

This split is well known to Khartoum which also capitalizes on the international preoccupation with more urgent crises like Iraq and Afghanistan, the fear of many African governments of legitimizing rebel movements, and the rising worldwide demand for energy. Under these conditions some panelists held that it seems unrealistic that either the UN or the AU will form a consensus to deploy a peacekeeping operation to Darfur without the consent of Khartoum or impose the only form of sanctions that could hurt the Sudanese regime: a complete ban on oil exports. The best option for the suffering civilians in Darfur, according to most participants, therefore remains a hybrid UN-AU mission – under discussion between New York, Addis Ababa and Khartoum for several months – that would supplant the struggling AMIS<sup>1</sup>.

The fact that AMIS is urgently in need of support was undisputed. Its task was next to impossible from the start. There is no functioning cease-fire agreement in place, as the *Darfur Peace Agreement* (DPA) of May 2006 was only signed by one of the three main rebel movements. Several participants therefore argued that AMIS has “no peace to keep”. The operation also suffers from a weak and unclear mandate, unrealistic rules of engagement, and an under-size military force of only 7000 badly equipped troops mostly tied up with protecting themselves and their facilities. Logistics and communication are the greatest challenges, different training standards among national contingents and the impossibility to practice joint operations before deployment add to the difficulties.

AMIS police specifically is handicapped by a lack of support from already overstretched AMIS troops and the absence of any division of labor or coordination between the military and police elements. Skill profiles of deployed officers are often badly matched to local requirements, with crucial specialists like planning and logistic experts in very short supply. AMIS’ finances are reliant on erratic donor assistance. As a result, salaries of field personnel are not paid on time for several months. Several participants also pointed out that AU headquarters seemed on several occasions overburdened and unable to provide any effective leadership to its field mission.

Three developments of recent months have further aggravated the situation facing AMIS and the future hybrid UN-AU operation. *Firstly*, the large population of the IDP camps in Darfur is beginning to acquire weapons to defend themselves against continuing harassment by bandits,

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<sup>1</sup> On July 31, 2007, the UN Security Council with resolution 1769 (2007) authorized this hybrid UN-AU mission.

irregular militias, and Sudanese security forces. IDPs are also showing a growing hostility towards AMIS troops whom they accuse of failing to provide for their protection. *Secondly*, the always weak internal unity of the Darfur rebels has completely broken down. The number of rebel groups has proliferated from three at the time of the DPA to currently close to twenty. To complicate matters further, the leaders of these constantly splitting and re-uniting movements are often as hostile to each other as to their common enemy in Khartoum. *Thirdly*, the conflict in Darfur is spreading to the neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). In retaliation for presidents' Deby's (Chad) and Bozizé's (CAR) alleged assistance to various Darfur rebel groups, Khartoum now reportedly abets armed insurgents against both governments.

## **2. Hybrid UN-AU Mission: Preconditions for Success**

Participants agreed that progress towards a solution for the Darfur conflict is nevertheless possible if the international community would find the political will and the resources to address four sets of challenges: creating a successful hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur, regaining the trust of the IDPs, facilitating a political agreement between the Darfur rebel groups and Khartoum, and including Chad and the CAR in the peace process.

As a quick-impact measure to strengthen AMIS in Darfur, the fastest possible deployment of the so-called "Light" and "Heavy Support Packages" was advocated by all participants. With regard to the particulars of the planned hybrid operation, they called upon all involved actors to learn from the shortcomings of AMIS, particularly in the areas of mandate, troop strength, equipment and interoperability, funding, and command and control. The new mission's UN Security Council mandate should be as unambiguous and strong as possible, ideally under chapter VII of the UN charter, in order to allow it a robust enforcement of the DPA against all possible spoilers.

A stabilization of the situation on the ground will require a well equipped military force of 15.-20.000 troops plus several thousand police officers and civilian staff. Highlighting the unfortunate experiences of AMIS, participants appealed to the international community to provide a solid financial base for this sizeable mission through binding commitments of contributions.

