Mali
Mali | AfrikaZIF kompakt
MINUSMA 2023: In Zukunft größer, gleich groß (aber anders)
oder klein (und politisch)? | 05/2023
EUTM 2022: Erzwungener Umzug von Bamako nach Niamey | 05/2022
MINUSMA 2022: Zwischen Söldnern und Sanktionen, Putschisten und Extremisten | 05/2022
ZIF kompakt spezial | Mali - Aktuelle Entwicklungen | 03/2022
MINUSMA 2021: Transition, Reform, Terror und Corona | 04/2021
EUTM Mali 2021: Erweiterter Einsatz in der Krisenregion | 04/2021
ZIF kompakt spezial | Diese Woche im Sicherheitsrat: MINUSMA | 06/2019
MINUSMA 2019: Stillstand im Norden, Krise in der Mitte von Mali | 05/2019
EUTM Mali 2019: Erfolgreich im Rahmen des Mandats | 05/2019
MINUSMA 2018: Wahlen, Friedensprozess und Terroranschläge | 04/2018
MINUSMA: Die UN-Mission in Mali im Wahljahr 2018 | 11/2017
EUSTAMS Mali - Ein Novum im EU-Krisenmanagement | 09/2017
MINUSMA in Mali: Europäisches Engagement bei der UN für Frieden im Sahel | 06/2015
EU-Missionen in Afrika: EUCAP Sahel Niger und EUCAP Sahel Mali | 05/2014
Aktuelle Einsätze
EUCAP Sahel Mali
EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EU)
Mandatiert seit: 04/14
Zum Einsatz
MISAHEL
African Union Mission to Mali und the Sahel (AU)
Mandatiert seit: 08/13
Zum Einsatz
News
In a sign that the Sahel mission could become a domestic political football, some opposition politicians have already begun to question the wisdom of staying the course.
More than 20 civilians were killed by an unidentified helicopter gunship in Mali this weekend, on top of mounting French army casualties, according to reports.
In looking into the P/CVE [prevent and counter violent extremism] policies and projects that are deployed in Algeria, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger and Tunisia, this policy brief examines how the EU’s endeavour to prevent and counter violent extremism is substantiated in practice – both on a case-by-case basis and across cases. It offers policy recommendations, focusing on how to develop a more context-sensitive and evidence-based approach to P/CVE.
Levels of armed violence in the Sahel are skyrocketing. Conflict metrics show that the region is caught in a spiral of insecurity.1 Communal violence and jihadist insurgencies have significantly undermined local states’ grip over large parts of their territories, particularly in the three-border area straddling Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Amidst the proliferation of non-state armed groups, attacks by terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State networks have risen sharply since 2015.
In France, meanwhile, President Macron is under pressure to scale back the Barkhane mission.
Britain is deploying 300 troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali to help strengthen security and human rights there, its defense ministry said Thursday. The British troops will provide the UN mission with “a highly specialized reconnaissance capability, conducting patrols to gather intelligence and engage with the local population,” the ministry said.
Attacks in distant towns appear to be a rare attempt at a coordinated assault on international forces operating in conflict-hit country.
[…] Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix noted that counterterrorism efforts in the region have “actually intensified”. “We welcome the increased coordination of security players on the ground…for a more visible presence of defence and security forces in the region as well as stepped-up pressure on terrorist groups”, he said in his virtual briefing on the Joint Force of the Group of Five (G5) Sahel nations, namely Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.
In Mali, violence in the areas to the south and east of Mopti is taking on an increasingly ethnic dimension. The transitional authorities should harmonise dialogue initiatives and strengthen state presence, while seeking to resolve substantial issues such as land disputes.