Furthermore, an operation of the size and complexity of the hybrid UN-AU mission also makes enormous demands on command and control mechanisms on various levels. Several participants pointed out that solving the unique challenges posed by the joint command structure of this operation is one key to its success. While acknowledging that there is room for improvement at UN headquarters, they expressed particular concern about the ability of AU headquarters to fill the demanding leadership role of a robust hybrid mission. AU headquarters' small staff, lack of analysis and lessons learned capacities and organizational shortcomings did already cause problems for AMIS. A number of participants therefore called an effort by the international

community to strengthen AU structures both through financial support and capacity building measures and named the EU and its member states as particularly suitable partners.

Fielding a peace operation capable of stopping harassment of IDP camps should go a long way towards improving the currently strained relationship between the international presence and the refugees. A stabilization of the security situation on the ground would also allow the resumption of humanitarian aid delivery. Additionally, the visible change-over to UN command (even if it is in practice exercised jointly with the AU) is a chance to regain lost confidence. This must be linked to an expanded information campaign to avoid unrealistic expectations and educate the IDPs about the new mission's mandate and capabilities.

Another important component of the international community's attempt to contain the Darfur conflict is the defusing of the escalating crisis in Sudan's western neighbors Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). The vicious circle where Khartoum, N'Djamena and Bangui foster local rebels to fight proxy wars on each other's territory must be broken. As a first step, participants proposed that the international community send a clear message to President Deby of Chad and President Bozizé of the CAR that a meaningful engagement with their domestic oppositions can no longer be put off. France could potentially play a key role in this initiative, as it has historically close connections – including a military presence – with both countries. A negotiated settlement of the opposition's grievances would bring great benefits to the populations of Chad and the CAR, stabilize both regimes, and automatically rob Khartoum of its local auxiliaries.

As a second step, the international community should encourage a dialogue between the three governments – possibly under the auspices of the AU – with a view to normalize their relations. In addition, a UN presence should be placed in the regions of Chad and the CAR bordering Sudan to at least monitor and verify the cessation of hostile cross-border activities. Participants were divided on the question of whether the mandate of these missions should allow them to confront armed incursions by force. Most experts felt such a mandate would be desirable but many questioned its feasibility, not only because of likely strong opposition by the governments of Chad and the CAR, but also because of limited UN capacities and political will.

## **V. Escalating Conflicts on the Horn of Africa: Sudan, Chad, CAR, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia**

### Speakers:

*Lieutenant General Rajender Singh*, former Force Commander, UNMEE, India

*Winrich Kuehne*, Director Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Germany

### Discussants:

*Kwesi Aning*, Director of Research, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Ghana

*Brigadier General Christian Houdet*, Senior Advisor to the Chief of Defence Staff, France

### **1. Patterns of Conflict in the Sub-Region**

The Horn of Africa is an area of considerable geo-strategic importance because of its proximity to the Middle East flashpoint, its petroleum resources, and its control of the trade route between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.

The region's existing conflicts, and the growing potential for a wider conflagration, are therefore a cause of grave concern for the international community. The nations on the Horn of Africa share a number of characteristics that make them prone to unrest and violence. Most are multi-ethnic and multi-religious states with artificial, colonial-era boundaries that often bisect ethnic groups and give rise to irredentist policies. A minority of the large Muslim population in the sub-region is turning towards Islamic fundamentalism, in part as a result of conflict with Christian groups within the same or a neighboring state.

All states in the area have a long history of weak governance that systematically denies their inhabitants a fair share of national resources and has done nothing to alleviate poverty and the lack of basic social services. Against the resulting widespread civil unrest and armed insurrections, regimes are reliant on the support of their security services whose loyalties are guaranteed through recruitment from the ruler's own ethnic group or by lavish pay. The armed forces and the police are often major human rights violators and rather than assuring public order and the Rule of Law aggravate existing tensions.

While violent instability is thus to be expected in the entire region, a closer look at the pattern of conflicts across the region shows *three* distinct but closely connected levels of conflict in most states: between local groups, between the center and the periphery, and inter-state conflict, often in the form of proxy wars. In local clashes, ethnic and religious tensions, while certainly a factor – and eagerly exploited by political leaders – are not the root cause. They are typically caused by a struggle for livelihoods, particularly for increasingly scarce usable land and water between farmers and pastoralists. Population growth and environmental degradation across the region have considerably sharpened this type of disputes in recent years. The conflict



in Darfur, originally pitting Muslim nomadic herders against equally Muslim sedentary farmers, is one prime example of this development.

Center-periphery conflicts are typically driven by political and economic marginalization of outlying regions through the concentration of power and public services in the capital and other areas favored by the government. This neglect is particularly keenly felt if income from natural resource deposits located in the provinces is funneled exclusively to the central government whereas local inhabitants – which often belong to a minority ethnic or religious group – gain nothing.

Several of the violent conflicts between local rebels and central governments on the Horn of Africa have widened into proxy wars involving the open or clandestine support of either the insurgents or governments by neighboring states. One reason for the prevalence of such cross-border conflicts in the sub-region lies in the fundamental weakness and lack of legitimacy of most regimes. Under increasing internal pressure for political participation and economic development, rulers use these conflicts to excuse the absence of progress on domestic reform agendas on the one hand and to fuel nationalistic as well as ethnic and religious sentiments on the other. Several participants went so far as to state that the governments of presidents Bashir of Sudan, Deby of Chad, Bozizé of the CAR, Meles of Ethiopia, and Afewerki of Eritrea in a sense “survived on instability and conflict”. Peace might endanger the survival of their regimes.

## **2. The Repercussions of the Ethiopia/Eritrea Conflict**

Sudan, Chad and the CAR are therefore not the only states in the sub-region engaging in reciprocal support of rebel groups. The long-running confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea has taken a similar course and deserves more attention by the international community than it is currently receiving. The Algiers peace agreement concluding the 1998-2000 war is fraying dangerously, the crucial boundary question remains unresolved, and both sides’ increasingly aggressive moves threaten to destabilize the entire Horn of Africa. Both governments have for years aided the other side’s domestic opponents, Ethiopia supporting the *Alliance of Eritrean National Forces* (AENF), Eritrea the *Ogaden National Liberation Front* (ONLF) and the *Oromo Liberation Front* (OLF).

Frustrated with Ethiopia’s continuing refusal to honor the decision of the *Independent Boundary Commission* which awarded the contested border town Badme to Eritrea, Asmara has recently begun to increase the pressure. Not only have arms shipments to the ONLF and OLF been stepped up, Eritrea also tried to hurt Ethiopia via Somalia by aiding the *Union of Islamic Courts* (UIC). This support allowed the UIC to gain control of large parts of Somalia including Mogadishu.

UIC follows an Islamist and pan-Somali ideology aimed – among others – at “liberating” the Ogaden region from Ethiopian rule. This ideology makes it an interesting tactical partner in the endeavor to hunt the regime in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia countered by enabling with troops and heavy equipment the December 2006 defeat of the UIC by the Somali *Transitional Federal Government* (TFG). The current TFG administration in Mogadishu thereby became totally reliant on Ethiopian military support against continuing resistance by remnants of the UIC, clan militias, and other armed groups opposing what they see as Ethiopia’s attempt to control Somalia. Eritrea continues to actively support the UIC.

Several participants pointed out that the *AU Mission in Somalia* (AMISOM) – deployed shortly after Ethiopia’s military engagement – is at risk of being identified in Somali eyes with Ethiopian interests. Originally conceived as a peacekeeping operation that would hand over to a UN mission after twelve months, AMISOM now finds itself lost in a hostile environment. It has an impossibly ambitious mandate to provide security and assistance to the TFG, stop illegal arms flows and assist in the disarmament of militias not under TFG control. Of AMISOM’s planned strength of 8.000 troops only 1.500 Ugandan soldiers have so far been deployed. The other countries that had earlier promised troops (Burundi, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria) understandably hold back on their commitments. In the current precarious situation, the UN is also unlikely to re-enter the quagmire of Somalia to relieve the AU operation.

Apart from its involvement with Somalia, Eritrea has been active on two other stages in an attempt to pressure the international community to bring about Ethiopia’s acceptance of the border demarcation ruling. It has severely limited the activities of the *UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea* (UNMEE) by banning helicopter flights and expelling UN staff. And its recent moves in Sudan to contribute to peace in Eastern Sudan and Darfur were described by some participants as an attempt to hijack the Darfur peace process and to derail the UN-AU-led negotiations between the insurgents and Khartoum.

Through these developments, the three current flashpoints on the Horn of Africa – Sudan/Chad/CAR, Eritrea/Ethiopia, and Somalia – have become interconnected. Such a complex environment not only makes managing individual crises much more challenging, there is also a danger that so far unaffected areas, such as Djibouti and Kenya, might be drawn into the widening conflagration.

It was therefore the unanimous opinion of all conference participants that a strong, timely and coordinated international engagement in the sub-region was vital to contain the repercussions of this network of conflicts as soon as possible.

## **VI. Improving Cooperation to Contain Conflict on the Horn of Africa**

### Speakers:

*Major General R.P.S. Malhan*, former Addl. Director General of Indian Peacekeeping Forces  
*Peter Schumann*, Regional Representative and Coordinator Southern Sudan, UNMIS

### Discussants:

*Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck*, Commander Bundeswehr Operations Command, Germany  
*Brigadier General Kai Vittrup*, Police Commissioner, UNMIS

In the discussion of the practical options available to the international community for stabilizing the Horn of Africa, participants focused on the roles of and cooperation between the UN, (sub-)regional organizations such as the AU, IGAD and the EU, and individual states with regional interests like France, the US, India, and China. The potential usefulness of sanctions and other invasive enforcement actions by the international community was also debated.

### **1. The Role of the UN**

It was forcefully argued that a proliferation of UN missions in both number and size is not a credible answer to the conflicts in the sub-region. One participant remarked that according to recent DPKO estimates, several peacekeeping operations would be needed to stabilize the situation in the Sudan/Chad/CAR, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Somalia theatres requiring in total around 60.000 military, 15.000 police, and 15.000 civilian personnel and an annual budget of US \$ 7 billion. Such a force clearly is unrealistic, foundering on the lack of personnel resources and political will of member states. Furthermore, it is unclear whether DPKO currently has the management capacities to deal with such a surge in scale and complexity of missions. In this context, some participants welcomed the planned reorganization of DPKO through splitting it into two departments. One will be responsible for planning, managing and offering political guidance to field operations, the other for delivering support services in staffing, finance, procurement and logistics. Others, however, pointed out that the reform will take considerable time to be implemented. Furthermore, it will not of itself generate more personnel and financial resources for peace operations. The split might also make coordination and a clear division of labor within the DPKO more difficult.

Several participants therefore argued that rather than concentrate on multiplying the number of personnel in the sub-region the UN should instead follow a strategy composed of three elements: Ensuring the success of the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur (as discussed above) is one key component. In parallel, the UN should also continue to explore the feasibility of operations with a limited mandate and staff to monitor the Sudan/Chad and Sudan/CAR borders, possibly in cooperation with the EU. The third – and in the opinion of many participants most important – element is the promotion of political solutions to the interlinked crises in Sudan and on the Horn of Africa.

Yet, finding a common ground among permanent UN Security Council members is an indispensable precondition for the success of these initiatives. Necessary actions include:

- the forceful continuation of the Darfur peace process in close cooperation with the AU to bring non-signatory members on board the DPA in spite of Eritrean spoiling attempts;
- the facilitation of direct negotiations between Sudan and Chad, and Sudan and the CAR, in order to settle their mutual grievances;
- the re-engagement with the Ethiopia/Eritrea peace process in coordination with the other members of the *Algiers Group* (AU, EU, US) with the goal to achieve a final border demarcation;
- the encouragement and back-up of the Somali national reconciliation process, combined with political and financial support for AMISOM in coordination with the other members of the *International Contact Group on Somalia* (AU, Arab League, EU, Italy, Kenya, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, UK, US).

## **2. African Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations: AU and IGAD**

As is clear from the above list, the AU will have to shoulder a considerable part of the international stabilization effort. Whether the AU should limit itself to the vital role of political consensus-building among its member states or should in addition also field more missions was controversial among the participants. They were unanimous, however, in repeating the doubts outlined above (in connection with AMIS) about the capacity of the AU in its current state to deliver the necessary operational leadership.

Should international decision-makers opt for a more active peacekeeping role for the AU, then significant additional capacity-building measures as well as financial and logistic assistance are needed. The support package could for example be arranged via the EU-Africa partnership.

A number of participants advocated the revitalization of IGAD as a promising accessory to the strengthening of the AU and pointed to IGAD's history of successful mediation in the North-South Sudanese peace process and also in Somalia. Others were less hopeful, arguing that Eritrea's recent suspension of its membership due to IGAD's supposed pro-Ethiopian bias robbed the organization of most of its potential usefulness. IGAD's lack of leverage is also shown by the fact that the signing of a communiqué between IGAD and the UIC in early December 2006 did not stop Ethiopia from toppling the UIC three weeks later. The settlement of the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict under UN auspices therefore appeared to many participants a precondition for re-establishing IGAD's effectiveness as a sub-regional mediator.

### **3. An EU Strategy for the Horn of Africa?**

As in the case of the AU, the conference was divided on the proper role of the EU on the Horn of Africa. One side argued the operational and political lead in peace operations in the sub-region should be taken by the AU and UN. The EU would instead best limit itself to providing financial, logistic, capacity-building and political support. In case the EU or single member states should wish to become more involved in peacekeeping missions, they were urged to commit troop contingents directly to UN operations.

The other side admitted that prime responsibility for conflict resolution on the Horn of Africa should ideally rest with the AU and UN, yet pointed firstly to the well-known limitations of both organizations and secondly to the reluctance of EU member states to put their soldiers under UN command. Furthermore, African states did not in all cases prefer an UN or AU mission to one led by the EU, as some participants had stated. As evidence the example of Chad was cited where discussions between the government and the EU about an EU-led operation tasked with monitoring the border with Sudan are making progress.

The supposed lack of strategic vision for African engagements by the EU also came under criticism. Several speakers deplored that – at least in public perception – the EU's approach to African conflicts consisted of little more than offering humanitarian assistance and insisting on compliance with human rights standards. Others retorted that the EU had in fact recently formulated a strategy calling for a close partnership between the EU and Africa in the areas of security and development. They admitted, however, that both its implementation and its communication to the public were inadequate. One reason for the lack of progress was – as in other EU foreign policy fields – bureaucratic turf fights and a lack of coordination between the European Commission and the Council of the European Union.

A second challenge consisted of the fact that parliaments and voters in most EU member states were reluctant to spend financial resources and risk the lives of their soldiers in crisis management operations in areas where no immediate national interests are at stake. Nevertheless, a number of experts argued that the growing number and scale of present and recently completed EU missions (EUPOL RD Congo, EUSEC DR Congo, EU Support for AMIS II, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUFOR RD Congo, Operation Artemis) demonstrated the EU's commitment to increasing its efforts in African peacekeeping.

### **4. Other International Actors: The Roles of France, the US, China and India**

Of all EU member states, France has the greatest interests in the sub-region which are backed by considerable military forces. In Chad, the 1.100 troops of *Opération Dorca* provide logistics and intelligence assistance to the Chadian army and to humanitarian organizations aiding refugees

from Darfur and Chadian IDPs. *Opération Boali* in the CAR consists of 230 troops that support and train the *Multinational Force (FOMUC)* deployed by the *Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)*. France also maintains a permanent presence of around 800 soldiers in Djibouti. According to an agreement with the AU, this contingent stands ready to assist with the training and deployment of any additional African units intended for AMISOM in Somalia. French participants of the conference made clear, however, that France is not prepared to undertake any more bilateral engagements in the sub-region and will only act in the framework of the EU and in close cooperation with the AU.

Like France, the US has a local military presence: the *Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa* containing 2,000 personnel in Djibouti, deployed in the context of *Operation Enduring Freedom*. Several experts voiced grave concerns about the recent actions of this task force in the sub-region aimed at destroying Islamic terrorist networks. The US not only gave its tacit approval to the Ethiopian-led overthrow the UIC. The US also intervened directly in the campaign with air strikes targeted at the UIC military leadership.

While supporting strong action against terrorist networks, these participants cautioned against viewing the UIC and similar Islamist movements exclusively through the lens of the “war on terror” as Washington seems to do. To ordinary Somalis, UIC rule meant a period of greater stability than at any point since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991: weapons were collected, markets functioned, and the port and airport of Mogadishu were re-opened. Several participants warned that a purely military approach to the very complex social realities of “terrorism” and “Islamic fundamentalism” can quickly become counterproductive, particularly if military interventions lead to civilian casualties or cause a nationalist backlash against foreign “aggressors”.

India’s and China’s actions in the sub-region are dominated by the strategic goal of safeguarding the supply of natural resources, particularly of oil, for their expanding economies. This interest necessitates friendly relationships with governments in the region in order to place contracts for raw materials, gain oil concessions, and protect the drilling sites. As a result, both countries have been reluctant to put pressure on Khartoum and other regimes in the region. Some participants held that, nevertheless, their influence should lead both countries to recognize their long-term interest in the stability of the region and to act accordingly when it came to applying pressure on Khartoum and other regimes. The recent attack by members of the *Ogaden National Liberation Front* on a Chinese-operated oil field in eastern Ethiopia that killed scores of Chinese workers and damaged the installation serves as a drastic reminder, how increasing instability may hurt them.

These participants therefore urged China and India to use their position as major trading partners and investors to move governments – particularly Khartoum – towards seeking political

solutions to the conflicts in the sub-region. Participants from India, however, were unanimous in pointing out that such a demand was a luxury which India, in contrast to Europe or the US, could not afford in view of the needs of its developing economy.

## Annex

### List of Abbreviations

AENF	Alliance of Eritrean National Forces
AMIS	AU Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia
CAR	Central African Republic
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EUFOR RD Congo	European Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
EUPOL Kinshasa	EU Police Mission in Kinshasa
EUSEC DR Congo	EU Security Sector Reform Mission
FARDC	Congolese Armed Forces
FOMUC	Multinational Force
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JIU <sub>s</sub>	Joint Integrated Units
MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NCP	National Congress Party
OAG <sub>s</sub>	Other Armed Groups
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSPS	South Sudan Police Service
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOSOM II	UN Operation in Somalia II
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force



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## A G E N D A

### **Asian, European and African Policies, Practices and Lessons Learned in Peace Operations in Africa**

#### **DR Congo, Sudan and the Darfur Conflict**

An Indian - European Dialogue in the  
Context of the German EU Presidency 2007

*Organized by the  
Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)  
and the  
United Service Institution of India – Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping  
(USI-CUNPK)*

*June 8-9, 2007  
Hotel Shangri-La, New Delhi*

**Friday, June 8**

**09:00 a.m. Welcome**

*Lt. General (Retd) Satish Nambiar, Director USI*  
*Dr. Winrich Kuehne, Director, ZIF*

Opening Statements:

*H.E. Bernd Muetzelburg, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany*  
*K.C. Singh, Additional Secretary (International Organisations), Ministry of External Affairs, India*

**09:45 Panel I: MONUC, EUFOR, the Indian Involvement and Other International Actors in the DR Congo – A Success Story of Local, Regional and International Cooperation**

Guiding issues:

- Basic problems of planning, doctrine, rules of engagement (RoEs), capabilities
- Working within the UN structure and with UN headquarters in New York and the EU structure and the headquarters in Brussels
- Basic issues of division of labour and cooperation between the major international actors (UN, EU, AU and others)
- Cooperation between the military, police and civilians
- Cooperation with local actors and local NGOs and managing “spoilers”

Chair:

*Dr. Winrich Kuehne, Director ZIF*

Speaker:

*Lt. General Viereck, Commander Bundeswehr Operations Command, Germany*  
*Brigadier Jag Verma, former Dept. Commander of MONUC Brigade*

Discussant:

*Brigadier Gen. Modey (Ghana), MONUC Commander Kinshasa Brigade*  
*Stefan Mair, Research Director, German Institute for International and Security*

*Studies (SWP)*

10:45

*Tea Break*

Discussion

**11:45 Panel II: Peacebuilding in the DR Congo after the Elections with Special Emphasis on DDR and SSR (Security Sector Reform)**

Chair:

*Lt Gen VK Jetley (Retd) Former FC UNAMSIL*

Speaker:

*Daniela Krosiak, Africa Research Director, International Crisis Group*

*Maj. General Bikram Singh, Addl Director General Perspective Planning,  
Indian Army*

Discussant:

*Thierry Baud, Police Unit, European Union Council  
Christian Houdet, Brig. General, Defence Staff, France*

01:00 p.m. Lunch Break

**02.00 Panel III: Implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)  
– How Well Have UNMIS, the EU and Other Actors Performed?**

Guiding issues:

- Basic problems of planning, doctrine, rules of engagement (RoEs), capabilities
- Basic issues of division of labour and cooperation between the major international actors
- Cooperation between the military, police and civilians
- Cooperation with local actors and local NGOs and managing “spoilers”

Chair:

*Kwesi Aning, Director of Research, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping  
Training Centre (KAIPTC) Ghana*

Speaker:

*Peter Schumann, Reg. Representative & Coordinator UNMIS (former Chief of  
Staff, UNMIS)  
Col. PJS Pannu, former Chief Operations Officer of UNMIS*

Discussant:

*Kai Vittrup, Police Commissioner, UNMIS  
RR Bhatnagar, IPS, IG ITBP*

Discussion

03:15 Tea Break

Discussion continued

**04:00 Panel IV: Containing Violence in Darfur - Lessons Learned from  
AMIS, the EU Support Mission to AMIS, UNMIS and Other International  
Actors**

Guiding issues:

- Basic problems of planning, doctrine, rules of engagement (RoEs), capabilities
- Cooperation between the military, police and civilians
- Basic issues of division of labour and cooperation between the major international actors
- Cooperation with local actors and local NGOs and managing “spoilers”

Chair:

*Peter Schumann, Reg. Representative & Coordinator UNMIS (former Chief of Staff, UNMIS)*

Speaker:

*Hedi Annabi, Assistant Secretary General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN*

*Yogesh Saksena, Brig. General (Rtd)*

Discussant:

*Abiodun Bashua, Chief, Political Affairs Section, UNMIS  
Udo Moeller, Chief Police Advisor, AU Commission*

Discussion

05:30 Conclusion

07:30 Reception and dinner invitation by Ambassador Mützelburg at his Residence

**Saturday, June 9**

**09:00 a.m. Panel V. Sudan, Chad, CAR and the Horn of Africa – Escalating Regional Violence and Destabilization?**

Chair:

*Lt. General (Retd) Satish Nambiar, Director USI*

Speaker:

*Lt. Gen. Rajender Singh, former FC UNMEE*

*Winrich Kuehne, Director ZIF*

Discussant:

*Kwesi Aning, Director CMPRD, Kofi Annan Int. Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana*

*Brid. General Christian Houdet, Senior Advisor, Chief of Defence Staff, France*

Discussion

10:30 Tea Break

**11:00 Panel VI: How can Africa and the International Community Improve their Capabilities and Cooperation to Contain Violence and Conflict in Sudan (Darfur), Chad, CAR and the Horn of Africa?**

Chair:

*Dr. Winrich Kuehne, ZIF*

Speaker:

*Hedi Annabi, Assistant Secretary General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN*

*Maj. Gen. RPS Malhan, Head of Peacekeeping, Indian Army HQ*

Discussant:

*Lt. General Viereck, Commander Bundeswehr Operations Command, Germany*

*Jean-Christophe Belliard, Police Unit, Task Force "Africa" Council of the EU*

**01:00 p.m. Concluding Remarks**

*Major General V Bhatnagar, Head of Indian Peacekeeping Forces*

*Dr. Winnich Kuehne, Director, ZIF*

01:30      *Lunch*

02:00 p.m.      *Afternoon free for Sightseeing in Delhi*

08:00 p.m.      *Farewell Dinner by United Service Institution of India–CUNPK-Akash Officer Mess*